General

Ohanya v Kasome & another [2026] KEHC 17000 (KLR)

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Court
High Court of Kenya At Machakos
Case number
Family Appeal E016 of 2024
Judgment date
6 October 2026
Judge(s)
Before Hon Joyce Gandani
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Background

This appeal arises from the ruling of Hon. D. N. Sure, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 26th November 2024 in Kangundo Principal Magistrate’s Court Succession Cause No. E052 of 2020, In the Matter of the Estate of Monica Kaveso Kasome (Deceased). By that ruling, the learned magistrate declined to determine, within the succession cause, the claims of several persons who described themselves as purchasers of portions of land comprised…

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Question before the court

The administrators filed submissions dated 19th September 2024 and the protesters filed submissions dated 3rd October 2024. In the ruling of 26th November 2024, the learned magistrate observed that the protesters had produced sale agreements and photographs of their homes, and that, save for Everlyne Mogiti Gechore, their claims were contested by the administrators. She held that whether the protesters purchased the land from the…

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Reasoning passage

The learned magistrate gave the protesters 60 days to file suit, stayed the succession cause and preserved the status quo. Those orders protected both sides: the estate was preserved from alienation, and the appellant was protected from eviction pending determination of his claim. I find no error of principle in them.

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

The court considered whether the appellant, an alleged purchaser from the deceased, had standing to protest confirmation; whether the magistrate should have determined his claim to one acre of Nairobi/Block 126/286 within the succession cause; whether the…

Material facts

Monica Kaveso Kasome died intestate on 25 June 2014. Her children, Susan Mbeke Kasome and Gabriel Opiyo Kaveso, obtained a grant over an estate including Nairobi/Block 126/286. Peter Odour Ohanya relied on a 22 February 2011 sale agreement under which the…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

FAMILY APPEAL NO. E016 OF 2024

PETER ODOUR OHANYA……………………………………………APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUSAN MBEKE KASOME…………………………………………1ST RESPONDENT

GABRIEL OPIYO KAVESO……………………………………….2ND RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the ruling of Hon. D. N. Sure, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 26th November 2024 in Kangundo Principal Magistrate’s Court Succession Cause No. E052 of 2020, In the Matter of the Estate of Monica Kaveso Kasome (Deceased))

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. This appeal arises from the ruling of Hon. D. N. Sure, Principal Magistrate, delivered on 26th November 2024 in Kangundo Principal Magistrate’s Court Succession Cause No. E052 of 2020, In the Matter of the Estate of Monica Kaveso Kasome (Deceased). By that ruling, the learned magistrate declined to determine, within the succession cause, the claims of several persons who described themselves as purchasers of portions of land comprised in the estate. She directed them to file suits in the appropriate court within 60 days, stayed the succession cause pending the outcome of those suits and ordered that the status quo be maintained.

2. The appellant, Peter Odour Ohanya, was one of those protesters. The respondents, Susan Mbeke Kasome and Gabriel Opiyo Kaveso, are children of the deceased and the administrators of her estate. The appellant asks this Court to set aside the ruling and to order that one acre be excised from the land known as Nairobi/Block 126/286 and transferred to him.

BACKGROUND

3. Monica Kaveso Kasome (“the deceased”) died intestate on 25th June 2014 at Kenyatta National Hospital. She was survived by seven children, one of whom, Naomi Mbinya Kaveso, is also deceased.

4. By a petition dated 13th November 2020, the respondents applied for letters of administration intestate. Their supporting affidavit listed the deceased’s assets as Nairobi/Block 126/286 and two plots held through Embakasi Ranching Company Limited, namely Plot P.9608 and Plot V.6121. No liabilities were disclosed. A grant of letters of administration intestate was made to the respondents on 27th November 2020 and issued on 12th January 2021.

5. The appellant’s claim rests on an agreement for sale dated 22nd February 2011, drawn and attested by Antony Mbunya Kiarahu, Advocate. Under that agreement, the deceased agreed to excise approximately one acre from Plot No. 252, measuring 2.7 acres, to be excised from L.R. No. 11593, Dandora, which she had acquired through Ngundu Farmers Co-operative Society Limited, and to sell it to the appellant for KShs.700,000. The agreement recites that the purchase price was acknowledged on execution, provides for completion within 90 days, and obliges the vendor to do all that is reasonably necessary for the surveying, subdivision and registration of the portion in favour of the purchaser.

6. The appellant exhibited a share certificate issued to the deceased by Ngundu Farmers Co-operative Society Limited in 1984 and a certificate of lease issued on 13th March 2012 registering the deceased as proprietor of Nairobi/Block 126/286. His case is that Plot No. 252 became Nairobi/Block 126/286 upon registration, that he took possession on execution of the agreement, that he has built his family home on the land, and that the deceased fell ill and died before the subdivision could be completed.

7. On 31st March 2022, the respondents’ advocates wrote to the appellant alleging that he had trespassed on Nairobi/Block 126/286, constructed a permanent house and erected a perimeter wall, and demanding that he vacate and demolish his developments within 21 days.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

8. Having learnt from an online cause list that the matter was listed for confirmation of grant, the appellant filed an application under certificate of urgency together with an affidavit of protest against confirmation, both dated 24th August 2023. He sought to be admitted as a person interested in the estate, an order that one acre be excised from Nairobi/Block 126/286 in his favour, and an order that the Executive Officer of the court execute the subdivision and transfer documents. Six other protesters filed similar applications dated 20th September 2023.

9. On 22nd September 2023, the learned magistrate consolidated the applications and directed that they be heard by way of oral evidence. The protesters testified on 27th February 2024. The appellant testified as PW2. He adopted his statement and documents, stated that he bought the land from the deceased, paid the full purchase price, lives on the land, and was involved in processing the title issued on 13th March 2012. In cross-examination, he maintained that there was no disparity between the land described in his agreement and Nairobi/Block 126/286, and he stated that the administrators had threatened to evict him from his house.

10. The administrators called four witnesses on 27th August 2024. The first respondent (DW1) testified that she did not know the appellant, that the agreements did not refer to Nairobi/Block 126/286, that the deceased never told her of any sale, and that the deceased was illiterate and used a thumbprint. She stated that she found the appellant had built on the land in 2023, though she later conceded that she did not know whether he had built in 2011. She confirmed that the administrators had sold a portion of the land to Samuel Nyambega and Everlyne Mogiti Gechore. The second respondent (DW2) testified that he visited the land towards the end of 2014 and found it occupied. Joseph Mwangi Kaveso (DW3) testified that he saw the appellant’s house in 2015 and that the matter was reported to the chief in December 2015, but maintained that all the agreements were forgeries. Timothy Odindo Ojuga (DW4) testified that his mother never told him of any sale.

12. On 4th September 2024, applications were filed seeking, among other things, the joinder of Ann Mbula Kabecho, a daughter of the deceased who was not a petitioner, and the forensic examination of signatures on the sale agreements. Ann Mbula Kabecho’s position was that she was present when the deceased sold portions of her land, including to the appellant.

13. The administrators filed submissions dated 19th September 2024 and the protesters filed submissions dated 3rd October 2024. In the ruling of 26th November 2024, the learned magistrate observed that the protesters had produced sale agreements and photographs of their homes, and that, save for Everlyne Mogiti Gechore, their claims were contested by the administrators. She held that whether the protesters purchased the land from the deceased, and whether the deceased signed the agreements, were questions for the Environment and Land Court, and that her role was limited to identifying the properties forming the estate and the persons entitled to inherit.

THE APPEAL

14. By a memorandum of appeal dated 10th December 2024, the appellant advanced four grounds: that the learned magistrate erred in law by not allowing his application; that she erred in law in finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the application; that she erred in law and fact by failing to consider his evidence in toto; and that she so misdirected herself on law and fact as to occasion a miscarriage of justice.

15. He seeks orders that the appeal be allowed, the ruling set aside, one acre be excised from Nairobi/Block 126/286 in his favour, and that he be awarded the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings below.

THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS

16. In submissions dated 7th November 2025, the appellant contends that he is a purchaser for value from the deceased, that he paid the full purchase price, and that he has been in continuous occupation since 2011 and has developed the land extensively. He relies on the evidence of Ann Mbula Kabecho, on the admission by DW3 that he saw the appellant’s house in 2015, and on the demand letter of 31st March 2022 as proof that the family knew of his occupation. He argues that the administrators’ evidence was contradictory and that, having themselves sold part of the land in 2021, they cannot deny that portions of the land were sold.

17. The appellant submits that he is an interested party in the estate and relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Musa Nyaribari Gekone & 2 others v Peter Miyienda & another [2015] eKLR. He further relies on the proviso to section 71(2) of the Law of Succession Act (Cap. 160), and on the decisions of the High Court in In re Estate of Kahoro Muchiri Kahoro (Deceased) [2016] eKLR and In re Estate of Joseph Mutua Munguti (Deceased) [2018] eKLR, in which purchasers from a deceased person were recognised at the confirmation stage. He contends that the probate court has jurisdiction to ensure that agreements made by the deceased during her lifetime are honoured.

THE RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS

18. In submissions dated 10th November 2025, the respondents support the ruling. They contend that the mandate of a probate court is limited to identifying the assets of the estate, settling liabilities and distributing the net estate, and that disputes over ownership of land and the validity of sale agreements belong to the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011. They rely on rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules and on the decisions of the High Court in In re Estate of Alice Mumbua Mutua (Deceased) [2017] eKLR and In re Estate of Atibu Oronje Asioma (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 11046 (KLR).

19. The respondents further contend that the appellant’s agreement relates to Plot No. 252 of L.R. No. 11593 and not to Nairobi/Block 126/286, and that the authenticity of the agreements is disputed. They also state that, after lodging this appeal, the appellant filed Milimani ELC Land Case No. E034 of 2025, Peter Oduor Ohanya v Susan Mbeke Kasome & Gabriel Opiyo Kaveso, seeking substantially the same orders, and that this amounts to forum shopping and an abuse of process. They pray that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

20. Having considered the record, the memorandum of appeal and the submissions, the following issues arise:

(a) whether the appellant had standing in the succession cause as a person interested in the estate;

(b) whether the learned magistrate erred in declining to determine the appellant’s claim to one acre of Nairobi/Block 126/286 within the succession cause;

(c) whether the learned magistrate failed to consider the appellant’s evidence;

(d) whether the orders made were a proper exercise of discretion, and what orders this Court should make; and

(e) who should bear the costs of the appeal.

THE DUTY OF THIS COURT

21. This is a first appeal. The Court must reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, while making allowance for the fact that it did not see or hear the witnesses. As it was held by the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123, an appeal to a first appellate court is by way of retrial, and the appellate court is not bound to follow the trial court’s findings of fact if it appears that the trial court failed to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities, or if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence generally.

22. The orders complained of were, however, directions on how the protesters’ claims were to be determined, coupled with a stay and a status quo order. Such orders involve the exercise of judicial discretion. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in United India Insurance Co. Ltd v East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] KLR 898, an appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion merely because it would have decided differently; it will interfere only where the trial court misdirected itself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take account of relevant ones, or where its decision, viewed as a whole, is plainly wrong.

ISSUE (a): WHETHER THE APPELLANT HAD STANDING IN THE SUCCESSION CAUSE

23. The respondents did not seriously contend that the appellant had no right to be heard, and the learned magistrate in fact heard him as a protester. It is nevertheless necessary to address the point, because the appellant’s first prayer below was to be admitted as a person interested in the estate, and because the respondents’ submissions below described the protesters as intermeddlers.

24. Rule 40(6) of the Probate and Administration Rules permits any person wishing to object to the proposed confirmation of a grant to file an affidavit of protest. The proviso to section 71(2) of the Law of Succession Act prohibits the confirmation of a grant in intestacy until the court is satisfied as to the respective identities and shares of all persons beneficially entitled.

25. The Court of Appeal considered the position of a purchaser of estate property in Musa Nyaribari Gekone & 2 others v Peter Miyienda & another [2015] eKLR. As it was held in that case, the expression “any interested party” in section 76 of the Law of Succession Act, in its plain and ordinary meaning, is wide enough to accommodate any person with a right or expectancy in the estate, and a person claiming as a purchaser of property of the deceased qualifies as an interested party with standing to challenge a grant. The same reasoning applies with equal force to a person who wishes to protest against confirmation.

26. The appellant produced an agreement for sale executed during the deceased’s lifetime, attested by an advocate, together with evidence of his occupation of the land. On any view, he has a claimed right or expectancy in the estate. He was entitled to be heard on confirmation. The allegation that he is an intermeddler cannot be sustained on this record. As defined in section 45 of the Law of Succession Act, intermeddling concerns dealings with the free property of a deceased person without lawful authority. The appellant’s case is that he entered the land in 2011 with the consent of the deceased herself, some three years before her death. Whether that is true is a matter for the court that determines his claim, but it is not a basis for treating him as an intermeddler in these proceedings.

27. Standing to be heard, however, is not the same thing as entitlement to have a contested claim to title determined in the probate court. The first answers the question whether the appellant may participate. The second concerns what the probate court may properly decide. It is to that second question that I now turn.

ISSUE (b): WHETHER THE CLAIM COULD BE DETERMINED IN THE SUCCESSION CAUSE

28. The question of jurisdiction is fundamental. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, jurisdiction is everything; without it a court has no power to make one more step, and it must down its tools the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.

29. The jurisdiction of a court exercising probate powers is defined by the Law of Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Rules. Section 47 of the Act confers jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain applications and determine disputes under the Act, and section 48 confers corresponding jurisdiction on magistrates within their pecuniary limits. Section 3 of the Act defines the “free property” of a deceased person as property of which the deceased was legally competent freely to dispose during her lifetime and in respect of which her interest has not been terminated by her death. It is only the free property of the deceased that is available for distribution.

30. Rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules directly addresses the present situation. It provides that where a question arises as to the identity, share or estate of any person claiming to be beneficially interested, which cannot at that stage be conveniently determined, the court may, prior to confirming the grant, appropriate and set aside the particular share or estate or the property comprising it to abide the determination of that question in separate proceedings, and may thereafter proceed to confirm the grant.

31. Rule 41(3) therefore does not oust a probate court’s jurisdiction to recognise the claim of a purchaser. Where the claim is admitted by the administrators and beneficiaries, or where the facts are so clear that no genuine dispute arises, a probate court may give effect to it at confirmation. That is what occurred in respect of Everlyne Mogiti Gechore, whose claim the administrators accepted. The High Court decisions on which the appellant relies, including In re Estate of Kahoro Muchiri Kahoro (Deceased) [2016] eKLR, concerned situations of that kind: in that case, the petitioner’s first affidavit did not deny the purchase or the purchaser’s possession, and the court treated her later denial as an afterthought.

32. The position is different where the claim is genuinely contested on matters that require trial. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 vest in the Environment and Land Court the jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the use and occupation of, and title to, land, including disputes relating to the enforcement of land-related contracts. Section 9(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 2015 confers a similar jurisdiction on magistrates’ courts within their pecuniary limits, but that jurisdiction is exercised in civil proceedings properly instituted, not in a succession cause.

33. Where a claim touches both on succession and on land, the correct forum is determined by the dominant issue. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] eKLR, in deciding whether a dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court, the court must examine the pleadings and identify the predominant issue in controversy; incidental references to land do not make a dispute a land dispute, but where the substance of the controversy is title to or use and occupation of land, the matter belongs to that court.

34. Applying that test, the substance of the appellant’s claim is not who among the deceased’s children should inherit. It is whether the deceased, during her lifetime, sold him one acre of land, whether that land is part of what is now registered as Nairobi/Block 126/286, whether he paid for it, and whether he is entitled to have it excised and transferred to him. Each of those questions was disputed at trial:

(i) The authenticity of the agreement was disputed. DW1 and DW3 testified that the deceased was illiterate and used a thumbprint and that the agreements were forgeries. Significantly, the protesters themselves applied on 4th September 2024 for the forensic examination of signatures on the sale agreements. That application demonstrates that authenticity was a live issue requiring expert evidence.

(ii) The identity of the land was disputed. The agreement describes Plot No. 252 of L.R. No. 11593, Dandora, whereas the land in the estate is registered as Nairobi/Block 126/286. The appellant testified that the two are the same land; the administrators denied it. The record also contains a document which, according to DW1, shows the land registered to Ngundu Farmers Co-operative Society Limited on 27th July 2011, before the certificate of lease issued to the deceased on 13th March 2012. Reconciling those documents requires evidence from the society and the land registry.

(iii) Payment was disputed. The agreement records a purchase price of KShs.700,000, yet the appellant’s submissions in this Court refer to “one million”. The administrators put him to strict proof.

(iv) The relief sought is the excision of one acre from registered land and its transfer to the appellant. That relief would require the court to determine the location and boundaries of the portion on the ground, to direct a subdivision, and to cause the register to be altered.

35. These are not questions that can conveniently be determined in affidavit-based or summary proceedings incidental to confirmation. They call for pleadings, discovery, expert evidence on handwriting and thumbprints, evidence from Ngundu Farmers Co-operative Society Limited and the Land Registrar, and possibly a survey. The claim also potentially engages equitable doctrines. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in Macharia Mwangi Maina & 87 others v Davidson Mwangi Kagiri [2014] eKLR, a purchaser who has paid the purchase price and been placed in possession by the vendor may, in appropriate circumstances, be entitled to rely on a constructive trust or on proprietary estoppel against the registered proprietor. Whether the appellant can establish such a trust is precisely the kind of question that requires a full trial before the court vested with jurisdiction over title to land.

36. The appellant’s possession is also material. The certificate of lease was issued subject to the overriding interests set out in section 30 of the now repealed Registered Land Act (Cap. 300), which are now provided for in section 28 of the Land Registration Act, 2012. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in Mwangi & another v Mwangi [1986] KLR 328, the rights of a person in possession or actual occupation of land are equitable rights which bind the land, and the registered proprietor holds the land subject to them. That principle protects the appellant’s position while his claim is litigated. It does not, however, dispense with proof of the facts on which the claimed right depends, and those facts are disputed.

37. For completeness, I note the respondents’ reliance, in the trial court, on the doctrine of privity of contract. As it was held by the Court of Appeal in Agricultural Finance Corporation v Lengetia Limited [1985] KLR 765, as a general rule a contract affects only the parties to it and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party. That principle may be relevant to protesters who bought from third parties such as Jasho Investments, but it does not assist the respondents against the appellant. He contracted directly with the deceased, and his claim, if proved, lies against her estate, which the respondents represent.

38. I therefore find that the learned magistrate did not err in declining to determine the appellant’s contested claim within the succession cause. Her conclusion accords with rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules and with the constitutional allocation of jurisdiction over title to land. The correct characterisation of her decision is not that the court had no jurisdiction over the appellant at all, but that the contested questions of title could not conveniently be determined in the succession cause and had to be determined by the court with jurisdiction over such disputes. Ground 2 therefore fails, and ground 1, insofar as it complains that the prayers for excision and transfer were not granted, fails with it.

ISSUE (c): WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S EVIDENCE WAS CONSIDERED

39. The appellant complains that the learned magistrate did not consider his evidence in toto. It is correct that the ruling does not analyse the evidence witness by witness. It does, however, record that the protesters produced sale agreements and photographs of their homes, and it acknowledges their developments and the costs they may have incurred. It then identifies the questions of whether the protesters purchased from the deceased and whether she signed the agreements as issues for the Environment and Land Court.

40. Having correctly concluded that the contested claims should be determined in a separate suit, the learned magistrate was right not to make findings on the merits. Had she evaluated the evidence and made findings on authenticity, payment and the identity of the land, she would have prejudged the very questions she was sending to another court, with a real risk of conflicting decisions.

41. I am conscious that the appellant’s evidence is not insubstantial. His agreement was drawn and attested by an advocate in 2011, three years before the deceased’s death. The demand letter of 31st March 2022 acknowledges that he had built a permanent house and a perimeter wall. DW3 conceded that he saw the appellant’s house in 2015, which is at odds with DW1’s evidence that the house was built in 2023. Ann Mbula Kabecho, a daughter of the deceased, supports his account. On the other side, the administrators deny the sale, dispute the authenticity of the thumbprint, and point to the discrepancy in the description of the land. These competing positions confirm, rather than undermine, the need for a full trial. Nothing in this judgment is, or should be read as, a finding on the merits of the appellant’s claim. Ground 3 therefore fails.

ISSUE (d): THE ORDERS MADE AND THE ORDERS THIS COURT SHOULD MAKE

42. The learned magistrate gave the protesters 60 days to file suit, stayed the succession cause and preserved the status quo. Those orders protected both sides: the estate was preserved from alienation, and the appellant was protected from eviction pending determination of his claim. I find no error of principle in them.

43. Two matters nevertheless require attention. The first is that the 60 days have long lapsed, the mention of 28th March 2025 having been overtaken by this appeal. According to the respondents, the appellant has since filed Milimani ELC Land Case No. E034 of 2025 against the administrators, seeking substantially the same relief. The pleadings in that suit are not in the record of appeal, and I make no finding on its scope. I note, however, that the appellant has not disputed its existence. If the suit is as described, it is the proper vehicle for the determination of his claim, and this Court should not make any order that would pre-empt it. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21) exists precisely to prevent two courts from determining the same matter in issue between the same parties at the same time. The appellant’s prayer that this Court should itself order the excision of one acre cannot therefore be granted.

44. I do not, however, accept that the appellant should be condemned for abuse of process. The ruling appealed from directed him to file a suit, and he has done so. He was also entitled to test on appeal whether the probate court should itself have determined his claim. The pursuit of both avenues, while the question of forum was unresolved, was imprudent but not an abuse.

45. The second matter concerns the scope of the stay. Rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules contemplates that the disputed share or property be appropriated and set aside to abide the outcome of the separate proceedings, and that the court may thereupon proceed to confirm the grant in respect of the rest of the estate. The inventory lists two other assets, Plots P.9608 and V.6121 held through Embakasi Ranching Company Limited, which are not the subject of any protest. An indefinite stay of the entire cause is not required to protect the appellant. The trial court remains seized of the succession cause and may, on application, give appropriate directions under rule 41(3) regarding the uncontested assets, provided that the portion claimed by the appellant remains protected.

46. Finally, the appellant has drawn attention to the administrators’ admission that they sold a portion of Nairobi/Block 126/286 to Samuel Nyambega and Everlyne Mogiti Gechore by an agreement dated 20th May 2021, before the grant was confirmed. Section 55(1) of the Law of Succession Act prohibits the distribution of capital assets before confirmation, and section 82(b)(ii) prohibits a personal representative from selling immovable property before confirmation except for the purposes of administration. The lawfulness of that transaction is not before this Court and I make no finding on it. The trial court will, however, need to address it when the cause resumes, since the same administrators who resist the appellant’s claim on the ground that the estate must be preserved have themselves dealt with part of the same land before confirmation.

ISSUE (e): COSTS

47. Under section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, costs follow the event unless the court, for good reason, orders otherwise. The respondents have succeeded in resisting the appeal. However, the appeal raised a genuine question concerning the limits of the probate court’s jurisdiction over a purchaser’s claim; the appellant’s substantive claim remains undetermined; and the status quo order that the respondents defend benefits both parties equally. In these circumstances, each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal.

DISPOSITION

48. For the reasons given, I find that the appellant had standing in the succession cause as a person interested in the estate of the deceased, but that the learned magistrate did not err in declining to determine his contested claim to one acre of Nairobi/Block 126/286 within the succession cause.

49. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

(a) The appeal is dismissed, and the ruling of the Principal Magistrate’s Court at Kangundo delivered on 26th November 2024 in Succession Cause No. E052 of 2020 is upheld, subject to orders (b) to (d) below.

(b) Pursuant to rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules, the portion of one acre of Nairobi/Block 126/286 claimed by the appellant, as presently occupied by him, shall be set aside and shall not be distributed, transferred, charged or otherwise alienated pending the final determination of the appellant’s claim by the Environment and Land Court or a court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) The status quo order made by the trial court on 26th November 2024 shall remain in force in respect of the appellant’s occupation of the said portion pending the final determination of that claim.

(d) The trial court is at liberty, upon application by any party, to give further directions under rule 41(3) of the Probate and Administration Rules regarding the confirmation of the grant in respect of the assets of the estate that are not in dispute.

(e) Nothing in this judgment constitutes a finding on the validity of the agreement for sale dated 22nd February 2011 or on the appellant’s entitlement to the land claimed.

(f) Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal.

(g) The Deputy Registrar shall transmit a copy of this judgment, together with the lower court file, to the Principal Magistrate’s Court at Kangundo.

READ AND PUBLISHED IN THE CTS THIS 6TH OCTOBER 2026 IN THE PRESENCE OF:

NO PARTY PRESENT

BEFORE HON JOYCE GANDANI, JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT