Background
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The court allowed the respondent/applicant’s recusal application. Justice Hellen Wasilwa recused herself forthwith from hearing the claim, with costs in the cause.
3 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 99 →
Held. Decided. The application was allowed and the Judge recused herself forthwith. The court acknowledged the undisputed fact that J. A. Guserwa acted for the Judge in another suit, while noting that this relationship arose before the cause was allocated to her and reflected the right to counsel of one’s choice. Nonetheless, to ensure that justice is both done and seen to be done, recusal was appropriate. Costs were ordered to be in the cause.
Ratio. Justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done. On the admitted advocate-client relationship between the Judge and the firm appearing for the Claimant, recusal was necessary to preserve that appearance of justice, notwithstanding that the Judge’s integrity and competence were not impugned.
Issue
1 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.
Court’s reasoning →
Held
3 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 99 →
Ratio
3 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Passage 99 →
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
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Paragraph 1 →Whether Justice Hellen Wasilwa should recuse herself from Kioko v Glovoapp Kenya Ltd [2026] KEELRC 4685 (KLR) because J.A. Guserwa & Co. Advocates, acting for the claimant, also represented the Judge in another suit; and whether costs should be awarded on the…
The respondent applied by Notice of Motion dated 15 June 2026 for recusal, reallocation, a stay, and costs. It relied on a 27 April 2026 demand letter said to show that the claimant’s firm represented the Judge in a personal defamation-related matter. The…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E322 OF 2025
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
IRENE KIOKO...............................................................CLAIMANT
VS
GLOVOAPP KENYA LIMITED……………………….......RESPONDENT
RULING
1 Before this Court is the Respondent/Applicant's Notice of Motion dated 15th June 2026, brought under Articles 50(1) and 73(2)(b) of the Constitution, Section 10 of the Judicial Service Act, Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020, Rules 3, 4 and 7 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It seeks orders THAT:
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2. This Honourable Court (Hon. Justice Hellen Wasilwa) be pleased to recuse herself from hearing, managing and determining this matter, owing to a direct and demonstrable conflict of interest arising from a subsisting advocate-client relationship between the Honourable Judge and the law firm currently representing the Claimant/Respondent.
3. This matter be forthwith referred to the Presiding Judge/Principal Judge of the Employment and Labour Relations Court for re-allocation to another Judge of competent jurisdiction, in
4. conformity with the principles of judicial impartiality and the right to a fair hearing guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution.
5. Pending pending the hearing and determination of this application, all proceedings. orders and timelines in this matter be stayed so as to preserve the integrity of the record and to avoid any
6. prejudice to either party.
7. The costs of this Application be provided for.
2 The application is supported by the affidavit of Caroline Mutuku, a director and the General Manager of the Respondent/Applicant, sworn on 15th June 2026, and her Affidavit in Rejoinder sworn on 24th June 2026.
Respondent/Applicant’s Case
3 It is the Respondent/Applicant's case that the firm of J.A. Guserwa & Co. Advocates is on record for the Claimant in these proceedings, which were fixed for hearing on 25th June 2026.
4 It avers that on or about 27th April 2026, the said firm issued a formal letter of demand, reference GAJ/CCA/3957(C)/2023, acting expressly on behalf of and in the personal interests of the Honourable Judge, in a matter concerning her alleged defamation. It states that it became aware of the advocate-client relationship upon discovery of the said letter.
5 The Respondent/Applicant contends that the letter is incontrovertible documentary evidence of a subsisting advocate-client relationship between the Presiding Judge and the very advocates who appear before her for the Claimant.
6 It is its case that this dual role creates a direct and irreconcilable conflict of interest, and objectively compromises the appearance of judicial impartiality in these proceedings.
7 It avers that Article 73(2)(b) of the Constitution places an enforceable obligation on every Judge to avoid any conflict between personal interests and public or official duties. This obligation is squarely violated by the circumstances disclosed.
8 On the applicable test, the Respondent/Applicant states that the question is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the relevant facts, would conclude that there exists a real possibility of bias. It relies on Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutuku & Another [2016] eKLR and Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others [2013] eKLR; and avers that the test is objective and does not require proof of actual partiality.
9 It is the Respondent/Applicant's case that such an observer would inevitably apprehend that the Honourable Judge may consciously or unconsciously favour the cause of the firm that acts for her personal legal interests.
10 It contends that the Claimant, being represented by the Judge's own lawyers, enjoys a structural advantage incompatible with equality of arms. Therefore, the Respondent/Applicant may be denied the right to an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution.
11 The Respondent/Applicant relies on Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020, which it avers commands in mandatory terms that a judicial officer:"shall not sit in any matter if there are grounds which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion or apprehension on the part of a reasonable and fair-minded person that the judicial officer will not act impartially or without prejudice." It contends that this threshold is plainly met and that the provision admits of no discretion.
12 It further relies on Regulation 4, which it states requires every judicial officer to discharge judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice, and Regulation 5, which requires the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. It avers that the dual representation creates precisely that appearance, and that no subjective assurance can cure an objective structural conflict of this character.
13 The Respondent/Applicant also invokes Value 2 (Impartiality) of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, as adopted by the Judiciary. Value 2 directs a Judge to disqualify himself or herself from any proceedings in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the Judge is unable to decide the matter impartially.
14 It states that the Commentary to Value 2 identifies, as a paradigm case requiring disqualification, the situation where a party's legal representative has an ongoing professional relationship with the Judge. In its view, that is precisely the situation herein.
15 It is its further case that justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. It cites R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, a principle it says was received into Kenyan jurisprudence in Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & Another, ex parte Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni [2010] eKLR.
16 The Respondent/Applicant avers that continued conduct of these proceedings before the Honourable Judge would irreparably damage public confidence in the administration of justice, undermine the institutional legitimacy of this Court, and expose any resultant judgment to challenge on grounds of apparent bias. It contends that recusal is not merely a right of the parties but a constitutional and ethical imperative.
17 It states that the application is raised without impugning the personal integrity of the Presiding Judge, and is grounded solely on the objective appearance of impartiality. Further, the application has been brought promptly, before any substantive hearing on the merits, and that it has not by any act, omission or conduct waived its right to raise the objection.
18 In its Affidavit in Rejoinder, the Respondent/Applicant responds to the Replying Affidavit of Judith A. Guserwa sworn on 22nd June 2026. This affidavit it avers that fundamentally irregular and ought to be expunged or accorded no probative weight.
19 It contends that the deponent swore it in her personal capacity as an Advocate, yet she is not a party to these proceedings, and any reply ought to have been sworn by the Claimant or a person duly authorised by her.
20 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s case that an Advocate on record has no personal standing to swear a replying affidavit in proceedings in which she acts as counsel. It avers that doing so conflates the role of Advocate with that of witness, which it terms a fundamental irregularity under Order 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
21 It further contends that the affidavit characterises the application as "mischievous" and "malicious" and makes observations about the deponent's reputation and years of practice; as these are matters of opinion and argument, not fact, and should be disregarded.
22 Without prejudice to that objection, the Respondent/Applicant avers that paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Replying Affidavit contain express admissions of the central facts on which the application is founded. It states that the deponent confirms that she represents the Honourable Judge, and expressly states that "my relationship with the aforesaid Judge in so far as any matter including the present matter is purely Client/Advocate." It contends that the relationship is therefore confirmed rather than disputed.
23 On the allegation that the application was strategically made in the face of the hearing scheduled for 25th June 2026, the Respondent/Applicant sets out its chronology. It avers that the demand letter was issued on 27th April 2026, that its Advocates identified the conflict and advised it on 30th April 2026, and that it confirmed instructions to proceed on 14th May 2026. Thereafter, the application was filed and served well before the hearing date. It maintains that there is no basis for the allegation of strategic timing.
24 In response to the averment that the deponent has assistants who can proceed with the matter, the Respondent/Applicant contends that this does not resolve the conflict. The advocate-client relationship giving rise to the apprehension of bias is between the Presiding Judge and the firm as an entity, not any individual advocate within it. The conflict therefore subsists for as long as the firm remains on record, irrespective of which member appears in court.
25 It further avers that the Replying Affidavit makes no attempt to engage with the legal framework on which the application is founded, an omission it says speaks to the absence of any substantive answer to the application.
26 The Respondent/Applicant maintains that the application is well-founded, brought in good faith and grounded in its right to a fair hearing under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. It urges that the application be allowed.
Claimant/Respondent’s Case
27 The Claimant/Respondent opposed the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn on 22nd June 2026 by Judith A. Guserwa, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya.
28 It is the Affiant’s case that being a qualified and seasoned practitioner, she is entitled to represent any client irrespective of their rank or position in society, while observing professional conduct and ethics. To this extent, the representation of Justice Hellen Wasilwa in any matter in which the Judge chooses to appoint her is no exception.
