Background
The Appellant moved this Court vide a Summons under Certificate of Urgency dated 26th July 2025 seeking the following orders;
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Appellant moved this Court vide a Summons under Certificate of Urgency dated 26th July 2025 seeking the following orders;
Paragraph 1 →The issues for determination are therefore whether the Applicant has the requisite locus standi to seek preservation and protective orders in respect of the deceased's estate, whether a prima facie basis for the Court to intervene and preserve the estate against alleged intermeddling has been established, and whether a case for issuance of interlocutory injunction has been made, and whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders for…
Paragraph 57 →In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated a sufficiently serious question concerning her interest in the deceased's estate and that there is a need to preserve the estate pending determination of the competing claims relating to representation and the validity of the alleged Will.
Paragraph 100 →Whether the applicant, who claimed to be the deceased’s surviving spouse, had standing without a grant to seek preservation orders; whether alleged intermeddling justified intervention; whether an interlocutory injunction should issue; and whether the…
The applicant alleged that she lived with the deceased and their minor son at the Syokimau residence, was later excluded by the respondent, and that the respondent collected rent, dealt with assets, and accessed bank and M-Pesa funds without authority. The…
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
FAMILY DIVISION CASE NO. HCFP&A E077 2025
IN THE ESTATE OF FARIDI MOHAMED GACHANGA FARIDI (DECEASED)
ELIZABETH SYOMBUA NZIVO …………………………………………..APPLICANT
-VERSUS-
LEILA MOHAMED………………………………………………………...RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The Appellant moved this Court vide a Summons under Certificate of Urgency dated 26th July 2025 seeking the following orders;
a. THAT pending the hearing and final determination of the application herein. The Honourable Court be and is hereby pleased to issue an order restraining the Respondent, her agents, servants and/or employees from intermeddling and/or interfering with the late FARIDI MOHAMED GACHANGA estate.
b. The Honourable Court be and is hereby pleased, pending the hearing and determination of the Succession Cause, to issue an INJUNCTION restraining the Respondent, by herself, her agents or assigns, from in any way intermeddling by constructing any such new structures, temporary or permanent, leasing, alternating in any form, selling, subdividing, destroying, residing in or dealing in any manner whatsoever with Syokimau; Katafi in Kamulu; Rental stalls at Bomas of Kenya; Pangani; Dagoretti South; Cooperative University in Karen; South B and Donholm and all other such properties subject of this succession of the estate of Faridi Mohamed Gachanga pending hearing and determination of the succession cause and its final determination and distribution of properties thereof.
c. The Honourable Court be and is hereby pleased to compel the Respondent herein to release to the Applicant all the title Certificates, all the deceased’s bank details and M-Pesa phone and records of transactions therefrom, and a proper account if all the rent and such amounts that she has accrued from all the properties.
d. That subject to Order 4 above, and pending the hearing and determination of this Application and the Succession Cause, the Applicant is hereby pleased to grant the Applicant an order to access the deceased’s bank accounts at Equity Bank, Gulf African Bank and Cooperative Bank of Kenya, account number for the purpose of drawing Kshs 2,000,000.00 for her school fees as well as upkeep, food, rent arrears, leisure, clothing, among others) for the months of September 2024- July 2025
e. The costs of this application be borne by the Respondent
2. The application is premised on the grounds set out on the face of the Summons and the averments contained in the Supporting Affidavit of Elizabeth Syombua Nzivo, the Applicant, dated 26th July, 2025.
3. The Applicant averred that she is the surviving spouse of the deceased and that no person in the family had obtained a grant of representation in respect of his estate. She stated that she had been consolidating the necessary evidence to file a succession cause.
4. The Applicant alleged that, in the meantime, the Respondent had unlawfully and unilaterally denied her access to the matrimonial home in Syokimau, contrary to the deceased’s wishes which, according to her, had been communicated to her before his demise.
5. The Applicant further alleged that the Respondent had, without a grant of representation or other lawful authority, collected rental income from various properties forming part of the deceased’s estate, including properties in Syokimau, Katafi in Kamulu, Bomas of Kenya, Pangani, Dagoretti South, Cooperative University in Karen, South B and Donholm. She contended that the Respondent had failed to account for the rental income and was wasting the estate.
6. The Applicant further alleged that the Respondent had accessed and withdrawn funds from the deceased’s bank accounts held at Equity Bank, Gulf African Bank and Co-operative Bank of Kenya and had utilized the funds for her personal benefit without any legal mandate or court authorization.
7. The Applicant also alleged that the Respondent had continued to keep active the deceased’s mobile telephone number, 0722329166, and had failed to notify Safaricom PLC of the deceased’s death to facilitate deactivation of the line pending the appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate.
8. The Applicant averred that the Respondent’s actions had caused her and her child emotional anguish, financial distress and undue suffering. She stated that she and the child had been recognized by the deceased as his dependants and were therefore entitled to protection and provision from the deceased’s estate. She further alleged that the Respondent had refused to pay school fees for one Giveon Janari Faridi, whom she described as a dependant of the deceased.
9. The Applicant contended that the Respondent’s actions amounted to intermeddling with the deceased’s estate contrary to Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act, Cap. 160, Laws of Kenya, and that the Court's intervention was necessary to prevent the estate from being wasted.
10. The Applicant maintained that she had brought the application without delay and urged the Court to grant the orders sought to preserve the estate and safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries pending the filing and determination of the succession cause.
11. In opposition to the application, the Respondent swore a Replying Affidavit dated 10th September 2025 in which she contended that the Applicant’s application was founded on misrepresentations and distortions of fact intended to mislead the Court.
12. The Respondent averred that the Applicant was never married to the deceased under any recognized system of law. She stated that the Applicant merely had a relationship with the deceased, from which a child was born, and contended that the existence of a child did not, in itself, constitute proof of marriage.
13. The Respondent further challenged the Applicant’s claim to have been recognised as the deceased’s wife, stating that the Applicant had allegedly misled the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation into issuing her with a letter stating that she was the deceased’s wife. The Respondent relied on an affidavit sworn by David Kilonzo Muthuka, the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation, together with the said letter.
14. The Respondent maintained that the Applicant was neither a spouse nor a beneficiary of the deceased’s estate and that her participation in the succession proceedings posed a risk of the estate being unlawfully distributed to a person not entitled thereto. She further averred that the deceased left a Will in which he named her as the executor.
15. In response to the allegation that the Respondent had denied the Applicant access to her matrimonial home in Syokimau, the Respondent denied that the house constituted the Applicant’s matrimonial home, maintaining that she had never been married to the deceased.
16. The Respondent denied accessing or withdrawing funds from the deceased’s bank accounts after his death. She further denied that the Applicant was a dependant of the deceased or entitled to a share of his estate on that basis.
17. The Respondent averred that a close friend of the deceased had been willing to assist with the child’s school fees but that the Applicant had declined the offer. She further stated that she could not afford or sustain the lifestyle the deceased had provided to the Applicant during his lifetime.
18. The Respondent asserted that she had an equitable interest in the deceased’s property by virtue of her alleged right to inherit from the estate, which, she contended, superseded the Applicant’s claims to the estate.
19. On that basis, the Respondent urged the Court to dismiss the application in its entirety and award her the costs thereof.
20. The Applicant filed a Further Affidavit dated 24th January 2026, in which she reiterates that she was the surviving spouse of the deceased, Faridi Mohamed Gachanga Faridi, and asserts that she had priority in applying for representation of his estate.
21. The Applicant states that she and the deceased had a son, Giveon Janari Faridi, and that during the deceased’s lifetime, he maintained both her and their son. She further states that they lived together at the Syokimau property, which she describes as their matrimonial home.
22. The Applicant states that the deceased introduced her to his children from a previous relationship, namely Said Mohamed, Feiswal Mohamed and the Respondent, Leila Mohamed. She contends that the Respondent was aware of her relationship with the deceased and regarded her as a stepmother to the deceased’s children.
23. The Applicant states that, following the deceased’s death and burial, the Respondent allegedly confronted her, removed her from the Syokimau property and took occupation thereof.
24. The Applicant further alleges that the Respondent, either personally or through her associates, dealt with the deceased’s motor vehicle and has been collecting rental income from various properties, including stalls at Cooperative University, Syokimau, South B, Dagoretti and Kangundo Road. She alleges that the rental income has been collected through the deceased’s mobile number.
25. The Applicant states that neither she nor the deceased’s other siblings have received any of the alleged rental income. She contends that the Respondent’s dealings with the deceased’s property constitute intermeddling with the estate.
26. The Applicant further maintains that the deceased died without a valid Will and challenges the document produced by the Respondent. She raises several concerns regarding the alleged Will, including the absence of page two, failure to identify all the deceased’s properties and beneficiaries, the identity and credibility of the witnesses, and the alleged advocate’s stamp appearing on the document.
27. The Applicant further questions the circumstances surrounding the alleged Will, including the date on which it was made, the circumstances in which it came to be known to the family, and its subsequent registration and payment of stamp duty after the filing of the present application.
28. The Applicant also disputes the Respondent’s reliance on the affidavit sworn by David Kilonzo Muthuka, the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation, concerning the letter previously issued identifying her as the deceased’s wife. She contends that the affidavit was not properly commissioned and that the Respondent did not call the Assistant Chief for examination or cross-examination.
29. The Applicant therefore maintains that the earlier letter issued by the Assistant Chief identifying her as the deceased’s wife remains relevant and disputes the Respondent’s allegation that she misled the Assistant Chief into issuing it.
30. The Applicant reiterates her request that the alleged Will be disregarded or declared invalid and that the orders sought in her application be granted.
31. The Applicant maintains that the application was brought without delay and that unless the orders sought are granted, the deceased’s estate is at risk of wastage and the interests of the beneficiaries may be prejudiced.
32. In her submissions, the Applicant maintained that she was the deceased's surviving spouse and reiterated that the Respondent had taken possession of and control over the deceased’s properties and rental income without a grant of representation. She contended that such conduct amounted to intermeddling with the deceased’s free property contrary to Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act.
33. The Applicant disputed the Respondent’s assertion that she had misled the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation into issuing a letter recognizing her as the deceased’s wife. She challenged the affidavit sworn by David Kilonzo Muthuka, the Assistant Chief, contending that the affidavit was defective as it had allegedly not been properly commissioned. She further submitted that the Respondent had not called the Assistant Chief for examination and that no alternative letter had been produced to demonstrate that the letter recognizing her as the deceased’s wife was false.
34. The Applicant further challenged the validity of the Will the Respondent produced. She contended that the Will was incomplete, as it contained pages one and three but did not contain page two. She further alleged that the Will did not disclose all the deceased’s properties and did not adequately provide for all persons whom she considered to be the deceased’s beneficiaries and/or dependants.
35. The Applicant also questioned the circumstances surrounding the execution and witnessing of the alleged Will. She contended that one of the witnesses was a cousin of the deceased and that the advocate whose stamp appeared on the document as a witness allegedly denied knowledge of having witnessed the Will. She further questioned the existence of the law firm said to have prepared the Will.
36. The Applicant submitted that the alleged Will was made on 8th August 2023, whereas the deceased died on 15th August 2024 and further contended that the document was only registered and stamp duty paid after the filing of the present application. She argued that these circumstances raised questions concerning the authenticity and validity of the Will.
37. The Applicant relied on Section 11 of the Law of Succession Act regarding the formal requirements for a valid written Will and urged the Court to interrogate the due execution and contents of the document before relying upon it in determining the administration of the estate.
38. The Applicant further contended that, even if the deceased had exercised his testamentary freedom, the Court retained power under Sections 26, 28 and 29 of the Law of Succession Act to make reasonable provision for dependants who had been inadequately provided for or excluded from the deceased’s estate.
