Background
This application be certified urgent, prayer 2 hereof be granted ex parte, and service thereof be dispensed with in the first instance.
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The Court allowed the recusal application and Justice Hellen Wasilwa recused herself from hearing the claim forthwith. Costs were ordered to be in the cause.
57 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 81 →
Held. Allowed. The Court accepted that J. A. Guserwa’s firm was representing the Judge in another suit, noted that this relationship pre-dated allocation of this cause and that the Judge’s integrity or competence was not challenged, but nevertheless recused herself forthwith so that justice would both be done and be seen to be done. Costs were ordered in the cause.
Ratio. Even absent a challenge to the Judge’s integrity or competence, recusal was warranted to preserve the appearance that justice is done where the Claimants’ advocates act for the Judge in separate litigation.
Issue
55 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.
Court’s reasoning →
Held
57 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 81 →
Ratio
55 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.
Court’s reasoning →
57 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 81 →
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
This application be certified urgent, prayer 2 hereof be granted ex parte, and service thereof be dispensed with in the first instance.
Paragraph 1 →Whether Justice Hellen Wasilwa should recuse herself from the cause because the Claimants’ advocates’ firm also represented her in another suit, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias or conflict of interest; and what consequential orders, including…
The Respondent, National Construction Authority, learned that J. A. Guserwa, the firm acting for the Claimants, represented Justice Wasilwa in a defamation-related dispute and in Nairobi HCCC E141 of 2026. It contended that this advocate-client relationship…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E154 OF 2024
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
DOUGLAS ESROM OKEDI…………………………..…..1ST CLAIMANT
ALLAN MUNYUA THAIRU……………………………….2ND CLAIMANT
JOSEPHINE WAWIRA WANJIRA…………………..….3RD CLAIMANT
VS
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY……………RESPONDENT
RULING
1 The Respondent/Applicant, the National Construction Authority, filed a Notice of Motion dated 29th June 2026 under Section 3 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 45 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, Rules 20 and 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations and all other enabling provisions of the law. It seeks the following orders:
1. This application be certified urgent, prayer 2 hereof be granted ex parte, and service thereof be dispensed with in the first instance.
2. Pending the hearing and determination of this application, the hearing and determination of other interlocutory applications and the main suit be stayed.
3. The Honourable Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa do recuse herself from hearing and determining this suit or any proceedings related or arising therefrom.
4. The matter be placed before the Presiding Judge for directions and/or reallocation to any other Judge of the Court.
5. The costs of this application be provided for.
2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and on the supporting affidavit of Paul Kariuki, the Respondent's Manager, Human Resources, sworn on 24th June 2026 and his Further Affidavit sworn on 2nd July 2026.
Respondent/Applicant’s Case
3 The Applicant avers that in late April 2026, the Respondent learnt through social media that the same firm acts for the Judge in a defamation dispute between the Judge and a member of the Senior Counsel bar.
4 It states that the firm issued a demand letter dated 27th April 2026 to the Senior Counsel, indicating that it had been retained by the Judge, who is its client.
5 It further avers that in early May 2026, the Respondent learnt that the firm acts for the Judge as plaintiff in Nairobi HCCC E141 of 2026, Justice Hellen Wasilwa v Nelson Andayi Havi.
6 The Applicant states that on 25th May 2026, the Respondent's advocates made an oral application for recusal when the matter came up for mention. The Claimants' advocates opposed it, and the Court directed the Respondent to file a formal application.
7 The Applicant contends that there is an advocate–client relationship between the Honourable Judge and the Claimants' advocates, which invariably creates a conflict of interest.
8 The Applicant avers that he has been advised by counsel that Rules 20 and 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations require judges to avoid situations that create an appearance of conflict of interest, and to recuse themselves where there is bias concerning any of the parties.
9 On that basis, the Respondent says it is reasonably apprehensive that the Judge cannot deal with this suit with the absolute impartiality required for a fair hearing and the fair administration of justice under Articles 50(1) and 159 of the Constitution.