29 She avers that her relationship with the Judge, in so far as any matter including the present one is concerned, is purely that of client and advocate. She has no control over the matters listed before any Court or Judge, as she does not guide the listing registry.
30 Counsel contends that the application is mischievous and intended to paint her person and profession in bad light, as it casts aspersions on her capability of making decisions as required by professional standards.
31 It is her case that the aspersions raised are personal and made with the intention of maligning her reputation in this Court, where she avers she has served with a clean record for over 40 years.
32 On the alleged apprehension of bias, she avers that the presumption of a likelihood of legitimate and reasonable apprehension of bias, conflict of interest and partiality is a malicious one, premised on a mindset that is scared of the outcome of this case.
33 She maintains that there is no violation of any constitutional right by the Judge in hearing or determining this matter, and puts the Respondent/Applicant to strict proof of its allegations.
34 The Affiant further avers that the matter was listed for hearing before this Court, and that if the Respondent/Applicant is scared of her prosecution of the matter, she has assistants who can proceed with it to its logical conclusion.
35 It is her position that the application has been strategically made in the face of the hearing scheduled for 25th June 2026, without any basis whatsoever, in order to scuttle the hearing. This, she avers, is in itself malicious.
36 She therefore denies all the negative accusations made against her person as a professional worthy of representing any client of her choice, and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs, so as to pave way for the hearing of this part-heard matter to its conclusion.
Respondent/Applicant’s Submissions
37 The Respondent/Applicant submitted that the application is premised on the uncontroverted fact that the firm of J.A. Guserwa & Company Advocates, which is on record for the Claimant, simultaneously acts as the personal legal representatives of the Presiding Judge in a private matter unconnected to these proceedings. It argued that this dual representation gives rise to a real possibility of bias in the eyes of a fair-minded and informed observer, and compels recusal as a matter of constitutional and regulatory obligation.
38 At the outset, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the application is not an attack upon the integrity, competence or character of the Honourable Judge, in whose personal integrity and professional standing it has full confidence.
39 It submitted that the application proceeds on a narrower and objective footing, as the test for apparent bias neither requires nor implies any actual or subjective partiality. In its submission, it is the existence of an undisputed and structural conflict, and not any suggestion of personal impropriety, that compels the relief sought.
40 As a threshold objection, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the Replying Affidavit is incompetent and ought to be expunged. It argued that the affidavit is sworn by Ms. Judith A. Guserwa in her personal capacity, yet she is not a party to these proceedings. It argued that an affidavit opposing an interlocutory application ought ordinarily to be sworn by the party affected, or by a person duly authorised to depose on that party's behalf with personal knowledge of the facts in issue, and that Ms. Guserwa is neither.
41 It relied on Order 19 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which it submitted confines affidavit evidence to facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent, save where the deponent is permitted to depose to matters of belief with the grounds thereof stated. It contended that an Advocate on record who swears an affidavit in proceedings in which she acts as counsel conflates the distinct roles of witness and advocate. This is a fundamental irregularity which compromises the independence that both roles require.
42 It further submitted that paragraphs 3, 6, 8, 9 and 11 of the Replying Affidavit do not depose to fact at all. They assert that the application is mischievous, malicious and strategically made, characterise the Respondent/Applicant's motives, and make submissions on the deponent's professional standing and 40 years of practice. The Respondent/Applicant submitted that these are matters of opinion and argument, inadmissible in an affidavit, therefore, the affidavit be expunged or, in the alternative, accorded no probative weight.
43 Notwithstanding that objection, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the Replying Affidavit affirmatively admits the very fact on which the application is founded. It pointed to paragraph 2, where the deponent states that "the representation of Justice Hellen Wasilwa in any matter she chooses to appoint me is no exception", and paragraph 5, where she states that "my relationship with the aforesaid Judge in so far as any matter including the present matter is purely Client/Advocate."
44 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that these averments are not denials but confirmations of a subsisting advocate-client relationship between the Presiding Judge and the firm on record for the Claimant. Thus, the dispute is not one of fact, but of the legal consequence that flows from an admitted state of affairs.
45 The Respondent/Applicant submitted that it does not impugn the propriety of Ms. Guserwa accepting instructions from whomever she chooses, nor her professional competence or standing. It framed the narrow question for determination as whether, given the admitted dual role of her firm, a fair-minded and informed observer would apprehend a real possibility of bias.
46 On the averment that counsel has no control over the listing of matters, it submitted that this is immaterial. The application, it argued, does not concern how the cause came to be listed before the Presiding Judge, but the conflict that exists now that it stands so listed.
47 On the averments that the application is premised on a malicious presumption and was strategically made to scuttle the hearing, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that these are answered by the documented chronology. The Respondent/Applicant consented to the hearing date of 25th June 2026 on 14th April 2026, before the demand letter disclosing the conflict was issued on 27th April 2026. Therefore, it cannot be taken to have engineered a conflict that came to its knowledge only after it had accepted the hearing date.
48 It further submitted that its Advocates identified the conflict on 30th April 2026, that instructions to proceed were confirmed on 14th May 2026, and that the application was filed and served well in advance of the hearing date. This chronology is not contested in any subsequent affidavit.
49 On the averment that counsel has assistants who can proceed with the matter, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that this does not resolve the conflict. It argued that the advocate-client relationship subsists between the Presiding Judge and the firm as an institutional entity, not any individual advocate within it. So long as the firm remains on record, the conflict subsists irrespective of which member appears, in the same manner that conflicts of interest in legal practice generally attach to the firm rather than to the individual practitioner.
50 The Respondent/Applicant further submitted that the Replying Affidavit makes no attempt to engage with Regulation 21, Value 2 of the Bangalore Principles, or Articles 50(1) and 73(2)(b) of the Constitution. It reasoned that the omission speaks to the absence of any substantive answer to the application on the law.
51 On the applicable test, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the test for recusal is objective and does not require proof of actual bias, still less of dishonesty or impropriety on the part of the judicial officer. It relied on Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR, where it submitted the Supreme Court affirmed that the test is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the relevant facts, would conclude that there exists a real possibility that the judge is biased. The same test was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kalpana H. Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & 2 Others [2016] eKLR.
52 It was submitted that the consistency of this test across these courts confirms that it is a standard of near-universal application, from which this Court has no principled basis to depart. The test is deliberately objective so as to protect both the right of litigants to an impartial tribunal and the public interest in the perceived integrity of judicial proceedings.
53 Applying the test, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the observer is presented with three undisputed facts: that the Claimant is represented before the Presiding Judge by J.A. Guserwa & Company Advocates; that the same firm simultaneously acts for the Presiding Judge in a private and unrelated matter, as evidenced by the letter of demand dated 27th April 2026 and confirmed in the Replying Affidavit; and that the dual relationship subsists at the very time the firm appears before the Judge.
54 The Respondent/Applicant submitted that based on the facts of instant the application, the observer cannot be confident that the proceedings, however conscientiously conducted, are free of the influence, whether conscious or unconscious, of that professional relationship. The Claimant, being represented by the Judge's own lawyers, enjoys a structural advantage incompatible with the equality of arms that a fair hearing demands.
55 The Respondent/Applicant relied on Article 50(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to have a dispute decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or another independent and impartial tribunal. It submitted that the guarantee is not aspirational but a justiciable right enforceable in these proceedings.
56 It further relied on Article 73(2)(b), which it submitted obliges every State officer, including a judicial officer, to avoid any conflict between personal interests and public or official duties. It argued that the subsisting advocate-client relationship places the Presiding Judge squarely within the situation the Article is designed to prevent.
57 The Respondent/Applicant further relied on Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020, which it submitted provides that a judicial officer:"shall not sit in any matter if there are grounds which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion or apprehension on the part of a reasonable and fair-minded person that the judicial officer will not act impartially or without prejudice." It submitted that the provision is couched in the language of obligation, not discretion, and is squarely engaged on the admitted facts.
58 It further submitted that Regulation 4 requires judicial duties to be discharged without favour, bias or prejudice, while Regulation 5 requires the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. It contended that the dual representation creates precisely the appearance Regulation 5 is designed to forestall, and that no subjective assurance of even-handedness, however sincerely held, could cure an objective structural conflict of this character.
59 The Respondent/Applicant also relied on Value 2 (Impartiality) of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which it submitted directs a judge to disqualify himself or herself from any proceedings in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. It submitted that the Commentary to Value 2 identifies an ongoing professional relationship between a judge and a party's legal representative as a paradigm case requiring disqualification.
60 It was submitted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done, as held in R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 and received into Kenyan law in Republic v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & Another, ex parte Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni [2010] eKLR.
61 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that continued conduct of the proceedings before the Presiding Judge would expose any resultant judgment, however correct on the merits, to permanent vulnerability to challenge on grounds of apparent bias.
62 The Respondent/Applicant further submitted that Regulation 20 of the said Regulations provides that a Judge may not recuse himself if no other Judge is available to deal with the case, if failure to sit could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice, or if recusal has been considered by a plural bench and determined to be unnecessary. It submitted that there are other Judges available to hear this matter.
63 On costs, it submitted that costs should follow the event. It argued that the conflict is a matter of objective, undisputed fact confirmed by the Claimant's own Replying Affidavit, and that it has been put to the expense of the application by circumstances not of its own making.
Claimant/Respondent’s Submissions
64 The Claimant/Respondent submitted that the claim herein is a personal interest claim filed by the Claimant, who was ready and willing to prosecute it on the hearing date of 25th June 2026, when she was ambushed with the application seeking the Court's recusal from hearing and determining the suit on its merits.
65 The Claimant/Respondent submitted that Counsel Judith Guserwa cannot and should not be estopped from representing any client, whether in the Judiciary or in any other space, as her ability to differentiate between legal matters and personal matters is not in doubt. The same applies to the Honourable Judge, who understands her parameters in law in handling any matter listed before her.
66 It was further submitted that any allegations made against the Judge should be subjected to the requirements of the law on proof before she can be profiled and sidelined. The Claimant/Respondent urged that the Court should not fall into the error of allowing parties or their advocates to profile and demean a Judge based on malicious allegations made on social media or in the public space.
67 On the applicable test, the Claimant/Respondent submitted that the grounds for recusal are generally premised on whether the circumstances cited give rise to a reasonable apprehension, in the mind of a fair-minded and informed member of the public, that the Judge did not apply his or her mind impartially in a matter placed before the Court.
68 In support, reliance was placed on Universities Academic Staff Union-Egerton Chapter Branch v Egerton University and 3 Others and 3 Interested Parties, ELRC No. E020 of 2023; wherein the court there dismissed an application for its recusal, which had been brought on the ground that the respondents were apprehensive that they would not receive an impartial hearing because the court had allegedly acted with bias against them. The court observed that it would hear and determine the matter on the merits, based on the evidence, the law and nothing more.
69 The Claimant/Respondent also relied on Samson Nyamai Masila v Athi Water Works Development Agency & Another, ELRC Cause No. E576 of 2020, where the court declined to recuse itself, no actual or perceived bias having been established. The court there described the application for recusal as an afterthought and a delaying tactic by the applicant to keep the parties in court indefinitely.
70 Further reliance was placed on Emmanuel Maitha David & 7 Others v the Governor of Kilifi County & 2 Others, ELRC Petition No. E003 of 2023, where it was submitted that an application for the recusal of the Judge was dismissed on the basis that it was unfounded, unreasonable and could not form a justifiable basis for recusal.
71 Applying these decisions, the Claimant/Respondent submitted that this Court has not displayed any signs of being biased in favour of Judith Guserwa merely because she is acting to defend the Judge in another forum.
72 It was submitted that the advocate-client relationship came up when the instant suit had already been processed and was awaiting hearing. The Claimant/Respondent argued that the suit should therefore be concluded, and that if the other party is dissatisfied with the outcome, it is at liberty to move to the Court of Appeal.
73 The Claimant/Respondent further submitted that the decision the Court is being asked to make is, in effect, to sideline matters being prosecuted by Judith Guserwa in this Court. This would delay the hearing and determination of any matter listed before the Judge by the Registry in its administrative role, and would punish counsel on matters beyond her control.
74 It was submitted that a party who alleges possible bias and favouritism cannot rely on any allegation against a Judge without evidence. The Claimant/Respondent urged the Court to desist from entertaining such allegations, so as to protect the right of a party to choose and be represented by a lawyer of its choice.
75 Lastly, reliance was placed on Republic v Egerton University and 2 Others with 3 Interested Parties, J.R. No. E001 of 2023, where it was submitted that the court declined an application for recusal of the Judge on the basis that it was premised on speculations, innuendos and paranoia without any evidence in support.
76 In conclusion, the Claimant/Respondent urged the Court to find and hold that the application is misconceived and lacking in merit, and to dismiss it with costs.
1 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.
2 I have noted that my integrity or competence is not in question in handling this matter. This is so given my oath of service to dispense justice to my utmost knowledge and ability without fear, favour, bias, affection, ill will prejudice and any political, religious or other influence.
3 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 16th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE