Land law

S Musalia Mwenesi Advocates & 2 others v Kirima (Through the Administratrix) [2026] KEELC 7081 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
28 October 2026
Judge(s)
Mbogo C.G.

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Background

Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 10th February, 2026 filed by the advocates/applicants and it is expressed to be brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order seeking the following orders:-

Paragraph 1 →

Reasoning passage

I have taken time to read the judgment delivered by the court on 23rd October, 2023. First, I note that there is no evidence that the valuation report by Legend Valuers Ltd dated July 2016 was produced as evidence before the court. Secondly, the valuation report dated 20th November, 2023 was prepared after judgment had been delivered and therefore the taxing officer could not rely on the same in assessing instruction fees. On this…

Paragraph 24 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC MISC. APPLICATION NO. E037 OF 2024

S. MUSALIA MWENESI ADVOCATES

NYAMU & NYAMU CO. ADVOCATES

P.C. ONDUSO & CO. ADVOCATES............................ADVOCATES/APPLICANTS

VERSUS

THE ESTATE OF GERISHON KAMAU

KIRIMA THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATRIX ................CLIENT/RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the chamber summons dated 10th February, 2026 filed by the advocates/applicants and it is expressed to be brought pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order seeking the following orders:-

1. Spent.

2. That this honourable court be pleased to set aside the decision of the taxing master as evidenced in the ruling delivered on 3rd February, 2026 in respect to the entire advocates/client bill of costs.

3. That the decision by the learned taxing master dated 3rd February, 2026 be set aside and the applicants bill of costs dated 26th February, 2926 be resubmitted to be taxed afresh.

4. That costs of this reference be awarded to the applicants.

2. The application is premised inter alia on the grounds that the advocates/applicants bill of costs dated 26th February, 2026 was delivered on 3rd February, 2026 (sic) allowing the sum of Kshs.37,383,284.52/- taxing off Kshs.3,336,242,299.68/-.

3. The application is supported by the affidavit of Paul Chapia Onduso, advocate, sworn on 10th February, 2026. In his affidavit, the advocates/applicants deposed that the taxing officer erred in principle in assessing the instruction fees, by disregarding the value of the properties involved as per the valuation reports, applying the relevant remuneration scales and taxing various items relating to court attendances, drawing, perusals and other services rendered. They further contend that the taxing officer erroneously deducted Kshs.12,000,000/- from the award notwithstanding that the amount had already been accounted for.

4. In particular, the taxing officer failed to consider that the appearances were by three law firms, wrongly giving the measurement of the two large parcels of land as 80 and 160 acres respectively as opposed to 500 acres and 472 acres. The advocates/applicants contend that the award of Kshs.37,383,284.52/- is not premised on proper facts as per the supporting documents.

5. The application was opposed through the replying affidavit of Anne Wangari Kirima sworn on 12th March, 2026. She deposed that the taxing officer properly exercised her discretion in taxing the advocate – client bill of costs and arriving at an award of Kshs.37,383,284/-, which she considers generous in light of the client/respondent’s position that the advocates/applicants acted contrary to the estate’s instructions. Further, she deposed that the valuation report was filed after judgment and therefore could not properly be used to determine the subject matter’s value for taxation purposes.

6. She further explained that the fees claimed arose from litigation determined by Justice Okongo in a judgment delivered on 23rd October, 2023 in Nairobi ELC No. 1257 of 2014, consolidated with ELC Nos. 850 of 2014, 509 of 2014, 1496 of 2013, 1318 of 2013 and 252 of 2011, being John Otieno Obade and 299 Others v Teresia Wairimu Kirima and Another. She deposed that six of the seven suits for which the advocates/applicants sought costs were consolidated in those proceedings, and that the remaining matter, ELCL no. E004 of 2023, was struck out by Justice L. Mbugua on 18th April, 2024.

7. The client/respondent further deposed that the underlying proceedings principally concerned claims of adverse possession, whose monetary value was neither ascertainable nor substantiated from the pleadings or judgments. She argued that it would have been prejudicial to the estate for the taxing officer to adopt the values contained in valuation reports which did not form part of the substantive proceedings. Consequently, she supports the taxing officer’s decision to exercise discretion in assessing instruction fees based on the nature and importance of the matters, the interests of the parties, the conduct of the proceedings and the other relevant circumstances.

8. On the applicable remuneration framework, the client/respondent deposed that the taxing officer correctly applied Schedule VI, paragraph B of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2006, to the proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Advocates Remuneration Order (2014), and that ELCLC no. E004 of 2023 was the exception, to which the 2014 Order would apply. Concerning the quantum of instruction fees, the client/respondent deposed that the taxing officer awarded each of the respective advocates Kshs.7,000,000/- as instruction fees. She further deposed that Kshs.12,000,000/- was properly accounted for which the advocates/applicants had admitted receiving from the estate. She disputed the contention that the taxing officer erred in deducting that amount, explaining that the taxable costs were first determined before the previously paid sum was offset against the amount due.

9. The client/respondent further deposed that the contested items were properly taxed and that there is no justification for disturbing the assessment. On the legal principles governing judicial interference with a taxation decision, she deposed that interference is justified only where the taxation is founded on an error of principle, where irrelevant considerations were taken into account, where relevant considerations were disregarded, or where the fees awarded are so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference of an error of principle.

10. The application was further opposed by the replying affidavit of Stephen Kamau Kuria sworn on 3rd June, 2026. He deposed that two of the advocates/applicants previously acted jointly for Mrs. Teresia Kirima, a former administrator of the estate, in the succession proceedings, and that all three law firms jointly represented the said Teresia Kirima in the primary suits giving rise to the advocate – client bill of costs. He deposed that the application does not clearly identify whether the advocates/applicants intend to challenge the entire ruling or only the findings relating to particular items in the bill of costs. He maintained that this lack of clarity renders the reference procedurally defective and warrants its striking out or dismissal with costs.

11. Regarding the valuation of the subject properties, the client/respondent distinguished between two valuation reports. He deposed that the valuation report prepared by Legend Valuers Limited was commissioned pursuant to an order issued in the succession proceedings and that its authenticity was tested before the trial court during the taking of viva voce evidence. He contrasted this with the valuation report prepared by Circuit Valuers & Management Consultants, which he deposed was not among the documents produced during the hearing of the succession proceedings. He disputed the reliability of the Circuit Valuers & Management Consultants report, describing its contents as speculative and misleading. He explained that the report relies on individual sectors within the subject properties, notwithstanding that the properties, identified as L.R. Nos. 5908/8 and 6825/2, had not been subdivided and their titles remained intact. He further deposed that the advocates/applicants have not produced any approvals or other necessary documentation establishing that the properties had been lawfully subdivided.

12. In the circumstances, it was deposed that the report was intended to mislead the taxing officer into adopting an inappropriate valuation for purposes of assessing their fees. He maintained that the amounts awarded upon taxation were reasonable and that there is no sufficient basis for disturbing the decision.

13. In response thereto, the advocates/applicants filed a further affidavit sworn on 26th June, 2026. While reiterating the contents of the supporting affidavit, the advocates/applicants maintained that the error in the paragraphs referenced are typos and does not affect the substance of the reference. He clarified that the correct bill of costs is dated 26th February, 2024 and asserted that the court can readily identify the bill from the proceedings.

14. On the value of the subject matter, it was deposed that sufficient evidence had been provided to establish the value of the properties involved in the consolidated suits. In particular, the subject matter comprised land exceeding 975 acres and that two valuation reports had been filed before the court. According to him, the reports provided objective evidence of the properties’ value and ought to have been considered in determining the appropriate instruction fees.

