Land law

Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Agwata & 4 others [2026] KEELC 6591 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case 56 of 2019
Judgment date
15 October 2026
Judge(s)
CG Mbogo

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The court dismissed the 1st defendant’s notice of motion dated 4 February 2026 and the plaintiff’s two chamber summons dated 6 February 2026. It declined to disturb the taxing officer’s assessments of the two party-and-party bills of costs and made no order as to costs.

Supporting judgment passages

23. From the above, I find that the notice of motion dated 4th February 2026, and the two chamber summons both dated 6th February, 2026 lacking merit. They are all hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Paragraph 23 →
Issue 1Whether the taxing officer committed an error of principle in determining the instruction fees in the two bills.

Held. No. The taxing officer correctly treated the value of the subject matter as governed by what the judgment had determined, rather than treating valuation reports produced at trial as the operative basis. The court found that the taxing officer properly exercised discretion in assessing both bills and that the awards were neither manifestly high nor low.

Ratio. Where taxation occurs after judgment, the taxing officer must first examine the judgment and its dispositive orders to determine the value of the claim or counterclaim as adjudged. A valuation report is evidence of value but does not, merely because it was produced at trial, become the operative basis for taxation.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

i. Whether the taxing officer committed an error of principle in determining the instruction fees in the two bills.

Passage 62 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

21. The assessment of instruction fees involves an exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not interfere merely because another figure might appear more appropriate. The intervention must be founded upon an error of principle or an award so excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. Having read the impugned rulings, it is clear that the subject matter was not derived from the valuation report, except from the judgment. The court of appeal’s pronouncement in Peter Muthoka’s case (supra) is categorical that once judgment has been entered, recourse is ordinarily no longer had to the pleadings because the judgment determines the value of the claim as adjudged by the court. I find that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in assessing the party and party bills of costs. The sums awarded were neither manifestly high or low, and there is absolutely no reason to disturb her findings.

Paragraph 21 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

20. There is an important distinction between evidence of value and the legally appropriate source from which the value of the subject matter is to be determined for purposes of taxation. As correctly stated by the taxing officer, a valuation report may constitute evidence of the value of property. However, where taxation takes place after judgment, the taxing officer is required to first consider what the judgment determined concerning the claim or counterclaim and the value attaching to the subject matter as adjudged by the court. The fact that a valuation report was produced at trial does not, without more, make that report the operative basis for taxation. The taxing officer must examine the judgment and determine whether the value of the subject matter can be ascertained from the judgment or its dispositive orders.

Paragraph 20 →
Issue 2Whether this court should interfere with the exercise of discretion by the taxing officer.

Held. No. There was no error of principle and the instruction-fee awards were neither so high nor so low as to cause injustice. The differing award on the 2nd defendant’s bill did not itself establish inconsistent or erroneous exercise of discretion, since costs may differ according to the party’s instructions, claims or counterclaims, role, applicable remuneration provisions, and circumstances.

Ratio. A court does not interfere with a taxing officer’s discretionary assessment simply because another figure may seem preferable. Intervention requires an error of principle or an award so excessive or low that it causes injustice; differing awards in bills from the same suit do not alone establish such an error.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

ii. Whether this court should interfere with the exercise of discretion by the taxing officer.

Passage 63 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

21. The assessment of instruction fees involves an exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not interfere merely because another figure might appear more appropriate. The intervention must be founded upon an error of principle or an award so excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. Having read the impugned rulings, it is clear that the subject matter was not derived from the valuation report, except from the judgment. The court of appeal’s pronouncement in Peter Muthoka’s case (supra) is categorical that once judgment has been entered, recourse is ordinarily no longer had to the pleadings because the judgment determines the value of the claim as adjudged by the court. I find that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in assessing the party and party bills of costs. The sums awarded were neither manifestly high or low, and there is absolutely no reason to disturb her findings.

Paragraph 21 →

22. I note that the plaintiff has made mention of the ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025 concerning the 2nd defendant’s bill of costs, arguing that the taxing officer exercised her discretion inconsistently. Let me say that a taxing officer is not bound to award identical instruction fees in different bills merely because the bills arise from the same suit. The entitlement and quantum of costs may differ depending on the nature of the instructions, the claims or counterclaims pursued, the role played by the particular party, the applicable provisions of the Remuneration Order and the circumstances of the proceedings. I do not find the mere difference between the two awards sufficient, by itself, to constitute an error of principle.

Paragraph 22 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

21. The assessment of instruction fees involves an exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not interfere merely because another figure might appear more appropriate. The intervention must be founded upon an error of principle or an award so excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. Having read the impugned rulings, it is clear that the subject matter was not derived from the valuation report, except from the judgment. The court of appeal’s pronouncement in Peter Muthoka’s case (supra) is categorical that once judgment has been entered, recourse is ordinarily no longer had to the pleadings because the judgment determines the value of the claim as adjudged by the court. I find that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in assessing the party and party bills of costs. The sums awarded were neither manifestly high or low, and there is absolutely no reason to disturb her findings.

Paragraph 21 →

22. I note that the plaintiff has made mention of the ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025 concerning the 2nd defendant’s bill of costs, arguing that the taxing officer exercised her discretion inconsistently. Let me say that a taxing officer is not bound to award identical instruction fees in different bills merely because the bills arise from the same suit. The entitlement and quantum of costs may differ depending on the nature of the instructions, the claims or counterclaims pursued, the role played by the particular party, the applicable provisions of the Remuneration Order and the circumstances of the proceedings. I do not find the mere difference between the two awards sufficient, by itself, to constitute an error of principle.

Paragraph 22 →
Issue 3What orders should issue in respect of the three applications.

Held. All three applications lacked merit and were dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

Ratio. No separate legal rule is necessary for this finding. The orders consequentially followed the findings on the taxation references; no separate legal principle was stated for this relief issue.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

iii. What orders should issue in respect of the three applications.

Passage 64 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

23. From the above, I find that the notice of motion dated 4th February 2026, and the two chamber summons both dated 6th February, 2026 lacking merit. They are all hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Paragraph 23 →
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Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

There are three applications coming up for ruling in this matter. The first is the notice of motion dated 4th February, 2026 filed by the 1st defendant and it is expressed to be brought under Rule 11 (1) and (2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order seeking the following orders:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The issues for determination are as outlined below:-

Paragraph 16 →

Reasoning passage

The assessment of instruction fees involves an exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not interfere merely because another figure might appear more appropriate. The intervention must be founded upon an error of principle or an award so excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. Having read the impugned rulings, it is clear that the subject matter was not derived from the valuation report, except from the judgment. The…

Paragraph 21 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the taxing officer committed an error of principle in assessing instruction fees in the two party-and-party bills; whether the court should interfere with that exercise of discretion; and what orders should issue on the 1st defendant’s notice of…

Material facts

The 1st defendant’s bill dated 20 June 2025 sought Kshs.14,199,966 and was taxed at Kshs.2,003,720.33, including Kshs.1,300,000 instruction fees. The plaintiff challenged that award as excessive, while the 1st defendant said it was manifestly low. The…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC CASE NO. 56 OF 2019

ETHICS & ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION…………..................…PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

ZABLON MABEA AGWATA…..……………......................……………1ST DEFENDANT

WILSON GACHANJA…………………………......................………….2ND DEFENDANT

IKM PLACE LIMITED..………………………......................………….3RD DEFENDANT

ARROW CENTRE LIMITED……………….....................…..………..4TH DEFENDANT

INVESTMENT & MORTGAGE

BANK LIMITED……………….............…………………………………….5TH DEFENDANT

RULING

1. There are three applications coming up for ruling in this matter. The first is the notice of motion dated 4th February, 2026 filed by the 1st defendant and it is expressed to be brought under Rule 11 (1) and (2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order seeking the following orders:

1. Spent.

2. The honourable court be pleased to vacate and set aside in its entirety the ruling and reasoning of the honourable Tessy Marienga - deputy registrar, dated and delivered on 23rd January 2026, taxing the party and party bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 at Kenya Shillings Two Million, Three Thousand, Seven Hundred and Twenty Three (Kshs.2,003,720.33) and refer the matter for fresh taxation before a different taxing officer.

3. In the alternative, this honourable court do exercise its inherent jurisdiction and allow such fees in respect of item no. 1 and 2 of the bill of costs as it shall deem fit.

4. Costs of this application be provided for.

2. The application is premised on the grounds on its face, and it is further supported by the affidavit of the 1st defendant sworn on even date. The 1st defendant deposed that he filed the party and party bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 seeking taxation in the sum of Kshs.14,199,966/- and upon taxation, the instruction fees was reduced to Kshs.1,300,000/-. He deposed that in addition to the getting up fees, the resultant total taxed sum was Kshs.2,003,720.33/- which is manifestly low.

3. The 1st defendant deposed that the taxing officer failed to apply the correct principles in assessment of instruction fees and thus fell into error. The 1st defendant further deposed that considerably, the taxing officer failed to accord due consideration to the value of the subject matter which was readily ascertainable from the pleadings specifically the valuation report dated 1st November, 2017. He deposed that unless the court intervenes to reassess items no. 1 and 2, he will suffer grave prejudice and injustice.

4. In response thereto, the plaintiff filed the grounds of opposition dated 2nd April, 2026 challenging the instant application on the following grounds:-

1. The application is fatally defective, frivolous, vexatious, incompetent and an abuse of the court process.

2. The plaintiff/respondent relies on the grounds set out in its reference application dated 6th February, 2026.

3. The instruction fees awarded was excessive.

4. The taxing master committed errors of principle in awarding instruction fees in the manner she did in the following material respects:-

a. Awarding excessive instruction fees and getting up fees in the circumstances.

b. Failing to set basic instruction fees before venturing to increase.

c. Failing to appreciate that the source of the subject matter was the judgment and not pleadings or any other document.

d. Assessing instruction fees of the counterclaim based on the pleadings when there was a judgment at the time of taxation.

e. Erroneously deriving the subject matter of the counterclaim from the pleadings instead of deriving it from the judgment.

f. Failing to appreciate the dispositive orders of the judgment.

g. Failing to describe accurately the nature and responsibility of the counsel in the matter.

h. Failing to determine with a measure of accuracy the amount of time, research and skill entailed in the professional work of counsel.

i. Failing to take into account the applicant’s submissions in respect to instruction fees.

j. Awarding instruction fees without regard to the judgment delivered.

k. Failing to take into account the public interest in awarding instruction fees.

l. Awarding instruction without regard to taxation principles.

5. The taxing officer demonstrated inconsistent and injudicious exercise of discretion in awarding instruction fees that were different from instruction fees awarded in favour of the 2nd defendant vide a ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025.

6. Instruction fees are determined based on the stage on which the suit is and this suit having been determined, the instruction fees was to be determined from the judgment.

7. The valuation report could not form the basis of ascertaining the instruction fees as it was contested, the court made no finding on it in the judgment and it was part of the pleadings and could form the basis of the subject matter in the circumstances where the court had made judgment as was the case herein.

5. The second application is the chamber summons dated 6th February, 2026 filed by the plaintiff and it is expressed to be brought under Section (sic) 11(1)(2) and 5 of the Advocates Remuneration Order and Order 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking the following orders:-

1. That the decision/ruling of the taxing officer Honourable T.E Marienga Deputy Registrar delivered on 23rd January, 2026 in respect of the respondent’s bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 be set aside on item 1 and 2.

2. That this honourable court be pleased to set aside the ruling/decision of the taxation of the Deputy Registrar given on 23rd January, 2026 on the respondent’s bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025.

3. That this honourable court be pleased to remit the bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 before a different taxing officer in its entirety.

4. That in the alternative, this honourable court be pleased to remit the bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 with appropriate directions.

5. That the costs of the application be provided for.

6. The application is premised on the grounds on its face. It is further supported by the affidavit of James Kithinji, a registered valuer and an investigator in the office of the plaintiff sworn on even date. The plaintiff deposed that the respondents filed the party and party bill of costs dated 20th June 2025, and the same was taxed in the sum of Kshs.2,003720.33/-. Further, that the taxing officer awarded excessive instruction and getting up fees, and failed to set out the basic instruction fees. It was further deposed that the taxing officer failed to appreciate the source of the subject matter, which was the judgment, as well as the dispositive orders of the same. Further, that the taxing officer demonstrated inconsistent exercise of direction in awarding instruction fees that were different from the instruction fees awarded in favour of the 2nd defendant vide a ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025.

7. The third application is the chamber summons dated 6th February, 2026 filed by the plaintiff and it is expressed to be brought under Section 11 (sic) of the Advocates Remuneration Order and Order 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking the following orders:-

1. That the decision/ruling of the taxing officer Honourable T.E Marienga Deputy Registrar delivered on 23rd January, 2026 in respect of the respondent’s bill of costs dated 18th November, 2024 be set aside on item 1 and 2.

2. That this honourable court be pleased to set aside the ruling/decision of the taxation of the Deputy Registrar given on 23rd January, 2026 on the respondent’s bill of costs dated 18th November, 2024.

3. That this honourable court be pleased to remit the bill of costs dated 18th November, 2024 before a different taxing officer in its entirety.

4. That in the alternative, this honourable court be pleased to remit the bill of costs dated 18th November, 2024 with appropriate directions.

5. That the costs of the application be provided for.

8. The application is premised on the grounds on its face. It is further supported by the affidavit of James Kithinji, a registered valuer and an investigator in the office of the plaintiff sworn on even date. The plaintiff deposed that the respondents filed the party and party bill of costs dated 18th November 2024, and that the same was taxed in the sum of Kshs.5,475,363.55/-. The plaintiff further deposed that the taxing officer awarded excessive instruction and getting up fees, and failed to set out the basic instruction fees. Further, that she failed to appreciate the source of the subject matter, which was the judgment, as well as the dispositive orders of the same. It was deposed that the taxing officer demonstrated inconsistent exercise of direction in awarding instruction fees that were different from the instruction fees awarded in favour of the 2nd defendant vide a ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025.

9. The 5th defendant filed its replying affidavit sworn on 6th March, 2026 by Andrew Muchina, the senior manager legal department. The 5th defendant deposed that the plaintiff sought cancellation of the titles over the suit properties and eviction of the 3rd and 4th defendants despite the fact that the combined value of both properties was in excess of Kshs.1 billion. During the hearing, both the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant produced valuation reports over the property charged to the bank, and each party called a professional valuer who testified as to the valuation reports.

10. The 5th defendant deposed that the value of the land was ascertainable, and thus the taxing officer correctly exercised discretion in assessing the costs based on the plaintiff’s suit. Regarding the plaintiff’s suit, the 5th defendant deposed that the taxing officer adopted a reasonable and conservative approach and properly exercised discretion in awarding 1,300,000/- as instruction fees. Further, that and based on the counterclaim, the taxing officer correctly identified the subject value of the counterclaim and had no discretion to award a lower amount once the liquidated value was ascertained. The 5th respondent contended that comparing the award with the ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025 is misplaced, and unlike the 2nd defendant, the bank pursued a substantive counterclaim.

11. All the applications were canvassed through written submissions. The 1st defendant filed its written submissions dated 13th March, 2026. The plaintiff filed two written submissions dated 2nd April, 2026 while the 5th defendant filed written submissions dated 7th April, 2026. I have considered all the application, the replies thereof and the written submissions filed. It is worthy to note that all three applications challenge the exercise of discretion by the same taxing officer and raise substantially similar questions concerning instruction fees, the ascertainment of the value of the subject matter and the consequential getting-up fees. I will determine them together.

12. In summary, the 1st defendant contends that he filed the party to party bill of costs dated 20th June, 2025 seeking to tax costs in the sum of Kshs.14,199,966/- and that upon taxation, the instruction fees were reduced to Kshs.1,300,000/- and that together with getting-up fees and the other items, the bill was taxed at Kshs.2,003,720.33/-. He contends that the amount awarded as instruction fees was manifestly low and that the taxing officer failed to take into account the value of the subject matter, which, according to the 1st defendant, was readily ascertainable from the valuation report dated 1st November, 2017.

13. The plaintiff opposed that application and, while acknowledging that a reference may be made against the decision of the taxing officer, contended that the taxing officer actually awarded excessive instruction and getting-up fees. The plaintiff argues that the taxing officer failed to establish the basic instruction fee before enhancing the same and, more importantly, failed to appreciate that by the time the bill was taxed the suit had already been determined by a judgment.

14. It is the plaintiff’s case that the value of the subject matter ought to have been derived from the judgment and its dispositive orders, rather than from the pleadings or a contested valuation report. The plaintiff further contends that the taxing officer failed to give due consideration to the judgment, the nature of the work undertaken, the time and skill involved and the public interest implications of the taxation. The plaintiff also contended that the taxing officer exercised her discretion inconsistently by awarding instruction fees different from those awarded to the 2nd defendant in a ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025.

15. In respect to the third application, the plaintiff raises substantially the same complaints in relation to the bill of costs dated 18th November 2024, which was taxed at Kshs.5,475,363.55/-. In opposition thereto, the 5th defendant argued that the combined value of the two properties exceeded Kshs.1 billion. Further, that during the hearing, both the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant produced valuation reports concerning the property charged to the bank and called professional valuers who testified on those reports. It is the 5th defendant’s position that the value of the subject matter was ascertainable and that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in awarding Kshs.1,300,000/- as instruction fees. In relation to the counterclaim, the 5th defendant maintained that the taxing officer correctly identified the value of the subject matter and had no discretion to award less once the liquidated value had been ascertained.

16. The issues for determination are as outlined below:-

i. Whether the taxing officer committed an error of principle in determining the instruction fees in the two bills.

ii. Whether this court should interfere with the exercise of discretion by the taxing officer.

iii. What orders should issue in respect of the three applications.

17. The supreme court in Kenya Airports Authority Vs Otieno Ragot & Co. Advocates 2024 KESC 4(KLR) held as follows:-

“Equally, the court of appeal in considering the issue of how the value of a subject matter can be determined in Peter Muthoka & Another Vs Ochieng & 3 others Civil Appeal No. 328 of 2017 [2019] eKLR stated as follows: “It seems to us quite plain that the basis for determining the subject matter value for purposes of instructions fees is wholly dependent on the stage at which the fees are being taxed where it happens before judgment, it is the pleadings that form the basis for determining the subject value. Once judgment has been entered and for what seems to us to be obvious reason, recourse will not be to the pleadings since the judgment does determine conclusively the value of the subject matter as a claim, no matter how pleaded, gets its true valued as adjudged by the court.”

18. The plaintiff’s complaint is that the taxing officer failed to appreciate that the bills were being taxed after judgment and therefore proceeded on the wrong basis in determining the subject matter. Conversely, the 1st defendant argued that the valuation report dated 1st November, 2017 disclosed the value of the subject property and ought to have formed the basis for assessment of the instruction fees. Similarly, the 5th defendant argued that the value of the property was ascertainable because valuation reports were produced at trial and professional valuers testified on them.

19. I have read the impugned ruling and paragraph 9 reads in part as follows:-

“In considering the valuation provided by the 1st defendant, the court in its judgment did not address the valuation report in determining whether the plaintiff had made a case for being granted the reliefs sought as none of the reliefs were premised on that valuation report. From the plaintiff’s pleaded case, it is clear that the plaintiff was not seeking any reliefs on the basis of that valuation report. It is not enough that the valuation report formed part of the court record when he had not referred to it in his pleadings. There was no relief whatsoever based on the value of the suit property and none was granted. Lastly, there is no consensus on the valuation subject for taxation as such I find that the subject value is unascertainable.”

20. There is an important distinction between evidence of value and the legally appropriate source from which the value of the subject matter is to be determined for purposes of taxation. As correctly stated by the taxing officer, a valuation report may constitute evidence of the value of property. However, where taxation takes place after judgment, the taxing officer is required to first consider what the judgment determined concerning the claim or counterclaim and the value attaching to the subject matter as adjudged by the court. The fact that a valuation report was produced at trial does not, without more, make that report the operative basis for taxation. The taxing officer must examine the judgment and determine whether the value of the subject matter can be ascertained from the judgment or its dispositive orders.

21. The assessment of instruction fees involves an exercise of judicial discretion. The court does not interfere merely because another figure might appear more appropriate. The intervention must be founded upon an error of principle or an award so excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. Having read the impugned rulings, it is clear that the subject matter was not derived from the valuation report, except from the judgment. The court of appeal’s pronouncement in Peter Muthoka’s case (supra) is categorical that once judgment has been entered, recourse is ordinarily no longer had to the pleadings because the judgment determines the value of the claim as adjudged by the court. I find that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in assessing the party and party bills of costs. The sums awarded were neither manifestly high or low, and there is absolutely no reason to disturb her findings.

22. I note that the plaintiff has made mention of the ruling delivered on 8th December, 2025 concerning the 2nd defendant’s bill of costs, arguing that the taxing officer exercised her discretion inconsistently. Let me say that a taxing officer is not bound to award identical instruction fees in different bills merely because the bills arise from the same suit. The entitlement and quantum of costs may differ depending on the nature of the instructions, the claims or counterclaims pursued, the role played by the particular party, the applicable provisions of the Remuneration Order and the circumstances of the proceedings. I do not find the mere difference between the two awards sufficient, by itself, to constitute an error of principle.

23. From the above, I find that the notice of motion dated 4th February 2026, and the two chamber summons both dated 6th February, 2026 lacking merit. They are all hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED VIRTUALLY

THIS 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

HON. MBOGO C.G.

JUDGE

15/10/2026.

In the presence of:

Mr. Benson Agunga - Court assistant

Mr. Otieno holding brief for the 5th Defendant/1st Plaintiff in the Counter-claim

Mr. Mwachofi for the 1st Defendant

No appearance for the rest of the parties

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