REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS CIVIL APPEAL NO. E266 OF 2023
DAVID KIOKO NZIOKA.....................................................1ST APPELLANT
JOSEPH NGIGI NJUGUNA ................................................2ND APPELLANT
-VERSUS-
ROSEMARY SYOMITI KIMOTHO (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of JAMES KIMOTHO NYUMU (Deceased))..........RESPONDENT
JUDGEMENT
1. The Respondent then Plaintiff before the subordinate court, filed suit by way of a Plaint dated 13th December 2020 and filed in court on 21st December 2020, against the Appellants seeking General Damages under the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act and Law Reform Act; Special Damages of Kshs.67,050/-; Costs of the suit; and Interest until payment in full.
2. The suit at the subordinate court was founded on the tort of negligence. The Respondent's claim was for compensation arising out of a road traffic accident which occurred on 23rd March 2019 along Kyeleni- Donyo Sabuk Road at Kyeleni area involving motor vehicle Registration Number KXC 646 which was being driven by the 1st Appellant and owned by the 2nd Appellant. It is contended that the 1st Appellant so negligently and or carelessly controlled the aforesaid motor vehicle such that he caused an accident where the deceased who at the time was a lawful passenger on the said motor vehicle sustained fatal injuries.
3. The Appellants upon service of Summons and Plaint, duly entered appearance and filed their joint Statement of Defence dated 10th February 2021 alluding contributory negligence on the deceased's part.
4. The suit proceeded to full hearing with only the Respondent tendering evidence through her four witnesses. The Appellants failed to call any witness to adduce evidence. Upon considering the pleadings and evidence tendered by the Plaintiff/Respondent, the trial court found the Appellants herein 100% liable and awarded the Respondent Kshs.3,567,426/= in damages plus costs and interest.
5. Being aggrieved by the trial court’s judgement, the Appellants lodged the instant appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 13th October, 2023 raising 9 grounds as follows:-
a. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that the 1st and 2nd Appellants had shown a prima facie case with a high probability of success;
b. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that the 1st and 2nd Appellants were not to blame for causing the accident by apportioning 100% liability against the Appellants;
c. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that there was no concrete evidence placed before the court to determine who was to blame for the accident between the 1st and 2nd Appellants and the deceased.
d. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that the contents of police abstract as extracted from the records held by the police is merely evidence that a report of an accident was made and not that an accident occurred.
e. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that a police abstract is not conclusive proof of liability.
f. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that the Police Officer and the Respondent were not present at the scene of the accident and as such cannot render any account leading up to or surrounding the alleged accident.
g. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider that the testimonies tendered by the Respondent and the Police Officer were not that which they saw or heard which goes against the evidentiary rules of direct evidence thereby rendering their testimonies as hearsay.
h. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that where there is no concrete evidence to determine how the accident occurred and who is to blame for causing an accident, both parties should be held equally liable.
i. That the learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider and find that there can be no liability without fault.
6. The Appellants pray that:-
a. The appeal be allowed;
b. The Judgement of the Honourable Court in CMCC No. E067 of 2020 by Honourable Paul M. Wechuli, SRM delivered on the 14th September 2023 be set aside.
c. Costs and interest of this appeal be born by the Respondent.
d. Any other relief the Honourable court may deem fit to grant.
7. The appeal was canvassed through written submissions. The Appellants’ submissions are dated 13th October 2025 whilst the Respondent’s submissions are dated 10th June 2026.
Analysis and Determination
8. This being a first appeal, I am reminded of the primary role as a first appellate court namely, to re-evaluate the evidence before the trial court as well as the judgment and arrive at its own independent judgment on whether or not to allow the appeal. A first appellate court is empowered to subject the whole of the evidence to a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny and make conclusions about it, bearing in mind that it did not have the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses first hand. This duty was stated in Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd.& others and in Peters v Sunday Post Limited (1968) E.A 123. (1958) E.A Page 424.
9. In the case of Mursal & another v Manese (suing as the legal administrator of Dalphine Kanini Manesa) (Civil Appeal E20 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 282 (KLR) (6 April 2022), the court held that: -
A first appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. A first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court, must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. While reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.
10. A first appellate court is the final court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full, fair, and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less is unjust. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard on both questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. While considering the scope of Section 78 of Civil Procedure Act, a court of first appeal can appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion
11. I have had the chance to critically assess and peruse the Record of Appeal and also considered the parties’ Counsel rival submissions on the appeal. The pertinent issue I form for my consideration is whether the trial court’s judgement ought to be set aside.
Determination on Liability
12. The claim herein being an action for negligence, like in all civil litigation, the burden is always on the Claimant to prove that the Respondent was negligent.
13. A cursory perusal at the record on evidence tendered before the trial court on liability was that of the PW2, Jane Kaswii Muthuma, the eye witness and PW3, was the Investigating Officer No. 452xx Sergent Paul Mwangi of Donyo Sabuk Police Station, Traffic Department.
14. PW2 adopted her witness statement filed in the lower court case. On cross-examination, she stated that on the material day i.e. 23rd March 2019 she was standing at the stage and saw the accident occur. The deceased was aboard the motor vehicle at the back. She blamed the driver for the reasons given at paragraph 10 of her witness statement. The further stated that she reported to the police but did not record a statement with the police and was not included in the police abstract as a witness. She stated that she was telling the truth and her neighbours could confirm the same. she was at the scene when the accident occurred and her neighbours arrived at the scene after the accident. She denied that a motorcycle rider was a witness nor did he record a statement. She stated that she found the deceased unconscious, he stayed for a while before he died.
15. PW3 testified that he was the Investigating Officer. They received a report of an accident on 23rd March 2019 which had occurred at Donyo Sabuk Road. He stated that he did investigations. The deceased was a passenger in the lorry and he fell from the lorry and died on the spot. He produced the Police Abstract as PEx.2.
16. On cross- examination, he stated that the evidence he had given was from OB No.15 of 23/3/2019 and that he had an excerpt of the same which was part of his exhibit. That paragraph 7 of the abstract shows the matter was pending under investigation and as at the time of him testifying, it was still pending under investigation. He confirmed that the abstract showed that no party had been blamed yet which meant the Defendants/Appellants are not to blame for the accident.
17. On re-examination, PW3 stated that the police abstract originated from the OB. Paragraph 9 of the abstract showed that the deceased was injured, he jumped from the moving vehicle. The deceased fell from the vehicle.
18. From the above Respondent’s evidence on liability, I have read PW’2 witness statement dated 7th January 2021 and more particular paragraph 10 where she states as follows:
“I wholly blame the driver of motor vehicle registration number KXC 646 for the accident in that he drove at an excessive speed in the circumstances, failed to observe due care and attention while driving and also because he failed to stop, brake and swerve or in any other way to control the motor vehicle to avoid the accident”.
19. I observe that PW2 stated that as she was at the bust stop waiting to board a motor cycle, a lorry passed by at a high speed such that she had to maintain a distance of 20 meters from the road to avoid being hit. Thereafter she saw a person fall off from the said lorry which she was able to read and note the registration details as motor vehicle registration number KXC 646. PW2 does not describe the appearance of the lorry and or state where exactly on the lorry the deceased fell from. It is not clear whether the lorry was open or closed and where exactly the deceased was positioned at the time of the accident. PW2 did not tell elaborately how the accident occurred.
20. I also note from the testimony of PW3 and the contents of paragraph 7 of the police abstract that the matter was pending under investigation as at the time of him testifying. He confirmed that the police abstract showed that no party had been blamed yet which meant the Defendants/Appellants are not to blame for the accident.
21. That Paragraph 9 of the police abstract showed that the deceased was injured when he jumped from the moving vehicle. The deceased fell from the vehicle.
22. In Omoke v Owino & 3 Others (Civil Appeal E103 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 2652 (KLR) cited the Court of Appeal decision in Michael Hubert Kloss & Another V David Seroney & 5 Others [2009] eKLR in discussing the question of liability, where it was held:
“The determination of liability in a road traffic case is not a scientific affair. Lord Reid put it more graphically in Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd (2) (1953) A.C. 663 at p. 681 as follows:
“To determine what caused an accident from the point of view of legal liability is a most difficult task. If there is any valid logical or scientific theory of causation it is quite irrelevant in this connection. In a court of law this question must be decided as a properly instructed and reasonable jury would decide it.