15. Regarding the applicable Advocates Remuneration Order, the advocates/applicants disputed the reliance on Schedule VI, paragraph B of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2006, and maintained that the taxing officer ought to have considered the applicable provisions governing instruction fees in circumstances where the value of the subject matter was ascertainable. On adverse possession, it was deposed that the nature of the claims did not prevent the court from determining the value of the land through the valuation evidence provided.

16. Turning to the replying affidavit sworn by Stephen Kamau Kirima, the advocates/applicants deposed that the reference clearly identifies particulars of the ruling under challenge and their claim for professional fees is separate from the question of distributing the estate’s properties to beneficiaries. Further, that the valuation reports were commissioned by the client/respondents which were intended to assist the court in exercising its discretion judiciously by providing an informed assessment of the value of the properties. In addition, it was deposed that the absence of subdivision approvals are irrelevant to the issue of professional fees.

17. The advocates/applicants additionally referred to previous taxation proceedings involving the estate and the law firm of Messrs Rachier & Amollo LLP. It was deposed that in high court miscellaneous appl. no. 81 of 2018, the taxing officer assessed an advocate – client bill of costs at Kshs.80,000,000/- against a bill in excess of Kshs.666,000,000/. They relied on a ruling delivered by Justice P.M. Nyaundi on 13th February, 2026.

18. The application was canvassed through written submissions. The advocates/applicants filed their written submissions dated 29th July, 2026 and 11th August, 2026. The client/respondent filed written submissions dated 2nd September, 2026. I have considered the application, the replies thereof and the written submissions. The issue for determination is whether the advocates/applicants have demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant interference with the decision of the taxing officer.

19. The circumstances under which this court may or can interfere with the taxing officer’s exercise of discretion are now well known. The taxing master must be guided by the principles governing taxation as was held in the leading case of Premchand Raichand Ltd Another -vs- Quarry services of East Africa Ltd and Another No. 3 (1972) EA 162. The principles laid out are:-

i. The instruction fee should cover the advocates work including taking instructions and preparing the case for trial or appeal;

ii. The taxing master was expected to tax each bill on its merits;

iii. The value of the subject matter had to be taken into account;

iv. The taxing master’s discretion was to be exercised judicially and not whimsically or capriciously;

v. Though the successful litigant was entitled to a fair reimbursement, the taxing master had to consider the public interest such that costs were not allowed to rise to a level that would confine access to the courts to the wealthy;

vi. No appeal or reference can be allowed unless the appellant can show or demonstrate that above mentioned principles have been breached because judges on appeal as a principle do not like to interfere with an assessment of costs by the taxing officer unless the officer has misdirected himself or herself in a matter of principle, but if the quantum of an assessment is manifestly extravagant, a misdirection of principle may be a necessary inference.”

20. On assessment of instruction fees, in the case of Joreth Ltd vs Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 E.A. 92, the court of appeal stated as follows:-

“We would at this stage point out that the value of the subject matter of a suit for the purposes of taxation of a bill of costs ought to be determined from the pleadings, judgment or settlement (if such be the case) but if the same is not so ascertainable the taxing officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account, amongst other matters, the nature and the importance of the cause or the matter, the interest of the parties, general conduct of the proceedings, any direction by the trial judge and all other relevant circumstances.”

21. In this case, the taxing officer considered the pleadings and judgment in the consolidated suits and found that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable therefrom. She declined to rely on the valuation reports presented after judgment and proceeded to exercise her discretion in assessing instruction fees. The advocates/applicants contend that the properties measured approximately 972 acres and that the taxing officer ought to have considered their substantial commercial value.

22. In Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] KECA 597 (KLR), the court of appeal held as follows:-

“It seems to us quite plain that the basis for determining subject matter value for purposes of instruction fees is wholly dependent on the stage at which the fees are being taxed. Where it happens before judgment, it is the pleadings that form the basis for determining subject value. Once judgment has been entered, and for what seems to us to be an obvious reason, recourse will not be had to the pleadings since the judgment does determine conclusively the value of the subject matter as a claim, no matter how pleaded, gets its true value as adjudged by the court.

Where, however, a suit is settled, then, from a literal and practical reading of the provision, the subject matter value must be sought by reference, in the first instance, to the terms of the settlement. Just as one would not start with the pleadings in the face of a judgment, it is indubitable that one cannot start with the pleadings where there is a settlement.

It is only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement, as the case may be, that the taxing officer is permitted to use his discretion to assess instructions fees in accordance with what he considers just bearing in mind the various elements contained in the provision we are addressing. He does have discretion as to what he considers just but that discretion kicks in only after he has engaged with the proper basis as expressly and mandatorily provided: either the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement. He has no leeway to disregard the statutorily commanded starting point. And we think, with respect, that the starting point can only be one of the three. It is not open to the taxing officer to choose one or the other or to use them in combination, the provision being expressly disjunctive as opposed to conjunctive. It is also mandatory and not permissive.”

23. On whether the taxing officer failed to consider that the appearances were by three law firms, the taxing officer acknowledged that the estate was represented by 3 firms. The advocates/applicants have not disclosed the actual error in assessing the said instruction fees based on representation by the 3 law firms.

24. I have taken time to read the judgment delivered by the court on 23rd October, 2023. First, I note that there is no evidence that the valuation report by Legend Valuers Ltd dated July 2016 was produced as evidence before the court. Secondly, the valuation report dated 20th November, 2023 was prepared after judgment had been delivered and therefore the taxing officer could not rely on the same in assessing instruction fees. On this issue, I agree with the taxing officer that the value of the subject matter could not be ascertained from the pleadings or the judgment. I am satisfied that the taxing officer appreciated the applicable principles and exercised her discretion upon finding that the value was not ascertainable from the pleadings and judgment.

25. On wrongly giving the measurement of the parcels of land as 80 and 160 acres respectively as opposed to 500 acres and 472 acres, the court in paragraph 251 of the judgment held that: “Evidence as to the correct description and identification of the land claimed by the applicants was crucial because there are other groups also claiming portions of LR no. 6825/2 which measures a total of approximately 471 acres.” In paragraph 259, the court held that: “LR no. 5908/8 measures approximately 499 acres.” Indeed, the taxing officer made an error in recognizing the size of both properties. While she noted that there was no doubt that the properties were of high value, I cannot state with certainty that she used the acreage to assess instruction fees. Perhaps, if she had taken note of the correct size of both properties, a different sum would have been used to exercise her discretion to assess the instruction fees. In my view, I find this error may have contributed to the assessment and there is need to disturb this finding.

26. In the advocate - client bill of costs dated 26th February, 2024, the advocates/applicants were seeking to tax the sum of Kshs.3,373,625,584.00/-. This sum was less the sum received of Kshs.12,000,000/-. In the impugned ruling, the sum less paid was deducted resulting to a total sum of Kshs.37,383,284.52/-. It appears that the sums so far paid were deducted twice resulting in an error in the total sum awarded.

27. Having carefully evaluated the impugned ruling, I find that there is reason to interfere with the taxing officer’s ruling. I find merit in the chamber summons dated 10th February, 2026 and grant the following orders:-

i. The ruling delivered by Hon. Judith Omollo on 3rd February, 2026 is hereby set aside.

ii. The advocate - client bill of costs dated 26th February, 2024 to be taxed afresh before another taxing officer.

iii. Each party to bear its own costs.

28. The clients/respondents are granted leave to appeal if they are dissatisfied with this ruling.

It is so ordered.

DATED, SIGNED & DELIVERED IN VIRTUAL COURT

THIS 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

HON. MBOGO C.G.

JUDGE

28/10/2026.

In the presence of:-

Mr. Benson Agunga – court assistant

Mr. Ashiruma for the Advocates/Applicants

Mr. Rao Serro holding brief for Mr. Fred Ojiambo (Senior counsel) for

the Client/Respondent (Anne Kirima)

Mr. Munge for Mr. Stephen Kamau Kirima

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