Meet Sheriaplex AI. Research, draft and review with tools for Kenyan legal work.

Try AI chat ↗Explore AI Tools →
Employment law

Ndihokubwayo v Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa & another [2026] KEELRC 4688 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Cause 277 of 2018
Judgment date
16 October 2026
Judge(s)
Abuodha Nelson Jorum

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The jurisdiction objection was dismissed. The Court held that the claimant’s three-year fixed-term contract carried an enforceable expectation of renewal subject to funding and individual performance; non-renewal without stated reasons on those matters was unfair termination. It awarded USD 55,983 as six months’ compensation and USD 27,991.50 as three months’ notice pay, totalling USD 83,974.50, subject to statutory deductions and interest at court rates from judgment until payment, plus costs to the claimant.

Supporting judgment passages

a. The claimant as per her letter of appointment was entitled to a gross monthly salary of USD 9,330.50 (basic pay, post a post adjustment annual benefit, house allowance). Considering that she was on a FTC for three years and the same had a clause for non-renewal on account of lack of additional funding and poor performance, an award of six month’s salary as compensation for unfair termination would be reasonable. That is to say USD 55,983/-

Passage 296 →

d. Items (a) and (b) shall be subject to taxes and statutory deductions but shall attract interest at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full

Passage 299 →

e. The claimant shall further have costs of the suit

Passage 300 →
Issue 1Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this claim.

Held. Yes. The Court held that it had jurisdiction and dismissed the respondents’ jurisdiction objection based on diplomatic immunity. The employment contract predated the Legal Notice conferring immunity and contained an exclusive Kenyan-courts jurisdiction clause; the respondents did not obtain the claimant’s agreement to amend it. The Court held that the 1st respondent, by its conduct, was deemed to have waived reliance on the subsequently conferred immunity for this dispute.

Ratio. Immunity conferred on an international organisation is donated and discretionary rather than inherent sovereign immunity. Where an employment contract already irrevocably submits disputes to Kenyan courts, the beneficiary of subsequently conferred immunity cannot rely on it against that pre-existing obligation without evidence of an agreed contractual amendment; on these facts, its conduct amounted to waiver.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

21. The Court has carefully considered the elaborate pleadings by the protagonists, their hotly contested evidence and the insightful submissions by counsel. The court highly regards their persuasive knack. However, this court considers the two main issues that if properly determined would render justice to the parties regardless of in whose favour, the finding of the court is. As always said justice sometimes means not getting the outcome expected provided the scales were properly balanced. The first issue is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this claim and second, whether the claimant was engaged by the 1st respondent on fixed term contract (FTC) or on an open-ended contract and as a corollary, if the court finds that the latter was the case, was she unfairly terminated hence entitled to compensation for such and the quantum of such compensation.

Paragraph 21 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

32. Before leaving the issue of immunity, it would be important to note that immunity granted to international organizations is upon application, donated hence discretionary and not stricto sensu on the same plane as sovereign immunity, which is inherent and granted to states by virtue of being part of the community of nations and intended to be protected by articles of the Vienna Convention. From the foregoing, the Court finds and holds that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The objection on jurisdiction is therefore dismissed.

Paragraph 32 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

31. The respondent was granted immunity through Legal Notice No. 24 of 2019 after it had it entered into a contract of employment with the claimant which contained a clause that the parties will submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya to settle any disputes that could arise in connection with the Claimant's employment. It would therefore be unjust for the respondent to raise the issue of immunity when the claimant has exercised the self-same right both parties agreed to in the contract of employment. The respondent by conduct is deemed to have waived its right to immunity conferred by the legal notice and therefore could not rely on the same at this point. As rightly submitted by the claimant’s counsel, if the respondent intended the subsequent granting of immunity to cover its past legal obligations such as the employment contract with the claimant, nothing was easier than invoking provisions of section 10 of the Employment Act and engaging the claimant for the amendment of the contract to incorporate the legal notice granting it immunity. No such evidence was availed to court.

Paragraph 31 →

32. Before leaving the issue of immunity, it would be important to note that immunity granted to international organizations is upon application, donated hence discretionary and not stricto sensu on the same plane as sovereign immunity, which is inherent and granted to states by virtue of being part of the community of nations and intended to be protected by articles of the Vienna Convention. From the foregoing, the Court finds and holds that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The objection on jurisdiction is therefore dismissed.

Paragraph 32 →
Issue 2Whether the claimant was engaged by the 1st respondent on fixed term contract (FTC) or on an open-ended contract and as a corollary, if the court finds that the latter was the case, was she unfairly terminated hence entitled to compensation for such and the quantum of such compensation.

Held. The claimant was employed for a three-year fixed term, but the contract expressly made renewal dependent on funding and her individual performance. She therefore had a legitimate expectation that renewal would be determined on those stipulated grounds. The respondent’s notice merely invoked expiry and gave no reason relating to funding or performance; this was unfair termination. The Court awarded six months’ gross salary, USD 55,983, as compensation and three months’ salary, USD 27,991.50, in lieu of notice, totalling USD 83,974.50, with statutory deductions, judgment interest, and costs.

Ratio. Although a fixed-term contract generally expires without reasons for non-renewal, an express contractual renewal clause can require the employer to assess and give reasons connected to the stated renewal conditions. The clause here required renewal to be considered based on funding and individual performance; construed against its drafter, the respondent could not rely solely on effluxion of time without addressing those conditions. The unsupported later reliance on performance did not cure the deficient non-renewal notice.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

21. The Court has carefully considered the elaborate pleadings by the protagonists, their hotly contested evidence and the insightful submissions by counsel. The court highly regards their persuasive knack. However, this court considers the two main issues that if properly determined would render justice to the parties regardless of in whose favour, the finding of the court is. As always said justice sometimes means not getting the outcome expected provided the scales were properly balanced. The first issue is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this claim and second, whether the claimant was engaged by the 1st respondent on fixed term contract (FTC) or on an open-ended contract and as a corollary, if the court finds that the latter was the case, was she unfairly terminated hence entitled to compensation for such and the quantum of such compensation.

Paragraph 21 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

42. Form the foregoing, the court finds and holds that the claimant had a legitimate expectation over renewal of her fixed term contract hence the notice of non-renewal without assigning reason for such non-renewal amounted to unfair termination of service over which the claimant is entitled to compensation which the court shall proceed hereafter to assess.

Paragraph 42 →

a. The claimant as per her letter of appointment was entitled to a gross monthly salary of USD 9,330.50 (basic pay, post a post adjustment annual benefit, house allowance). Considering that she was on a FTC for three years and the same had a clause for non-renewal on account of lack of additional funding and poor performance, an award of six month’s salary as compensation for unfair termination would be reasonable. That is to say USD 55,983/-

Passage 296 →

b. Three months’ salary in lieu of notice of termination as provided in her contract……USD 27,991.50

Passage 297 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

A plain reading of the above clause yields the interpretation that the claimant’s employment first of all, was for a period of three years and that the same would be renewed based on funding and the claimant’s individual performance. Contrary to the contention by respondents’ counsel that there were no terms, express or otherwise in the employment contract or the HR Policies and Manual that placed an obligation on the 1st Respondent to consider its funding and the Claimant’s performance before opting not to renew her contract, it is there in black and white and cannot by any manner of interpretation be construed otherwise. To demonstrate departure from this patent provision in the claimant’s contract, the notice on non-renewal of the claimant’s contract simply stated that: -

Passage 250 →

individual performance. Now that this was an express condition on the face of the contract, the respondent was under obligation to furnish the claimant with reasons for not renewing her contract and they had to be reasons connected or relating to funding or the claimant’s performance. The respondent in the circumstances was deprived of relying on effluxion of time as a reason for not renewing the claimant’s contract as evidenced in the notice of non-renewal dated 31st August 2017.

Passage 259 →

42. Form the foregoing, the court finds and holds that the claimant had a legitimate expectation over renewal of her fixed term contract hence the notice of non-renewal without assigning reason for such non-renewal amounted to unfair termination of service over which the claimant is entitled to compensation which the court shall proceed hereafter to assess.

Paragraph 42 →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

By a Memorandum of Claim dated 5th March 2018, the claimant pleaded inter alia: -

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

On the issue of jurisdiction, it is now settled that this is the grundnorm of any claim or dispute presented before any adjudicating authority and without it, everything must grind to a halt. It has further been authoritatively stated that no amount of innovative interpretation can confer jurisdiction where none exists. That having been noted, the respondent objects to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the suit on the basis that…

Paragraph 22 →

Reasoning passage

The Court has carefully considered the elaborate pleadings by the protagonists, their hotly contested evidence and the insightful submissions by counsel. The court highly regards their persuasive knack. However, this court considers the two main issues that if properly determined would render justice to the parties regardless of in whose favour, the finding of the court is. As always said justice sometimes means not getting the outcome…

Paragraph 21 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the Employment and Labour Relations Court had jurisdiction notwithstanding the respondents’ claimed diplomatic immunity; whether the claimant’s contract was fixed-term or open-ended; and whether non-renewal without stated reasons was unfair and…

Material facts

Emmie Ndihokubwayo was employed by Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa as Program Officer, Policy from 1 December 2014 under an agreement expressed to run for three years, with a review at the end of the second year towards renewal based on funding and…

Get the complete brief with membership →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

CAUSE NO. 277 OF 2018

EMMIE NDIHOKUBWAYO……..……....................................... CLAIMANT

VERSUS

ALLIANCE FOR A GREEN REVOLUTION

IN AFRICA........ ……………………………………………1ST RESPONDENT

AGNES KALIBATA……………………………………… 2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. By a Memorandum of Claim dated 5th March 2018, the claimant pleaded inter alia: -

a) The Claimant was formally employed by the 1st Respondent as Program Officer, Policy for a fixed Contract term of Three Years with effect from 1st December 2014. The contract was renewable.

b) Based on the contractual terms set out in the Employment Agreement, the

Claimant signified her acceptance of the appointment and commenced her duties in the capacity of Program Officer, Policy, as aforesaid. The Claimant avers that she henceforth carried out her duties diligently and with fidelity and was not the subject of any disciplinary process or action whatsoever. The Claimant's Gross Annual Salary was USD. 85,000.00 (Approx. KShs.8, 500, 000.00 at current exchange rate) excluding benefits.

c) It was a term of the said Contract of employment that the Employment relationship would be "reviewed at the end of the 2nd Year towards renewal based on funding and individual performance."

d) Thereafter, vide a letter dated 27th July 2015 entitled "Confirmation" the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that her appointment was confirmed with effect from 1st June 2015 after she successfully completed her probation.

e) Thereafter, vide a letter dated 30th January 2017 entitled "Change in Role, reporting relationship or division" the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that her role with effect from 1st February 2017 would be that of Policy & Advocacy officer in the Country Support, Policy Delivery division.

f) Vide Letter dated 15th August 2017 the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that her calibrated Performance Appraisal Rating for the Year 2016 was 3.68 out of a Possible 4.0 in accordance with the Respondents Human resources Manual-

g) The said letter further thanked the Claimant for her "Commitment" and wished her the very best in her Job.

h) Thereafter, vide a letter dated 31st August 2017 entitled "Non-Renewal of your Employment Contract" the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that her Contract would not be renewed upon expiry.

i) The Claimant was utterly perplexed, shocked and dismayed by the letter dated 31st August 2017 coming hot on the heels of the letter of 15.08.17, less than 14 days earlier, acknowledging her stellar performance and extolling her commitment to her duties.

j) That given her performance as appraised by the 1st Respondent and the terms of her contract of employment, the Claimant had a legitimate expectation that her Contract of Employment would be renewed for another term.

k) The Claimant avers that the 1st Respondent's action was most unfair and discriminatory and appears to have been directly inspired by malice and ill will fomented by the 2nd Respondent.