39. In this regard, the Applicant maintained that she and the deceased’s minor son, Giveon Janari Faridi, were dependants of the deceased. She relied on an affidavit sworn by Said Mohamed, stated to be the deceased’s eldest son, which she contended confirmed that she had been living with the deceased and that the deceased had maintained her and their minor son at the Syokimau home.
40. The Applicant further relied on the letter issued by the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation dated 24th July 2025, which she contended confirmed that she and the deceased had lived together as husband and wife and had one child, Janari Faridi. She submitted that the evidence supported her assertion that she was the deceased’s spouse.
41. The Applicant also referred to a summary inventory allegedly prepared by the deceased concerning the needs of his minor son, including school fees and other basic needs. She submitted that the deceased had maintained both her and the minor during his lifetime and that the minor’s welfare and educational needs ought to continue to receive reasonable provision from the estate.
42. On the issue of maintenance, the Applicant relied on Sections 26, 28 and 29 of the Law of Succession Act and submitted that she was entitled to reasonable provision from the estate by virtue of her alleged status as the deceased’s wife, while the minor child was entitled to provision as a child and dependant of the deceased.
43. The Applicant further alleged that the Respondent had continued collecting rental income from various properties belonging to the deceased through the deceased’s mobile telephone number and had managed the deceased’s properties without letters of administration. She maintained that the Respondent was consequently under an obligation to account for all funds and proceeds collected from the estate since the deceased’s death.
44. The Applicant relied on the decision in Re Estate of M’Ngarithi M’Miriti [2017] eKLR for the proposition that acts which diminish, dissipate or place the free property of a deceased person at risk may constitute intermeddling within the meaning of Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act.
45. The Applicant therefore urged the Court to restrain the Respondent from further dealing with the deceased’s estate pending the issuance of a grant of representation, and to direct the Respondent to account for all income and funds collected from the estate since the deceased’s death.
46. The Applicant further sought an order for a forensic audit of the deceased’s estate by a reputable audit firm to be agreed upon by the beneficiaries, or, in default of agreement, one to be appointed by the Court. She also sought that all monies collected from the deceased’s properties since his death be accounted for, returned to and preserved as part of the estate pending the issuance of the appropriate grant of representation.
47. The Applicant ultimately urged the Court to allow the Summons dated 26th July 2025 and grant the orders sought therein.
48. The Respondent submits that the deceased was her father and that he left a written Will appointing her as the executor of his estate. She contends that the Applicant subsequently claimed to have been married to the deceased, but has not produced evidence of a marriage recognized under law.
49. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s claim to spousal status is based principally on the fact that she had a child with the deceased. She argues that the existence of a child, without evidence of a marriage under a recognized system of law, does not establish a marital relationship. In support, she relies on Re Estate of BMK (Deceased) [2021] eKLR.
50. The Respondent further submits that the Applicant obtained a letter from the Assistant Chief of Syokimau Sublocation identifying her as the deceased’s wife. She states that, upon learning of the letter, she approached the Assistant Chief, who subsequently swore an affidavit stating that he had been misled by the Applicant when issuing the letter.
51. On that basis, the Respondent submits that the Applicant is not the deceased’s wife and therefore cannot claim the Syokimau property as her matrimonial home. She further contends that the Applicant is not a dependant or beneficiary of the estate, while acknowledging that the deceased’s child would have a claim under the Law of Succession Act.
52. The Respondent denies the Applicant’s allegation that she accessed or withdrew funds from the deceased’s bank accounts, submitting that no evidence has been presented to establish the allegation.
53. On the question of administration of the estate, the Respondent submits that the estate is testate and that the deceased appointed her as executor under the Will. She relies on Sections 53(a) and 66 of the Law of Succession Act and argues that, in the circumstances, the Applicant lacks the requisite standing to seek a grant or participate in the administration of the estate.
54. The Respondent further submits that her interest in the estate arises from the Will and her position as executor and beneficiary and that allowing the Applicant to participate in the administration would prejudice the interests of the beneficiaries identified in the Will.
55. Regarding the Assistant Chief’s affidavit, the Respondent submits that the affidavit effectively retracts the earlier letter identifying the Applicant as the deceased’s wife. She argues that the affidavit, having been sworn on oath, constitutes the credible and admissible account of the Assistant Chief’s position and that the Applicant cannot rely on the earlier letter after its maker purportedly withdrew it.
56. The Respondent accordingly urges the Court to dismiss the Applicant’s application dated 26th July 2025 in its entirety, principally on the ground that the Applicant lacks locus standi.
57. The issues for determination are therefore whether the Applicant has the requisite locus standi to seek preservation and protective orders in respect of the deceased's estate, whether a prima facie basis for the Court to intervene and preserve the estate against alleged intermeddling has been established, and whether a case for issuance of interlocutory injunction has been made, and whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders for production of title documents, bank/mobile-money records, accounts, access to bank funds and/or payment of Kshs. 2,000,000 pending determination of the succession cause
58. The Respondent contends that the Applicant lacks locus standi because she has no grant of representation and her alleged status as the deceased's spouse is disputed
59. I note that in the present application, the Applicant has not sued in the name of the estate but in her own capacity as a person interested in the succession cause; that is, claiming that as a surviving spouse to the deceased she ranks in priority over everyone else in taking out letters of administration to the estate of the deceased.
60. I also note that the Applicant is not seeking in the application to administer the estate, or to collect its assets, or to institute proceedings on its behalf or exercise the powers of a personal representative but for preservation orders pending determination on the question of who is entitled to representation.
61. I have combed through case law on the point, and it is apparent that there are two schools of thought, one holding that for one to make an application seeking preservatory orders of the estate from intermeddling, an applicant must have a grant of representation and the other holding that any person interested in the estate of a deceased person is entitled to move the court to preserve the estate.
62. Odunga J in Re: Estate of Benson Maingi Mulwa (Deceased) (2021 KEHC 6181 (KLR) was of the latter view; he held as follows;
41. In my view, since intermeddling can be committed even by administrators, any person interested in the state of a deceased person as a beneficiary or otherwise is properly entitled to move the court and seek orders intended to preserve the estate. It is therefore not mandatory that such an application be made by the administrators or with consent or authority of the other beneficiaries since a beneficiary is properly entitled to protect his or her interest in the estate.
63. I am inclined to that view; the view that a party must possess a grant of representation to stop intermeddling creates a legal paradox: it may permit an estate to be destroyed legally through procedural delay.
64. Section 45, as Odunga J observed, outlaws intermeddling by anyone, and because even administrators can act unlawfully, the right to move the court for preservation orders ought to be tied to a party's material interest in the estate, not their possession of formal written permission obtained through another lengthy legal process.
65. It would be a pedantic reading, as opposed to a purposive one, that would allow the law to command the preservation of property under Section 46 while simultaneously stripping beneficiaries, and persons with an identifiable apparent interest in the same, of the procedural means to enforce that preservation
66. Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act vests the High Court with wide, overarching jurisdiction to entertain any application and make any necessary orders to facilitate the administration of justice; I perceive no hindrance to a beneficiary invoking the Court’s powers under this section for the preservation of the estate of a deceased person that is the subject of a succession cause before Court.
67. The Applicant in this case claims to be a surviving spouse of the deceased; the Respondent admits that she was in a relationship with and had an issue with the deceased, who the Respondent acknowledges as her brother and a beneficiary of the estate of the deceased. I believe those facts disclose sufficient interest in the applicant to make the application for preservation of the deceased's estate.
68. I therefore find that the Applicant has locus standi to make the application directed at preserving the estate pending determination of who is entitled to representation, in the absence of a grant of representation.
69. And to conclude on the point, I believe that there is a world of difference between orders requiring the Applicant to administer or deal with estate property, which would require representation; and orders intended merely to preserve the estate from dissipation pending determination of representation, which fall within the protective jurisdiction of the succession court.
70. On the next issue, section 45 (1) of the Law of Succession Act states as follows:
“Except so far as expressly authorized by this Act, or by any other written law, or by a grant of representation under this Act, no person shall, for any purpose, take possession or dispose of, or otherwise intermeddle with, any free property of a deceased person.”
71. Section 45 prohibits a person, except where authorised by the Act, another written law or a grant of representation, from taking possession of, disposing of or otherwise intermeddling with the free property of a deceased person.
72. The Court of Appeal has adopted a strict approach to dealings with estate property before lawful representation; in its decision in Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 140 of 2017, between Beth Mueni v. John Kinyanjui Gakunga & Another, the court held as follows;
“There is the final issue as to whether the sale of the estate property by beneficiaries without a grant could pass interest capable of protection under the Act. A person can only lawfully deal with the estate of a deceased person pursuant to a confirmed grant. Section 45 of the Act prohibits intermeddling with the property of a deceased person. It follows, therefore, that the transactions entered into before receipt of the letters of administration were issued and confirmed were invalid as they offended Sections 45 and 82 of the Act. The trial court, in holding that the appellant was not an interested party as provided under Section 76 of the Act, was, in our view, not in error in fact or law, as it has been established that the sale transaction was void for want of consent from the Land Control Board; and also that the transactions were void as the same were done by the beneficiaries before the Letters of Administration were issued and confirmed…”
73. In that decision, the Court specifically held that beneficiaries themselves could not lawfully transact with estate property merely by virtue of being beneficiaries.
74. That decision is particularly relevant in this case, because the Respondent's alleged status as a daughter, beneficiary or named executor does not, without more, entitle her to deal freely with the deceased's property.
75. The authenticity and validity of the alleged will, and the Applicant’s status as a surviving spouse of the deceased are not up for consideration at this stage of the proceedings; they are essentially matters to be determined at trial.
76. The Applicant alleges that the Respondent has collected rental income, dealt with motor vehicles, operated or retained the deceased’s mobile money facilities, accessed bank accounts, altered. Leased, sold, subdivided or developed estate property or otherwise appropriated estate income, all which, if established, would fall within the prohibition in section 45 of the Law of Succession.
77. Of course, bare allegation would not suffice; the Applicant is expected to present evidence sufficient to prove the allegations.
78. The Respondent denied the allegation in her replying affidavit sworn on 10th November 2025.
79. I have combed through the rival affidavits, but I have not found credible evidence on the Applicant’s allegations; there are no bank statements, no M-Pesa statements, or other credible evidence that proves the allegations made.
80. The Applicant bore the onus of proof, but from the evidence presented she did not prove those allegations on a balance of probabilities at this stage of the proceedings.
81. This finding does not absolve any party later found to have intermeddled with the property from either criminal sanction or the remedies available in civil proceedings in respect of the estate of the deceased; the findings are limited to the current application falling for consideration.
82. There is a distinct allegation made by the applicant that I chose to deal with separately, and that is her alleged eviction from the home she shared with the deceased.
83. At paragraph 5 (a) of her supporting affidavit sworn on 26th July 2025, the applicant alleges that the Respondent unlawfully and unilaterally denied her access to her matrimonial home in Syokimau. The applicant annexed to her supporting affidavit a copy of a letter from the Office of the Assistant Chief Syokimau sub-location dated 24th July 2025.
84. In the letter, the Chief confirmed that the deceased was resident in his jurisdiction and, before his death, he was living with the applicant, with whom he had a child called Jarari Faridi. That letter is on the official letterhead of the State Department for Internal Security and National Administration; it bears the Assistant Chief’s signature and stamp.
85. The Applicant, in her further affidavit sworn on 24th January 2026, stated that during the lifetime of the deceased, she together with her son was fully supported by the deceased.
86. She stated that they lived in Syokimau Land Reference No. 12715/3025, which was their matrimonial home.
87. That she stayed with the deceased up to his last breath, and that barely a month after the deceased was interred, the Respondent picked a fight with her and chased her out of her matrimonial home and occupied the same.
88. The Respondent in her replying affidavit stated that the house in Syokimau is not the Applicant’s matrimonial home for the reason that the Applicant wasn’t married to the deceased.
89. I note that the Respondent did not deny that the Applicant, together with her son, who is the son of the deceased, lived together with the deceased at the Syokimau house.
90. The Respondent admits in her replying affidavit that the deceased was providing for the Applicant and her son; to quote verbatim, the Respondent stated as follows:
“ I am unable to afford the lifestyle my father was giving the Applicant, and I cannot sustain her on the same”.
91. The Respondent annexed to her replying affidavit a purported affidavit of the Assistant Chief recanting his letter issued to the Applicant. I call it purported because the document is certainly not an affidavit, as it is not sworn either before a magistrate or a commissioner for oaths; at best, it is a statement that, considering it's not on the official letterhead and bears no office stamp of the office, can hardly displace the letter issued to the Applicant that was addressed to the Assistant Chief's superiors at the relevant State Department that has all the hallmarks of official correspondence.
92. Section 45 prohibits any person from taking possession or in any manner intermeddling with the property of the deceased except as permitted by law.
93. The Respondent in this case has neither a grant of representation nor a grant of probate, and her actions in that regard fell afoul of express provisions of the law, more so seeing that her actions affected the son of the deceased who is a minor and the Applicant who was living in the said house at the time of the deceased’s demise. Her actions clearly affected persons dependent on the deceased’s provision for their housing before she was clothed with legal authority to interfere with the same.
94. In the case of Floris Piezzo & Another –vs- Giancarlo Falasconi (2014) eKLR, while considering whether an injunction can issue in a Succession Cause, the Court of Appeal expressed itself as follows;
“We have carefully considered the grounds of appeal, rival written and oral submissions, and the law. The application before the High Court was for a temporary injunction to restrain the appellants from dealing with the suit premises in a manner inimical to the estate of the deceased. The question which arose and had to be determined first was whether the Court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction in a Succession Cause. The appellants took the position that the Court had no such jurisdiction, whereas the Respondent took the contrary position. However, the High Court was persuaded that Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules reserved the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to allow for the grant of injunctions in deserving cases. We are in total agreement with this conclusion. We have no doubt at all that the Law of Succession Act gives the Court wide jurisdiction in dealing with testamentary and administration issues of an estate. Indeed, Section 47 of the said Act gives the Court jurisdiction to entertain any application and determine any dispute under the Act and to pronounce such decree and orders as may be expedient. It cannot be said that such decrees and orders would exclude injunction orders. In other words, we are of the same view that Section 47 of the Act gives the Court all-embracing powers to make necessary orders, including injunctions where appropriate to safeguard the deceased’s estate. This section must be read together with Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, which further emboldens the Court’s jurisdiction to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. We would imagine such orders would also include injunctive orders.”
95. The principles applicable to an interlocutory injunction are settled. The Applicant must establish a prima facie case; demonstrate that she is likely to suffer irreparable injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy; and, where the Court remains in doubt, demonstrate that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction.
96. In the present matter, however, the application must be considered in the context of the Court's protective jurisdiction over the estate of a deceased person. Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act prohibits unauthorised possession of, disposal of or other intermeddling with the free property of a deceased person. Section 47 confers upon this Court jurisdiction to entertain disputes under the Act and to make such orders as may be expedient. Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of its process.
97. I have already found that the Applicant has sufficient interest in the estate to move the Court for preservatory orders notwithstanding the absence of a grant of representation. That finding does not amount to a determination that she is the deceased's spouse or that she is entitled to administer or inherit the estate.
98. On the evidence presently before the Court, the Applicant has not established, on a prima facie basis, all the allegations of intermeddling pleaded against the Respondent. In particular, the allegations concerning withdrawal of funds from the deceased's bank accounts, operation of the deceased's mobile-money facilities and collection of rental income have not been supported by bank statements, M-Pesa statements, rent schedules or other documentary evidence sufficient to establish the alleged dealings at this stage.
99. The position is, however, different regarding the occupation of the Syokimau property. It is not disputed that the Applicant and the deceased lived together at the property and that the deceased supported the Applicant and their child during his lifetime. The Applicant has also placed before the Court the letter of the Assistant Chief dated 24th July 2025 concerning their cohabitation and child. The Respondent disputes the Applicant's status as a spouse, but that is a matter for determination at the substantive hearing and ought not to be conclusively determined at this interlocutory stage.
100. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated a sufficiently serious question concerning her interest in the deceased's estate and that there is a need to preserve the estate pending determination of the competing claims relating to representation and the validity of the alleged Will.
101. I am further satisfied that the preservation of the estate is necessary because alienation, transfer, subdivision, charging, destruction or material alteration of estate assets during the pendency of the succession proceedings may occasion prejudice that may not readily be undone. The balance of convenience consequently favours maintenance of the estate in its condition as at the time of the deceased’s death.
102. Therefore, pending the hearing and determination of the succession cause, the Respondent, whether by herself, her agents, servants or persons acting through her, is hereby restrained from selling, transferring, charging, subdividing, disposing of, alienating or materially altering the deceased's immovable properties and other identified estate assets, except with the authority of the Court or pursuant to a lawful grant of representation or grant of probate.
103. As regards the prayer for access to the deceased's bank accounts and withdrawal of Kshs. 2,000,000, the same is declined at this interlocutory stage. Such an order would go beyond preservation and would permit the Applicant to deal with estate assets before the Court has determined the parties' respective rights.
104. The relief sought in respect of the Syokimau property requires separate consideration from the allegations concerning rental income, bank accounts and mobile-money transactions. I have already found that the latter allegations have not, at this interlocutory stage, been supported by sufficient documentary evidence to warrant the orders sought.
105. As regards the Syokimau property, however, the evidence presents a materially different position. What is presently material is that, immediately before the deceased's death, the Applicant and the deceased's minor child were residing with him at the Syokimau property.
106. In my view, the circumstances disclose a sufficient basis for the Court to intervene, not for the purpose of determining the Applicant's ultimate proprietary or succession rights, but for the limited purpose of preserving the residential position obtained at the time of the deceased's death pending determination of the succession dispute.
107. I am mindful that an order requiring restoration of possession is mandatory in character and therefore calls for greater caution than a merely prohibitory injunction. Nevertheless, this is not a case where the Applicant seeks to establish a new right to possession based solely upon a disputed claim of ownership.
108. The evidence before the Court is that she and the deceased's minor child were already in occupation of the premises with the deceased immediately before his death and that the subsequent exclusion occurred before the question of representation of the estate had been determined.
109. The Respondent has neither a grant of probate nor a grant of letters of administration. Her assertion of authority derives substantially from an alleged Will whose validity and authenticity have been challenged and which remain matters for determination in the substantive proceedings.
110. I consider it just and proportionate, in exercise of the Court's protective jurisdiction, to restore the Applicant and the deceased's minor child to occupation of the Syokimau residence pending the hearing and determination of the succession cause.
111. This order is intended solely to preserve the position of the Applicant and the minor child pending determination of their respective legal rights and does not constitute a finding that the Applicant was married to the deceased, that the property constitutes her matrimonial property, or that she has any proprietary interest therein.
In light of all the aforestated, I hereby order as follows;
A. Pending the hearing and determination of the succession cause, the Respondent, her servants, agents or persons acting under her authority are hereby restrained from evicting, excluding, removing or otherwise interfering with the Applicant and the deceased's minor child in their occupation of the Syokimau residence (Syokimau Land Reference No. 12715/3025); the Applicant and the minor child shall be restored to occupation thereof forthwith.
B. Pending the hearing and determination of the succession cause, the Respondent, whether by herself, her agents, servants or persons acting through her, is hereby restrained from selling, transferring, charging, subdividing, disposing of, alienating or materially altering the deceased's immovable properties and other identified estate assets, except with the authority of the Court or pursuant to a lawful grant of representation or grant of probate.
C. Costs shall be in the cause,
Dated, signed and delivered via Microsoft Teams, at Mombasa this 1st day of October, 2026.
Emmanuel Bitta
Judge of the High Court
In the Presence of;
Nechesah C/A
Kimotho h/b Okoth for the Applicant
Khaniri h/b Swaka for the Respondent