“The question must be determined by applying common sense to the facts of each particular case. One may find that as a matter of history several people have been at fault and that if any one of them had acted properly the accident would not have happened, but that does not mean that the accident must be regarded as having been caused by the faults of all of them. One must discriminate between those faults which must be discarded as being too remote and those which must not. Sometimes it is proper to discard all but one and to regard that one as the sole cause, but in other cases it is proper to regard two or more as having jointly caused the accident. I doubt whether any test can be applied generally.”
23. On whether the Respondent herein is liable for contributory negligence. The law on contributory negligence is to apportion proximate cause and blameworthiness where appropriate. Liability in road traffic accidents is determined upon assessment and evaluation of the circumstances of the case
24. Having re-analysed and re-evaluated the evidence of PW2 and PW3 on how the accident herein occurred, it is my considered view that the deceased somehow was the author of his own misfortune and I tend to agree with the PW3 that the deceased might have jumped from the moving vehicle because even assuming the motor vehicle was over speeding, that alone could not possibly have pushed and thrown out the deceased passenger from the moving vehicle. Clearly, the deceased contributed in negligence to the occurrence of the fatal injuries he sustained.
25. In De Frias v Rodney 1998 BDA, LR 15 it was held as follows:
“Contributory negligence required the foreseeability harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence, if she ought reasonably to have foreseen that if she did not act as a reasonable prudence person, she might be hush and in reckoning must take into account the possibility of others being careless. All that is required here is that the plaintiff should have failed to take reasonable care for her own safety. I do not find that the plaintiffs conduct was in any way contributory negligence. In the agony of the circumstances, she made an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the collusion.”
26. In Wayne Ann Holdings Limited (T/a Superplus Food Stores) v Sandra Morgan, the Court held as follows:
“In this case contributory negligence was raised as a defence. When such a defence [sic] is raised, it is only necessary for a defendant to show a want of care on the part of the claimant for his own safety in contributing to his injury. In Nance v British Columbia Electric Rly [1951] AC 601, at page 611, Lord Simon said:
“……When contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove … that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff’s claim the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full.”
27. What the above principle of contributor negligence attempts to explain is that the negligence calculus is a framework for a trial court faced with such situational analysis to decide what precautions the reasonable person would have taken to avoid the harm. The classic definition of negligence given by Alderson B in Blyth vs Birmingham Waterworks Co. [1843 – 60] ALL ER 478:-
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations with ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”
28. Negligence and contributory negligence come in infinite forms and would therefore depend on a case-to-case basis. Furthermore, once the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case showing the Defendant is guilty of negligence the onus to discharge that burden in rebuttal rests with the defendant.
29. In the instant case the Defendants/Appellants pleaded and contended that the claim was denied for the reasons that the deceased illegally and unlawfully hang on and attempted to disembark from the Appellants’ motor vehicle registration number KXC 646 without taking any reasonable steps or measure to ensure his safety. As already observed hereinabove, the Respondent’s key and eye witness failed to elaborately tell how the accident herein occurred. It is my considered view that in the circumstances of this matter, the element of contributory negligence clearly comes out.
30. I draw inspiration from a holding by Justice K.G. Balakrishnan in the Indian case of Pramodkumar Rasikhhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, (2002) 6 SCC 455: AIR 2002 SC 2864 where the good Judge said that:
“The question of contributory negligence arises when there has been some act or omission on the claimant’s part, which has materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature that it may properly be described as negligence. Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in the expression “contributory negligence” it does not mean breach of any duty. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an author of his own wrong.”
31. From the above it is clear that contributory negligence refers to the lapses that lead to a self-inflicted injury by the deceased herein. Pursuant to the foregoing, this court finds that there is reason to disturb the finding of the trial court on liability and proceeds to apportion contributory negligence at 40% against the Respondent/then Plaintiff and 60% against the Appellants/then Defendants.
Determination on Quantum
32. On quantum, the trial Court assessed general damages awardable to the Respondent as follows:-
a) Pain and suffering
The deceased died on the same day as per the witnesses’ statements on record. The trial court made an award of Kshs.10,000/= being guided by the decision in Mercy Muriuki & Anor vs Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Anor (Suing as the Legal Administrator of the Estate of the late Robert Mwangi) 2019 eKLR where it was held that an award for pain and suffering ranges from Kshs.10,000/= to Kshs.100,000/= with higher damages being awarded if the pain and suffering before death had prolonged.
b) Loss of expectation of life
The trial court awarded Kshs.100,000/= adopting the decision in Easy Coach Bus Services & Anor vs Henry Charles Tsuma & Anor (suing as the Administrators and personal representatives of the Estate of Josephine Weyanga Tsuma (Deceased) [2019] eKLR where the court held that a sum of Kshs.100,000/= was the conventional figure for damages for loss of expectation of life.
c) Loss of dependency
The trial court observed that PW4 in his evidence stated that the deceased was a senior security officer with Strategic Industries Ltd. At the time of the accident his contract had been renewed for one year and he was earning Kshs.45,000/= per month.
The Appellants did not adduce any evidence to prove that the contract was invalid or that the Company in question did not exist. A copy of the contract on record was sufficient proof of the deceased’s employment. The Respondent’s evidence was thus credible. The deceased died at the age of 54 years. The trial court stated that since most superior courts use a limit o the retirement age of 60 years in determining an expected life span of a deceased, it thus adopted the same. The trial court adopted a multiplier of 6 years, a ratio of 2/3 since the deceased had dependants. The multiplicand was calculated at 45,000 x 6 x 12 x 2/3 =Kshs.2,160,000/=. The trial court relied on the finding in Jacob Ayiga Maruja & Anor vs Simeone Obayo, COA Civil Appeal No. 167 of 2002 [2005] eKLR and COA in Annalisa Muigai & Anor [2020] eKLR.
Under this head, the Appellants claim that the trial court made an exorbitant award on general damages for Loss of dependency at Kshs.2,160,000/- with which they call upon this court to set aside the same as being manifestly excessive and inordinately high in the circumstances and submit that a conservative multiplier of two (2) years is reasonable and appropriate. Applying a multiplicand based on the minimum wage of Kshs.15,201 and a dependency ratio of two-thirds (2/3), the Respondent’s entitlement under this head would amount to Kshs.243,216. The Appellants further submit that the deceased was employed on a fixed-term contract, and there is no convincing evidence of a contractual right or legitimate expectation of renewal, a court should not assume continued employment up to the statutory retirement age (60 years) when applying the multiplicand/multiplier approach to loss of dependency.
This court does not agree with the Appellants’ submissions as they have not laid any basis inviting the court to base the deceased’s earning on the minimum wage when they failed to challenge the deceased’s earning as demonstrated in his contract of employment. They did not also lead evidence to show that the deceased’s contract would likely not be renewed in future.
d) Special damages
The Respondent pleaded and proved special damages of Kshs.67,050/= which the trial court awarded.
33. The fact of the matter of assessment of damages is purely at the discretion of the trial court of facts. The idea that an appellate Court would fundamentally differ with the trial Court is neither here nor there. That is the attention of the principle in Loice Kagunda v Julius Gachau Mwangi CA 142 of 2003 the Court of Appeal held that:-
“We appreciate that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of judicial discretion and hence an appellate Court should not interfere with an award of damages unless it is satisfied that the judge acted on wrong principles of law or has misapprehended the facts or has for those other reasons make a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages suffered. The question is not what the appellate Court would award but whether the lower Court acted on the wrong principles.” (See Mariga v Musila {1984} KLR 257)
34. It is trite law that an appellate court should be slow to reverse a lower court on the question of the amount of damages unless it is satisfied that the judge acted on a wrong principle of law or has misapprehended the facts, or has for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. The question is not what the appellate court would award but whether the lower judge acted on the wrong principles (See Maraga V Musila (1984) 1 KLR 251).
35. On the foregoing re-analysis on the award of damages, I am not convinced that the trial court acted on wrong principles in making the awards under quantum.
36. The upshot is that the appeal partly succeeds and I make the following orders :-
a. Liability 60% as against the Appellants and 40% as against Respondent;
b. Pain and suffering Kshs. 10,000/=
c. Loss of expectation of life Kshs. 100,000/=
d. Loss of dependency Kshs.2,160,000/=
Kshs.2,270,000/=
Less 40% contribution Kshs. 908,000/=
Kshs.1,362,000/=
e. Special Damages Kshs. 67,050,/=
Total award Kshs.1,429,050/=
37. The Respondent is awarded the costs of the lower court suit plus interest at court rates.
38. Each party to bear their own costs of the appeal.
39. Stay of execution for thirty days is granted.
Orders accordingly, file closed.
JUDGMENT DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 5TH OCTOBER 2026
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS 5TH OCTOBER 2026