REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E006 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
AGATHA NYARUAI NDERITU ………………………………………………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
XAVERIAN BROTHERS (K) TRUSTEES REGISTERED …………………… RESPONDENT
(Being an appeal from the Judgment of Hon. A. N. Makau, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 8th November 2024 at Ngong in Ngong C.M.E.L. Cause No. E010 of 2022: Agatha Nyaruai Nderitu v Xaverian Brothers (K) Trustees Registered)
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 10th January, 2025, filed with the leave of this court. It arises from a judgment delivered on 8th November, 2024 in Ngong C.M.E.L. Cause No. E010 of 2022. Here, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claim for unfair termination with costs.
The Appellant was employed by the Respondent as an accountant from January 2010. She was summarily dismissed with effect from 2nd September, 2019. By a Memorandum of Claim dated 30th August, 2022 and filed on 5th September, 2022 she sought a declaration that the termination was unfair and unlawful, one month’s salary in lieu of notice of Kshs. 35,470.00 severance pay of Kshs. 177,350.00 compensation of Kshs. 425,640.00 being twelve months’ salary, a certificate of service, costs and interest.
The appeal was filed out of time. By a Ruling delivered on 25th June, 2025 this court overruled the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection dated 12th February, 2025 enlarged time, and granted the Appellant leave to file her Memorandum of Appeal and a Record of Appeal. Costs of that application were awarded to the Appellant. The objections on counsel’s practising certificate, territorial jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the record were disposed of in that Ruling. These are closed and this court does not wish revisit them.
The Memorandum of Appeal comes out as follows;
1. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact by finding that the Claimant admitted to taking 50% of the money that was allegedly stolen yet the Claimant expressly stated that he never took any of the money alleged to have been stolen leading up to her unfair dismissal from employment.
2. THAT the learned Magistrate therefore erred in law and fact by failing to consider that the Respondent had failed to establish that the Appellant’s ground for dismissal from employment was not proved and therefore that it was substantively unfair and illegal.
3. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to find that the Respondent’s decision to terminate the Appellant’s employment pending investigations into the grounds for her termination was procedurally unsound, illegal and unfair.
4. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to find that it was procedurally illegal and unfair for the Respondent to terminate the Appellant’s employment without issuing her a Notice to Show Cause why her employment should not be terminated.
5. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by not taking into consideration the Respondent’s failure to inform the Appellant of her right to have a witness of her choice in a disciplinary hearing before making the decision to terminate her from employment.
6. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in failing to consider that the Appellant expressly stated that she was never invited into a disciplinary Hearing before her dismissal from employment; and further failing to consider the Claimant’s position that the minutes filed in court from a meeting supposedly held on 26th August 2019 was a fabrication by the Respondent intended to defeat the ends of justice.
7. THAT the learned Magistrate erred in fact by finding that the Respondent denied all allegations levelled against it and failing to consider that the Respondent actually admitted to failing to pay the Appellant one month’s salary in lieu of notice.
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
a) The Appeal herein be allowed.
b) The Judgment in favour of the Respondent in Ngong C.M.E.L E010 of 2022 Agatha Nyaruai Nderitu Versus Xaverian Brothers (K) Trustees Registered be set aside.
c) The prayers sought in the Memorandum of Claim dated 30th August 2022 in Ngong C.M.E.L E010 of 2022 Agatha Nyaruai Nderitu Versus Xaverian Brothers (K) Trustees Registered be allowed as prayed
d) The Appellant be awarded the costs of the Appeal and costs of the trial Court.
At trial, the Appellant testified and called no other witness. She said she was handed a dismissal letter on the morning of 2nd September, 2019 and that she was never invited to a disciplinary meeting or heard, or at all.
Her account of the money was this. The accounts office was shared, others held keys, and thefts were common. The then director, Brother Raphael Wanjala, used his online banking credentials to move church money into her personal account and told her to withdraw it in cash and hand it to him. She said she did not take the money lost in 2019 and does not know who did. She was prosecuted and acquitted.
The Respondent called one witness, Benard Albert Wandera Jumah, its superior in the congregation. He did not attend the meeting of 26th August, 2019 and was then in Lodwar. He took over the office in September, 2022 and gave his evidence from the files he found.
The Respondent in a Response dated 29th January, 2024 admitted the employment, the salary of Kshs. 35,470.00 and the termination on 2nd September, 2019. It pleaded that she was dismissed in order to pave way for investigation by the police. Again, all terminal dues were paid save payment in lieu of notice, and that a certificate of service would be issued.
The trial court found that the Appellant admitted 50% liability for the lost money, that she could not explain the loss at the meeting of 26th August, 2019 and that she was heard. It held the reasons valid and the procedure fair, and held that no notice pay was due. It therefore dismissed the claim with costs.
It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the trial court misread the evidence. She posits the 50% admission concerned an old loss of Kshs. 13,000.00 and not the Kshs. 566,000.00 on which the dismissal rested and was based and founded. She says the Respondent’s witness had no knowledge of the meeting, that no notice to show cause was produced, and that the minutes show no decision.
She relies on section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 and on the authority of Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) and states that section 44 does not displace section 41. She asks that the dismissal be declared unfair, that she be awarded notice pay, compensation under section 49 and a certificate of service, and that the costs order of the trial court be set aside.
The Respondent’s case and submission is that the Appellant admitted liability for 50% of the misappropriated funds and undertook to reimburse them. It says she was heard at a meeting on 26th August 2019, that a notice to show cause is not a precondition to dismissal for gross misconduct, and that it was entitled to dismiss her without notice pay. The Respondent prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs, that the judgment of the trial court be upheld and that it be awarded the costs of the appeal and of the trial court.
After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;
1. Whether the Respondent proved a valid and fair reason for the summary dismissal.
2. Whether the summary dismissal was carried out in accordance with a fair procedure.
3. What reliefs, if any, the Appellant is entitled to, and who should bear the costs.
This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify. It will not lightly disturb findings of fact unless they are based on no evidence or on a misapprehension of the evidence, as in Machuka & another v Nyangute & another [2025] KECA 538 (KLR), applying Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123.
The 1st issue for determination is whether the Respondent proved a valid and fair reason for the summary dismissal. On this, the law is clear and not in dispute. Section 43(1) of the Employment Act, 2007 requires the employer to prove the reason for termination, failing which the termination is deemed unfair. Section 43(2) defines the reason as the matter the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time. Section 45(2) requires that the reason be valid and fair.
Section 44(4)(c) and (g) lists, among matters that may amount to gross misconduct, careless and improper performance of work and reasonable and sufficient suspicion of a criminal offence against the employer’s property. These provisions do not relieve the employer of proving that the conduct occurred or that it genuinely and reasonably believed so. The dismissal letter dated 31st August, 2019 states the reasons. They are the loss of Kshs. 566,000.00 the loss of the safe key in the Appellant’s custody, her failure to inform the authorities of both losses, and, in the letter’s words, wilful insubordination and gross negligence of your primary duties in your capacity as an accountant. The letter does not charge her with theft or fraud. The trial court nonetheless found that she admitted 50% liability and agreed to pay 50% of the lost monies. Further, it is either she was involved or she was used to causing the money disappear and that at the meeting of 26th August, 2019 a resolution was made for her dismissal. Each of these findings is open to challenge on the record.
On the 50% admission, which is Ground 1, the Appellant’s evidence was about an incident in late 2011 or early 2012 when Kshs. 13,000.00 went missing and the then director proposed that they each bear half. She agreed because she needed her job. In re-examination she said she did not acknowledge the loss. That incident preceded the 2019 loss by some seven years. It is not an admission of the Kshs. 566,000.00. The Respondent in their Response posits that she undertook to reimburse half of the misappropriated funds. Nothing in the record shows any reimbursement of a 2019 loss. The trial court conflated two unrelated events. Ground 1 succeeds in substance, even though it is loosely worded.
On the resolution for dismissal, the minutes of 26th August, 2019 record none. Their last paragraph says the committee would discuss among themselves and communicate the next action to the Appellant. The dismissal letter followed five days later. The finding is not supported by the document on which the trial court relied. The statement that she was either involved or she was used to causing the money disappear is a conclusion reached without evidence. A first appellate court may set aside a finding that rests on a misreading of the evidence. The finding that the Appellant committed fraud or theft cannot stand.
The question then is what the Respondent proved of the reasons it actually stated. Its only witness had no knowledge of the events. He joined the office in September, 2022 was in Lodwar in 2019 and relied on files. He did not produce the audit report on which the figure of Kshs. 566,000.00 rests. The persons who attended the meeting were not called.
The Respondent produced bank statements and an extract of minutes. No witness took the court to any entry showing the Appellant taking or losing money. Some entries name the director himself, such as an M-Pesa transfer of Kshs. 70,000.00 on 22nd February, 2019 and a cash withdrawal of Kshs. 500,000.00 on 25th February, 2019 in the name of Raphael Wanyonyi. The minutes are an extract certified by Brother Raphael Wanjala, with the date left blank. On the Respondent’s own evidence he is still with the congregation. He was not called. I am not persuaded that the minutes are a fabrication, as Ground 6 alleges, because the dismissal letter records the same meeting and attendees. But a document whose author is not called, and whose date is blank, carries limited weight on what was said in the room.
The Appellant’s evidence does establish that money was stolen from the accounts office in July or August, 2019 and that she was the sole accountant with a key to the safe. It does not establish the sum lost, that her conduct caused the loss, or that she failed to report it. Her unrebutted evidence is that the safe key was kept on a tray in a shared office for the director and the treasurer to use. The Respondent’s case also undercuts any genuine belief in the stated reasons. Its Response and its witness statement say she was dismissed to pave way for investigation by the police and for an internal audit. An employer that dismisses in order to start an investigation has not concluded that misconduct occurred. Summary dismissal is not an investigative tool. Interdiction or suspension is such.
That is the substance of Ground 3. This court finds that the Respondent has not proved, as section 43(1) requires, the reasons it gave for dismissing the Appellant. The dismissal was substantively unfair within section 45(2)(a). Grounds 1, 2 and 3 therefore succeed.
On the 2nd issue for determination, the starting point is section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007. Before terminating for misconduct, or summarily dismissing under section 44, the employer must explain to the employee the reason for which it is considering termination, in a language she understands, in the presence of another employee of her choice and must hear and consider her representations.
The Court of Appeal in the authority of Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) held that section 41 sets the minimum standards of a fair procedure and that four elements must be discernible. These are an explanation of the grounds, the reason termination is being considered, the entitlement to be accompanied, and a hearing and consideration of the representations. Section 44 does not displace section 41. Section 41(2) applies in terms to summary dismissal under section 44(3) or (4). The trial court erred in treating the fact of a meeting as proof of compliance. A meeting at which an employee is questioned is not the same as a hearing that meets the four elements. The Respondent carried the burden of proving the process it says it followed.
The evidence of the Respondent’s witness poses salient issue on this. He said a notice to show cause was issued, that he found this from his predecessor, and that it was not filed. A document said to exist, and not produced, proves nothing. He also said the Appellant was invited to a meeting after her termination, and then that she was invited in August, 2019. He had no personal knowledge of either.
The Respondent’s documents are inconsistent on the date. Its Response pleads a meeting on Monday 29 August, 2019 which was a Thursday. The minutes and the dismissal letter give Monday 26th August, 2019. The invitation letter, whichever date it bore, was never produced.
The Respondent’s witness statement asserts that the Appellant was told she could bring a person of her choice and never showed up with one. That is hearsay from a witness who was not there. The minutes do not record that she was told of that entitlement or told in advance what the allegations were. This answers Ground 5. The minutes themselves show the process. The Superior raised the missing money and key at the start of the meeting. The Auditor was then asked to “run a quick audit”, and after an hour reported the figure of Kshs. 566,000.00. The Appellant had no prior notice of that figure and no chance to examine any record behind it. The meeting ended with no decision, and the dismissal letter followed. The letter also cites wilful insubordination and gross negligence as “discussed during the meeting. The minutes record no such discussion. They record nothing from which one could conclude that her representations were considered before the decision. The minutes are consistent with a meeting held to find facts, not to hear a charge.
There is a further difficulty with the decision maker. Brother Raphael Wanjala raised the allegation, chaired the meeting, certified the minutes and signed the dismissal letter. The Appellant’s unrebutted evidence is that it was he who moved money through her account and told her to hand him the cash. He was the complainant, the chair and the decision maker, and he was not called to answer her evidence.
The Respondent says a formal notice to show cause is not a precondition to dismissal for gross misconduct, which answers Ground 4. The Act does not use that term. But it does require notification of the reason before the hearing and a real opportunity to respond. The Respondent proved neither a document nor equivalent notice.
The Respondent also points to the right of appeal given in the dismissal letter. An appeal after the fact does not cure the failure to comply with section 41 before the decision. I find that the Respondent did not comply with section 41. The dismissal was procedurally unfair within section 45(2)(b). Grounds 4, 5 and 6 succeed to that extent.
On the 3rd issue for determination, I begin with notice pay, which is Ground 7. The Respondent’s Response admitted at paragraphs 5, 9 and 10 that payment in lieu of notice of Kshs. 35,470 was due and unpaid. The trial court nonetheless found that the Respondent had denied all allegations, and held no notice pay was due. That was an error on the pleadings. The reasoning on notice was also wrong on the facts. The trial court said the Respondent gave a three day notice. The Respondent’s submissions say it gave a 31 day notice. Neither is right. The letter is dated Saturday 31st August, 2019 and takes effect on Monday 2nd September, 2019. It is a summary dismissal. Ground 7 succeeds and I award Kshs. 35,470.00.
On compensation, section 49(1)(c) allows up to twelve months’ gross salary, and section 49(4) lists the factors to weigh. The Appellant served about nine years and eight months. She does not ask for reinstatement. She was prosecuted and the case ended without a conviction. These factors support a substantial award.
Against that, by her own evidence, the Appellant was the sole accountant and was party to an arrangement by which the director paid church money into her personal account and she withdrew it in cash for him, booking it as expenditure on his account. She calls this following instructions. It remains an irregular practice that exposed the Respondent’s funds, and it contributed to the circumstances.
The Respondent did not rely on that conduct as its reason, and I do not treat it as a valid reason for dismissal. Section 43(2) limits the reason to what the employer believed at the time. But section 49(4) permits this court to weigh the extent to which the employee contributed to the circumstances. I award three months’ gross salary as compensation, being 3 × Kshs. 35,470 = Kshs. 106,410.00.
On severance pay, no ground of appeal challenges the trial court’s finding, and it is correct. Section 40(1)(g) of the Employment Act, 2007 confines severance pay to termination by redundancy, and this was a summary dismissal. The dismissal of that prayer is upheld.
On the certificate of service, section 51(1) provides that an employer shall issue one upon termination. It does not depend on a request or on proof of refusal. The Respondent pleaded that it was willing to issue one. The trial court erred in refusing the prayer. I order it to be issued.
On costs, section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act gives this Court a discretion. The trial court awarded costs to the Respondent as a matter of course. That order, certified at Kshs. 77,500 in the decree issued on 17th December 2024, falls with the judgment. Success on appeal is mixed. Each party shall bear its own costs of the trial court and of this appeal.
I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;
(i) The Judgment of the Senior Principal Magistrate’s Court at Ngong delivered on 8th November, 2024 in Ngong C.M.E.L. Cause No. E010 of 2022 is set aside.
(ii) The decree and certificate of costs of Kshs. 77,500.00 issued on 17th December, 2024 are also hereby set aside save that the dismissal of the claim for severance pay is upheld.
(iii) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the summary dismissal of the Appellant by the Respondent, by letter dated 31st August, 2019 and effective 2nd September, 2019 was substantively and procedurally unfair.
(iv) The Respondent shall meet and pay the Appellant the sum of Kshs. 141,880.00 made up as follows:
(a) One month’s salary in lieu of notice………………………………......Kshs. 35,470.00
(b) Eight (8) month’s salary as compensation for unfair termination of employment ….8 × Kshs. 35,470……………………………………………………...………Kshs. 283,760.00
Total of award………………………………………………..……..Kshs. 319,230.00
(v) The Respondent shall issue the Appellant with a certificate of service in accordance with section 51 of the Employment Act, 2007 within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment of court.
(vi) The sum in order (iii) shall carry interest at court rates from the date of this Judgment until payment in full.
(vii) The costs of this appeal shall be borne by the Respondent.
Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Miss Kariuki instructed by GNK & Associates LLP for the Appellant.
2. Miss Kansiime Gedion instructed by The Kagoma Advocates for the Respondent.