Land law

Gacheru v Lakamshi Khimji & Sons Limited & another [2026] KEELC 7232 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Petition E010 of 2023
Judgment date
27 October 2026
Judge(s)
J G Kemei

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The Court held that the petitioner wrongly invoked its constitutional jurisdiction because the tenancy, eviction/distress, and damages disputes should have been pursued in an ordinary civil suit. It struck out the petition and ordered each party to bear its own costs.

Supporting judgment passages

a. It is therefore my finding that the Petitioner wrongly invoked this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The dispute ought to have been brought as an ordinary civil suit and not a constitutional petition. Consequently, the Petition is therefore struck-out.

Passage 73 →

b. Each party will bear their own costs of the Petition.

Passage 74 →
Issue 1Whether this Petition offends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

Held. Decided. Yes. The dispute arose from a private tenancy/commercial contractual relationship and concerned alleged breach, eviction, distress for rent, sale of goods, and damages—matters for an ordinary civil court rather than constitutional interpretation. The earlier ruling on the Business Premises Rent Tribunal's jurisdiction did not decide whether constitutional jurisdiction was properly invoked, so the point was not res judicata. The petition was struck out.

Ratio. Under constitutional avoidance, a court should not determine a constitutional question where the dispute can properly and effectively be resolved through ordinary legal remedies. Statutory or contractual claims do not become constitutional claims merely because constitutional rights are invoked; disputes concerning private commercial contracts should proceed through ordinary civil processes.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

a. Whether this Petition offends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

Passage 48 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

39. In my view, the jurisdictional issue was determined only with respect to the Tribunal, not the constitutional aspect. The Court did not determine whether its constitutional jurisdiction had been properly invoked. Accordingly, the issue cannot be considered res judicata.

Paragraph 39 →

a. It is therefore my finding that the Petitioner wrongly invoked this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The dispute ought to have been brought as an ordinary civil suit and not a constitutional petition. Consequently, the Petition is therefore struck-out.

Passage 73 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

30. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance dictates that where a dispute can be effectively resolved under ordinary law, Courts must refrain from converting it into a constitutional question. The Supreme Court decision in Communications Commission of Kenya and 5 Others vs Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others (2014) eKLR held that;

Paragraph 30 →

35. The Petitioner invites this Court to determine whether there has been a breach of contract by the 1st Respondent in the manner in which she was evicted from the premises and in the sale of her goods proclaimed by the 2nd Respondent. That cannot, in any way, fall within the mandate of this Court exercising its constitutional interpretative jurisdiction to determine. Those are issues that fall squarely within the usual Civil Court.

Paragraph 35 →
Issue 2Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought

Not reached

Held. Not reached. Having found that the constitutional petition was improperly brought and striking it out, the Court did not determine the petitioner's substantive claims or entitlement to the requested declarations, damages, or compensation.

Ratio. This issue was not decided. The petition was disposed of on constitutional avoidance rather than on the merits of the requested reliefs.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

b. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought

Passage 49 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

a. It is therefore my finding that the Petitioner wrongly invoked this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The dispute ought to have been brought as an ordinary civil suit and not a constitutional petition. Consequently, the Petition is therefore struck-out.

Passage 73 →
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Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

Vide the Petition dated 4/9/2023, the Petitioner initiated this matter against the Respondents seeking the following orders;

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

On her part, the Petitioner submits that the issue of jurisdiction was already determined by this Court vide the Ruling delivered on 24/9/2024 by my brother Justice MD Mwangi. It is therefore argued that the learned judge having held that this Court has jurisdiction to here and determine the dispute, issue of jurisdiction is res judicata.

Paragraph 27 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

The Court identified two questions: whether the petition offended the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and whether the Petitioner was entitled to the reliefs sought. It also addressed the Petitioner’s submission that a ruling of 24 September 2024 had…

Material facts

The Petitioner alleged an oral tenancy for Shops M14 and M15 at Dubois Road Stalls, payment disputes concerning rent, licence fees and goodwill, welding shut of the shops, and removal and sale of her goods through distress for rent. She alleged forged…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

PETITION NO. E010 OF 2023

KAREN NJERI GACHERU - PETITIONER

AND

LAKAMSHI KHIMJI & SONS LIMITED - 1ST RESPONDENT

BALLON WANJALA NANGALAMA

T/A HEBROS AUCTIONEERS - 2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

Background

1. Vide the Petition dated 4/9/2023, the Petitioner initiated this matter against the Respondents seeking the following orders;

a. A declaration that the 1st Respondent’s actions, namely welding shut shop M14 and M15 situated on land parcel LR. NO. 209/523/23, Dubois Road, Dubois Stalls, and failing to issue a proper tenancy notice as provided for under the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act Cap 301, were illegal and amounted to unlawful eviction.

b. A declaration that the Respondents actions of fabricating evidence in order to distress for rent the Petitioner’s property were illegal and amounted to unlawful distress for rent.

c. A declaration that the 2nd Respondent’s actions of failing to follow the laid down procedures under the Auctioneers Rules, 1997 to distress for rent the Petitioner’s property and failing to serve the Petitioner with a Proclamation Notice, Notification of Sale, Miscellaneous Application and Court order were illegal and amounted to unlawful distress for rent.

d. A declaration that the Respondents actions denied, violated, infringed, and/or threatened the Petitioner’s fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded under Articles 27, 28, 40, 43, 48, 50 and 53 of the Constitution of Kenya and Article 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

e. An order for award of compensation for the violation of the Petitioner’s fundamental human rights.

f. Special damages of Kshs. Kshs. 5,793,731.98.

g. General damages for unlawful eviction, unlawful distress for rent and loss of earning capacity due to the unlawful eviction and unlawful distress for rent.

h. Exemplary and aggravated damages for unlawful eviction and unlawful distress for rent.

i. Costs and interest at Court rates from the date of Judgment.

2. The Petition is based on the facts, the various provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been violated, the statutory provisions of the law and supported by the Petitioner’s Affidavit of even date.

3. The Petitioner avers that she entered into an oral tenancy agreement with the 1st Respondent for Shop M15 at Dubois Road Stalls on 4/10/2019, paying a monthly rent of Kshs. 35,000/= and a goodwill of Kshs. 500,000/=. She states that the tenancy agreement was not reduced to writing, making it a controlled tenancy. She subsequently operated a beauty shop on the premises, which initially struggled but began to thrive after a temporary closure necessitated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Following this success, the Petitioner avers that she requested to rent the adjacent Shop M14 in November 2020. The 1st Respondent accepted the request on the understanding that the additional Kshs. 500,000/= goodwill for M14 would be paid in instalments via post-dated cheques, while she continued to pay rent for M15 without arrears.

4. To expand her business for the projected December 2020 peak season, the Petitioner secured a Kshs. 500,000/= loan from a moneylender, using her husband's car as collateral, and procured stock on credit from suppliers. However, on or about 5/12/2020, the 1st Respondent demanded full payment of the Kshs. 500,000/= goodwill, disregarding the existing instalment agreement. Despite the Petitioner's pleas and subsequent partial payments totalling Kshs. 458,000/= made between December 2020 and March 2021, the 1st Respondent welded shut both Shop M14 and M15, effectively halting her business operations. The Petitioner states that she had fully stocked the shop with goods, and the forced closure prevented a potential buyer from purchasing the business and stopped her from securing a loan from Family Bank.

5. The Petitioner deposes that on or about 16/9/2021, she learnt that the 2nd Respondent had removed her goods, valued at approximately Kshs. 5,793,731.98, and computers from the welded premises, pursuant to a Court order dated 26/8/2021, which she had never been served with. She asserts that the Respondents obtained this order by fabricating a Licence Agreement and forging her signature. The Petitioner contends that neither a Proclamation Notice, a Notification of Sale nor the Miscellaneous Application was ever served upon her, thereby denying her the right to be heard or to redeem her property before the adverse orders were executed.

6. It is deposed that the Respondents' actions have left her destitute, caused severe financial loss, and severely affected her family, including a tragic incident in which her former housekeeper attacked her children, resulting in hospital bills she could not pay because her funds had been seized. She alleges that the Respondents rejected an offer from her suppliers to pay the claimed arrears of Kshs. 235,000/=, and instead auctioned goods of significantly higher value. Consequently, she seeks general and exemplary damages, as well as compensation for the immense physical, psychological, and emotional trauma suffered as a result of the Respondents' actions and omissions.

7. The Petitioner has anchored her case on various provisions of the Constitution, namely Articles 10, 27, 28, 40, 43, 48, 50 and 53, arguing that her rights under those provisions were violated by the Respondents. The Petitioner also alleges that the Respondents violated Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Respondents’ Replying Affidavit

8. The Respondents opposed the Petition by the Replying Affidavit, sworn by Nimish Nalinchandra Shah, deposed on 14/12/2023. In that response, the Respondents challenged this Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the Petition by the Ruling delivered on 24/9/2024.

9. The 1st Respondent categorically denies the allegations in the Petition, asserting that the Petitioner was fully bound by her tenancy agreement to pay licence fees and goodwill, irrespective of whether her shop was operational. The 1st Respondent maintains that the Petitioner was in occupation of the premises but consistently defaulted on her financial obligations, ignoring repeated demands and communications. Consequently, the Respondent denies claims of receiving rent without arrears, noting that the Petitioner explicitly acknowledged her substantial debt of Kshs. 691,000/= in a letter dated 17/12/2020 and later admitted an outstanding balance of Kshs. 497,500/= on 26/3/2021.

10. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner breached their agreement by issuing fraudulent postdated cheques intended to deceive the management. That the Cheque dated 30/12/2021 was dishonored due to insufficient funds as evident by the copy of the return document from Guaranty Trust Bank. That out of caution to protect its image, the 1st Respondent did not present the other cheques. The 1st Respondent asserts that based on the history of non-payment, the 1st Respondent asserts it was well within its legal rights to demand the full outstanding sum and restrict access to the premises. Furthermore, the 1st Respondent denies that any formal agreement existed regarding the handling of the postdated cheques and argues that the Petitioner cannot use a separate unfortunate incident involving a house help as a scapegoat to evade her contractual obligations.

11. To recover the outstanding licence fees and rent totalling Kshs 497,500/=, it is averred that the 1st Respondent lawfully engaged the 2nd Respondent, an auctioneer, to distress for the arrears. It is averred that a Proclamation Notice was issued on 20/7/2021, which the Petitioner declined to sign. The 2nd Respondent’s initial attempt to cart away the goods was unsuccessful, as the Petitioner allegedly became violent and uncooperative. As a result, the 2nd Respondent filed a Miscellaneous Application No. E1263 of 2021 before the Magistrates’ Court and was granted an order on 26/8/2021. On 16/9/2021, in the company of Police Officers, the 2nd Respondent executed the order by carting away the goods from the subject premises. It is averred that the attached goods were advertised on 22/9/2021 and sold on 3/9/2021. That the sale of the attached goods yielded a mere Kshs. 76,680/=, as most items were expired and of minimal value, falling far short of the alleged claim of over Kshs. 5 million.

12. The Respondents assert that they acted strictly within the law to recover a legitimate debt and that the Petitioner was fully aware of the impending Court action, having received prior notice. They deny any fabrication of evidence or coercion, noting that the Petitioner failed to apply to set aside the Court order despite her claims of falsified documents. Ultimately, the Respondents pray that the Court find the Petition entirely frivolous, an abuse of the Court process, and calculated to mislead the Court. Therefore, they urge the Court to strike it out, with costs awarded to the Respondents.

13. Despite seeking leave on 26/2/2024, which leave was granted, to file a Further Affidavit in response to the Respondents’ assertions, none was filed.

14. Following pre-trial directions, the Petition was heard through viva voce evidence.

15. Karen Njeri Gacheru, the Petitioner, testified as PW 1 and relied on the Petition and her Affidavit, both dated 4/9/2023, as her evidence in chief. PW 1 further relied on the exhibits marked KNG 1-16 and produced them as P Ex Nos. 1-16 on pages 29-248 of the Petitioner's Trial Bundle. She stated that the Respondents' actions prejudiced her economically, hence the prayers sought in the Petition.

16. In cross-examination, PW 1 told the Court that she entered the shop in 2019. She stated that there was no written agreement, as she only asked for the shop and was given it. She averred that the licence fee was Kshs. 35,000/= from October 2019. She averred that she paid Kshs. 145,000/=. She further stated that the licence was to be paid in instalments. However, she could not support this assertion with a document. She averred that she paid Kshs. 190,000/= in October, but she had no receipts to evidence the payments. She confirmed that by December 2019 she ought to have paid Kshs. 605,000/=, but she only paid Kshs. 190,000/=. The alleged payment in January 2020 of Kshs. 35,000/= could not be substantiated. She stated that she paid for the goodwill when the shop had been closed.

17. PW 1 told the Court that for the period from January to November 2020, she paid rent by postdated cheques totalling Kshs. 600,000/=. She confirmed that the first cheque bounced. When referred to her Letter dated 17/5/2020, the witness confirmed owing the 1st Respondent rent arrears. She declined to sign any agreement, stating that the agreement is a forgery, but there is no criminal case on the same. She averred that the shop was closed from March to July 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. PW 1 testified that she was making Kshs. 200,000/= per month in sales, not profits. She reiterated that the claim is Kshs. 5,793,731.98/=, as evidenced by the attached receipts.

18. In re-examination, PW 1 averred that she never signed any agreement on the terms and conditions of payment. She stated that when she paid the rent and goodwill, she was told that the Lease would be prepared later. She further stated that from 2019 she paid only rent, not goodwill, which she alleged was to be paid in instalments. She stated that the payment was made to the 1st Respondent’s bank account. Referring to the Letter dated 17/12/2020, she informed the Court that she did not appeal against the Auctioneers’ notice.

19. Counsel for the Petitioner then closed to the Petitioner’s case.

20. Nimish Shah, a Director of the 1st Respondent, testified as DW 1. He averred that the Petitioner is a licensee in the building, with stalls M15 and M14. He maintained that the terms of the License Agreement were not varied. He confirmed that the Petitioner paid goodwill fees in arrears but failed to make the payments. He further testified that after issuing cheques that bounced for insufficient funds, the Petitioner never made any payments towards the licence fees. DW 1 averred that the Petitioner was duly notified of the distress for rent by the Auctioneer. He denied forging the Petitioner’s documents. He maintained that the Auctioneer recovered only Kshs. 70,000/=, which went towards the Auctioneer’s fees. He further averred that the Petitioner still owes the 1st Respondent about Kshs. 600,000/=. He also relied on their Replying Affidavit dated 14/12/2024 as part of his evidence.

21. During cross-examination, DW 1 stated that 1st Respondent and the Petitioner entered into an Agreement for shop No. M15 on 4/10/2019. That the License Agreement was for 1/1/2021 to 31/12/2021. He confirmed welding the Petitioner’s shop from December, 2020. Regarding the Letter dated 17/12/2020, DW 1 stated that the Petitioner had access to Shop No.14. That the Agreement provided when rent ought to have been paid hence after being notified of the arrears, there was no need to issue a termination notice. That the Letter dated 31/3/2021 demanded the Petitioner to pay rent arrears within 14 days. He confirmed that the Petitioner refused to sign the proclamation notice. He averred that although the Petitioner did not acknowledge receipt of the Notice of Motion dated 24/8/2021, service was duly effected on her WhatsApp.

22. In re-examination, DW 1 stated that there was a License Agreement in respect of Stall M15, the terms of which were similar to those for M14. He stated that the Petitioner could access M14 since 17/12/2020 and effectively access M15 since the shops were merged and the partitions removed. He stated that he was not involved in the service of the proclamation notice. That marked the close of the Respondents’ case.

23. After the defense testimony, parties were directed to file and exchange written submissions.

Parties Submissions

24. The Court’s directions were that parties file submissions in support of their respective cases. The Petitioner filed submissions dated 25/2/2026 and the supplementary ones dated 8/6/2026. The Respondents submissions are dated 3/6/2029. I have had the opportunity to read the submissions, which now form part of the record of the Court.

Analysis and Determination

25. Having considered the Petition, the Supporting Affidavit thereto, the Replying Affidavit in opposition to the Petition as well as the rival submissions by the parties, it is my considered view that the issue that arises for determination are;

a. Whether this Petition offends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

b. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought

Whether this Petition offends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

26. In his opening statement before commencement of the hearing as well as their submissions, the Respondents contend that this Court is bereft of jurisdiction to hear and determine this dispute as a constitutional petition. The Respondents submit that the dispute herein relates to a tenancy agreement, written or otherwise, for the occupation of the suit premises, the alleged rent arrears and the legality of the enforcement measures undertaken by the Respondents as well as the monetary compensation in form of damages. The Respondent argues that the matters complained of fall squarely within the realm of ordinary civil and commercial disputes for which adequate statutory and common law remedies were readily available. That the dispute herein arises on contractual relationship and the respective rights and obligations of the parties thereof. That in the circumstances, the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court has been improperly invoked.

27. On her part, the Petitioner submits that the issue of jurisdiction was already determined by this Court vide the Ruling delivered on 24/9/2024 by my brother Justice MD Mwangi. It is therefore argued that the learned judge having held that this Court has jurisdiction to here and determine the dispute, issue of jurisdiction is res judicata.

28. The threshold of a Constitutional Petition was stated in the often cited case of Anarita Karimi Njeru vs. Republic (1979) eKLR stated as follows:

“…if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be ingrained.”

29. The Court of Appeal in the case of Mumo Matemu -vs- Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR reaffirmed the principle enunciated in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) where at Paragraph 44 of its judgment the Court stated as follows: -

“(44) We wish to reaffirm the principle holding on this question in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra). In view of this, we find that the petition before the High Court did not meet the threshold established in that case. At the very least, the 1st Respondent should have seen the need to amend the petition so as to provide sufficient particulars to which the Respondents could reply. Viewed thus, the petition fell short of the very substantive test to which the High Court made a reference to in view of the substantive nature of these shortcomings, it was not enough for the superior Court below to lament that the petition before it was not the “epitome of precise, comprehensive, or elegant drafting”, without requiring remedy by the 1st Respondent”.

30. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance dictates that where a dispute can be effectively resolved under ordinary law, Courts must refrain from converting it into a constitutional question. The Supreme Court decision in Communications Commission of Kenya and 5 Others vs Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others (2014) eKLR held that;

“the principle of avoidance entails that a Court will not determine a constitutional issue when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. The doctrine interrogates whether there are other ways of resolving a dispute outside a constitutional petition. The petition as drawn clearly does not plead which provisions of the constitution were breached and/or violated and how the same had been violated.”

31. In Gabriel Mutava Elizabeth Kwini & Mary Martha Masyuki v Managing Director, Kenya Ports Authority & another [2016] KECA 411 (KLR), emphasized that the Constitution should not be converted into a thoroughfare for ordinary litigation where standard legal processes apply. The Court held thus: -

“Time and again it has been said that where there exists other sufficient and adequate avenue to resolve a dispute, a party ought not to trivialize the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court by bringing actions that could very well and effectively be dealt with in that other forum. Such party ought to seek redress under such other legal regime rather than trivialize constitutional litigation.…A corollary to the foregoing is the principle of constitutional avoidance. The principle holds that where it is possible to decide a case without reaching a constitutional issue that should be done.”

32. Lenaola, J (as he then was) in the case of Patrick Mbabu Karanja -vs- Kenyatta University (2012) eKLR held that it was imperative that the Bill of Rights and the constitutional interpretative mandate of the Court ought not to be invoked where there are other remedies. In the case he stated thus: -

“I maintain in this position and it is important that simple matters between individuals which are of a purely Civil or Criminal nature should follow the route of Article 165 (3) (a) and be determined as such. To invoke the Bill of Rights in matters where the state is not a party would certainly dilute the sanctity of the Bill of Rights”.

33. Similarly, in the case of Godfrey Paul Olutoyi & Another -vs- Habil Olaka & Another (2018) eKLR Chacha, J (as he then was) stated as follows regarding instances where there could be an alternative remedy in lieu of constitutional remedies: -

“It is time it became clear to both litigants and counsel that rights conferred by statute are not fundamental rights under the Bill of Rights and therefore a breach of such rights being a breach of an ordinary statute are redressed through a Court of law in the manner allowed by the particular statute or in an ordinary suit as provided by procedure. It is not every failure to act in accordance with a statutory provision or where action is taken in breach of statutory provision that should give rise to a Constitutional Petition. A party should only file a Constitutional Petition for redress of a breach of the constitution or denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to a right of fundamental freedom. Any other claim should be filed in the manner allowed by the applicable law and procedure”.

34. In the instant petition, it is not in dispute that the Petitioner was a tenant of the 1st Respondent’s premises, known as Shop M14 and M15, situated on land parcel LR. NO. 209/523/23, Dubois Road, within Nairobi County, having entered into a Tenancy Agreement. Whether the agreement was written or oral is a separate issue. The tenancy relationship was therefore a commercial contract for the occupation of the premises and the payment of the agreed rent. The rights and duties of each party under such an agreement must be construed in accordance with the agreement.

35. The Petitioner invites this Court to determine whether there has been a breach of contract by the 1st Respondent in the manner in which she was evicted from the premises and in the sale of her goods proclaimed by the 2nd Respondent. That cannot, in any way, fall within the mandate of this Court exercising its constitutional interpretative jurisdiction to determine. Those are issues that fall squarely within the usual Civil Court.

36. The Court of Appeal stated in Sumayya Athmani Hassan –vs- Paul Masinde Simidi & another [2019] eKLR as follows:

“… where a legislation has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, it is not permissible for a litigant to found a cause of action directly on the Constitution without challenging the legislation in question. That principle has been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Communications Commission case (supra)……In conclusion, we find that the alleged unlawful interdiction and termination of a contract of employment was not a constitutional issue and thus the petition did not disclose a cause of action anchored on the Constitution. Accordingly, the petition being incompetent, the Court acted in excess of jurisdiction and erred in law in determining the petition. ….”

37. Further, in the case of George Owino Odhiambo & 13 Others -vs- Kenya Railways Corporation & Another (2020) eKLR, where the Petitioners claimed to have been singled out and discriminated against by Kenya Railways Corporation and served notices terminating their residential tenancies in houses belonging to the Kenya Railways, the Court held that the acts complained of did not constitute a breach of the Petitioners' constitutional rights. The Court held that the parties had private commercial contracts and that the forum for any party who felt the contract had been breached was the ordinary Civil Court, for the issue to be adjudicated. The Court held that the Petitioners had not properly invoked the Court's constitutional jurisdiction and dismissed the Petition as an abuse of the Court process.

38. Regarding the Ruling delivered on 24/9/2024 by my brother, Justice MD Mwangi, I note that the Court raised the issue of jurisdiction on its own motion in light of the assertions in the Respondents’ Replying Affidavit at Paragraph 8. That paragraph asserted that the matter ought to have been filed before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal, not as a Petition before this Court. Having found that the tenancy relationship had been terminated, the Learned Judge held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the dispute.

39. In my view, the jurisdictional issue was determined only with respect to the Tribunal, not the constitutional aspect. The Court did not determine whether its constitutional jurisdiction had been properly invoked. Accordingly, the issue cannot be considered res judicata.

40. Final orders for disposal

a. It is therefore my finding that the Petitioner wrongly invoked this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The dispute ought to have been brought as an ordinary civil suit and not a constitutional petition. Consequently, the Petition is therefore struck-out.

b. Each party will bear their own costs of the Petition.

41. It is so ordered.

DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.

J G KEMEI

JUDGE

Delivered online in the presence of:

1. Ms. Njuguna for the Petitioner

2. Mr. Oyatta for the Respondents

CA – Mr. Oglen

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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