REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E274 OF 2025
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LABOUR RIGHTS DIVISION
IN THE MATTER IN THE MATTER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF BILL OF RIGHTS AND OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND MORE SPECIFICALLY ARTICLES 19, 20, 27, 28, 3', 41, 47 AND 50.
-AND-
IN THE MATTER OF EMPLOYMENT ACT CAP 226 NO. 11 OF 2007 AND MORE SPECIFICALLY SECTIONS 5 (2), 12, 44, 45, 47 (3), 49, 50, 51, AND 87
-AND-
IN THE MATIER OF THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT ACT CAP 234 B NO. 20 OF 2011 AND MORE SPECIFICALLY SECTION 12
-AND-
IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACT, NO. 4 OF 2015
-BETWEEN-
MARY NEHEMA NDERITU………………………………..……………………………………………………………..PETITIONER
-VERSUS-
CREDIT INFO KENYA…………………………………………...……..………………………………………………..RESPONDENT
CORAM
Before Lady Justice Jemimah Keli
C/A Otieno
JUDGMENT
1. The Petitioner, upon receipt of a notice to show cause on disciplinary issues from the Respondent, resigned from employment, alleging unfair labour practice at the workplace and constructive dismissal. The Petitioner commenced this suit against the Respondent, the former employer, by a Petition dated 15th December 2025, seeking the following relief:-
a) A Declaration do issue that the Respondent’s gender-based discrimination against the Petitioner is unfair, unlawful and in contravention of the Petitioner's labour rights.
b) A Declaration do issue that the failure by the Respondent to provide a conducive working environment to the Petitioner is in contravention of the Petitioner's labour rights as per Article 41 of the Constitution.
c) A Declaration do issue that the action of the Respondent in failing to provide the Petitioner with a conducive working environment and discriminating against her based on her gender amounted to constructive dismissal of the Petitioner.
d) An award of damages do issue as against the Respondent for the constructive dismissal of the Petitioner.
e) An award of punitive damages do issue as against the Respondent for the pain and suffering by the Petitioner.
f) An award of compensation do issue for the violation of the Petitioner's constitutional rights by the Respondent.
g) Costs of the suit.
h) Such other or further orders as the court may deem necessary to enforce the Constitution do issue.
2. The Petition was filed with the Petitioner's Supporting Affidavit, sworn on 15th December 2025, and the annexures thereto.
3. In response to the said Petition, the Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by FIONA AMUSUDZU on 23rd February 2026 with annexures thereto.
4. To counter the Respondent’s response, the Petitioner filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 16th July 2026.
The Petitioner’s case in summary
5. The Petitioner’s case is that she was an employee of the Respondent in the position of Commercial Manager, having entered into an employment contract dated 7th December 2023 with the Respondent. Under the contract, she was to be paid a monthly salary of Kshs. 500,000/-, and her responsibilities included driving revenue, cultivating commercial relationships and strengthening the company's market position, which stood at 4% of the market share at the time of her employment. The Petitioner avers that she performed her duties by acquiring and retaining clients, including banks, SACCOs, telecommunications companies and microfinance institutions, and improved the Respondent's market share to 14% as at January 2025. She also proposed several strategic initiatives aimed at strengthening the company's data integrity, deepening commercial relationships and improving operational efficiency during the duration of her employment.
6. The Petitioner’s grievance against the Respondent is that she was subjected to unbearable and unreasonable working conditions, including: being removed from her team without prior notice; being subjected to an abrupt restructure of her role without consultation, with her direct reports reassigned to Mr. Nicholas Karanja and some to Michael Nyaga; being subjected to late and unreasonable performance targets; and being subjected to hostile treatment by members of the Respondent's Executive, such as public undermining of her work, exclusion from strategic meetings, deliberate professional isolation, refusal to address concerns about her working conditions, disregard for her work ideas, and, in some instances, being expressly edged out of conversations with the Petitioner’s clients. She contends that the poor treatment she received from the Respondent not only eroded her mental health but also made it impossible for her to contribute any meaningful work to the Respondent.
7. In response to her mistreatment, the Petitioner contends that she sent several emails to the Respondent's Executive team raising concerns and ideas to improve her work output and environment, but the Respondent never addressed them. Specifically, she states that she lodged formal concerns with the Respondent's Head of Sales, Charles De Winner, via email and by phone to Emma Redfern, the Respondent's Group Head of Human Resources, and in management meetings, but the Respondent's Chief Executive Officer, Steve Kamau, despite acknowledging her concerns, insisted that prior decisions would not be reversed. Instead of addressing her complaints and concerns, the Respondent issued her with a Notice of Disciplinary hearing on 8th July 2025, inviting her to attend on 11th July 2025, 3 days later. The Petitioner complains that the 3-day period was too short to prepare a suitable response to the allegations against her.
8. It is stated that one of the allegations raised against the Petitioner in the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing dated 7th July 2025 was “Gaps in sales performance relative to targets”. She protests against the Respondent’s inclusion of this charge in the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing, on the ground that she had been issued with the 2025 Annual Sales Target Confirmation & Commitment on 20th June 2025, barely 3 weeks before she was served with the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing. She states that the performance targets set out in the Commitment signed on 20th June 2025 were unilaterally imposed contrary to Section 10 (5) of the Employment Act, and that she was forced to sign the document in the middle of the year so the targets could be used retrospectively to terminate her employment. According to the Petitioner, the inclusion of this charge against her demonstrates that the entire disciplinary process was unjust, unfair and malicious, and that it was commenced with the intention of terminating the Petitioner’s employment rather than addressing a legitimate employment issue.
9. The Petitioner further complains that the Respondent acted in direct violation of Sections 4.14 and 4.14.2 of its own Policies and Procedures Manual, as well as Section 41 of the Employment Act of Kenya, which mandate a progressive disciplinary process that includes coaching, written warnings, and a formal Performance Improvement Plan (P.I.P) prior to being invited to a disciplinary hearing. She denies that she was ever served with written warnings, received coaching sessions, or was placed on Performance Improvement Plans prior to being served with the sudden invitation to a disciplinary hearing on 8th July 2025. She also states that the Respondent failed in its implied duty to provide the Petitioner with the necessary tools and a viable product to perform her duties, as evidenced by several emails exchanged on data quality.
10. The Petitioner explains that during her employment, the Respondent suffered from severe and documented data quality failures that caused its 2025 country-wide and global revenue targets to be missed; hence, it is unfair and legally untenable to hold her individually responsible for a performance shortfall caused by a systemic product and data failure.
11. Regarding her purported absenteeism, the Petitioner contends that the Respondent's biometric logs, which they relied on, are incomplete and a misleading metric, as her position was highly client-facing and required off-site management. She clarifies that her working hours and active performance were characterised by off-site client meetings, Microsoft Teams logs, CRM updates and remote system access, evidence which can only be provided by the Respondent, being the custodian thereof.
12. The Petitioner vehemently protests against the Respondent’s failure to accord her sufficient time to prepare a defence to the allegations leveled against her, and to provide her with the relevant documentation and evidence that they intended to rely on at the disciplinary hearing in order for her to prepare her defence, stating that this violated her constitutional rights to fair hearing and fair administrative action.
13. It is the Petitioner’s case that the constant frustration, discrimination, unprofessional and hostile treatment she was subjected to by the Respondent amounted to constructive dismissal. The Respondent's conduct was a fundamental breach of the employment contract and showed that it no longer intended to be bound by its essential terms. It forced her to resign from employment on 9th July 2025, by email to the Respondent's Human Resource Manager.
14. The Petitioner states that the Respondent’s discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution with its Head of Sales expressing a preference for male counterparts in Executive Roles in Kenya as opposed to female ones, breached the principles of natural justice specifically on fair hearing and fair administrative action in violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution, and contravened the Petitioner’s right to fair labour practices under Article 41 of the Constitution.
Respondent’s case in brief
15. The Respondent admits that the Petitioner was appointed as its Commercial Manager vide an offer letter dated 7th December 2023 with a commencement date of 8th January 2024, at a monthly salary of Kshs. 500,000/-. They agree that her role was primarily to drive revenue, cultivate commercial relationships, and strengthen the company's market position.
16. They state that during a regional strategy session held by the Respondent at the management level in September 2024, with subsequent reinforcement during a February 2025 in-country engagement, concerns regarding the Petitioner's integration and adherence to the sales cadence were raised. This culminated in an in-person meeting with the Petitioner on 25th April 2025 to communicate the concerns, followed by a formal email sent on 12th May 2025 documenting the key outcomes of the engagement and confirming that the Petitioner's performance would be assessed based on January to June 2025 targets. The Respondent also reaffirmed their mandatory 5-day-per-week in-office policy.
17. Despite the engagement with the Petitioner on her performance, it is averred that between January and June 2025, the Respondent noted several instances of non-compliance on the part of the Petitioner, namely: by May 2025, the Petitioner had booked only EUR 99,000 in revenue against a target of EUR 229,000, representing a 56% shortfall; biometric logs from the Respondent’s office at Standard Chartered building revealed that the Petitioner was only present for 59 days during the entire six-month period; the Petitioner missed at least seven critical sales meetings as well as the company's product launch event without apology or explanation; and as at 30th June 2025 the Petitioner had failed to update her performance goals in the company's BambooHR system, despite multiple reminders.
18. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner signed a Sales Commitment Letter acknowledging her 2025 targets on 20th June 2025. Shortly afterwards, due to the Petitioner’s non-compliance, the Respondent initiated formal disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner by issuing her with a Notice of Disciplinary Action dated 7th July 2025 on 8th July 2025, outlining the charges against her namely: insubordination, underperformance, and absence without leave. Instead of responding to the charges brought against her, the Petitioner submitted her voluntary resignation from employment on 9th July 2025, claiming "constructive dismissal". Nonetheless, the disciplinary hearing scheduled for 11th July 2025 which the Petitioner had been invited to vide the Notice of Disciplinary Action proceeded in the Petitioner’s absence. The Petitioner refused to attend the same on the premise that doing so would "lend legitimacy to a predetermined outcome".
19. It is stated by the Respondent that they accepted the Petitioner’s resignation, permitted her to complete her notice period and final clearance on 9th August 2025 and issued her with a formal Letter of Service on 9th August 2025 acknowledging her tenure.
20. The Respondent categorically denies the Petitioner’s claims that the Respondent created a hostile working environment, publicly undermined, professionally isolated, and subjected the Petitioner to gender-based discrimination, and removed her from her team They state that these claims are entirely unsubstantiated and raised only as a strategic response to legitimate disciplinary proceedings, and to support the false claim of constructive dismissal. To buttress this position, the Respondent points out that the Petitioner never lodged any formal complaint regarding her treatment or working conditions through the company's established internal channels, for the duration of her employment. It is averred that the Petitioner was expressly informed of the Company policy which explicitly directs employees to escalate any concerns regarding inappropriate behaviour or breaches of group policy to their line manager, the Country Head, or HR, but notably failed to utilize these resources. She only raised her complaints on 9th July 2025 after being served with the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing.
21. Further, the Respondent states that in direct contradiction to her claim of professional isolation, the Respondent on 12th May 2025 formally communicated to the Petitioner that her role remained intact and fully aligned with the broader team strategy. The Respondent takes the position that the Petitioner’s resignation and claim of constructive dismissal were designed to evade the disciplinary process initiated to address her documented 56% revenue shortfall and chronic absenteeism. On the issue of removal from her team, the Respondent states that its internal records confirm that her position remained stable and integrated within the commercial department until her voluntary resignation. In particular, the Petitioner’s profile on the BambooHR system still listed her official designation as Commercial Manager reporting directly to Nicholas Karanja (Head of Sales), as at 30th June 2025; sales reports from late June 2025 show the Petitioner was actively leading engagements with major clients such as ABSA, Eco-Bank, KCB, and Family Bank; and in a formal email dated 12th May 2025 management explicitly reiterated that the Petitioner was part of a "unified team" with clearly defined roles and accountabilities. On the purported restructuring of the Petitioner’s role without her consent, the Respondent states that no restructuring took place, highlighting that in the email dated 12th May 2025 management formally confirmed to the Petitioner in writing that there had been "no change or demotion" in her assigned responsibilities, the scope of her role was described as remaining "intact and fully aligned" to the broader team and market strategy, and it was noted that any transitional or structural alignment matters were thoroughly discussed, reviewed, and concluded during the April 2025 engagement.
22. On discrimination, the Respondent takes the view that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that she was treated differently from any other employees, or that her gender played any role in management's pursuit of performance and attendance standards. The Respondent clarifies that the 2025 annual targets, rather than forming part of a targeted campaign against the Petitioner, were part of a company-wide performance framework, with all team members receiving targets based on their portfolio size and seniority. Additionally, they contend that a comparative review of the performance of other female sales managers indicates that they were subject to the same tracking and performance metrics during the same period, hence the Petitioner was evaluated against the same objective criteria as her colleagues. The allegation that the Respondent’s Head of Sales expressed a preference for men in Executive roles is denied, with the Respondent pointing at statistics that show women make up a significant percentage of persons in Executive roles. The Respondent avers that the policies that the Petitioner describes as "unbearable" were mandatory for the entire team the requirement to be in the office five days a week and attend daily engagement meetings. The issue was raised when the Petitioner's attendance was noted as being significantly lower than her peers, regardless of gender. On the issue of imposition of late performance targets and procedural unfairness, the Respondent states that these were matters that would have been tested at the disciplinary hearing, but the Petitioner pre-empted and voluntarily abandoned the same.
23. The claim that the Respondent’s disciplinary process was "maliciously hell-bent" on removing the Petitioner is denied and deemed speculative. The Respondent contends that Clause 4.16.1 of the Respondent's Human Resource Manual sets out a number of potential outcomes to be determined by the disciplinary panel after hearing an employee’s defence, including: issuance of a verbal reprimand, written warnings, suspension without pay, or termination of employment. The Petitioner resigned prior to attending the disciplinary hearing and therefore frustrated the process before its conclusion.
24. The Respondent emphasizes that they provided the Petitioner with a summary of the specific charges brought against her including performance shortfalls and unauthorized absenteeism; they gave her adequate notice of the hearing slated for 11th July 2025, and provided her with a reasonable period within which to submit a preliminary response; they informed her of her right to be accompanied by a representative or colleague of her choice in the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing; and they invited her to submit a written response by 10th July 2025 to allow the panel to review her position in advance. The Petitioner specifically declined to submit a response and attend the disciplinary hearing. They therefore state that they complied with the lawful requirement for procedural fairness contained in the Employment Act 2007, and the principles of natural justice.
DETERMINATION
25. Following directions by the court that parties should file written submissions, both parties complied.
Issues for determination
26. In her submissions dated 21st July 2026, the Petitioner submitted on the Petition generally.
27. On their part, the Respondent identified the following issues for determination in their submissions dated 8th September 2026:
i. Whether the Petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment with the Respondent.
ii. Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on grounds of her gender, contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and Section 5(2) and (3) of the Employment Act.
iii. If the answers to any of the issues above is in the affirmative, what remedy is appropriate and what, if any, is the correct quantum of damages, including whether the Petitioner’s constitutional claims can yield relief beyond what the employment statutes provide.
28. The court on perusal of the pleadings, and the submissions by the parties, was of the considered opinion that the issues placed before the court for determination were as follows-
a. Whether the Petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment with the Respondent.
b. Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on grounds of her gender, contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and Section 5(2) and (3) of the Employment Act.
c. Whether the petitioner is entitled to relief sought.
The relevant law
29. Articles 19,20,27,28,31,41,47 and 50 of the Constitution.
30. section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.
31. The Employment Act, sections 5(2),12,44,45,50,51 and 87
32. The threshold for Constitutional Petitions as set out in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru-vs-Republic (1976)-
"We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed."
Whether the Petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment with the Respondent.
33. The petitioner alleged she was constructively dismissed. The court finds all authorities cited by the parties on constructive dismissal relevant. The petitioner relied on the Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition) definition of constructive dismissal –
"Constructive dismissal" A termination of employment brought about by the employer making the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to leave"
34. The petitioner further relied on decision by Lord Denning in the case of Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp (1978) QB 761 where he stated that –
"If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer's conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice 13 at all or alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of the notice."
35. Both parties relied on the landmark decision on constructive dismissal in Coca Cola East and Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that:-
"...what are the key element and test to determine if constructive dismissal has taken place? The factual circumstances giving rise to constructive dismissal are varied. The key element in the definition of constructive dismissal is that the employee must have been entitled or have the right to leave without notice because of the employer's conduct. Entitled to leave has two interpretations which gives rise to the test to be applied. The first interpretation is that the employee could leave when the employer's behavior towards him was so unreasonable that he could not be expected to stay - this is the unreasonable test. The second interpretation is that the employer's conduct is so grave that it constituted a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment - this is the contractual test. The contractual test is narrower than the reasonable test..."
36. The Court of Appeal, above, further proceeded to state the legal principles relevant to determining constructive dismissal to be as follows-
‘ а. What are the fundamental or essential terms of the contract of employment?
b. Is there a repudiatory breach of the fundamental terms of the contract through conduct of the employer?
c. The conduct of the employer must be a fundamental or significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract.
d. An objective test is to be applied in evaluating the employer's conduct.
e. There must be a causal link between the employer's conduct and the reason for employee terminating the contract i.e. causation must be proved.
f. An employee may leave with or without notice so long as the employer's conduct is the effective reason for termination.
g. The employee must not have accepted, waived, acquiesced or conducted himself to be estopped from asserting the repudiatory breach; the employee must within a reasonable time terminate the employment relationship pursuant to the breach.
h. The burden to prove repudiatory breach or constructive dismissal is on the employee.
i. Facts giving rise to repudiatory breach or constructive dismissal are varied."
37. I applied the foregoing jurisprudence in the determination of whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment by the respondent.
38. The Petitioner submits that, to successfully prosecute a case of constructive dismissal, one ought to demonstrate that the employer made a fundamental change to the contract of employment; that such change was unilateral; that the situation was so intolerable that the employee was unable to continue working; that the employee would have continued working had the employer not created the intolerable work environment; and that the employee resigned because she did not believe the employer would abandon the pattern of creating an unacceptable work environment.
39. The petitioner resigned from employment vide letter dated 9th July 2025 and filed the case alleging constructive dismissal. The resignation letter is at the crux of the claim for constructive dismissal. The letter was preceded by a disciplinary letter dated 7th July 2025. The content of the resignation letter was as follows-
‘I acknowledge receipt of the disciplinary letter dated 7th July 2025.
After careful consideration, I have chosen not to participate in the scheduled hearing on 11th July. The pattern of events, including but not limited to the removal of my team without prior notice, the abrupt restructuring of my role, and the imposition of performance targets without engagement, makes it evident that this process is no longer about fairness or performance improvement. It is about removal, and I will not lend legitimacy to a predetermined outcome.
More concerning is the sustained hostility I have endured from some members of the executive team- ranging from public undermining of my work, exclusion from key strategic meetings, to subtle but deliberate attempts to isolate me professionally. These actions have not only eroded the psychological safety essential for any productive working environment, but have also made it untenable for me to contribute meaningfully while preserving my dignity.
Throughout my tenure, I have made clear, strategic contributions to Creditinfo Kenya's commercial success, contributions that remain on record and continue to bear fruits. I led and closed the Stima Sacco deal, Kaleidofin Private Ltd, contributed to the FSD bureau data analysis, JICA SME 2024 report and progressed the KCB Scoring Engine RFP opportunity, am on course to sign up NBK Bank for credit referencing, and initiated key partnerships including IFC, DTB Bank, Family Bank (RFP), and EcoBank (scoring Solutions) to mention only a few. These engagements, once finalized, will continue to generate value for the business. I have done my part and made the difference I set out to achieve.
It is unfortunate that these efforts have not been met with recognition, but rather with marginalization and a process seemingly designed to discredit my professional standing. I believe in accountability and transparency, but I do not believe in participating in a process that has lost all objectivity.
Accordingly, I hereby tender my resignation from my position as Commercial Manager - Creditinfo Kenya, effective 29th July 2025. I intend to utilize my accrued leave days during this period and request confirmation of the appropriate transition and clearance steps.
I leave with my integrity intact, confident that my record, not internal corporate politics, will define my legacy.
Kind regards,
Mercy Nehema Nderitu’
40. The petitioner states that discrimination and the restructuring of her role amounted to repudiation of contract. The court notes that the word 'discrimination' does not appear in the resignation letter. It appears in the petition and in her affidavit, paragraph 8, where she states that the respondent’s team, by isolating her professionally, amounts to discrimination based on gender. To this, the respondent contended that the allegations of discrimination were not substantiated and that the issue was not raised under the employer’s internal policies. The respondent further, in the replying affidavit, stated that, contrary to claims of professional isolation, management formally communicated to the petitioner on 12th May 2025 (FA2) that her role scope remained intact and fully aligned with the broader team strategy. That she only raised the issue in the resignation letter in reaction to the disciplinary process.
41. The court perused the email dated 12th May 2025, addressed to the petitioner by Charles De Winnaar. The email referred to their meeting held on Friday 25th April and documented the outcome of the meeting. Among the issues in the email was clarification of her role and responsibilities. It was confirmed that there was no change or demotion in her assigned responsibilities, and the scope of her role remained intact and fully aligned with the broader team and market strategy (Respondent’s FA-2).
42. The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit dated 16th July 2026 to the response and in paragraph 8 stated –
‘8. THAT further on the issue of gender-based discrimination, during our meeting on 25.04.25, Mr. Charles de Winnar, the Respondent's Global Head of Sales Strategies and Operations, explicitly made his preference for male leadership in Executive Roles known by stating that the Kenyan market is a male-dominated market and that a male counterpart is highly preferred for Executive Roles. This, coupled with my subsequent professional exclusion and removal from my team, clearly shows there is gender-based discrimination at the Respondent's company.
9. THAT my discrimination at the Respondent's work place is not an isolated incident. For instance, there is a high historical turnover rate for Commercial/Sales Manager role at the Respondent's operation in Kenya indicating a structural toxic group leadership issue rather than individual failure on my part.
10. THAT the Respondent's assertion that I was never removed from my position is false and the same is contradicted by its own actions. The Respondent reassigned my direct work reports to Mr. Nicholas Karanja and some to Micahel Nyaga without any consultation, organizational justification or revised job description. This unilateral restructuring significantly reduced my operational scope and side-lined me from my key client portfolios yet the Respondent still maintained my revenue targets which were kept artificially high. The move to side-line me and practically replace me with Mr. Nicholas Karanja was propagated by Mr. Charles de Winnar, who as stated earlier, made his preference to having male counterparts as opposed to female ones in Executive Roles in Kenya explicitly clear.(Annexed herein and marked "MNN-SA3" are copies of my email correspondence with Mr. Charles de Winnar regarding my role changes with the Respondent)
11. THAT my demotion in scope, coupled with the refusal to provide basic operational support such as a viable market ready products, corporate fuel/lunch cards, marketing resources or automated on- boarding frame works (USSD) made my working conditions objectively intolerable leaving me with no option but to resign from employment.
12. THAT the Respondent in its Replying Affidavit is quick to state that my claim is unsubstantiated knowing very well that it is the sole custodian of all the evidence needed to prove the each and every allegation I have raised like its electronic system logs showing date, time and users, comparative biometric records and verification reports, organizational & restructuring records, historical market research records and electronic metadata but they have failed to provide the same to this Honourable Court in order to conceal their gender-based discrimination, manufacturing….’
43. In response, the petitioner did not deny the email of 12th May 2025, which documented the meeting with Charles on 25th April 2025. The court places greater weight on documentation than on oral evidence. In view of the documentary evidence indicating no variation of the contract, the court finds no violation of section 10(5) (being on variation of clause of contract) of the Employment Act to wit-
‘Where any matter stipulated in subsection (1) changes, the employer shall, in consultation with the employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the employee of the change in writing.’
44. The email of 12th May 2026 confirmed there was no demotion, and the role and responsibilities remained intact. If the petitioner was aggrieved, nothing would have been easier than to dispute the meeting documentation in writing. She did not, and thus affirmed the contents as related to the meeting of 25th April, including those relating to her contract terms. The Court of Appeal in Kimweli v Kimweli (2022)KECA1 394(KLR) on the onus of proof stated-
‘32.The onus can ordinarily only be discharged by adducing credible evidence to support the case of the party on whom the onus rests. Where the onus rests on the plaintiff, he can only succeed if he satisfies the court on a preponderance of probabilities that his version is true, accurate, and therefore acceptable, and the other version advanced by the defendant is therefore false or mistaken and falls to be rejected. In deciding whether that evidence is true or not, the court will weigh up and test the plaintiff’s allegations against the general probabilities.’’ The petitioner failed to prove her allegations against Charles as relates to the said meeting of 25th April 2025. Charles documented the meeting and shared it with the Petitioner. That evidence was not rebutted. It is accepted as a true record of the said meeting.”
45. In a case of constructive dismissal, what matters is that the employer’s conduct does not materially breach the contract. The petitioner worked and was paid in accordance with the contract. After a meeting, it was confirmed to her that her contract, role, status and responsibilities were not affected by the re-organisation. Re-organisation of business is a management prerogative and is permissible as long as it does not breach the employee’s contract. Indeed, re-organisation appears to the court to be a necessary strategy to improve productivity and profits. Profit is the main essence of a business. The court ought not to interfere with the employer's operations and business strategies unless there is an apparent unfair labour practice.
46. The court noted that whereas the allegations of discrimination relate to the meeting of 25th April 2025, the petitioner continued to execute her duties till resignation of 9th July 2025. Further, all the allegations concerned business strategies and changes aimed at improving business efficiency. On keen perusal of the affidavits of the petitioner is did not find any complaint related to wages and conduct which can amount to unfair labour practice. The petitioner was a senior employee with significant responsibilities for driving the business's performance. The disciplinary letter raised issues of performance. Since she did not take the opportunity to raise the issues she had with the re-organisation and its effect on her performance, the court cannot ascertain her claims of hostility or whether the employer was unfair. I upheld the decision relied on by the petitioner in the case of Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp (1978) QB 761 where Lord Denning stated that –
"If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer's conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice at all or alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of the notice."
47. On evaluation of the affidavits by the petitioner, I am not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that the allegations of frustrations at the shop floor or the re-organisation amount to a significant breach going to the root of the contract. In the opinion of the court, the resignation was not a breach of contract but a reaction and a strategic exit to evade the disciplinary action under the letter dated 7th July 2025. This position is fortified by the fact that the allegation of gender discrimination or variation of contract was not raised in the resignation letter. As relates to the disciplinary process, the petitioner stated in the resignation letter –
‘It is unfortunate that these efforts have not been met with recognition, but rather with marginalization and a process seemingly designed to discredit my professional standing. I believe in accountability and transparency, but I do not believe in participating in a process that has lost all objectivity.’’(emphasis given).
48. The disciplinary letter raised what appears to be serious issues of gross misconduct under section 44 of the Employment Act against the petitioner, including non-adherence to management and team instructions, absence from duty without prior communication, gaps in sales performance relative to targets, incomplete performance reporting and tracking, and breaches of internal policies and standards.
49. The court finds that the resignation letter was an evasion of accountability. The court cannot substitute for the employer; thus, only after the disciplinary process would the court have an outcome to assess whether it was fair or lacked objectivity. The issue of lack of sufficient notice cannot justify constructive dismissal. The sufficiency of notice is subjective. The notice was of 3 days. A notice can also be for a day. The employee is at liberty to ask for an extension of time, and there was no evidence that the petitioner requested an extension. In Obara v Technical University of Kenya [2026] KEELRC 2175 (KLR) the court handled a similar case of resignation on being confronted with a disciplinary process as follows-
’89. The claimant has averred that the interdiction was harsh and unfair and unlawful and was thus a termination of his employment. Despite the claimant indicating that the
interdiction was unlawful, he has not pointed out under what provisions of the law and the respondent's own internal processes it was against. Neither the claimant nor the respondents produced before this court any HR manual of the respondent that would be a reference document on whether or not the respondent followed its own processes or procedures.
90 An interdiction is indeed a disciplinary process and whether or not it is unfair or not would largely depend on the employment disciplinary processes put in place which
has not been exhibited before this court.
91 After the claimant was placed on interdiction, he chose to resign without any evidence on the law and procedure that would aid this court determine that the interdiction
was unfair. I find that I cannot fault the respondent for exercising their right to institute any disciplinary process on the face of any report of misconduct. The claimant chose to resign by himself and his contention that he was constructively dismissed on this account cannot stand.’ I uphold the decision to apply in the instant case.
50. The petitioner did not prove, on the balance of probabilities, the claim of constructive dismissal. Challenges in meeting employer expectations and the disciplinary process cannot be a basis for constructive dismissal (principles under Coca Cola East and Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] eKLR). The court has frowned upon the employee's conduct in resigning to evade the disciplinary process. In Chege v Timsales (2025)KECA 1660(KLR), the Court of Appeal held that a resignation aimed at evading a disciplinary process is unacceptable. In the upshot, the claim of constructive dismissal is held to lack merit.
Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on grounds of her gender, contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and Section 5(2) and (3) of the Employment Act.
51. The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit dated 16th July 2026 to the response and in paragraph 8 stated –
‘8. THAT further on the issue of gender-based discrimination, during our meeting on 25.04.25, Mr. Charles de Winnar, the Respondent's Global Head of Sales Strategies and Operations explicitly made his preference to male leadership in Executive Roles known by stating that the Kenyan market is a make dominated market and that a male counterpart is highly preferred for Executive Roles. This coupled with my subsequent professional exclusion and removal from my team clearly shows there is gender-based discrimination at the Respondent's company.’
52. Section of the Employment Act defines discrimination at employment and states-
‘5. Discrimination in employment
(1)It shall be the duty of the Cabinet Secretary, labour officers and the Employment and Labour Relations Court—
(a)to promote equality of opportunity in employment in order to eliminate discrimination in employment; and
(b)to promote and guarantee equality of opportunity for a person who, is a migrant worker or a member of the family of the migrant worker, lawfully within Kenya.
(2)An employer shall promote equal opportunity in employment and strive to eliminate discrimination in any employment policy or practice.
(3)No employer shall discriminate directly or indirectly, against an employee or prospective employee or harass an employee or prospective employee—
(a)on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, pregnancy, marital status or HIV status;
(b)in respect of recruitment, training, promotion, terms and conditions of employment, termination of employment or other matters arising out of the employment.
(4)It is not discrimination to—
(a)take affirmative action measurers consistent with the promotion of equality or the elimination of discrimination in the workplace;(b)distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job;
(c)employ a citizen in accordance with the National employment policy; or
(d)restrict access to limited categories of employment where it is necessary in the interest of state security.
(5)An employer shall pay his employees equal remuneration for work of equal value.
(6)An employer who contravenes the provision of the section commits an offence.
(7)In any proceedings where a contravention of this section is alleged, the employer shall bear the burden of proving that the discrimination did not take place as alleged, and that the discriminatory act omission is not based on any of the grounds specified in this section.’
53. Discrimination on account of sex is a constitutional violation. The Employment Act does not use the word ‘gender’ as basis of discrimination. Gender refers to the socially constructed characteristics of men and women. A transgender man can identify as a woman despite being male biologically. The court assumed the petitioner meant sex, that is, discrimination based on being a woman. Article 27 of the Constitution states-
‘27. Equality and freedom from discrimination
(1)Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.
(2)Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.
(3)Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres.
(4)The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.’
54. Discrimination can be direct or indirect. The Supreme Court pronounced itself on the subject in Gichuru v Package Insurance Brokers Ltd [2021] KESC 12 (KLR). In paragraph 5 the Supreme Court described discrimination as follows-
‘5. Discrimination was failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction could be found between those favoured and those not favoured. Not all cases of distinction amounted to discrimination. Discrimination could be said to have occurred where a person was treated differently from other persons who were in similar positions on the basis of one of the prohibited grounds like race, sex, disability or due to unfair practice and without any objective and reasonable justification.’
The Supreme Court further distinguished between direct and indirect discrimination as follows-
‘6. Direct discrimination involved treating someone less favourably because of their possession of an attribute such as race, sex, religion compared to someone without that attribute in the same circumstances. Indirect or subtle discrimination involved setting a condition or requirement which was a smaller proportion of those with the attribute were able to comply with, without a reasonable justification.
7. In considering claims of indirect discrimination, courts were:
a. to identify the relevant provision, criterion or purpose, which was applicable;
b. to determine the issue of disparate impacts, which entailed identifying a pool for the purpose of making a comparison of the relevant disadvantage;
c. to ascertain whether the provision, criterion or practice also disadvantaged the claimant personally; and
d. to consider whether the policy was objectively justified by a legitimate aim; and to consider (if the above requirements were satisfied) whether that was a proportionate means of achieving such a legitimate aim.
8. The salient features of indirect discrimination were that:
in none of the various definitions of indirect discrimination was there any express requirement for an explanation of the reasons why a particular provision, criterion or practice put one group at a disadvantage when compared with others.
e. The contrast between the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination expressly required a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination did not. Instead it required a causal link between the provision criterion or practice and the particular disadvantage suffered by the group and the individual.
f. The reasons why one group could find it harder to comply with the provision, criterion or practice than others were many and various.
g. There was no requirement that the provision, criterion or practice in question should put every member of the group sharing the particular protected characteristic at a disadvantage.
h. It was commonplace for the disparate impact, or particular disadvantage, to be established on the basis of statistical evidence.
i. It was always open to the respondent to show that the provision, criterion or practice was justified.’
55. The petitioner in that instant case alleged discrimination on prohibited ground of sex. The court did not find evidence that she was treated differently from her male colleagues. The re-organisation was not stated to have related to her team only. The court finds that the employee who is a leader of a team does not own the team and the employer retains management prerogative to organize workers in business interests. Challenges in employment will always arise at the shop floor. The employer is the owner of the shop floor and thus any challenges faced ought to be raised for redress by the employer under internal mechanism. The petitioner flooded the court with emails on work. There was no request for support by the petitioner on the teams and which was denied. The court finds that it has no basis to fault the employer in the circumstances.
56. Further, as indicated earlier in the judgment, the meeting of 25th April 2025 between the petitioner and Charles was documented vide email to the petitioner dated 12th May 2025(FA-2). It is at the said meeting that the claim of discrimination is grounded. The petitioner alleged Charles insinuated he preferred women at the senior level. The petitioner received the meeting documentation without raising any issue. Specifically, no issue of the allegation of gender discrimination is raised. The court holds that the allegations by the petitioner are held to be based on conjectures and unfounded assumptions. The petitioner had a contract, and the issues raised in the disciplinary letter of 7th July 2025 are serious and related to her conduct and performance. I find the allegation of discrimination for being a woman is only meant to justify her evasion of the disciplinary process. The petitioner did not lay before the court evidence of being treated differently from other female workers at her level. Indeed, in paragraph 27 of the replying affidavit, it was indicated that 2 ladies were under the same performance tracking. The petitioner did not challenge the assertion in her supplementary affidavit of the respondent. The allegations under paragraph 8 of her supplementary affidavit are refuted categorically by the said Charles in further affidavit dated 4th September 2025.
57. I find no evidence in the petition to support a claim for discrimination based on sex. The respondent, in the opinion of the court, met the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the petitioner was not discriminated against based on sex /gender as alleged.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought
58. The petitioner sought the following relief-
a. THAT, a Declaration do issue that the Respondent's gender based discrimination against the Petitioner is unfair, unlawful and in contravention of the Petitioner's labour rights;
b. THAT, a Declaration do issue that the failure by the Respondent to provide a conducive working environment to the Petitioner is in contravention of the Petitioner's labour rights as per Article 41 of the Constitution;
с. THAT, a Declaration do issue that the action of the Respondent in failing to provide the Petitioner with a conducive working environment and discriminating against her based on her gender amounted to constructive dismissal of the Petitioner;
d. THAT, an award of damages do issue as against the Respondent for the constructive dismissal of the Petitioner;
e. THAT, an award of punitive damages do issue as against the Respondent for the pain and suffering by the Petitioner;
e. THAT, an award of compensation do issue for the violation of the Petitioner's constitutional rights by the Respondent;
59. The court held that the petitioner did not prove, on a balance of probabilities, a claim of constructive dismissal or a claim of discrimination based on sex. The court established that the petitioner served notice of resignation and separated amicably from the employer. There is no claim for terminal dues. The claim for constructive dismissal and discrimination having failed, the entire petition is for dismissal.
60. The petition is dismissed with costs to the respondent.
61. It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT MACHAKOS THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
JEMIMAH KELI,
JUDGE.
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Court Assistant: Otieno
Petitioner- Simiyu h/b Kipkorir
Respondent–Opole h/b Musyoka