10 The Applicant avers that the recusal application must therefore be heard urgently and in priority to any other application and to the main hearing, so that it is not overtaken by events.
11 In its Further Affidavit, the Applicant avers that the replying affidavit, sworn by Judith A. Guserwa of the Claimants' advocates, confirms at paragraphs 2 and 5 that an advocate–client relationship exists between the firm and the Judge, so grounds (b) and (c) of the application are admitted.
12 It states that the test for impartiality includes the appearance of bias. Since an advocate invariably advises their client, he contends, it can at the very least reasonably be said that the Judge has taken advice from the Claimants' advocates, albeit on a separate matter.
13 The Applicant further relies on Rule 9 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, which requires judges to carry out their duties with impartiality, and contends that the relationship reasonably calls that impartiality into question.
14 The Applicant denies that it is scared of the outcome of the case; and avers that it filed the application out of confidence in the judicial system's ability to uphold the law, and that the application is not a personal attack on the Claimants' advocate.
15 It further denies that the suit is part-heard before the Honourable Judge; and avers that the main suit was last heard on 4th November 2025 before Justice Radido, before his appointment to the Court of Appeal. The matter was then listed before the Honourable Judge on 23rd March 2026, when she gave directions on disposal of a pending application filed by the Respondent, as shown in the certified typed proceedings annexed as PK-4.
16 The Applicant further avers that the main suit has not been heard by any judge since 4th November 2025. Additionally, there is a pending appeal, Nairobi COACA E466 of 2026, against the Judge's decision of 9th April 2026 declining leave to produce additional evidence in the main suit.
17 The Applicant avers that no hearing is scheduled for 23rd July 2026. The matter was last in court on 29th June 2026, when the Judge gave directions on the Respondent's application for stay of proceedings dated 6th May 2026, and that it was then fixed for mention on 23rd July 2026 to confirm compliance.
18 The Applicant asserts that the Respondent has no intention of scuttling or delaying the suit, and that the application was filed in good faith in pursuit of justice and fairness.
19 The Applicant maintains that, since no judge has heard the main suit since the previous judge's elevation, the Claimants will suffer no harm, loss or prejudice if the suit is allocated to another judge. The Respondent, on the other hand, will be greatly prejudiced if the orders are refused, because of the possibility of bias.
Claimants/Respondents’ Case
20 The Claimants/Respondents opposed the application through a Replying Affidavit dated 29th June 2026, sworn by their advocate, Judith A. Guserwa, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya.
21 The deponent avers that, as a qualified and seasoned practitioner, she is entitled to represent any client regardless of their rank or position in society, while observing professional conduct and ethics. To that extent, she states, her representation of Justice Hellen Wasilwa in any matter in which the Judge chooses to appoint her is no exception.
22 She contends that the application is mischievous and intended to paint her and her profession in bad light, as it casts aspersions on her capability to make decisions as required by professional standards.
23 It is the Claimants' case that the deponent has no control over the matters listed before any Court or Judge, as she does not guide the listing registry.
24 She avers that her relationship with the Judge, as regards any matter including the present one, is purely that of client and advocate.
25 It was further averred that the presumption of a reasonable apprehension of bias, conflict of interest and likelihood of partiality is malicious, and is premised on a mindset that is scared of the outcome of this case.
26 She further avers that the Judge has violated no constitutional right in hearing or determining this matter, and puts the Applicant to strict proof of its allegations.
27 The deponent states that the aspersions raised by the Applicant are personal and made with the intention of maligning her reputation before this Court, where she has served with a clean record for over 40 years.
28 She avers that the matter is part-heard before Justice Wasilwa, and that if the Applicant is apprehensive about her prosecution of the matter, she has assistants who can take it to its conclusion.
29 The deponent avers that the application was strategically made in the face of the hearing scheduled for 23rd July 2026, without any basis and with malice, in order to scuttle that hearing.
30 The deponent therefore denies all the negative accusations made against her as a professional worthy of representing any client of her choice. She prays that the application be dismissed with costs, to pave the way for the hearing of this part-heard matter to its conclusion.
Respondent/Applicant's Submissions
31 The Respondent/Applicant submitted that the application is founded on the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations. Rules 4 and 9 require the impartiality of judges and the independence of the Judiciary to secure the fair administration of justice. It relied in particular on Rule 20(1), which provides that:
"a judge shall use the best efforts to avoid being in situations where personal interests conflict or appear to conflict with the judge's official duties," and on Rule 21(g), under which a judge may recuse himself or herself "in any proceedings in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned where the judge is precluded from hearing the matter on account of any other sufficient reason."
32 It was submitted that the Replying Affidavit, sworn by Judith A. Guserwa of the Claimants' advocates, confirms at paragraphs 2 and 5 that an advocate–client relationship exists between the firm and the Honourable Judge, so that grounds (b) and (c) of the application are admitted from the outset. The Respondent pointed out that the response to the application comes from the advocate, not the Claimants themselves.
33 On the test for recusal, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, a judge should readily recuse herself. It argued that where a reasonable basis exists, the application must be made, however unpleasant, as the lesser of two evils, since the alternative is to risk violating the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court under Articles 50(1) and 159 of the Constitution.
34 In support, it relied on Republic of South Africa v The South African Rugby Football Union & others, Case CCT16/98, where the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that:
"a litigant and her or his counsel who find it necessary to apply for the recusal of a judicial officer has an unenviable task and the propriety of their motives should not lightly be questioned," and that the judge whose recusal is sought "should not be unduly sensitive and ought not to regard an application for his [or her] recusal as a personal affront."
35 The Respondent/Applicant argued that the advocate–client relationship creates a reasonable basis for apprehending bias. Since an advocate invariably advises their client, it can at the very least reasonably be said that the Judge has taken advice from the Claimants' advocates, albeit on a separate matter, and this creates an objective apprehension of bias, whether conscious or not.
36 Reliance was placed on Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2013] KESC 20 (KLR), where the Supreme Court held that "any error in failing to recuse deprives the affected litigant of a fundamental constitutional right to have the case heard by a neutral person."
37 It also relied on Rishad Hamid Ahmed & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission [2016] KEHC 5680 (KLR), where the Court held that:
"it is the duty of a judicial officer to ensure that the litigants have faith in the court," and that "even if the Judge will not be biased, such remote feeling by the litigant should be avoided by having the matter heard by a different judicial officer."
38 The Respondent/Applicant denied that the application is a personal attack on the Claimants' advocate, or that the suit is part-heard before the Judge. It submitted that the main suit was last heard on 4th November 2025 before Justice Radido, prior to his appointment to the Court of Appeal, and that the Judge has since only given directions on pending applications.
39 It further submitted that an appeal is pending in Nairobi COACA E466 of 2026 against the Judge's decision of 9th April 2026 declining leave to produce additional evidence. It contended that since the main suit has not substantively progressed before the Judge, the Claimants will suffer no prejudice if the application is allowed.
40 In its rejoinder, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that all the authorities cited by the Claimants are distinguishable, because none involved a relationship between the judge and a party or its representatives.
41 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submissions that in Universities’ Academic Staff Union Egerton University Chapter Branch v Egerton University & 5 others [2026] KEELRC 1379 (KLR), recusal was sought because the judge had decided a similar matter between the same parties adversely to the Union. It noted, however, that the Court there rightly held that:
"a cautious, conscious, and reasonable court of law… shall and should never wait to be moved to recuse itself from a matter," and that a judge who does not appreciate when to leave a matter to another judge "is oblivious of the import of his oath of office and the attendant professional ethics."
42 It submitted that in Masila v Athi Water Works Development Agency & another [2025] KEELRC 3268 (KLR), the application was based on the judge's decisions in the matter, whereas here the Claimants and the Judge effectively share the same advocate.
43 The Respondent/Applicant distinguished David & 303 others v Governor, County Government of Kilifi & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 1066 (KLR), where the judge declined to recuse herself after confirming that she did not know any of the parties and had no interest in the outcome. It also distinguished Republic v Egerton University & 2 others; Kibue & 2 others (Ex parte Applicants); University Academic Staff Union (Interested Party) [2023] KEELRC 1707 (KLR), both because the judge had no relationship with the parties and because the Court applied the wrong test by requiring proof of actual bias, whereas the courts have consistently held that a reasonable apprehension of bias suffices.
44 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that the application is well founded in view of the advocate–client relationship between the Honourable Judge and the Claimants' advocates, and that recusal is necessary to ensure complete impartiality and remove any apprehension of bias, without prejudice to the Claimants.
Claimants/Respondents’ Submissions
45 It is the Claimants' submission that theirs is a personal interest claim, and that they are ready and willing to prosecute it on a date to be fixed by the Court after pre-trial directions, save for the present application seeking the Judge's recusal.
46 The Claimants argued that their counsel cannot and should not be barred from representing any client, whether within the Judiciary or elsewhere, as her ability to distinguish between legal and personal matters is not in doubt. The same, they submitted, applies to Justice Hellen Wasilwa, who understands her parameters in law in handling any matter listed before her.
47 It is the Claimants’ submissions that any allegation against a judge must be proved as required by law before the judge can be profiled and sidelined, and urged the Court not to fall into the error of allowing parties or their advocates to profile and demean a judge on the strength of malicious allegations made on social media or in the public space.
48 It was submitted that the test for recusal is whether the circumstances cited would give rise to a reasonable apprehension, in the mind of a fair-minded and informed member of the public, that the judge did not apply her mind impartially to the matter before her.
49 The Claimants relied on Republic v Egerton University & 2 others; Kibue & 2 others (Ex parte Applicants); University Academic Staff Union (Interested Party) [2023] KEELRC 1707 (KLR), where the Court dismissed a recusal application founded on alleged bias against the respondents, holding that it would determine the matter on its merits based on the evidence and the law and nothing more.
50 They relied on Masila v Athi Water Works Development Agency & another [2025] KEELRC 3268 (KLR), where the Court declined to recuse itself because no actual or perceived bias was established, describing the application as an afterthought and a delaying tactic intended to keep the parties in court indefinitely.
51 They further relied on David & 303 others v Governor, County Government of Kilifi & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 1066 (KLR), where a recusal application was dismissed as unfounded, unreasonable and incapable of forming a justifiable basis for recusal.
52 It is the Claimants’ submission that the Court has displayed no sign of bias in favour of their counsel merely because she is acting for the Judge in another forum.
53 They submitted that the advocate–client relationship arose when this suit was already processed and awaiting hearing, and that it should therefore be concluded, with any party dissatisfied with the outcome free to appeal to the Court of Appeal. They contended that the Court is in effect being asked to sideline matters prosecuted by their counsel, so as to delay their hearing and punish her for listings made by the Registry in its administrative role, which are beyond her control.
54 They further submitted that a party alleging bias and favoritism cannot rely on mere allegations against a judge without evidence, and that the Court should guard the Claimants' right to be represented by an advocate of their choice. In this regard, they relied on Republic v Egerton University & 2 others; Kibue & 2 others (Ex parte Applicants); University Academic Staff Union (Interested Party) [2023] KEELRC 1707 (KLR)where the Court declined to recuse itself because the application was premised on "speculations, innuendos and paranoia" unsupported by any evidence.
55 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.
56 I have noted that my integrity or competence is not in question in handling this matter. This is so given my oath of service to dispense justice to my utmost knowledge and ability without fear, favour, bias, affection, ill will prejudice and any political, religious or other influence.
57 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 28th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE