Land law

Simandi Investment Ltd v Macharia & another [2026] KEELC 7101 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case 1035 of 2016
Judgment date
28 October 2026
Judge(s)
C.K. Nzili

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 2 September 2026, which sought review, variation or setting aside of the direction that the suit begin de novo, continuation from the prior judge’s part-heard proceedings, and a stay. Costs were awarded to the respondents. The matter was fixed for mention to take a hearing date, with the fresh hearing to proceed urgently.

Supporting judgment passages

a. The plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 2.9.2026 is hereby dismissed with cost to the respondents.

Passage 133 →

b. This matter is fixed for mention to take a hearing date on….

Passage 134 →

115. In the present case, the court has determined the substantive application for review and found that the applicant has not established the grounds necessary to set aside the directions of 6.7.2026. The request for a stay, being consequential upon the application for review, cannot independently succeed in the absence of a sufficient legal basis for interfering with those directions. Because the court rejected to grant the orders for review, the request to temporarily stay of the orders issued must also fail.

Paragraph 115 →
Issue 1Whether the court should review, vary or set aside its 6 July 2026 direction that the suit commence de novo, and instead continue from the prior judge’s part-heard proceedings.

Held. No. The plaintiff did not establish an error apparent on the face of the record, other sufficient reason, or a denial of a fair hearing capable of justifying review under Order 45. The absence of a separate formal motion for the de novo request did not automatically invalidate a procedural direction made at a mention: the plaintiff’s counsel had opposed the proposal before the direction was issued. The complaints challenged the correctness of the court’s case-management discretion rather than showing a self-evident error. The court also declined to substitute continuation from PW1’s partial cross-examination for the de novo direction merely because the plaintiff preferred it. The earlier proceedings were not automatically erased or invalidated, but their legal use would depend on the applicable law and directions for the fresh hearing.

Ratio. Review is confined to the statutory grounds: new and important evidence unavailable despite due diligence, a self-evident error apparent on the face of the record, or other legally sufficient reason. It is not an appeal or a means of replacing a discretionary case-management choice with another preferred choice. Procedural directions may be made during a mention without a separate motion where the court acts within its authority and the affected parties have a meaningful opportunity to state their positions. A fair hearing requires that opportunity, not every procedural step such as written submissions.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

69. The court must focus on the actual substance of the applicant's complaints rather than how they are labeled. The question is not whether the applicant considers the decision undesirable, but whether the decision falls within the limited grounds upon which review may lawfully be granted.

Paragraph 69 →

70. The applicant's primary argument is that the order for the suit to start de novo was issued without a formal request, proper notice, or documented reasoning. It also challenges the manner in which the order was communicated and the status of the earlier proceedings.

Paragraph 70 →

91. The court further notes that its order expressly recognised the age of the suit and directed that the matter be given priority. That direction remains material. A hearing de novo must not become an excuse for further avoidable delay; equally, the need for expedition must not be pursued at the expense of a fair determination.

Paragraph 91 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

81. The court therefore finds that the applicant has not established an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Paragraph 81 →

100. The court accordingly finds that the applicant has not demonstrated a violation of Article 50 sufficient to justify review of the impugned directions.

Paragraph 100 →

110. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the directions of 6.7.2026 should be reviewed merely because the applicant prefers continuation from the stage reached before the previous Judge.

Paragraph 110 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

58. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21, provides for review by a court of its decree or order, subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law. Order 45 Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, permits a person aggrieved by a decree or order, from which an appeal is allowed but no appeal has been preferred, or from which no appeal is allowed, to seek review upon discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced when the decree or order was made; on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or for any other sufficient reason.

Paragraph 58 →

75. Failing to file a separate notice of motion does not automatically strip a court of its authority to issue procedural directions during a mention. When interpreted as a whole, the Civil Procedure Rules alongside the court's inherent power to manage its proceedings allow for such directions, provided that procedural fairness is maintained and the specific context of the case justifies the action.

Paragraph 75 →

98. The core issue is whether the applicant was given a fair chance to object to the proposed action, rather than whether the issue was presented in the precise procedural format preferred by the applicant.

Paragraph 98 →
Issue 2Whether the order requiring the suit to proceed de novo should be stayed pending determination of the review application.

Held. No. Having rejected the application for review and found no basis to interfere with the 6 July 2026 directions, the court held that the consequential request for a stay could not independently succeed. PW1’s age and ill health, expense, and delay were relevant to urgent case management but did not justify an indefinite stay or return to the precise prior stage sought.

Ratio. An interlocutory stay is consequential to and depends on a sufficient legal basis for interfering with the impugned directions. Once review fails on the merits, a stay of those directions cannot succeed independently on the same material.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

113. The applicant also seeks a stay of the order requiring the suit to proceed de novo pending determination of the application.

Paragraph 113 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

115. In the present case, the court has determined the substantive application for review and found that the applicant has not established the grounds necessary to set aside the directions of 6.7.2026. The request for a stay, being consequential upon the application for review, cannot independently succeed in the absence of a sufficient legal basis for interfering with those directions. Because the court rejected to grant the orders for review, the request to temporarily stay of the orders issued must also fail.

Paragraph 115 →

117. The appropriate response to the age of the suit is to ensure that the fresh hearing proceeds with urgency, that adjournments are avoided where reasonably possible and that the parties comply with the court’s directions. The court will not permit the application for review, having failed on its merits, to become an additional source of delay in the substantive proceedings.

Paragraph 117 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

114. The principal purpose of an interlocutory stay is to preserve the position of the parties where the applicable legal requirements have been met and where proceeding with the impugned step would cause prejudice that cannot adequately be addressed by the eventual determination of the dispute.

Paragraph 114 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

There is an irony in lamenting the prolonged pendency of a suit while inviting the court to undertake yet another round of litigation over a procedural direction intended to move that very suit towards determination. Expedition cannot be achieved if every unfavourable interlocutory decision becomes the starting point of a fresh contest.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the plaintiff met the statutory grounds for review, variation or setting aside of the 6 July 2026 direction that the partly heard suit commence de novo; whether the direction, made after an oral request during a mention, disclosed an error apparent,…

Material facts

Simandi Investment Ltd filed this 2016 land suit, which was partly heard by Justice Mohamed Kullow. PW1, Simion Nyamanga Ondiba, completed examination-in-chief and was partially cross-examined before that Judge recused himself. After reallocation, Justice…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

MILIMANI LAW COURTS

ELC CASE NO. 1035 OF 2016

SIMANDI INVESTMENT LTD………………………..PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

VERSUS

ROSELINE NJERI MACHARIA……………..1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION……….2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

RULING

1. There is an irony in lamenting the prolonged pendency of a suit while inviting the court to undertake yet another round of litigation over a procedural direction intended to move that very suit towards determination. Expedition cannot be achieved if every unfavourable interlocutory decision becomes the starting point of a fresh contest.

2. The plaintiff, by an application dated 2.9.2026, seeks orders that:

a. Spent

b. This Honourable Court be pleased to review, vary and/or set aside its ruling and order made on 6.7.2026 to the extent that it directed the hearing of ELC Case No. 1035 of 2016 to commence de novo (afresh).

c. Pending the hearing and determination of this application inter partes, the order made on 6.7.2026 directing the suit to be heard afresh on 11th and 12th September 2026 be stayed.

d. This Honourable court be pleased to direct that the suit do proceed from the stage it had reached before Hon. Justice Mohamed Kullow, that is, from the point of continuation of the cross-examination of PW1, and that the proceedings recorded and the exhibits already produced before Hon. Justice Kullow be retained and form part of the record of the suit.

e. The cost of this application be provided for.

3. The application is founded on the grounds set out on its face and the supporting affidavit sworn by Simion Nyamanga Ondiba on 2.9.2026.

4. The deponent avers that he has been duly authorised by the applicant, Simandi Investments Ltd, to execute and swear affidavits and other documents on its behalf in relation to this suit and any other court proceedings instituted by or against the company.

5. The deponent states that the suit was instituted in 2016 and has, during its pendency, proceeded partly to hearing before Hon. Justice Mohamed Kullow. During the hearing, PW1 testified in examination-in-chief and was thereafter partially cross-examined by counsel for the 1st defendant.

6. The deponent avers that he is PW1 in the suit by virtue of being a director and shareholder of the plaintiff, which he incorporated together with his wife, Mary Nyamanya, who is now elderly and ailing. He further states that he is seventy-three (73) years old and suffers from ill health, having endured considerable hardship as a result of the prolonged pendency of the suit without a final determination.

7. The deponent states that when the matter came up for further hearing, specifically for the continuation of PW1’s cross-examination, before Hon. Justice Mohamed Kullow on a date in June 2025, the learned Judge recused himself from further conduct of the matter. On 11.6.2026, the file was forwarded to Hon. Lady Justice Christine Ochieng for reallocation to another Judge, and an order was made for the proceedings to be typed.

8. The deponent avers that when the matter came up for mention before Hon. Lady Justice Christine Ochieng on 11.6.2026 for purposes of reallocation, Senior Counsel Ochieng Oduol, appearing for the 1st defendant, made an oral application or proposal that the suit be heard afresh.

9. The deponent contends that although Hon. Lady Justice Christine Ochieng entertained the oral application made by Senior Counsel Ochieng Oduol during a mention, counsel for the plaintiff vigorously opposed the proposal to commence the hearing afresh on the grounds that it was procedurally improper and prejudicial to the plaintiff and the proper administration of justice.

10. The deponent avers that he subsequently wrote to the Chief Justice, Hon. Martha Koome, to express his grievances and protest the prospect of the suit commencing afresh, as well as what he perceived to be bias, prejudice and unreasonable delays in the determination of the matter. A copy of the letter dated 29.6.2026 was annexed to the affidavit and marked SNO-1.

11. The deponent further states that Senior Counsel Ochieng Oduol, acting on behalf of the 1st Defendant, promptly responded to the complaint, cautioning against involving the Chief Justice in matters that were actively before the courts. He also maintained that he was justified in seeking an order for the suit to commence afresh on behalf of the 1st defendant, notwithstanding the alleged procedural impropriety. A copy of his letter dated 1.7.2026 is annexed and marked SNO-2.

12. The deponent avers that before PW1’s cross-examination could be concluded, Hon. Justice Kullow recused himself from further conduct of the suit. The file was subsequently placed before Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili (this court).

13. The deponent states that the matter came up for mention before this court on 6.7.2026 for directions regarding the further hearing of the suit. The matter had not been listed for the hearing of any interlocutory or substantive application. A copy of the Judiciary e-filing case activities printout in ELC No. 1035 of 2016, together with a certificate of electronic evidence, was annexed and marked SNO-3.

14. The deponent avers that, on the said date, Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili stated in open court that he had neither read the court file nor familiarised himself with the facts of the case and that he required time to peruse the record.

15. The deponent further states that, during the mention on 6.7.2026, counsel for the defendants made an oral application, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without filing any formal application, seeking an order that the suit commence de novo.

16. The deponent deposes that the plaintiff’s advocate opposed the oral application, arguing, inter alia, that commencing the proceedings afresh would occasion substantial prejudice to the plaintiff, further delay the determination of a suit that had been pending since 2016, and infringe the plaintiff’s right to a fair and expeditious hearing under Article 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

17. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s objection, the deponent avers that the learned Judge allowed the oral application and directed that the suit be heard afresh on 15 and 16 September 2026. The Judge allegedly did so without providing reasons for the decision and without clarifying whether the proceedings and exhibits already recorded before Hon. Justice Kullow would be retained or expunged from the court record.

18. The deponent contends that the impugned order has left the status of the previously recorded proceedings and exhibits uncertain. This, he argues, exposes the plaintiff to the risk of PW1 being recalled to testify afresh in its entirety, notwithstanding that he had already given evidence in examination-in-chief and undergone partial cross-examination.

19. The deponent states that, upon perusal of the court file, the plaintiff’s advocate established that, as at 6.7.2026, there was no Notice of Motion, Chamber Summons or other formal application filed by the defendants seeking an order for the suit to proceed de novo. Accordingly, the oral application and the order allegedly granted pursuant thereto had no corresponding formal application on the court record.

20. The deponent further avers that the plaintiff’s advocate, by a letter dated 7.6.2026 filed and served through the Judiciary e-filing portal, requested the Deputy Registrar of the Environment and Land Court at Milimani Law Courts to provide a certified copy of the ruling and order allegedly delivered or issued by Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili on 6.7.2026. However, no ruling or order had been supplied or uploaded to the e-filing portal by the time the affidavit was sworn.

21. The deponent relies on Order 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which generally provides for applications to be made by motion and heard in open court unless otherwise directed, together with Order 51 Rule 3, which requires notice of a motion to be given to the parties affected by it.

22. The deponent states that the plaintiff’s advocate further examined the handwritten proceedings and found that they contained neither reasons nor any identified legal or evidentiary basis for directing that the suit proceed afresh. He also avers that the learned Judge did not clarify whether the proceedings and exhibits recorded before Hon. Justice Kullow, including PW1’s evidence in examination-in-chief and partial cross-examination, would remain part of the record or be treated as expunged.

23. The deponent states that the plaintiff’s advocate was subsequently issued with a certified copy of the typed proceedings on 13.8.2026.

24. The deponent contends that the discrepancies and omissions identified in the notice of motion are apparent from a mere perusal of the court record and do not require elaborate reasoning or investigation. He therefore maintains that they constitute errors apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

25. The deponent further contends that the manner in which the impugned order was made, following an oral application presented and determined on the same day during a mention, without a formal application on notice and without an opportunity for the plaintiff to file grounds of opposition, a replying affidavit or written submissions, violated the plaintiff’s right to be heard under Article 50 of the Constitution. He argues that these circumstances independently constitute sufficient grounds for review under Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and, alternatively, justify setting aside the order under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2) of the Constitution.

26. The deponent maintains that where a Judge assumes conduct of a part-heard suit from a predecessor Judge, the evidence and exhibits already recorded remain part of the court record and may be relied upon. He contends that such evidence should only be expunged, or a retrial ordered, in exceptional circumstances supported by cogent reasons and after the parties have been heard, rather than as a matter of course pursuant to an oral application made during a mention.

27. The deponent avers that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it will occasion further and unnecessary delay in the determination of a suit that has been pending since 2016. He further contends that the plaintiff will suffer prejudice, additional expense and hardship if required to recall a witness who has already undergone substantial examination.

28. The deponent states that, despite the plaintiff’s advocate writing to the Deputy Registrar requesting an extracted order and a copy of the ruling allegedly delivered on 6.7.2026, neither document had been supplied or uploaded to the Judiciary e-filing portal. A copy of the advocate’s letter requesting the ruling and order was annexed and marked SNO-4.

29. The deponent avers that the plaintiff’s advocate only became aware of the impugned order upon being served with a demand letter dated 17.7.2026 from the advocates for the 1st Defendant. A copy of the demand letter was annexed and marked SNO-5A, while the purported order attached to it was marked SNO-5B.

30. The deponent alleges that the purported order dated 17.7.2026 does not accurately reflect the court proceedings, copies of which had since been released to the plaintiff’s advocate. He alleges that the order was manipulated in favour of the defendants and contends that it is consequently fundamentally defective.

31. The deponent further asserts that it is unprofessional and unethical for an advocate, allegedly acting in collusion with judicial officers, to manipulate a court order in favour of one party, whether in the present high-profile matter or any other suit. He maintains that litigants are entitled to expect impartial judicial officers and the fair administration of justice.

32. The deponent contends that unless this Honourable Court intervenes to review and set aside the impugned order, the plaintiff will suffer grave and irreparable prejudice arising from further delay and the risk of an unjustified retrial, which prejudice cannot adequately be remedied by an award of costs.

33. The deponent reiterates that he is both a director of the plaintiff and PW1 in the suit and is therefore best placed to appreciate the manner in which the plaintiff’s case has been conducted. He contends that requiring him to testify afresh and undergo another hearing is unjustified and raises concerns about the motives behind the application, particularly given that the defendants would have a further opportunity to cross-examine him. He further emphasises that the suit has been pending for nearly eleven years, during which period he has continuously sought justice.

34. The application is opposed by the 1st defendant through grounds of opposition dated 14.9.2026.

35. The 1st defendant contends that the application fails to satisfy the requirements for review under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21, and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. She argues that the applicant has demonstrated neither an error apparent on the face of the record, the discovery of new and important evidence, nor any other sufficient reason to warrant the review, variation or setting aside of the orders and directions issued by this court on 6.7.2026.

36. The 1st defendant asserts that the orders of 6.7.2026 were made after the court heard all the parties present, including counsel for the plaintiff, who opposed the proposal to commence the suit de novo and presented his objections. She therefore maintains that the plaintiff was accorded a fair hearing and that no violation of the rules of natural justice or Article 50 of the constitution occurred. The 1st defendant adds that the orders were delivered ex tempore after counsel for all parties had been given an opportunity to be heard, as reflected in the court record.

37. The 1st defendant further contends that the order of 6.7.2026 discloses no error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. She argues that, having come before the court for mention and directions, the matter afforded the learned Judge an opportunity to exercise the court’s case-management powers, including the authority to issue directions concerning the manner in which the hearing should proceed.

38. The 1st defendant maintains that the direction for the suit to commence de novo was a lawful exercise of judicial discretion under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution. She contends that the direction was intended to enable the trial Judge to appreciate the full extent of the dispute and that a discretionary decision made after hearing the parties cannot be reviewed merely because one party is dissatisfied with the outcome.

39. The 1st defendant argues that the proceedings before Hon. Justice Mohamed Kullow had reached only a preliminary stage because PW1 had completed examination-in-chief, but had not concluded cross-examination. She therefore contends that no substantive evidence had been fully taken and that directing the suit to commence de novo occasioned no real or appreciable prejudice to the plaintiff capable of justifying a review.

40. The 1st defendant further states that, following the recusal of Hon. Justice Kullow, the matter was referred to the Presiding Judge, Hon. Lady Justice Christine Ochieng, and subsequently re-allocated to Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili. She maintains that the latter properly assumed conduct of the suit and was entitled, during a mention for directions, to issue appropriate orders to facilitate the just, expeditious and proportionate resolution of the dispute.

41. The 1st defendant contends that the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the orders of 6.7.2026, initially exercised its right of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal dated the same day, which it subsequently purported to withdraw through a Notice of Withdrawal filed on 24.7.2026. She argues that, having elected to pursue and then abandoned the appellate process, the plaintiff cannot resort to review under Order 45 as an alternative appeal or a second opportunity to challenge the same decision. The application is consequently said to constitute an abuse of the court process.

42. The 1st defendant characterises the allegations that the orders of 6.7.2026 were fictitious or improperly procured, together with the allegations of impropriety against Hon. Justice C.K. Nzili and counsel for the 1st and 2nddefendants, as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and unsupported by evidence. She argues that the allegations contravene Order 19 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and ought to be struck out ex proprio motu.

43. The 1st defendant further contends that the allegation that no formal application for a hearing de novo existed on the court record is misleading. She maintains that the oral application and submissions made by counsel for all parties on 6.7.2026 form part of the proceedings and that a mention for directions is a proper forum for issuing such directions, without necessarily requiring a formal notice of motion.

44. The 1st defendant argues that the alteration of the hearing dates initially scheduled was an ordinary case-management decision within the court’s discretion. She maintains that any discrepancy between the cause list and the orders issued does not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record or a ground for review, since the court retains the authority to vary its directions concerning hearing dates.

45. The 1st defendant further asserts that the application was filed only after the plaintiff withdrew its Notice of Appeal and is calculated to interfere with, delay and frustrate the expeditious determination of a suit that has been pending since 2016. She contends that the application is contrary to the overriding objective under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution and amounts to an abuse of the court process.

46. The 1st defendant maintains that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any loss or prejudice that cannot adequately be compensated by an award of costs. It therefore argues that no sufficient basis has been established for staying the orders of 6.7.2026 or granting the consequential reliefs sought in the application.

47. Finally, the 1st defendant contends that granting the application would establish an undesirable precedent by permitting a dissatisfied litigant who has abandoned an appeal against a discretionary order to reopen the same issue through review. She argues that such a course would undermine the finality of judicial decisions and the proper administration of justice.

48. The 2nd defendant also opposed the application through grounds of opposition dated 14.9.2026.

49. The 2nd Defendant contends that the application is misconceived, improperly founded and constitutes an abuse of the court process.

50. The 2nd defendant further argues that the application does not satisfy the statutory and procedural requirements for review under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

51. The 2nd defendant maintains that the orders sought to be reviewed, varied or set aside were issued after the learned Judge afforded all parties an opportunity to express their respective positions on the appropriate manner of proceeding with the suit.

52. The 2nd defendant further asserts that the learned Judge exercised judicial discretion in directing that the matter commence de novo, having heard the parties on the issue.

53. Accordingly, the 2nd defendant contends that the Notice of Motion dated 2.9.2026, together with the supporting affidavit, is defective, irregular and an abuse of the court process and ought to be struck out for failure to comply with the applicable procedural requirements.

54. Upon perusal of its own record, the court notes that on 6.7.2026 it made the following observation: since the court was newly seized of the matter and PW1 had not been cross-examined by all the parties, it was in the interests of the parties and the court for the suit to commence de novo. The court acknowledged that the suit had been pending for hearing for over ten years and directed that it be given priority, taking into account the advanced age of the plaintiff.

55. The court further observed that, to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, all parties and their respective advocates should refrain from making disparaging remarks on social media or through other channels that might compromise the integrity of the proceedings. The court consequently scheduled the hearing for 15 and 16 September 2026.

56. The court directed the parties to file their respective written submissions on or before 21.9.2026. The 1st defendant filed submissions dated 22.10.2026. The 2nd defendant filed written submissions dated 26.10.2026, which the court notes were filed out of time. As at the date of writing of this ruling, none of the other parties have filed their written submissions within the stipulated timelines.

57. The court’s authority to review a decision is strictly defined by written law. This power is not an open-ended license for a court to re-examine a case simply because a losing party is unhappy with the verdict.

58. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21, provides for review by a court of its decree or order, subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by law. Order 45 Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, permits a person aggrieved by a decree or order, from which an appeal is allowed but no appeal has been preferred, or from which no appeal is allowed, to seek review upon discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced when the decree or order was made; on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or for any other sufficient reason.

59. The applicant is entirely responsible for proving that their case fits into at least one of the legally accepted categories for review. Simply using legal catchphrases like "error apparent," "procedural impropriety," or "sufficient reason" is not enough to satisfy this requirement.

60. Principles of review match standard academic legal theory regarding a judge's decision-making power and when a case is permanently settled.

61. According to Sir Jack Jacob’s seminal work on the court's inherent jurisdiction, a court must possess the power to regulate its own proceedings. This authority is essential for maintaining the effective administration of justice and preventing the misuse of procedural rules. While this inherent power serves to complement existing laws, it does not grant a court the authority to ignore explicit statutory requirements.

62. Similarly, H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, in Administrative Law, (11th ed, Oxford University Press, 2014)discuss the distinction between a lawful exercise of discretion and a decision challenged merely because a different outcome might have been preferred. Although their work addresses administrative law, the broader analytical distinction between the existence of discretion, the limits governing its exercise and the grounds for judicial intervention is instructive.

63. In National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Ndungu Njau [1997] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that review is not an appropriate remedy for correcting an erroneous finding of law or fact where establishing the alleged error requires detailed legal arguments. An incorrect interpretation of the law or an improper exercise of judicial discretion should ordinarily be challenged through an appeal rather than an application for review.

64. Similarly, in Muyodi v Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation & Another [2006] 1 EA 243, the Court of Appeal explained that an error apparent on the face of the record must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate process of reasoning to establish.

65. The distinction is important. A review only looks at whether there was a specific mistake in how the decision was made, or if new evidence was found. An appeal, on the other hand, asks if the final decision was right or wrong. A party cannot claim a judge made a legal error just because they disagree with their decision and call it "wrong."

66. Civil procedure must balance correcting real judicial mistakes with ensuring lawsuits reach a final, orderly conclusion. If courts allowed parties to reopen every discretionary decision just because it caused inconvenience or because an alternative option existed, pretrial arguments would take over. Consequently, these interlocutory applications would overshadow the main trial, undermining it as the primary focus of the court.

67. However, the court must not make the mistake of viewing a final decision as completely unchangeable. A decision that satisfies a statutory ground for review must be corrected where the law so requires. In the present application, the applicant faces both evidential and legal hurdles, as the arguments presented fail to prove the necessary grounds for the court to grant a review.

68. In Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Kogo [2001] 1 EA 173, the court discussed the nature of an error apparent on the face of the record and distinguished an obvious error from one which requires a process of reasoning or the resolution of a debatable legal question.

69. The court must focus on the actual substance of the applicant's complaints rather than how they are labeled. The question is not whether the applicant considers the decision undesirable, but whether the decision falls within the limited grounds upon which review may lawfully be granted.

70. The applicant's primary argument is that the order for the suit to start de novo was issued without a formal request, proper notice, or documented reasoning. It also challenges the manner in which the order was communicated and the status of the earlier proceedings.

71. The court has examined its record. The record reflects that, on 6.7.2026, the court observed that it was newly seized of the matter and that PW1 had not been fully cross-examined by all the parties. The court considered it to be in the interests of the parties and the court that the suit commence de novo. It also acknowledged the prolonged pendency of the suit and directed that the matter be given priority, taking into account the advanced age of the plaintiff.

72. The court must distinguish between an error in recording or communicating a court order and dissatisfaction with the substance of the order itself. Any inconsistency between the cause list, handwritten proceedings, typed proceedings, and extracted order may, depending on its nature, warrant administrative clarification or correction. However, such a discrepancy does not, by itself, render the substantive judicial decision amenable to review under Order 45of Civil Procedure Rules.

73. The applicant has not demonstrated, by reference to a specific and indisputable contradiction in the record, that the court’s decision to direct a hearing de novo was founded upon a self-evident error. The principal complaint is that the Court ought to have exercised its discretion differently and ought to have retained the earlier proceedings.

74. The complaint questions whether the decision was appropriate, how competing factors were weighed, and how a partially heard matter should be managed .These are matters requiring judicial evaluation. They do not, without more, constitute an error apparent on the face of the record.

75. Failing to file a separate notice of motion does not automatically strip a court of its authority to issue procedural directions during a mention. When interpreted as a whole, the Civil Procedure Rules alongside the court's inherent power to manage its proceedings allow for such directions, provided that procedural fairness is maintained and the specific context of the case justifies the action.

76. The Applicant relies on Order 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Order 51 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Rules, contending that the oral request ought not to have been entertained. Those provisions must be considered in context. Formal applications and notice are essential whenever a party requests substantive relief that impacts another person's rights.. However, not every procedural direction made during the mention of a pending suit must necessarily originate in a separate notice of motion.

77. The critical determination rests on whether the court exceeded its lawful authority and whether the parties received an adequate opportunity to argue the matter.. The 1st defendant maintains that the parties were heard and that the applicant’s counsel opposed the proposal to commence the suit afresh. The applicant’s own statements confirm this sequence of events, admitting that their advocate objected to the proposal prior to the issuance of the contested orders.

78. The court is not persuaded that simply lacking a formal written application automatically proves an obvious error occurred that requires the directions to be reviewed.

79. Further, the applicant’s contention that the court failed to give adequate reasons does not, in the circumstances of this application, automatically satisfy Order 45 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Rules.

80. Whether the reasons were sufficient, whether the court correctly assessed the evidence already recorded and whether a hearing de novo was the preferable course are questions going to the correctness of the exercise of discretion. They cannot be resolved merely by invoking the doctrine of error apparent.

81. The court therefore finds that the applicant has not established an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

82. The phrase "any other sufficient reason" must be interpreted strictly within the legal boundaries of a judicial review. It does not give a party permission to overturn a decision simply because they find the results inconvenient or would prefer a different outcome.

83. In Pancras T. Swai v Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] eKLR KECA 883 (KLR), the court of Appeal considered the scope of review and the requirement that an application be grounded in the recognised statutory conditions. The jurisdiction must be exercised according to law rather than as a general power to reconsider concluded questions.

84. The applicant highlights several critical practical factors, including PW1’s advanced age and poor health, the long-standing nature of the lawsuit, and the extra costs a new trial would incur. While the court takes these concerns very seriously, it must balance them with the fundamental right to a fair and speedy trial. The court must actively prevent redundant proceedings, unreasonable delays, and unfair procedural hardships.

85. Hardship alone does not guarantee a review. Instead, the court must weigh that hardship against both the purpose of the disputed orders and the need for a fair trial for everyone involved.

86. The record indicates that PW1 had completed examination-in-chief but had not completed cross-examination. This situation forced the court to determine how a successor Judge who did not personally witness the testimony should handle the case, and figure out how much of the prior proceedings could be fairly and effectively carried forward.See also Madavia Vs Rattan Singh.

87. Section 146 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80, governs the order of examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Cross-examination is not an incidental formality; it is a fundamental means by which evidence is tested. The fact that PW1 had commenced cross-examination did not mean that the evidentiary process had been completed.

88. The court’s direction was intended to enable the trial to proceed before the Judge then seized of the matter with the benefit of hearing the evidence in its entirety. Whether this approach benefited the applicant is separate from whether the order itself was illegal or open to review.

89. In Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa explained the caution required when appellate courts interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion. Although the case concerned appellate intervention, its underlying principle is relevant: judicial discretion is not displaced merely because another course might also have been reasonable.

90. The applicant has failed to establish that the order was issued with improper intent, that the court relied upon extraneous factors, or that the ruling was sufficiently capricious to merit judicial review on the stated grounds.

91. The court further notes that its order expressly recognised the age of the suit and directed that the matter be given priority. That direction remains material. A hearing de novo must not become an excuse for further avoidable delay; equally, the need for expedition must not be pursued at the expense of a fair determination.

92. The Court therefore finds that the age of the suit, the personal circumstances of PW1 and the inconvenience associated with a fresh hearing, though relevant to case management, do not in themselves establish sufficient reason for reviewing the directions of 6.7.2026.

93. Article 50(1) of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to have a dispute resolved by the application of law in a fair and public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.

94. Article 159(2)(b) requires that justice shall not be delayed, while Article 159(2)(d) directs courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. These constitutional principles must be read harmoniously. Neither expedition nor procedural flexibility permits a court to disregard the right to be heard.

95. In Onyango Oloo v Attorney-General [1986–1989] EA 456, the Court of Appeal affirmed the importance of the right to be heard and the principle that a decision affecting a party should not ordinarily be made without affording that party an opportunity to present its case.

96. The applicant argues that it was denied a fair hearing because the request for a hearing de novo was made orally and determined without a formal application, replying affidavit or written submissions. However, the material before the court indicates that the applicant’s counsel was present and opposed the proposal before the directions were issued.

97. The right to a fair hearing means you have a real chance to explain your side of a story and the issues in question. It does it does not mean a party get to take every single legal step possible, including the filing of written submissions, where the court is properly dealing with a procedural issue and the parties have had a fair opportunity to state their positions.

98. The core issue is whether the applicant was given a fair chance to object to the proposed action, rather than whether the issue was presented in the precise procedural format preferred by the applicant.

99. In the present case, the applicant acknowledges that its counsel opposed the proposal to commence the suit afresh. The 1st & 2nd defendants, maintains that the court heard the parties before issuing its directions. The record, as described in the material before this court, does not establish that the applicant was excluded from the proceedings or prevented from communicating its objection.

100. The court accordingly finds that the applicant has not demonstrated a violation of Article 50 sufficient to justify review of the impugned directions.

101. Courts must remain vigilant to ensure that oral applications and case-management directions do not become vehicles for ambush. The conclusion here is narrower: on the material presented, the applicant has not established that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard

102. The applicant maintains that the proceedings recorded before Hon. Justice Mohamed Kullow should be retained and that the suit should resume from the continuation of PW1’s cross-examination.

103. Courts generally aim to preserve the progress made in ongoing legal proceedings to prevent the unnecessary repetition of evidence and the waste of judicial resources when a new judge takes over. However, the incoming judge must balance this efficiency by ensuring the trial remains fair and that all evidence used to resolve the dispute is properly presented and evaluated.

104. The applicable legal framework includes Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, which establish the overriding objective of facilitating the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes. Section 3A preserves the court’s inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

105. These provisions do not grant unrestricted authority. Instead, they obligate the court to strike an equitable balance between procedural speed, fairness, proportionality, the efficient allocation of judicial resources, and the valid interests of all parties involved.

106. In Hunker Trading Company Limited v Elf Oil Kenya Limited [2010] eKLR, the Court of Appeal discussed the overriding objective and the need to administer justice in a manner that is just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable. The overriding objective is not a device for disregarding procedural safeguards; it is a framework for achieving substantive justice efficiently.

107. In Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of procedural rules and the need for parties to comply with them. Although the case arose in a different procedural context, it reinforces the principle that procedural discretion must be exercised according to law and cannot be treated as an unrestricted indulgence.

108. In the present matter, the court was newly seized of the suit following the recusal of the previous Judge. PW1 had not completed cross-examination by all the parties. The court considered those circumstances and directed that the hearing commence afresh.

109. The applicant’s contention that the court should instead have adopted the earlier proceedings invites this court to substitute a different case-management choice for the one already made. The statutory power of review does not ordinarily permit such substitution in the absence of a recognised ground under Order 45Civil Procedure Rules.

110. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the directions of 6.7.2026 should be reviewed merely because the applicant prefers continuation from the stage reached before the previous Judge.

111. To clarify, ordering a new trial (de novo) does not automatically erase the original court records or imply that the past proceedings were invalid, unless specifically stated by the court. The documentation of what happened under the previous judge stays in the case's official history. How those past records are legally applied will depend on relevant laws and the specific guidelines set for the fresh hearing.

112. The Court further reiterates that the suit must receive priority. The directions for a fresh hearing should be implemented in a manner that minimises unnecessary adjournments and takes due account of the age and circumstances of the witnesses. The overriding objective requires expedition, but it does not authorise the court to prejudge the merits of the substantive dispute.

113. The applicant also seeks a stay of the order requiring the suit to proceed de novo pending determination of the application.

114. The principal purpose of an interlocutory stay is to preserve the position of the parties where the applicable legal requirements have been met and where proceeding with the impugned step would cause prejudice that cannot adequately be addressed by the eventual determination of the dispute.

115. In the present case, the court has determined the substantive application for review and found that the applicant has not established the grounds necessary to set aside the directions of 6.7.2026. The request for a stay, being consequential upon the application for review, cannot independently succeed in the absence of a sufficient legal basis for interfering with those directions. Because the court rejected to grant the orders for review, the request to temporarily stay of the orders issued must also fail.

116. The applicant’s concerns regarding age, ill health, expense and delay are relevant to the manner in which the hearing should be managed. They do not, on the material presented, establish a basis for staying the impugned directions indefinitely or for returning the suit to the precise stage sought by the applicant.

117. The appropriate response to the age of the suit is to ensure that the fresh hearing proceeds with urgency, that adjournments are avoided where reasonably possible and that the parties comply with the court’s directions. The court will not permit the application for review, having failed on its merits, to become an additional source of delay in the substantive proceedings.

118. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:

a. The plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 2.9.2026 is hereby dismissed with cost to the respondents.

b. This matter is fixed for mention to take a hearing date on….

119. Orders accordingly.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 28th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

….………………………..

HON. JUSTICE C.K. NZILI

JUDGE

Delivered In the Presence of :

Mr.Okoth S.C Ochipus Odoul for 1st respondent

Mr. Maosa and Mr.Arunda for the applicant

Mr. Odonyo for 2nd respondent

Julius-CA

Bevalyn N. -Legal Researcher

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