PARTICULARS

i) The 2nd Respondent often bullied, harassed, intimidated and verbally

assaulted the Claimant publicly during meetings in the presence of other staff and even donors especially during the 2nd Year of Employment.

ii) The 2nd Respondent, in open violation of the Human Resources Manual, actively interfered with the Claimants performance appraisals even though the Claimant did not report directly to her.

iii) The Claimant avers that the 2nd Respondent's actions were done in anticipation of the expiry of her contract of employment to ensure a difficult work environment and conjure a basis for the ultimate refusal to renew the said contract.

iv) The malice is clear in light of the fact that barely a fortnight to the termination of her services, the 1st Respondent had appraised her performance to be at 3.68 out of a possible 4.0. The Claimant had all along excelled in her duties as evidenced by various correspondences with her line manager and various other appraisals.

v) As a result of the incessant inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment at the hands of the 2nd Respondent, the Claimant suffered severe depression necessitating medical attention for long periods of time.

2. The Claimant in the upshot prayed for the following against the Respondent:

a. A declaration that the Claimants rights have been violated

b. An award of general damages for violation of the Claimants rights.

c. An award of general damages for mental anguish, torment and subsequent depression suffered by the claimant

d. Any such other or further appropriate relief or orders as the Court may deem fit.

e. an order that the Respondent pay the Claimant's costs of this claim plus interest thereon.

3. The Respondent filed a statement of response dated 4th April, 2018 and averred among others that: -

i. The 2nd Respondent as the President of the 1st Respondent was pursuant to the same gazette notice accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Paragraphs 2 and 7 of Part III of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act.

ii. The Respondents will therefore raise a preliminary objection in limine that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter under Section 9(2) of the Privileges and Immunities Act, Chapter 179 of the Laws of Kenya as read together with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as the Claimant is non­suited against them.

iii. WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the foregoing, in response to the contents of paragraphs 2,4 and 6 of the Memorandum of Claim, the Respondents admit that the Claimant was employed as a Program Officer, Policy for a fixed period of three years but deny that the contract was renewable as alleged. The contract did not envisage an automatic renewal, and any renewal of the contract would be determined based on the 1st Respondent’s funding and the Claimant’s performance.

iv. In response to paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Claim, the Respondents state that in carrying out her duties as a Policy and Advocacy Officer for the 1st Respondent, the Claimant was expected to carry out her duties with skill, care and diligence.

v. The contents of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Memorandum of Claim are admitted.

vi. Pursuant to Clause 8.2 of the 1st Respondent’s Human Resource Manual, the performance of the 1st Respondent’s employees is reviewed at the conclusion of their probationary period and thereafter during the annual appraisal, taking into consideration the following criteria:

a) Diligence, skills, and accuracy in executing assignments;

b) Collaboration and cooperation with other members of staff;

c) Initiative in addressing problems and resolving them;

d) Compliance with AGRA’s policies and operating procedures; and

e) Adherence to AGRA’s core values.

vii. In response to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Memorandum of Claim, the Respondents state that although the Claimant’s calibrated Performance Appraisal rating for the year 2016 was confirmed to be 3.68 in the letter dated 15th August 2017, the said rating was out of a possible 5.0 and not 4.0 as averred by the Claimant.

viii. The Respondents deny the misleading contents of paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Claim. The 1st Respondent’s letter did not acknowledge the Claimant’s “stellar performance” and extol her commitment to her duties as alleged.

ix. The Respondents deny that the Claimant had any legitimate expectation that her contract would be renewed as alleged in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum of Claim. The Claimant was aware ab initio that pursuant to Clause 1.2 of the employment contract; her term of employment was for a period of three years which would automatically terminate by reason of effluxion of time on 30th November 2017.

x. The Respondents state that the Claimant’s contract of employment did not have any statutory underpinning and the Respondents made no representation that her contract would be renewed for any legitimate expectation to arise in law.

xi. The Respondents state that in a meeting held on 28th July 2017, the 1st Respondent’s Director of Human Resources had verbally informed the Claimant of the 1st Respondent’s decision not to renew her contract and the Claimant notified the 1st Respondent’s Director of Human Resources that she had already taken a decision not to renew her contract as she would be leaving employment to pursue other interests. The conversation was confirmed in an email to the Claimant by the 1st Respondent’s Director of Human Resources dated 1st August 2017.

xii. The Claimant only responded to this email by an email dated 31st August 2017, in which email she attempted to resile from the earlier position already communicated to the 1st Respondent claiming that she was not ready to pursue any other interests but that the 1st Respondent was free to take any decision on matters related to her contract.

xiii. The Respondents deny the spurious allegations of discrimination and malice in paragraph 14 of the Memorandum of Claim. The Respondents state that the 1st Respondent did not in any way treat the Claimant unfairly nor discriminate against her as alleged or at all. In particular, the Respondents state as follows in answer to the Claimant’s allegations as pleaded;

xiv. The 2nd Respondent never bullied, harassed, intimidated or verbally assaulted the Claimant at any time during her employment as alleged or at all;

xv. The 2nd Respondent did not and could not interfere with the Claimant’s performance appraisal as alleged which was carried out by the Claimant’s supervisor, the Head of Policy and Advocacy and the calibration of the score calibration was done corporately by the Executive Committee of the 1st Respondent;

xvi. The 2nd Respondent did not create a difficult work environment for the Claimant and the decision whether or not to renew the Claimants contract was for the Human Resource Department and not the 2nd Respondent as President;

xvii. The Claimant’s calibrated Performance Appraisal rating for the year 2016 was confirmed to be 3.68 in the letter dated 15th August 2017, the said rating was out of a possible 5.0 and not 4.0 as averred by the Claimant. The fact that the Claimant was put on the Performance Improvement Program was proof enough that she had not excelled in her duties;

xviii. The Claimant was never subjected to any inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment as alleged and her medical condition and severe depression was not caused by the 2nd Respondent or attributable to her employment with the 1st Respondent. The Respondents state that the 1st Respondent offered the claimant the necessary support including giving her time off from work to enable her seek medical assistance, allowing her sick leave as well as giving her flexible reporting time to work to help her deal with her health issues.

xix. The Respondents aver that it is inconceivable that the Claimant would have had a legitimate expectation that her employment would be renewed for another term if the claims of discrimination, mental anguish and torment by the 2nd Respondent as alleged were true.

xx. The Respondents admit paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Memorandum of Claim and state that the 1st Respondent was well within its rights to decline the renewal of the contract with the Claimant, who in any case had not performed optimally during the duration of the contact.

xxi. The Respondents deny the contents of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Memorandum of Claim that they were manifestly unfair to the Claimant or that the Claimant’s rights to inherent dignity were violated as alleged or at all put the Claimant to strict proof thereof. The Respondents state that the decision of the Is1 Respondent was lawful, justified and in compliance with the 1st Respondent’s Human Resource Policies.

xxii. The Respondents further state that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the prayers sought in the Memorandum of Claim and the claim for violations of constitutional rights is defective and should have been filed by way of a Constitutional Petition. The Respondents will raise a preliminary objection in limine to the suit herein.

EVIDENCE

4. Claimant’s case was heard on 12th March 2025 and the claimant testified among others that she recorded a witness statement on 8th March 2018 which she relied on as her evidence in chief. She also filed bundles of documents dated 5th March 2018 which she relied on as her exhibits in the case. She also filed a supplementary witness statement dated 14th November 2024.

5. In cross-examination she stated among others that she was offered a job as a Programme Officer Policy- Advocacy and was reporting to Director Policy and Advocacy. Clause 1.2 of the contract – agreement was for three years reviewable/renewable subject to performance and funding. She admitted that the renewal was not automatic and that under clause 11.2, the agreement could be terminated by a month’s notice and that the agreement was further governed by respondent’s Human Resource Manual. It was her evidence that she was an international recruited staff (IRS) and that all IRS contracts were fixed terms contracts. Respondent guaranteed at least three months’ notice of intention not to renew contract. It was however her position that the respondent was obliged to give reasons for non-renewal. The claimant stated that her annual salary was USD 85,000/= payable monthly. This was stated at clause 5 of the contract and that she was exempted from taxes. The claimant further stated that her annual salary including allowances was approximately USD 124,000/= and that she was eligible for merit awards. Merit awards were based on performance clause as contained at clause 8.1 of the Human Resources Manual. She however stated that she never received merit award during my employment.

6. The claimant further testified that she was entitled to medical insurance and counselling and that the contract was signed on behalf of the respondent by the Human Resource Manager on behalf of the respondent and that the letter of confirmation was signed by Chief Human Resource Officer and Advisor to the President. The claimant admitted that at p16 of the RBD was letter on change of role and reporting and that the Advocacy Officer was reporting to Head of Policy & Advocacy. She however stated that the reason for change and was not explained to her but that she knew the reason since she was part of the restructuring. It was further her evidence that she was part of the restructuring, so she knew about it. The letter however did not indicate change and duties. It never mentioned extension of contract.

7. Regarding appraisal, she stated that she was subject to annual performance appraisal and that she underwent the same and that she knew the criteria. She however stated that the document at page 83 which was her appraisal by her supervisor was not signed and that her calibration was 3.8 and that there was attempt to put her on PIP. She received the PIP form found at page 140 of RBD and that it had her comments on it. Regarding the email at page166 of the RBD dated 11th August, 2017, she stated that they had a meeting on 28th July, 2017 and was informed of the intention to renew her contract but responded saying she was not ready to renew as she wanted to pursue other interests and left the director take any decision they deemed fit. She further stated that she was aware of the respondent’s global structure but never reported directly to the president.

8. Regarding bullying, it was her evidence that she never filed any complaint of bullying by the president. She confirmed that the president made appointments but did not interfere with appraisal and the president only appointed IRS that reported to her. It was her view that the interference appeared in the process and not directly and that she never appealed against her appraisal because the context was not there.

9. Regarding her distress she stated that she sought treatment for the distress she underwent. The Doctor wrote to the respondent and advised that she be given 10 days off which was granted but the respondent kept sending email on work issues.

