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Employment law

Mokaya v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education & 7 others [2026] KEELRC 4682 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Petition E243 of 2026
Judgment date
15 October 2026
Judge(s)
M. Mbaru

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The court dismissed the 2nd interested party’s exhaustion/jurisdiction objections, allowed the 4th respondent’s jurisdictional objection, and struck out the petition. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Supporting judgment passages

Accordingly, the court dismisses the 2nd interested party's objections dated 6 August 2026. The court hereby allows the objections by the 4th respondent dated 7 August 2026, and strikes out the petition. Each party to bear its costs.

Conclusion and orders →
Issue 1Whether the petition was premature or the court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner had not exhausted the statutory remedies under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act and section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.

Held. Decided: the objection failed and was dismissed. Section 24 of the TVET Act concerns appeals arising from refusal to register and license an institution; it does not concern recruitment or employment of TVETA’s CEO. The related reliance on section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act therefore had no bearing on the court’s jurisdiction in this petition.

Ratio. The statutory exhaustion route in section 24 of the TVET Act applies to disputes about refusal to register and license an institution, not to a challenge concerning recruitment or appointment of a CEO. It could not oust or limit the court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

The application is under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act. Section 24 therefore relates to an appeal arising from the refusal to register and license an institution. It has nothing to do with the recruitment or employment of a CEO, such as the 2nd interested party, who was appointed with the 3rd respondent's concurrence through a letter dated 23 July 2026.

Passage 42 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

Objections regarding the court's jurisdiction on the application of section 24 of the TVET Act and the resultant reference to section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act have no bearing on this court.

Passage 43 →

The 2nd interested party's objections lack basis and are dismissed.

Passage 44 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

The application is under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act. Section 24 therefore relates to an appeal arising from the refusal to register and license an institution. It has nothing to do with the recruitment or employment of a CEO, such as the 2nd interested party, who was appointed with the 3rd respondent's concurrence through a letter dated 23 July 2026.

Passage 42 →

Objections regarding the court's jurisdiction on the application of section 24 of the TVET Act and the resultant reference to section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act have no bearing on this court.

Passage 43 →
Issue 2Whether the Employment and Labour Relations Court had jurisdiction over a public-interest petition challenging the appointment of TVETA’s Chief Executive Officer, where the petitioner had no direct employment relationship with the respondents.

Held. Decided: the court lacked jurisdiction. The petitioner brought the case under Articles 22 and 258 as a public-interest litigant and had no direct employment relationship with the respondents. Applying the binding Supreme Court decision in Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, the court allowed the 4th respondent’s objection and struck out the petition.

Ratio. Where a public-interest litigant, rather than a party within the employment relationships contemplated by section 12 of the ELRC Act, brings a public-law constitutional challenge against state organs, the constitutional questions fall for determination by the High Court under Article 165(3)(b) and (d), not the ELRC.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

On the application of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the Supreme Court has outlined the relationships envisaged under section 12 of the ELRC Act and further held that those acting in the public interest are regulated and should not move this court. The basis is that, where a contest in the public law regime between citizens and state organs concerns alleged constitutional violations, these questions can only be properly raised for determination before the High Court under Article 165(3)(b) and (d) of the Constitution.

Passage 45 →

The petitioner filed the petition dated 3 August 2026 and describes himself as a Kenyan committed to public interest litigation, accountability, and the protection of constitutional governance. The petition is therefore filed under Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution. He challenges the respondents' decision to appoint the 2nd interested party as the CEO of TVETA. He has no direct employment relationship with the respondents save to urge a case in the public interest.

Passage 46 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

On the judgment of the Supreme Court in Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the court is bound. The petitioner is acting in the public interest; the court is without jurisdiction.

Passage 48 →

Accordingly, the court dismisses the 2nd interested party's objections dated 6 August 2026. The court hereby allows the objections by the 4th respondent dated 7 August 2026, and strikes out the petition. Each party to bear its costs.

Conclusion and orders →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

On the application of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the Supreme Court has outlined the relationships envisaged under section 12 of the ELRC Act and further held that those acting in the public interest are regulated and should not move this court. The basis is that, where a contest in the public law regime between citizens and state organs concerns alleged constitutional violations, these questions can only be properly raised for determination before the High Court under Article 165(3)(b) and (d) of the Constitution.

Passage 45 →

On the judgment of the Supreme Court in Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the court is bound. The petitioner is acting in the public interest; the court is without jurisdiction.

Passage 48 →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in light of the provisions of Article 165(3) (b) of the Constitution.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act and section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act required exhaustion of a statutory remedy before this petition could be heard; and whether the Employment and Labour Relations…

Material facts

Shem Osiemo Mokaya, describing himself as a Kenyan committed to public-interest litigation, accountability and constitutional governance, petitioned under Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution. He challenged the respondents’ decision to appoint the 2nd…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO. E243 OF 2026

SHEM OSIEMO MOKAYA PETITIONER

VERSUS

THE CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 1ST RESPONDENT

TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND

TRAINING AUTHORITY 2ND RESPONDENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND HEAD OF THE

PUBLIC SERVICE 3RD RESPONDENT

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 4TH RESPONDENT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL 5TH RESPONDENT

AND

MORIASI ARABU JOSIAH 1ST INTERESTED PARTY

DR. WANYEKI PAUL MACHOCHO 2ND INTERESTED PARTY

DR. KABURU LEAR WANGARI 3RD INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

The ruling relates to the Notice of Preliminary Objections filed by the 2nd interested party dated 6 August 2026 and the 4th respondent's Notice of Preliminary Objections dated 7 August 2026.

The objections by the 2nd interested party are on the grounds that the petition is premature, incompetent and offends the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act and section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act; hence the court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.

The 2nd respondent's objections are on the grounds:

1. The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in light of the provisions of Article 165(3) (b) of the Constitution.

2. By dint of the Supreme Court decision Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter as the petitioner is not a party envisaged under section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, the Employment Act, the Labour Relations Act and the Labour Institutions Act.

3. The substratum of the petition revolves around an ongoing recruitment process and specifically impugns the procedural integrity and legality of the recruitment process

for the Chief Executive Officer of a statutory body.

4. The petition has not been filed on behalf of any applicants for the advertised position but has been filed as an independent case in the public interest.

5. The petition does not concern an employment and labour relations dispute within section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act over which the court has jurisdiction.

6. The petition is an abuse of court process and should be dismissed with costs.

The 4th respondent submitted that, in view of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition because the petitioner has no employment relationship with the 1st respondent. Under section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act (the ELRC Act), the petitioner is not a party envisaged under the Act, and his petition asserts that it is filed in the public interest. The matter thus ought to have been filed before the High Court under Article 163 of the Constitution. Given the nature of the petition, the court has no jurisdiction.

The respondents and 2nd interested party supported the objections.

The 2nd interested party's father submitted that the petitioner has failed to exhaust the dispute resolution mechanisms under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act and section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, making the petition premature. Where such procedures were to be invoked, there would still be an option to file an appeal before approaching the court as herein done. The court lacks original jurisdiction and should strike out the petition.

The petitioner submitted that the court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition. Under section 12 of the ELRC Act, the law is framed to include other employment relationships that may arise pre-employment and within employment. In Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the Supreme Court emphasized that the term under section 12(1) of the ELRC Act that disputes “including” other relationships does not restrict the disputes that arise from the employment relationship. The petitioner anchored the petition on the employment dispute relating to the 2nd interested party, and supported it with a letter dated 3 August 2026 assuming the office of Director General/Chief Executive Officer (the CEO) of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority.

The petitioner submitted that the 2nd interested party's objections have no basis, as section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act relates to internal disputes within the entity and does not oust the court's jurisdiction. Once the Board has made a decision, a party can invoke such provisions but not in a case such as herein where the employment and assumption of office is in issue.

The 1st Interested Party opposed the objections and supported the petitioner’s submissions.

Determination

The background of the petition needs to be revisited.

The petitioner moved the court through the petition and application dated 3 august 2026. The court issued interim orders directing the parties to attend on 10 August 2026 for a hearing.

Before 10 August 2026, the respondents and the 2nd interested party filed their objections.

The petitioner sought interim orders and submitted that, following a recruitment process undertaken by the respondent, the 2nd Interested Party was appointed as CEO with the concurrence of the 3rd respondent, through a letter dated 3 August 2026.

To allow the court to hear the objections on merit, interim orders were issued in terms of order (2) of the application dated 3 August 2026. The respondents were directed not to gazette the appointment of the 2nd interested party and to maintain the status quo as of 23 July 2026.

Before the scheduled hearing, the 2nd interested party filed an application dated 12 August 2026 seeking an interpretation of the orders issued on 10 August 2026. The court directed that since the 2nd interested party had assumed office and his letter of appointment dated 23 July 2026 as the CEO, this remained the status quo on 23 July 2026 and should apply in the interim.

This takes into account the objections regarding court jurisdiction filed by the 4th respondent and the 2nd interested party.

The application is under section 24 of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act. Section 24 therefore relates to an appeal arising from the refusal to register and license an institution. It has nothing to do with the recruitment or employment of a CEO, such as the 2nd interested party, who was appointed with the 3rd respondent's concurrence through a letter dated 23 July 2026.

Objections regarding the court's jurisdiction on the application of section 24 of the TVET Act and the resultant reference to section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act have no bearing on this court.

The 2nd interested party's objections lack basis and are dismissed.

On the application of Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the Supreme Court has outlined the relationships envisaged under section 12 of the ELRC Act and further held that those acting in the public interest are regulated and should not move this court. The basis is that, where a contest in the public law regime between citizens and state organs concerns alleged constitutional violations, these questions can only be properly raised for determination before the High Court under Article 165(3)(b) and (d) of the Constitution.

The petitioner filed the petition dated 3 August 2026 and describes himself as a Kenyan committed to public interest litigation, accountability, and the protection of constitutional governance. The petition is therefore filed under Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution. He challenges the respondents' decision to appoint the 2nd interested party as the CEO of TVETA. He has no direct employment relationship with the respondents save to urge a case in the public interest.

Previously, I have applied the provisions of Article 165(5) (b) of the Constitution to mean that where an employment dispute arises, the specialised courts envisaged under Article 162(2) of the Constitution should address it.

On the judgment of the Supreme Court in Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital & 3 others v Gikenyi & 74 others [2026] KESC 50 (KLR), the court is bound. The petitioner is acting in the public interest; the court is without jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the court dismisses the 2nd interested party's objections dated 6 August 2026. The court hereby allows the objections by the 4th respondent dated 7 August 2026, and strikes out the petition. Each party to bear its costs.

Dated this 15th Day of October 2026

M. MBARU

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Court Assistant: Mohammed Ali

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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