10. The claimant’s second witness (CW2) duly sworn stated that her name was Grace Kibunya and that she filed a witness statement on March 23rd March 2023 and she relied on the same as her evidence in chief. In cross-examination she stated that she was running AGRF and that she reported to Adam Meyer. He was chief of staff reporting to President. They both worked under different divisions with the claimant. AGRF worked with all departments of the respondent. She never reported the threats and intimidations to anyone in AGRA – the respondent. According to her the bullying and harassment went on with several people including herself however she had no evidence except that the claimant spoke to her at length about the harassment by Agnes and the mental stress.

11. The Respondent’s case on the other hand was heard on 13th May, 2025 and the respondent’s witness Boaz Kaisare (RW1) testified that he was the Director for Policy for the respondent and used to be head of policy and Advocacy and that he knew the claimant. She used to work for the respondent and reported to him. He stated that he signed a witness statement on 12th September 2022 and relied on the same as his evidence in chief he also relied on the documents filed by the respondent in support of the respondent’s defence.

12. In cross-examination he stated that at the time of the trial he was the Director for policy at the respondent and that the claimant was asked to report to him from January 2017. The Employment contract contained the letter of appointment. The agreement was for three years renewable on performance and funding. There was to be review for renewal by the end of the second year. The contract started in December 2014. It was his evidence that he could not recall any performance issues against the claimant as of 2016 and was not aware if the respondent reviewed the claimant’s contract towards renewal. He acknowledged that C1 1.2 of the contract did not state that the contract was for a specific period.

13. Concerning termination, he stated that the claimant was invited for a hearing, discussions were held and the claimant eventually terminated. The claimant was issued with a notice of non-renewal found at page 181 of the RBD. According to him, there was no need for hearing. Regarding appraisal he stated that the claimant’s calibrated score in 2016 was 2.88. He made reference to the appraisal dated 4th March 2017 and accepted that it was not signed. According to him the claimant refused to sign the same. At page 17 of CBD was a letter dated 15th August 2017 and the calibrated score for 2016 was stated as 3.68. He stated that as the claimant’s supervisor he could not verify the source and the authenticity of the letter. It was not addressed to him or his department. The document was purportedly signed by Director human resource. Mr. Kaisare admitted that as per the letter found at page 212 of CBD from Gilead Medical Centre, the claimant was undergoing mental treatment and as a leader he suggested psychological counselling for the claimant.

14. In re-examination he clarified that he joined the respondent in June 2015 and that the Claimant started reporting to me in 2017. He was the head of policy and Advocacy then. The letter was to confirm who she was reporting to after restructuring. Even before the claimant was reporting to him. The contract was to be read together with the policy manual. The review of the contract was done in 2016 and that he did the review himself. He clarified that the contract could be terminated for other reasons before expiry of three years and that the claimant’s contract was terminated for lapse of time and not on disciplinary issues.

15. The respondent’s second witness (RW2) Dorca Muchai testified that she was the interim Director for People and Organizational Development and that she signed her statement dated 16th May 2025 which she adopted as her evidence in chief. According to her, after individual appraisal the same was discussed with the line manager. The data was then presented to calibration Committee. This was to ensure objectivity and remove possible biases. Additional information on individual performance may be looked into at this stage and the final rating would be done thereafter and that a staff may challenge the final rating. There was a panel to deal with that.

16. She further testified that in August 2017 there was no email regarding contract renewal exchanged between the claimant and Elizabeth and that at p165 RBD was an email on intention not to renew the contract. The email was written before the letter at page 17 CBD on claimant’s performance. The performance above 3.68 was good performance and that the claimant’s performance was placed at 2.8889 and this was at page 166 of the RBD. Further that the document at page 157 did not indicate when the calibration was done. The appraisal at 3.68 might have been an agreement and that the claimant did not agree to be put in PIP. About psychological issues, it was her evidence that she was not aware that the claimant was undergoing the same but there was a letter from Gilead Mental Health Consultants and that the claimant sought extended period of sick off. She also admitted that she was aware the claimant complained of bullying at the workplace but there was a grievance handling mechanism and that the claimant did not file any complaint of harassment by the 2nd respondent.

17. In cross-examination she stated that she was the Interim Director for People and dealt with Human Resource issues and that she was testifying on behalf of the respondents. It was her evidence that the 2nd respondent had since left respondent’s employment. She stated that she was familiar with the claimant’s contract. Regarding contract renewal, she stated that clause 1.2 of the contract document provided that it would be reviewed at the end of 2nd year. The commencement date of contract was 1st December 2014. The 2nd year review was to be 2nd December 2016 but there was no evidence of contract review at the end of the 2nd year. He further stated that the meaning of calibration was not captured in the contract but was captured in Human Resource policy. He further stated that the letter found at page 17 of CBD placed the claimant’s rating at 3.68 and that he did not dispute the same. He however emphasised that the contract and HR Policy prevailed and that the claimant was on a fixed term contract and that there was no need to issue a notice to show cause. He further stated that the claimant was not invited for disciplinary hearing and that the letter at page 16 of CBD concerned change of roles of the claimant, but the other terms of the contract remained unchanged.

18. In re-examination she stated that employees were provided with human resource policy with the contract and that all appointments were on fixed term and extension depended on funding and further that there was performance review at the end of the 2nd year.

CLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

19. Counsel for the claimant Mr. Mailu submitted among others that:

a) At the time of the Claimant's employment, the Respondents did not have immunity and even when the Respondents were conferred immunity, the Agreement was never changed to curve out the Respondents' irrevocable submission to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court as per Clause 18 of the Agreement. Whereas Clause 1.1 of the Agreement provided that the Agreement was to be for a period of 3 years, it subsequently stated that “Notwithstanding this clause (clause 1.1), the Agreement was not to be regarded as a contract for any specific period of time”.

b) It was a term of the Agreement that the Agreement would be "reviewed at

“The end of the 2nd year towards renewal based on funding and individual performance. “

Through a letter dated 15 August 2017, the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that her calibrated Performance Appraisal Rating for the Year 2016 was 3.68 out of a possible 5.0. The said letter further thanked the Claimant for her "commitment" and wished her the very best in her job. Given the terms of the Contract, the Claimant was of the view that her contract was not for a fixed term. Moreover, if the Respondents deemed it to be for a fixed term, the Claimant had a legitimate expectation that the Agreement would be renewed for another term as the 1st Respondent did not have a funding issue and her individual performance was stellar. According to counsel, the 2nd Respondent often bullied, harassed, intimidated and verbally assaulted the Claimant publicly during meetings in the presence of other staff and even donors during her 2nd year of employment. The 2nd Respondent had not denied this allegation.

c). Concerning the claimant’s salary, it was submitted that the Claimant's base Annual Salary at the time of her termination was USD 111, 966.00 composed of USD base salary 85,000.00 a post adjustment of $ 26,966.00 per annum excluding benefits. The Claimant's other annual benefits totaling USD 97,716.00 included school fees allowances for her 3 children of USD 48,000.00 per year paid upon expenditure report (Receipt or Bill), a Housing Allowance of USD 10,000.00 for housing, a contribution by the employer to the Provident fund of USD 12,750.00

d). Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, it was submitted that the honourable had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. According to counsel, the issue of jurisdiction was paramount and whenever raised, the Court must deal with the issue in limine.

e). According to counsel, the Respondents through an Application dated 7 May 2018 (Respondents' Application) invoked Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act, Cap 179, Laws of Kenya alongside the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. They argued that, due to their claimed diplomatic immunity, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case against them, as stipulated under Section 4 and Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act. However, on 24 September 2018, the trial Court dismissed the Respondents' Application and held that the question of their immunity could only be resolved after a full hearing of the case. The Respondents subsequently appealed the trial Court's decision at the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial Court's decision, agreeing that issues related to diplomatic immunity should be addressed during the hearing stage rather than at the interlocutory stage.

f). The Respondents contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction by virtue of section 11(1) of Privileges and Immunities Act read together with Legal Notice No. 24 of 24 February 2016 in which the Respondents were conferred immunity status by the then Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Section 11(1) provides:

“Technical assistance, etc., agencies

a. Where the Government of Kenya has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into any agreement with an external agency under which, in return for assistance or co-operation in works executed in, or rendered to, Kenya by that agency, the Government has agreed that such agency or persons in its service should enjoy immunities or privileges, the Minister may, by order:

i. declare that such agency is one to which this section applies;

ii. provide that, to such extent as may be specified in the order, such agency shall have the immunities and privileges set out in Part I of the Fourth Schedule to this Act; and

iii. confer upon such classes of officers and servants of such agency as may be specified in the order, to such extent as may be so specified, the immunities and privileges set out in Part III of the Fourth Schedule, and for the purposes of any such order references in the said Fourth Schedule to the organization shall be construed as references to the external agency named in the order.”

g). On this issue counsel submitted that it was not in dispute that by the time the Claimant entered the Agreement with the 1st Respondent dated 27 July 2015, the Respondents had not been granted immunity status. This was evidenced by the fact that the Agreement provided at Clause 18 that the applicable law for purposes of interpretation of the Agreement is:

b. “The Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in all respects in accordance with Kenyan law and the parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of Kenya to settle any disputes that may arise in connection with your employment and this Agreement.”

h). It was imperative to note that the term “irrevocable” as defined by the 9th edition of Black's Law dictionary means “unalterable; committed beyond recall.” Accordingly, the Respondents having made an unalterable commitment could not be allowed to recall it later. Such an unalterable commitment could not be altered in any other way save for written mutual agreement of the parties. Further for the sake of argument, even if it were possible to alter the irrevocable commitment to the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts, when the 1st Respondent was granted immunity status through Legal Notice no 24 dated 26 February 2016, the Claimant's Agreement was not amended to carve out of the irrevocable undertaking by the parties to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court in Kenya to settle any dispute that may arise in connection with the Agreement. Additionally, the Respondents never notified the Claimant that they did not intend to be bound by Clause 18 following the grant of immunity.

i). If the Respondents intended to be shielded by immunity, they should have revised the Agreement, providing the Claimant with the opportunity to determine whether she wished to forego the Court's jurisdiction in resolving disputes between her and the respondents. This was in line with Section 10 (5) of the Employment Act which required the employer to consult with an employee before revising the terms of an employment contract and such change to be in writing. It would be unjust for the Respondents to raise the issue of immunity when the Claimant had exercised the same right both parties agreed to in the Agreement. In this regard Counsel relied on the case of Antoine Ndiaye V African Virtual University where the High Court dealt with a similar issue in which an organisation entered into an employment contract with an employee prior to being granted immunity. The High Court held that such immunity could not apply retrospectively but prospectively.

j). Further, sections 27 and 28 of the Interpretation and General provisions Act, Cap 2 which provide that all subsidiary legislation operates from the date of Gazettement and if they are to operate retrospectively, it should be stated as such in the legislation itself. Legal Notice 24 which granted the Respondents immunity had not been stated to apply retrospectively. It was additionally submitted that the Legal Notice No. 24 dated 26 February 2016 was not absolute since the Respondent was not a sovereign state but an international organisation whose immunity had been donated. The Employment and Labour Relation Court in Aderbis v Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa [2023] KEELRC 2530 (KLR) held that:-

“immunity granted to international organizations was upon application, donated hence discretionary and not stricto sensu on the same plane as sovereign immunity, which was inherent and granted to states by virtue of being part of the community of nations intended to be protected by articles of the Vienna Convention.”

k). The Claimant's claim against the Respondents was based on a contract of employment which was under the ambit of private law and state immunity did not apply.

l). Regarding the claimant’s contract, it was submitted that the 1st Respondent did not have a fair and valid reason to terminate the Claimant’s service. In this regard, counsel adopted three points of argument, namely:

c) the ambiguous Clause 1.2 of the Agreement.

d) the Alleged Poor Performance by the Claimant.

e) the end date of the contract, if at all for a fixed period was 1 December 2017 and not 30 November 2017.

Concerning the ambiguity of clause 1.2 of the Agreement, it was submitted that through a letter dated 31 August 2017 titled "Non-Renewal of Your Employment Contract," (the letter of non-renewal) the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant that the Agreement would not be renewed upon expiration. It was imperative to note that the letter of non-renewal referred to Clause 1.2 of the Agreement which Clause stated that:

a. "This Agreement is for a period of 3 years and will be reviewed at the end of the 2nd year towards renewal based on funding and individual performance. Notwithstanding this clause, the Agreement will not be regarded as a contract for any specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice in accordance with Clause 11.3."

Clause 1.2 of the Agreement was therefore ambiguous. While it indicated that the Agreement was for a period of three years, it also stated that the Agreement should not be regarded as a contract for a specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice in accordance with Clause 11.3 of the Agreement.

m). Counsel further submitted that the Claimant testified that she viewed the Agreement as not being a fixed-term contract as is it was the practice in international organizations to automatically renew unless there are issues of poor performance and lack of funding which should be clearly communicated in the termination letter. It was submitted that whereas Clause 1.2 of the Agreement provided for a review at the end of the second year geared towards renewal based on funding and performance, the Respondents' witnesses as well as the Claimant, testified that the review at the end of the second year was never conducted. Counsel further submitted that if the 1st Respondent intended for the Agreement to be strictly three years in duration, why was this review not conducted as provided for under Clause 1.2 of the Agreement?

n). Further, given the contradictory nature of the Clause 1.2 of the Agreement, it was reasonable for the Claimant to perceive the Agreement as not being a fixed-term Agreement, particularly since the latter part of Clause 1.2 of the Agreement not only provided so but also specifically indicated that it was not a contract for a specific period of time and it could be terminated with notice in accordance to Clause 11.3 of the Agreement. In Paragraph 7 of Boaz Keizire's witness statement, which he adopted as his evidence in chief, he asserted that Clause 1.2 of the Agreement denoted that the Agreement was indeed for a fixed term of three years and any renewal would be at the discretion of the 1st Respondent, but subject to funding and the Claimant's performance. Counsel however disagreed and submitted that Clause 1.2 of the Agreement did not afford the 1st Respondent limitless discretion regarding renewal but rather stipulated that such renewal must depend on specified criteria which was the availability of funds and the Claimant's performance.

o). In this respect, counsel relied on the case Transparency International - Kenya v Omondi [2023] KECA 174 (KLR) cited with the authority the case of Francis Chire Chachi v Amatsi Water Services Company Limited, [2012] eKLR in which the court stated that;

“This court has recently stated that employers are not under any obligation to give employees reasons for non-renewal of fixed term contracts, unless there is such an obligation created in the expiring contract.” (emphasis added)

Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Registered Trustees De La Salle Christian BrothersT/A St. Mary's Boys' Secondary School v Julius D M Baini [2017] eKLR stated that:

“In the view of the court, there is no obligation on the part of an employer to give reasons to an employee why a fixed-term contract of employment should not be renewed. To require an employer to give reasons why the contract should not be renewed, is the same thing as demanding from an employer to give reasons why, a potential employee should not be employed. The only reason that should be given is that the term has come to an end, and no more.... Reasons, beyond effluxion of time, are not necessary in termination of fixed-term contracts, unless there is a clause in the contract, calling for additional justification for the termination.”(emphasis added)

p). The claim under Clause 1.2 of the Agreement that renewal would be based on "funding and your individual performance" provided essential parameters that ought to have been considered by the 1st Respondent. Further Clause 1.2 of the Agreement provided that if adequate funding was available and the Claimant's performance was satisfactory, which it was, there was a legitimate expectation that the 1st Respondent would renew the Agreement. Smith, Woolf & Jowell, in “Judicial Review of Administrative Action cited in Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex Parte M- Kopa Kenya Limited stated:

“A legitimate expectation arises where a person responsible for taking a decision has induced in someone a reasonable expectation that he will receive or retain a benefit of advantage. It is a basic principle of fairness that legitimate expectations ought not to be thwarted. The protection of legitimate expectations is at the root of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which requires predictability and certainty in government's dealings with the public.”

The Court of Appeal in Transparency International - Kenya v Omondi [2023] KECA 174 (KLR) held that:

“Concomitantly, the scenario would have been different if there was an indication, by act or omission from the appellant, to indicate renewal was forthcoming to whet the respondent's appetite, that her contract would be renewed and hence rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation.”

The Employment and Labour Relations Court in Mwangi Ngumo v Kenya Institute of Management [2012] eKLR addressed the contra preferentum rule as follows; -

“The contract itself, it appears was drawn by the Respondents. And if it was not drawn by the Respondents, it has not been shown or argued that the Respondents entered into it under duress or coercion. I do agree with the Claimant that any ambiguities in the contract should be construed against the party who drew the contract and that party is the Respondents. This is what has been referred to as the contra proferentem rule and which was applied in the case of Horne Coupar v Velletta & Co. 2010 BCSC 483, relied on by the Claimant.”

q). Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent has claimed that the Claimant's performance was unsatisfactory, attributing this as a reason for non-renewal of the Agreement despite the letter of non­renewal not stating so. The Respondents' witnesses testified that the 2016 Performance Appraisal Rating for the Claimant was 2.68. However, we submit that the calibration score that was ultimately used to categorize the Claimant as a non-performer contradicted established criteria by the 1st Respondent, as this calibration process was not provided for in either the Agreement or the 1st Respondent's Human Resources Policy Manual, a fact which was confirmed by Doreen Muchai, who testified as the second Respondents' witness.

r). Clause 8.0 and 8.2 of the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Policy Manual provided for a structured performance appraisal process that incorporated both self-evaluation and supervisory assessment. However, the Claimant was subjected to an additional level of performance appraisal conducted by management, which was not stipulated in the Agreement nor the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Policy Manual. This illegitimate process ultimately resulted in a purported reduction of her performance score to a below satisfactory level, as alleged by the witnesses for the Respondents and seemingly informed the “non­renewal” of her contract.

s). Boaz Keizire, the Claimant's supervisor, admitted in paragraph 13 of his witness statement that following the Claimant's self-assessment, he awarded her a score of 3 out of 5, which was considered above average. In addition to these discrepancies, the 1st Respondent informed the Claimant through the letter dated 15 August 2017 that her 2016 Performance Appraisal score after calibration was 3.68. Further, the Respondents' witness, Doreen Muchai, acknowledged that the letter dated 15 August 2017 indicating the Claimant's performance rating as 3.68 was indeed issued by the 1st Respondent. Notably, in an attempt to extricate the 1st Respondent from the implications of this letter, Doreen testified that the letter was released to the Claimant erroneously. However, this supposed error was never communicated to the Claimant. This also proves that it is indeed true that the Claimant faced harassment and sabotage while working at the 1st Respondent's company.

t). It was therefore submitted that the 1st Respondent did not follow a fair procedure when terminating the Claimant's employment. Although Clause 1.2 of the Agreement specified that the decision to renew the Claimant's Agreement hinged on funding and performance, the letter of non-renewal failed to address whether these critical factors were duly considered. The Court of Appeal in Transparency International case (Supra) cited with the authority the case of Francis Chire Chachi v Amatsi Water Services Company Limited, [2012] eKLR in which the court stated that; “employers are not under any obligation to give employees reasons for non-renewal of fixed term contracts, unless there is such an obligation created in the expiring contract.” (emphasis added). Further, the Court of Appeal in Registered Trustees De La Salle Christian BrothersT/A St. Mary's Boys' Secondary School (Supra) stated that:

Reasons, beyond effluxion of time, are not necessary in termination of fixed-term contracts, unless there is a clause in the contract, calling for additional justification for the termination.”(emphasis added)

w). Concerning harassment at work, Counsel cited that case of Nzilu v Inter-Religious Council of Kenya & another [2025] KEELRC 931 (KLR) which cited ILO Convention No. 190- Violence and Harassment in the world of work which defines violence and harassment as

“ a range of unacceptable behaviour and practices, or threats thereof, whether a single occurrence or repeated, that aim at, result in, or are likely to result in Physical, psychological, sexual or economic harm, and includes gender-based violence.'

The Claimant alleged that the 2nd Respondent bullied, harassed, intimidated and verbally assaulted her during her employment, leading to her suffering from depression in March 2017 and requiring prolonged medical attention.Despite the personal nature of these allegations, the 2nd Respondent did not avail herself to testify in response to the claims. Also, the witnesses presented by the Respondents did not produce any authority to testify on behalf of the 2nd Respondent.

Mr. Boaz Keizire, a witness for the 1st Respondent, confirmed during the hearing that he was aware the Claimant was undergoing treatment for mental health issues.

The Claimant also produced an email dated 29 March 2017 from Boaz Keizire recommending to the Claimant to consult a psychological expert. The Claimant's witness, Grace Kibunja, testified that she observed the 2nd Respondent engaging in harassment and bullying of the Claimant. In her witness statement, she provided specific instances detailing how and when the 2nd Respondent harassed and bullied the Claimant.

x). The Labour Court of South Africa, Johannesburg, in the case of Windscreen Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Motor Industry Bargaining Council (Dispute Resolution Centre) and Others (JR1767/2012) [2014] ZALCJHB 114 (4 March 2014) drew an adverse inference against the Applicant (employer) for failing to call Botha, a key manager and the only direct participant in a critical meeting held on 13 December 2011 with the 3rd Respondent (employee), as a witness. This omission led to the inference that Botha's testimony would have damaged the employer's case, particularly since the employee claimed Botha demanded she sign a pre-prepared voluntary retrenchment agreement or leave immediately, which she refused, prompting her summary dismissal. The court noted the employer's inadequate explanation for not calling Botha and upheld the employee's version of events which was corroborated by another witness, Henderson who described Botha's aggressive actions in urging the employee to exit.

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS

20. Counsel for the respondent Mrs. Ahomo submitted among others that:

This Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter

i) The Respondents raised a preliminary objection in the Amended Statement of Response on the grounds that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter under the provisions of the Privileges and Immunities Act1 as read together with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as the Claimant is non-suited against them.

ii) The challenge to this Honourable Court’s jurisdiction to hear the suit on the basis that the Respondents have diplomatic immunity and the misjoinder of the 2nd Respondent was initially heard by this Honourable Court and in a Ruling delivered on 24th September 2018. the Court found that these were issues that would need to be determined after a full hearing in order to find out the extent if any to which the is immunity. In its judgment delivered on 7th February 2020, the Court of Appeal in Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa & Another v. Emime Ndihokubwayo agreed with the ruling of the Court and held that the issue of immunity could not be determined through a preliminary process and the suit should proceed to full hearing for the Court to determine the existence and the extent of the pleaded immunity. In the circumstances, the issue of immunity is now ripe for determination.

A. Respondents have diplomatic immunity

iii) The Respondents submit that at all material times to the dispute before the Court, they were clothed in diplomatic immunity, and this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim against the Respondents.

iv) Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act vests the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs powers to grant privileges and immunities to certain international organizations hosted in Kenya and to persons connected therewith. In exercise of his powers under Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs duly declared the 1st Respondent as an organization to which Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act applies vide Legal Notice No. 24 Privileges and Immunities (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) Order, 2016 dated 26th February 20162 as required by law and pursuant to an Agreement dated 11th March 2008, between the Government of Kenya and the 1st Respondent, regarding the establishment of its headquarters in Kenya as required by law. Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act specifically provides that:

“Where the Government of Kenya has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into any agreement with an external agency under which, in return for assistance or co-operation in works executed in, or services rendered to, Kenya by that agency, the Government has agreed that such agency or persons in its service should enjoy immunities or privileges, the Minister may, by order—

declare that such agency is one to which this section applies;

provide that, to such extent as may be specified in the order, such agency shall have the immunities and privileges set out in Part I of the Fourth Schedule to this Act;

confer upon such classes of officers and servants of such agency as may be specified in the order, to such extent as may be so specified, the immunities and privileges set out in Part III of the Fourth Schedule,

and for the purposes of any such order references in the said Fourth Schedule to the organization shall be construed as references to the external agency named in the order. ”

v) Vide Legal Notice No. 24 the Respondent was accorded the legal capacity of a body corporate with the privileges and immunities specified in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act accord the 1st Appellant “immunity from suit and legal process” and “exemption from rates and taxes, other than taxes on the importation of goods, as is accorded to a mission by the First Schedule.”

vi) The 2nd Respondent was pursuant to Clause 4 of the same Legal Notice, accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Paragraphs 2 and 7 of Part III of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act. The Respondents also submit that the 2nd Respondent, at all material times the 1st Respondent’s President, is also a privileged person against whom civil action could not be entertained pursuant to the provisions Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, domesticated in Kenya through Section 4 of the Privileges and Immunities Act which provides as follows:

“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

i) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

ii) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

iii) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. ”

vii) The Respondents submit that the 2nd Respondent’s immunity flows from the 1st Respondent’s immunity in her capacity as the President. The Respondents further submit that from the foregoing, the Respondents have immunity from suits and legal process including the instant suit and, in the circumstances, this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. In support of this submission, the Respondents rely on the decision of the High Court in N J vs. Aglia Khan Academy & 6 Others1* where Mwita J, (as he then was) having had the opportunity to address himself on the effect and purport of the provisions of Section 11 and the privileges conferred upon an organization by virtue of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act, found that the 5th Respondent in the said matter, having been conferred with statutory immunity, enjoyed immunity from the suit before the High Court as follows:

“24. The manner of conferring statutory immunity is provided for in section 11(3) which provides that (3) where immunities and privileges are conferred upon any person by an order under subsection (1) of this section, the Minister shall, by notice in the Gazette, specify the persons who are for the time being entitled to those immunities and privileges. Statutory immunity was thus conferred on the 5th respondent by paragraph 3 of the Aga Khan Network Order which states that The Aga Khan Development Network shall have the privileges and immunities specified in part 1 of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. Part 1 of the Fourth Schedule is clear that it applies to sections 9 and 11 and provides for immunity from suit and legal process.

25. There is no doubt, therefore, that the 5lh respondent has immunity from suits and other legal processes a fact the petitioner did not dispute. That means the 5th respondent is immune from suits and legal processes in this country including this petition. It is therefore clear to me, that the 5th respondent having been conferred with immunity and privileges in accordance with the law is immune from the present litigation and the petitioner’s decision to include it in this petition was doomed to fail.”

viii) The Claimant contends that the Claimant’s claim is based on a contract of employment which belongs under the ambit of private law and state immunity does not apply and in support of her submission, relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Embassy of Sweden vs. Lucy Muingo Kusewa & Renald Mbonge Mjomba. 2020 [Unreported], The Claimant then proceeds to place reliance on the provisions of Article 11 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. However, My Lord, the Claimant’s contention is misguided and the authority relied upon is distinguishable for the following reasons:

i) Kenya is not a state party to and has not ratified the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004) and the said Convention does not therefore form part of Kenyan law as envisaged by Article 2(6) of the Constitution. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Unicom limited vs. Ghana High Commission3 4 held as follows at paras. 14 and 15:

“14. ... Counsel however based their arguments before us on the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. That Convention was not invoked by the lower court. Furthermore, that Convention is not yet in force. Article 30 thereof provides that:

“1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary- General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present Convention after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ix) As this Court observed recently in Karen Njeri Kandie vs Alssane B & another 120151 eKLR, that Convention is not “reflective of the Kenyan law on the subject” and “there is no evidence that Kenya has ratified that 2004 Convention”. Under Article 2(6} of the Constitution of Kenya, “any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution”, and to the extent that Kenya has not ratified that Convention, it is not part of the law of Kenya. ”

x) The above notwithstanding and as authoritatively held by this Honourable Court in Joyce Mueni Gatambia vs. Aga Khan Foundation (Kenya) & Another the cited Convention “is an instrument that relates to states and to other state like territories. In any event, Kenya has not ratified the same and is not bound by the provisions of the said Convention.” The 1st Respondent is an international non­governmental organization whose immunity is not covered by the Convention.

xi) In view of the foregoing, the contention that the Claimant’s employment contract falls under private law and state immunity does not apply is clearly misguided and not supported in law. Further, the Embassy of Sweden Nairobi case relied on by the Claimant speaks to state immunity enjoyed by diplomatic missions rather than international non-governmental organizations like the 1st Respondent herein. The employment agreement between the Claimant and the 1st Respondent for her employment as Program Officer, Policy in the Policy and Advocacy program of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) was not entered into by the 1st Respondent in a private capacity but the same was directly connected to and necessary for the fulfilment of the 1st Respondent’s gazetted objective of “developing and implementing strategies for agricultural development in Africa.” The Respondents submit that the employment contract passes the test set down by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Defence of the Government of the United Kingdom vs. Ndegwa5 6 as follows:

“It is apparent that there is no absolute sovereign immunity. It is restrictive. The test is whether the foreign sovereign or government was acting in a governmental or private capacity then the doctrine will apply otherwise it will not afford protection to a private transaction. The nature of the act is, therefore, important.”

xii) This is to be contrasted from the facts in the Tononoka Steels Limited case relied on by the Claimant where the transaction under consideration by the Court was a purely commercial transaction where the bank offered financial services or even in the Unicom Limited case where the relationship between the parties was a tenancy agreement. The Respondents further submit that it is now trite law and has been settled by the Courts that immunity from suit is not a denial of access to justice but only a procedural bar from approaching Court for determination of the rights of parties to a dispute.

xiii) The Claimant also contends that immunity does not apply to the employment contract between her and the 1st Respondent because under the provisions of Clause 18 of the employment contract, parties had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Kenyan Courts and that having failed to amend the provisions of the said clause, the Respondents waived their right to assert the defence of immunity.

xiv) The employment contract dated 18th August 2014 between the 1st Respondent, and the Claimant was entered into before the Respondents were granted diplomatic immunity. The Respondents submit that the provisions of Clause 18 of the agreement stood amended and/or varied on 26th February 2016 by application of law. Indeed, in the said clause, the parties bound themselves to have the Agreement “governed and interpreted in accordance with Kenyan law” which includes the immunities and privileges conferred pursuant to Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act through Legal Notice No. 24 of 2016.

xv) The Respondents submit that waiver of immunity must be unequivocal. Article 32 (1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that the immunity from jurisdiction of domestic courts may only be waived expressly. Upon immunity having been granted to the Respondents and the provisions of Clause 18 of the Agreement having been amended and/or varied by operation of law, the Respondents could only waive their immunity through an express further agreement with the Claimant. In fact, the Respondents have pleaded immunity in the first instance, denied the jurisdiction of this Court and averred that as at the time the cause of action arose, the 1st Respondent was clothed in immunity from suit and legal process under paragraph 1 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule of the Privileges and Immunities Act. In any event, the contract between the Claimant and the 1st Respondent does not oust the diplomatic immunity conferred on the 1st Respondent.

xvi) Without prejudice to the above, the Respondents submit that the Claimant has no cause of action against the 2nd Respondent as there is no privity of contract between herself and the 2nd Respondent, the then President of the 1st Respondent. The employment contract, basis of the claim before this Honourable Court, was between the 1st Respondent and the Claimant. Similarly, the Court of Appeal, in the case of William Muthee Muthami vs. Bank of Baroda addressed itself as follows on the doctrine of privity of contract:

“..It is elementary learning, that as a general rule, according to the common law doctrine of privity of contract, rights and obligations under a contract are only conferred or imposed on the parties to that contract. This doctrine was stated as long ago as 1861 by Wightman, J. in Tweedie V. Afkinson (1861) EWHCQBJ57 in the following oft-cited words

“....no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit. ”

We are further guided by Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 9 (1) Para 749 and this Court’s own recent decision in Aineah Liluyani Njirali vs Aga Khan Health Services 12013] Civil Application No. 194 of 2009. In the former, the authors explain that:-

“The general rule: the destine of privity of contract is that, as a general rule, at common law a contract cannot confer rights or impose strangers to it. That is, persons who are not parties to it. The parties to a contract are those persons who reach agreement and, whilst it may be clear in a simple case who those parties are, it may not be so obvious where there are several contracts, or several parties, or both, for example in the case of multilateral contracts; collateral contracts, irrevocable credits contracts made on the basis of the memorandum and articles of a company; collective agreements, contracts with unincorporated association; and mortgage surveys and valuation. ”

xvii) In the circumstances, the Respondents submit that the Claimant was non-suited against the 2nd Respondent, the fact that the Respondents have diplomatic immunity from legal process notwithstanding. That there was therefore misjoinder of the 2nd Respondent to the claim, a pure employee - employer dispute.

xviii) Without prejudice to all the foregoing, the Respondents will submit on the merit of the suit as hereunder:

Termination of the Claimant’s employment was fair

xix) From the outset, the Respondents submit that the Claimant’s employment contract with the 1st Respondent terminated by effluxion of time. On her part, the Claimant contends that the 1st Respondent did not have a fair and valid reason to terminate the Claimant. The burden of proof in a claim for unfair termination lies with the employee to prove that the termination was wrongful while the burden of justifying the grounds for termination of employment rests with employer as provided under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act.

xx) In interpreting this provision, Courts have upheld this two-pronged test requiring the employee to first prove that their termination was unfair prior to shifting the burden unto the employer to justify the reasons for termination this was demonstrated in Justice B.O.M. Manani’s holding in Galsalo Jarso Jillo vs. Agricultural Finance Corporation where the learned Judge held as follows:

“32. 47(5) of the Employment Act sometimes presents a challenge regarding how to navigate the aspect of the burden of proof in addressing disputes arising from terminations. It does suggest two burdens: the employee lies the burden of proving the unlawfulness of the termination; and the employer has the burden of justifying the termination. The interpretation given to the section by courts is that all the employee needs to do in order to discharge the burden of proof on him/her is to place before the court prima facie evidence suggesting that a termination has occurred and that the said termination lacks a substantive justification and or is procedurally flawed. Once the employee makes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts onto the employer to justify the termination.

In Josephine M. Ndungu & others vs Plan International Inc (2019] eKLR, the court said this of the foregoing:

“Under section 47(5) of the Employment Act, the burden of proving unfair termination lies with the employee. The said burden is discharged once he establishes a prima facie case that, the termination did not fall within the four corners of the legal threshold set out by section 45 of the Act.”

xxi) The Respondents submit that as provided under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, a reason is valid and fair if it relates to the employee’s conduct, capacity and compatibility or based on the employer’s operational requirements. It is the Respondents submission that pursuant to Clause 1.2 of the Claimant’s employment contract as read together with the provisions of Clause 4.6 the 1st Respondent’s HR Policies and Manual, that all appointments of staff are fixed term contracts.

xxii) Clause 1.2 of the Claimant’s employment contract provided that:

“This agreement is for a period of 3 years and will be reviewed at the end of the 2nd year towards renewal based on funding and your individual performance. Notwithstanding this clause, this agreement will not be regarded as a contract for any specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice in accordance with clause 11.3.”

xxiii) In cross-examination, the Claimant confirmed that according to Clause 12 of the contract, the terms of the employment contract were in addition to the terms in the Human Resource Policy and Manual (HR Policy and Manual) of AGRA.

No requirement for 1st Respondent to issue reasons for non-renewal of contract and the Claimant’s performance

xxiv) The Claimant contends that the criteria for renewal provided for under clause 1.2 of the employment contract, being funding and an employee’s individual performance, ought to have been considered by the 1st Respondent and if it was, the same was not mentioned in the letter of non-renewal of the contract. In support of this submission, the Claimant relies on the decision of Francis Chire Chachi vs. Amatsi Water Services Company Limited [2012] eKLR cited with approval in the Transparency International - Kenya case, that employers are not under an obligation to give employees reasons for non­renewal of fixed term contracts unless there is such an obligation created in the expiring contract.

xxv) There are not terms, express or otherwise in the employment contract or the HR Policies and Manual that place an obligation on the 1st Respondent to consider its funding and the Claimant’s performance before opting not to renew her contract. That notwithstanding, the Claimant contends that her performance was satisfactory performance and she therefore ought to have been considered for renewal of contract. She however confirmed that during her tenure at AGRA, she had never received a merit award, which was an award considered based on merit. We submit that if indeed her performance was as good as claimed, the Claimant would have surely received a merit award during the duration of her employment!

xxvi) Indeed, her own supervisor, RW-l’s comments in the Claimant’s 2016 performance appraisal form, are quite telling about the Claimant’s competencies. He noted that the Claimant needed to “strengthen the area of self-control to generate new advocacy ideas and drive them”, that she depicted “strong interpersonal relations, very calm and confident although she can sometimes overreact to situations”, that “she can set very easily frustrated with negative feedback " and “the organization does not feel a strong advocacy presence through her. ”

xxvii) During cross-examination, the Claimant confirmed that she was aware of the criteria used to measure her performance under Clause 8.2 of the HR Policy and Manual but proceeded to disown her calibrated appraisal score of 2.88 for the year 2016 which was contained in a document in her own trial bundle and produced as part of the Claimant’s exhibits in support of her case. On his part, RW-1 testified that the total score an employee could attain was 5 and any score below 3.0 was considered to be poor performance. That he awarded the Claimant a score of 3 out of 5 in her performance review but after calibration, the performance rating was 2.88.7 RW-2 evidence as contained in her witness statement corroborated RW-l’s testimony that RW-1 awarded her a score of 3.0 which score was reduced to 2.88 during the calibration process.

xxviii) In her evidence-in-chief, RW-2 testified that after personal assessment by the employee, the line manager also does his appraisal upon completion of which, the data is subjected to a calibration committee comprising of line managers who have interacted with the individual for their input to remove subjectivity biases after which there is a second level calibration attended by the President of AGRA and the Executive Management after which a calibrated score is the given.

No legitimate expectation for renewal of a fixed term contract

xxix) In answering whether the non-renewal of a fixed term contract of employment created a legitimate expectation that is capable of an enforcement through an award of damages, the Court of Appeal in Transparency International - Kenya vs. Teresa Carlo Omondi authoritatively held that “the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not arise in the renewal of a fixed-term contract and its non-renewal cannot constitute unfair termination or dismissal. ” Further, the Court held that “whether a contract with a renewal clause will be extended or not, is an issue that is at the discretion of the employer and it cannot create a legal right under the doctrine of legitimate expectation.”

xxx) That Claimant contends that if adequate funding was available (which has not been denied) coupled with her satisfactory performance, she had a legitimate expectation that the 1st Respondent would renew the contract. However, the unsatisfactory performance of the Claimant and her refusal to collaborate in efforts to improve her performance notwithstanding, the 1st Respondent cannot be faulted for exercising discretion not to renew the Claimant’s employment contract. In any event, even in circumstances where an employee’s performance was satisfactory and she was severally promoted during the contract period, which she asserted contributed to her legitimate expectation that her contract would be renewed, this Honourable Court in the recently decided case of Christine Okore vs. LCVT Health held that such circumstances did not constitute a legitimate expectation that the employee’s contract would be renewed as follows:

"87.The Claimant’s position is that her performance was satisfactory, that she was severally promoted during the contract period, that she participated in planning meetings for the Respondent’s activities for the subsequent year, and finally, that she was included in the Respondent’s medical cover list, the totality of which she asserts contributed to her legitimate expectation that her contract would be renewed.

While these circumstances may have created a subjective expectation, they’ do not, in my considered view, constitute a clear and unambiguous representation that the contract would be renewed.

89.1 further note that the Claimant testified that she did not receive any written communication confirming renewal, did not know whether the renewal process had been initiated by her supervisor, nor did she in any wav inquire from the Respondent whether the renewal process had been initiated.

9O. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Claimant has not sufficiently established the existence of a legitimate expectation that her contract would be renewed.”

xxxi) The Claimant asserts that she viewed the agreement as not being a fixed-term contract as is the practice in international organizations to automatically renew unless there are issues of poor performance and lack of funding which should be clearly communicated in the termination letter. We have already established that for fixed-term contracts, there is no requirement in law or otherwise for the employer to give reasons for non-renewal of the contract. Further, we submit that the said “practice” in international organizations as claimed by the Claimant has not been demonstrated through cogent evidence or otherwise. We submit that the of renewal of a fixed term contract is not automatic and must be based on a clear representation made by the employer and must be based on clear representation or consistent practice. As held by the Court of Appeal in the Transparency International - Kenya case, “an automatically renewable fixed-term contract is a contradiction in terms, as it would subject the parties to an indeterminate employment contract.” Further, the Court of Appeal quoted with approval the decision of this Honourable Court in Margaret A. Ochieng vs. National Water Conservation & Pipeline Corporation where Justice Rika held that:

“In another case in which the main issue for determination was whether the respondent legitimately expected the contract to be renewed after the lapse of the contract period, Justice Rika, in Margaret A Ochieng v National Water Conservation& Pipeline Corporation f20I4] eKLR held that:

“Automatic renewal would undermine the very purpose of the fixed-term contract, and revert to indeterminate contracts of

employment courts have upheld the principle that fixed-term contracts carry’ no expectancy of renewal, in a catena of judicial authorities the court is persuaded that the claim has no merit. The fixed termination notice, in that the date of termination was advised to the claimant on execution of the three-year contract in December 2008. She knew termination would be upon the lapse of the three years in 2011...”

xxxii) The Claimant contends that the provisions of Clause 1.2 of the employment contract is ambiguous for indicating that the agreement is for a period of three years but also stating that the employment contract should not be regarded as a contract for a specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice. This contention is based on a misapprehension of the import of the said provision. The said provisions, correctly construed, means that the agreement could be terminated by either of the parties with notice before the lapse of the 3 years pursuant to the clause 11 on termination.

Alleged harassment and bullying of the Claimant by the 2nd Respondent

xxxiii) The Claimant alleges that the 2nd Respondent bullied, harassed, intimidated and verbally assaulted her during her employment, leading her to suffer depression in March 2017 and requiring prolonged medical attention. She claimed that she was bullied and harassed during meetings in the presence of other staff and even donors. However, the Claimant did not speak particularly to a specific incidence where the alleged bullying took place.

xxxiv) PW-2, Grace Kibunja who claimed to have worked with the Claimant but confirmed on cross-examination that she and the Claimant worked in different Divisions of AGRA, claimed that she was present at two occasions where she experienced the 2nd Respondent’s alleged bullying and intimidating behaviour towards the Claimant. This evidence was not corroborated by the Claimant who could have easily testified to the same. PW-2’s evidence was not credible.

xxxv) As confirmed by Clause 2.9.7 of the 1st Respondent’s HR Policies and Manual,33 AGRA has an elaborate policy on harassment and discrimination and commits to providing a work environment that among others respects the dignity of the individual and is free from all forms of discrimination and free from general harassment. The HR Policies and Manual also provides that it has “established avenues of assistance for supporting staff who have experienced harassment or discrimination” and it "addresses promptly all complaints of discrimination, harassment or abuse of power. ”

xxxvi) The HR Policies and Manual are clear that "where such a complaint is upheld, AGRA takes disciplinary action against the offending staff member. ” The Harassment and Discrimination Policy is clear that where a complaint of such nature is upheld, the same results in disciplinary action against the said staff member.

xxxvii) The Claimant, who testified that she did not report to the 2nd Respondent as President of AGRA, confirmed on cross-examination that she did not raise any grievance or complaint to the Human Resource regarding the alleged bullying and harassment by the 2nd Respondent. Similarly, PW-2 who also confirmed that she did not report to the 2nd Respondent and also claimed to have also been harassed and bullied by the 2nd Respondent, also confirmed on cross-examination that she did not report any grievance relating to her alleged bullying by the 2nd Respondent to Human Resources or to the Board.

The Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought

xxxviii) The Respondents have demonstrated the Claimant’s employment contract was for a fixed term of 3 years, that no legitimate expectation arose for renewal of the same, that the 1st Respondent issued the Claimant with a notice of non-renewal of the contract as required by the 1st Respondent’s HR Policies and Manual and that the Claimant’s employment contract terminated by effluxion of time. The Claimant’s termination therefore passed the test for both substantive justification and procedural fairness.

xxxix) Further, Respondents have also demonstrated that the Claimant was not harassed and bullied by the 2nd Respondent and her rights to fair labour practices were not violated as claimed or at all.

xl) Consequently, the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought of declarations that her right to fair labour practices was violated, that she was unfairly and unlawfully terminated and the award of damages for unfair and unlawful termination in the sum of USD. 182,716.00 and an award for general damages in the sum of USD. 182,716.00 for violation of her right to fair labour practices. The amount claimed in damages, as confirmed by the Claimant, is made up of her annual salary (including benefits), education allowance and housing allowance. There is no justification in law or otherwise for the damages sought.

xli) Further, having failed to discharge her burden to prove that the 2nd Respondent bullied and harassed her and having failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the said alleged bullying and harassment led her to suffer depression in March 2017, the Claimant is not entitled to the prayers sought for a declaration that her right to human dignity was violated by the Respondents and the general damages sought for the violation of the said right in the sum of USD. 182,716.00. Similarly, the Claimant is also not entitled to the award of USD. 182,716.00 for mental anguish, torment and subsequent depression allegedly suffered.

DETERMINATION

21. The Court has carefully considered the elaborate pleadings by the protagonists, their hotly contested evidence and the insightful submissions by counsel. The court highly regards their persuasive knack. However, this court considers the two main issues that if properly determined would render justice to the parties regardless of in whose favour, the finding of the court is. As always said justice sometimes means not getting the outcome expected provided the scales were properly balanced. The first issue is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this claim and second, whether the claimant was engaged by the 1st respondent on fixed term contract (FTC) or on an open-ended contract and as a corollary, if the court finds that the latter was the case, was she unfairly terminated hence entitled to compensation for such and the quantum of such compensation.

22. On the issue of jurisdiction, it is now settled that this is the grundnorm of any claim or dispute presented before any adjudicating authority and without it, everything must grind to a halt. It has further been authoritatively stated that no amount of innovative interpretation can confer jurisdiction where none exists. That having been noted, the respondent objects to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the suit on the basis that the Respondents have diplomatic immunity and further that there is misjoinder of the 2nd Respondent in the suit on the basis that she was the authorized agent of the 1st Respondent in her capacity as the president. The objection as to jurisdiction and misjoinder was initially take in limine and was heard by this Honourable Court (Wasilwa J) and in a Ruling delivered on 24th September 2018, the learned Lady Justice held that the issue of misjoinder of the 2nd Respondent and jurisdiction could only be decided after the full trial, a position which was concurred with by the Court of Appeal. The court therefore proceeds to determine the issue of jurisdiction first.

23. The gravamen of the respondents’ objection to the jurisdiction is anchored on the provisions of Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act which vests the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs powers to grant privileges and immunities to certain international organizations hosted in Kenya and to persons connected therewith. In exercise of this power under Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs duly declared the 1st Respondent as an organization to which Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act applies vide Legal Notice No. 24 Privileges and Immunities (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) Order, 2016 dated 26th February 2016 as required by law and pursuant to an Agreement dated 11th March 2008, between the Government of Kenya and the 1st Respondent, regarding the establishment of its headquarters in Kenya as required by law.

24. Section 11 of the Privileges and Immunities Act specifically provides that:

“Where the Government of Kenya has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, entered into any agreement with an external agency under which, in return for assistance or co-operation in works executed in, or services rendered to, Kenya by that agency, the Government has agreed that such agency or persons in its service should enjoy immunities or privileges, the Minister may, by order—

declare that such agency is one to which this section applies;

provide that, to such extent as may be specified in the order, such agency shall have the immunities and privileges set out in Part I of the Fourth Schedule to this Act;

confer upon such classes of officers and servants of such agency as may be specified in the order, to such extent as may be so specified, the immunities and privileges set out in Part III of the Fourth Schedule,

and for the purposes of any such order references in the said Fourth Schedule to the organization shall be construed as references to the external agency named in the order. ”

25. Regarding the 2nd Respondent, pursuant to Clause 4 of the same Legal Notice, she was accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Paragraphs 2 and 7 of Part III of the Fourth Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act. The Respondents also submitted that the 2nd Respondent, at all material times was the 1st Respondent’s President hence a privileged person against whom civil action could not be entertained pursuant to the provisions Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, domesticated in Kenya through Section 4 of the Privileges and Immunities Act which provides as follows:

“A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

iv) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

v) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

vi) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. ”

26. In opposing the objection, counsel for the claimant submitted among others that at the time of the Claimant's employment, the Respondents did not have immunity and even when the Respondents were conferred immunity, the Agreement was never changed to carve out the Respondents' irrevocable submission to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court as per Clause 18 of the Agreement which provided that:

“The Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in all respects in accordance with Kenyan law and the parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of Kenya to settle any disputes that may arise in connection with your employment and this Agreement.”

27. According counsel, if the respondents intended to benefit from the Legal Notice which came after the entry into the employment contract with the claimant, they ought to have amended the contract but with concurrence of the claimant as required by section 10 of the Employment Act besides the legal notice did not provide for retroactive application required by sections 27 and 28 of the Interpretation and General provisions Act, Cap 2 which provide that all subsidiary legislation operate from the date of Gazettement and if they are to operate retrospectively, it should be stated as such in the legislation itself. Legal Notice 24 which granted the Respondents immunity had not been stated to apply retrospectively.

28. As pointed by Counsel for the claimant, this Court has had occasion to consider a similar objection involving the same respondent. This was in the case of Aderbis v Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa [2023] KEELRC 2530 (KLR) but before returning to what I considered and eventually decided in Aderbis case, it is useful go a little back. Earlier in this case, the Court of Appeal agreeing with Wasilwa J, stated that the issue of jurisdiction could not be determined through a preliminary objection. The issue before the trial Court was whether a contract of employment entered into in 2014 was affected by the Legal Notice No. 24 which came into force in 2019.

29. The contract in issue in that case just like the one in Aderbis case and before me, had a clause 18 which provided that the parties to the agreement irrevocably submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya to settle any disputes that could arise in connection with employment of their staff in Kenya just like the claimant before this court. The effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision mentioned earlier was whether immunity conferred by Privileges and Immunity Act applied, was a matter of inquiry and could not be disposed of by way of a preliminary objection. That is to say, there were cases where a Court on the evidence presented reached a conclusion that immunity did not apply. In other words, such immunity could be waived either expressly or by conduct of the beneficiary, in this case the respondent and the question is only determinable by receiving evidence in support of such conferment of immunity and or against it.

29. To try and understand if the respondent was immune from the jurisdiction of our judicial process, it is important to resort to Articles of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation having Force of Law in Kenya which are found at the First Schedule to the Privileges and Immunities Act which provides as follows at article 32;

“…The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending state.

2.The waiver must always be express.

3.The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counterclaim directly connected with the principal claim.

4.Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary…”

30. In my view the above provision by parity of reasoning implies that since a counterclaim is a cross-suit, where a diplomatic agent defends itself in a claim and raises a counterclaim, the person against whom it is counterclaimed has a right to put up a defence, crossclaim or plead set off or any other defence to the counterclaim. Any other different interpretation would yield an unconscionable result where a person enjoying diplomatic immunity has a right to sue by way of counterclaim but plead immunity if the defendant files a cross-suit or pleads set-off, accord or satisfaction or any other defence available to him. Furthermore, the foregoing provisions of article 32 of the Vienna Convention presents that diplomatic immunity is not absolute. In the case of Tandex Trading Corporation Ltd vs. Central Bank of Nigeria [1971]1 All ER 881. Shaw L.J stated as follows:

“…there has been put before the court a wealth of material comprising decisions of foreign courts and writings of international jurists which tend to show that over the last half century there has been a shift from the concept of absolute immunity to a narrower principle which excludes ordinary mercantile transactions from the ambit of sovereign immunity notwithstanding the sovereign state of a party to those transactions…so long as sovereign institutions confine themselves to what may in general terms be described as the basic functions of government a total personal or individual immunity from suits was unobjectionable…”

31. The respondent was granted immunity through Legal Notice No. 24 of 2019 after it had it entered into a contract of employment with the claimant which contained a clause that the parties will submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya to settle any disputes that could arise in connection with the Claimant's employment. It would therefore be unjust for the respondent to raise the issue of immunity when the claimant has exercised the self-same right both parties agreed to in the contract of employment. The respondent by conduct is deemed to have waived its right to immunity conferred by the legal notice and therefore could not rely on the same at this point. As rightly submitted by the claimant’s counsel, if the respondent intended the subsequent granting of immunity to cover its past legal obligations such as the employment contract with the claimant, nothing was easier than invoking provisions of section 10 of the Employment Act and engaging the claimant for the amendment of the contract to incorporate the legal notice granting it immunity. No such evidence was availed to court.

32. Before leaving the issue of immunity, it would be important to note that immunity granted to international organizations is upon application, donated hence discretionary and not stricto sensu on the same plane as sovereign immunity, which is inherent and granted to states by virtue of being part of the community of nations and intended to be protected by articles of the Vienna Convention. From the foregoing, the Court finds and holds that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The objection on jurisdiction is therefore dismissed.

33. The next issue that calls my decision at this point is whether the claimant herein was hired on FTC or an open-ended contract. The contention over what terms, the claimant was hired is reposit on clause 1.1 of the contract of employment which provided: -

“This agreement is for a period of 3 years and will be reviewed at the end of the 2nd year towards renewal based on funding and your individual performance. Notwithstanding this clause, this agreement will not be regarded as a contract for any specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice in accordance with clause 11.3.”

34. It is this clause that became contentious upon the decision not to renew the claimant’s contract by the respondent in exercise of the same hence this suit. According to the claimant, this clause meant that despite the statement that her contract was to be for a period of three years, it ought to have been construed as an open-ended contract and not for any specific period. Further that the criteria for renewal provided for under clause 1.2 of the employment contract was availability of funding and an employee’s individual performance and that the letter of termination mention neither of the two as reasons for not renewing her contract hence the termination was unfair within the meaning of section 45 of the Employment Act.

35. The respondent on the other hand contended that there were no terms, express or otherwise in the employment contract or the HR Policies and Manual that placed an obligation on the 1st Respondent to consider its funding and the Claimant’s performance before opting not to renew her contract and that notwithstanding, the Claimant contends that her performance was satisfactory and she therefore ought to have been considered for renewal of contract. She however confirmed that during her tenure at AGRA, she never received a merit award, which was an award considered based on merit. Counsel further submitted that the claimant’s own supervisor, RW-l’s comments on 2016 performance appraisal form, were quite telling about the Claimant’s competencies. He noted that the Claimant needed to “strengthen the area of self-control to generate new advocacy ideas and drive them”, that she depicted “strong interpersonal relations, very calm and confident although she can sometimes overreact to situations”, that “she can set very easily frustrated with negative feedback " and “the organization does not feel a strong advocacy presence through her.”

36. The two diametrically opposed positions taken by the parties herein calls upon me to relook and reproduce once and verbatim the provisions of clause 1.1 of the claimant’s contract of employment. The contract provided thus:-

This agreement is for a period of 3 years and will be reviewed at the end of the 2nd year towards renewal based on funding and your individual performance. Notwithstanding this clause, this agreement will not be regarded as a contract for any specific period of time and may be terminated by either party with notice in accordance with clause 11.3.”

A plain reading of the above clause yields the interpretation that the claimant’s employment first of all, was for a period of three years and that the same would be renewed based on funding and the claimant’s individual performance. Contrary to the contention by respondents’ counsel that there were no terms, express or otherwise in the employment contract or the HR Policies and Manual that placed an obligation on the 1st Respondent to consider its funding and the Claimant’s performance before opting not to renew her contract, it is there in black and white and cannot by any manner of interpretation be construed otherwise. To demonstrate departure from this patent provision in the claimant’s contract, the notice on non-renewal of the claimant’s contract simply stated that: -

“…We wish to notify that pursuant to clause 1.2 of your employment contract, your tenure as AGRA’s Program Officer, Policy will expire on November 30th, 2017…Please note that your employment contract shall not be renewed for a further term at expiry…”

The claimant’s contract was drawn by the 1st respondent as required of it by section 9(2) of the Employment Act. Under the contra preferentem rule of contract interpretation, an ambiguous contract term should be construed against the drafter of the contract in this case the respondent. In the case of Mwangi Ngumo v Kenya Institute of Management [2012] eKLR relied on by counsel for the claimant, Radido J (as he then was) stated as follows regarding the contra preferentum rule:-

“The contract itself, it appears was drawn by the Respondents. And if it was not drawn by the Respondents, it has not been shown or argued that the Respondents entered into it under duress or coercion. I do agree with the Claimant that any ambiguities in the contract should be construed against the party who drew the contract and that party is the Respondents. This is what has been referred to as the contra proferentem rule and which was applied in the case of Horne Coupar v Velletta & Co. 2010 BCSC 483, relied on by the Claimant.”

37. The court is alive to several decisions by this court and superior courts above it that there is no obligation of on parties to a FTC to give notice of termination where the contract is due to expire and further that there is no obligation to assign reasons for the termination where the contract ends by effluxion of time. For instance, in the case of Francis Chire Chachi v Amatsi Water Services Company Limited, [2012] eKLR relied on by the claimants counsel the court stated that;

“This court has recently stated that employers are not under any obligation to give employees reasons for non-renewal of fixed term contracts, unless there is such an obligation created in the expiring contract.”

38. It however should be noted that International Labour Standards to which Kenya is bound by virtue of membership to ILO and article 2(5) of the Constitution stipulates that employment protection legislation by state parties should regulate both hiring and dismissal processes, aiming to strike a fair balance between employer flexibility and worker security. The Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) sets forth the principle that the employment of a worker should not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the worker’s capacity or conduct, or based on the operational requirements of the enterprise, establishment or service. It also recalls that adequate safeguards shall be provided against recourse to contracts of employment for a specified period of time the aim of which is to avoid the protection resulting from the Convention.

39. Further, in contract law, there is a general requirement of contracting in good faith. If this condition was satisfied and established, the intentions of the parties would be easily realised or established where the parties have disagreed. A court in such a scenario ought to examine the express terms, and, in general, enforce them since they expressly state the intentions of the parties. Without such enforcement, there would be room for opportunistic behaviour on the part of one or other party, and the victims of such behaviour lose their expected share of the cooperative surplus that arises under voluntary exchange. It is therefore the court’s view that where the contract is silent on certain matters, it is acceptable for a court impute outside evidence but only to give effect to the intentions of the parties and not to contradict those intentions.

40. Whereas as noted, the claimant’s contract on the face of the letter of appointment was renewable on two conditions. Namely: funding and

individual performance. Now that this was an express condition on the face of the contract, the respondent was under obligation to furnish the claimant with reasons for not renewing her contract and they had to be reasons connected or relating to funding or the claimant’s performance. The respondent in the circumstances was deprived of relying on effluxion of time as a reason for not renewing the claimant’s contract as evidenced in the notice of non-renewal dated 31st August 2017.

41. From the foregoing observation, the court takes the view that the claimant’s contention that she had a legitimate expectation that her contract would be renewed meets the requirements for establishing legitimate expectation as has been held in several cases including the ones relied on by counsel for the claimant. The attempt by the respondent to introduce the issue of the claimant’s performance and interpersonal relationship with colleagues came too late in the matter and most probably an afterthought since if the claimant’s contract was not being renewed due to her poor performance, nothing was easier than to state so in the letter of non-renewal of contract.

42. Form the foregoing, the court finds and holds that the claimant had a legitimate expectation over renewal of her fixed term contract hence the notice of non-renewal without assigning reason for such non-renewal amounted to unfair termination of service over which the claimant is entitled to compensation which the court shall proceed hereafter to assess.

43. The claimant in her statement of claim prayed for

a. A declaration that the Claimants rights have been violated

b. An award of general damages for violation of the Claimants rights.

c. An award of general damages for mental anguish, torment and subsequent depression suffered by the claimant

d. Any such other or further appropriate relief or orders as the Court may deem fit.

e. an order that the Respondent pay the Claimant's costs of this claim plus interest thereon.

It is noteworthy that the claimant did not make any claim for compensation for unfair termination of service and related statutory entitlements contained in the Employment Act payable once the court reaches the conclusion that the termination unlawful and or unfair. The Court however takes the view that these heads of compensation are statutory and need not be pleaded for the court make an award in respect thereof. In support of this position, the Court places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Krishna Rai (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Banaras Hindu University Through Registrar & Ors 2022 INSC 647 where it was held that: -

“…if the law requires something to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner, if not done so then it would not have any existence in the eyes of law. In this context...it has been laid down that there can be no estoppel against law. If the law requires something to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner, and if it is not done in that manner, then it would have no existence in the eyes of the law…

39. Section 49 of the Employment Act as read with section 50 of the same provides as follows concerning remedies for wrongful dismissal and unfair termination:-

(1) Where in the opinion of a labour officer summary dismissal or termination of a contract of an employee is unjustified, the labour officer may recommend to the employer to pay to the employee any or all of the following—

(a) the wages which the employee would have earned had the employee been given the period of notice to which he was entitled under this Act or his contract of service;

(b) where dismissal terminates the contract before the completion of any service upon which the employee's wages became due, the proportion of the wage due for the period of time for which the employee has worked; and any other loss consequent upon the dismissal and arising between the date of dismissal and the date of expiry of the period of notice referred to in paragraph (a) which the employee would have been entitled to by virtue of the contract; or

(c)the equivalent of a number of months wages or salary not exceeding twelve months based on the gross monthly wage or salary of the employee at the time of dismissal.

(2) Any payments made by the employer under this section shall be subject to statutory deductions.

(3)Where in the opinion of a labour officer an employee's summary dismissal or termination of employment was unfair, the labour officer may recommend to the employer to—

(a)reinstate the employee and treat the employee in all respects as if the employees employment had not been terminated; or

(b)re-engage the employee in work comparable to that in which the employee was employed prior to his dismissal, or other reasonably suitable work, at the same wage.

(4) A labour officer shall, in deciding whether to recommend the remedies specified in subsections (1) and (3), take into account any or all of the following—

(a) the wishes of the employee;

(b)the circumstances in which the termination took place, including the extent, if any, to which the employee caused or contributed to the termination; and

(c)the practicability of recommending reinstatement or re-engagement;

(d)the common law principle that there should be no order for specific performance in a contract for service except in very exceptional circumstances;

(e)the employee's length of service with the employer;(f)the reasonable expectation of the employee as to the length of time for which his employment with that employer might have continued but for the termination;

(g)the opportunities available to the employee for securing comparable or suitable employment with another employer;

(h)the value of any severance payable by law;

(i)the right to press claims or any unpaid wages, expenses or other claims owing to the employee;

(j)any expenses reasonable incurred by the employee as a consequence of the termination;

(k)any conduct of the employee which to any extent caused or contributed to the termination;

(l)any failure by the employee to reasonably mitigate the losses attributable to the unjustified termination; and

(m)any compensation, including ex-gratia payment, in respect of termination of employment paid by the employer and received by the employee.

50. Courts to be guided

In determining a complaint or suit under this Act involving wrongful dismissal or unfair termination of the employment of an employee, the Employment and Labour Relations Court shall be guided by the provisions of section 49.

44. A reading of the above provisions according to me, yields the interpretation that once a Labour Officer or the Court has reached the conclusion that the service of an employee has been wrongfully and or terminated, it provides a compendium of recommendations, in case of the Labour Officer and orders, a Judge hearing the matter can make after reaching such conclusion. In that regard, they are statutory directives and need not be pleaded.

45. The Court therefore having found that the claimant was unfairly terminated by reason of failure to renew her contract without assigning any reasons as implicitly provided for in her letter of appointment proceeds to award her compensation as follows.

a. The claimant as per her letter of appointment was entitled to a gross monthly salary of USD 9,330.50 (basic pay, post a post adjustment annual benefit, house allowance). Considering that she was on a FTC for three years and the same had a clause for non-renewal on account of lack of additional funding and poor performance, an award of six month’s salary as compensation for unfair termination would be reasonable. That is to say USD 55,983/-

b. Three months’ salary in lieu of notice of termination as provided in her contract……USD 27,991.50

c. Total Award USD 83,974.5

d. Items (a) and (b) shall be subject to taxes and statutory deductions but shall attract interest at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full

e. The claimant shall further have costs of the suit

46. It is so ordered.

Dated at Nairobi this 16TH day of OCTOBER 2026

Delivered virtually this 16TH day of OCTOBER 2026

Abuodha Nelson Jorum

Presiding Judge-ELRC Mombasa

Footnote 1.

Footnote 2.

Footnote 3.

Footnote 4.

Footnote 5.

Footnote 6.

Footnote 7.

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder