REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC E&P PETITION NO. E037 OF 2026
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 10, 22, 23, 35, 42, 47, 48, 50, 62, 69, 70, 159, 162(2)(b) AND 258 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010
AND
IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 129 AND 130 OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND CO-ORDINATION ACT, CAP. 387; SECTION 9 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015; AND SECTION 9(3) OF THE LAW REFORM ACT, CAP. 26
BETWEEN
FAITH KARIUKI & 4,641 OTHERS - PETITIONERS
VS
KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICE - 1ST RESPONDENT
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY - 2ND RESPONDENT
CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
TOURISM & WILDLIFE - 3RD RESPONDENT
CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE
& FORESTRY - 4TH RESPONDENT
KENYA FOREST SERVICE - 5TH RESPONDENT
BOMAS OF KENYA LIMITED - 6TH RESPONDENT
COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI CITY - 7TH RESPONDENT
THE HON. ATTORNEY-GENERAL - 8TH RESPONDENT
AND
FRIENDS OF NAIROBI NATIONAL PARK - INTERESTED PARTY
RULING
[In respect of the Petitioners’ applications dated 28/6/26 and the 6th Respondent's preliminary objection dated 22/7/26]
1. Before the Court are two matters for determination. The first is the Petitioners’ Notice of Motion dated 28/6/2026 brought under Articles 22, 47, 62, 69, 70 and 159 of the Constitution, Sections 13 and 18 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011, the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, Cap. 387 [EMCA] and Rules 23 and 24 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 [Mutunga Rules], seeking the following orders;
a) Spent.
b) Spent.
c) A conservatory order preserving the status quo obtaining as at the date of filing of the Petition in respect of the disputed site within Nairobi National Park [the Park], and prohibiting any further alteration, degradation or alienation of the said site pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
d) An order of discovery compelling the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th Respondents to supply to the Court and to the Petitioners, within 10 days, certified copies of all licences, approvals, permits, studies, County approvals, publication records, lead-agency consultation records and hearing records pertaining to EIA Licence No. NEMA/ENVIS/CPR/LIC-0940, together with the Kenya Gazette for the NEMA publication.
e) Pending the hearing and determination of the Petition, a conservatory order restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, employees, contractors, sub-contractors or any other person acting under their authority, from undertaking, continuing, procuring or causing any clearing of vegetation, felling of trees, excavation, grading, fencing, road construction or any construction works whatsoever in relation to the relocated Nairobi Animal Orphanage [the orphanage], the associated parking facility, the connecting/access road and the pedestrian bridge across Lang’ata Road, at the disputed site within the Park [the disputed site].
f) A site visit of the Park, specifically the construction area, by the Court or the Deputy Registrar in the presence of the parties, and the filing of a report thereof.
g) Such further or consequential directions, including directions for the expeditious hearing of the Petition and for the inspection and preservation of the site, as may be just.
h) Costs of the application.
2. The second is the 6th Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 22/7/2026, against the Petition and the application, which I shall set out shortly.
3. The application is premised on the grounds on its face and on the supporting affidavit of James Mudhune Kinyany, the 2nd Petitioner, sworn before the authority of the other Petitioners. In summary, he stated as follows;
a) He is the Vice-Chair of the board of Friends of Nairobi National Park [FoNNaP], a frequent visitor to the Park, and brings the Petition in his own right and in the public interest.
b) The Park was gazetted in 1946 as Kenya’s first national park. It is the only fully protected national park within a capital city, a designated black rhino sanctuary, and an Important Bird and Biodiversity Area. It is public land held in trust for the people of Kenya under Article 62 of the Constitution.
c) The 1st Respondent [KWS] proposes relocating the orphanage from its existing site of approximately 7.4 acres to a new site on the northern periphery of the Park, about 1.5 kilometres away and directly opposite the Bomas International Convention Centre [BICC], which is being developed by the 6th Respondent.
d) The 2nd Respondent [NEMA] issued EIA Licence No. NEMA/ENVIS/CPR/LIC-0940 [the licence] on 3/12/2025. The EIA Study Report on which it is based is riddled with contradictions. The site is described as 26 acres, 64 acres and 76.6 acres; the perimeter fence as 700 metres and as 10 kilometres; and the parking as 50 buses and 100 cars, and as 1,300 vehicles on about 8 acres.
e) The licence and the Study Report were not made available to the public until February 2026, more than two months after their issue. FoNNaP and other stakeholders' requests for information between October 2025 and February 2026 were ignored.
f) Neither the project proponent nor NEMA failed to publish the Study Report in the Kenya Gazette or in newspapers of nationwide circulation, to circulate it to lead agencies, or to convene a public hearing as required by Regulations 17 and 20 to 23 of the Environmental (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003. The only engagement was a single meeting on 2/10/2025, at which the Study Report was neither distributed nor discussed.
g) The clearing of indigenous highland dry forest began on or about 21/3/2026 without the pre-commencement approvals required under Conditions 2.0(2), (5), (10) and (11) of the NEMA licence.
h) The Nairobi National Park Management Plan 2020–2030 [the Management Plan] designates the disputed site as a Low Use Zone, in which no new roads may be constructed and only non-permanent facilities are permitted. The Plan contemplated a modest in-situ expansion of the orphanage, not a relocation to 31 hectares or more.
i) The conversion of park and forest land for the project requires a resolution of the National Assembly under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, and under section 34 of the Forest Conservation and Management Act, 2016. No such resolution has been passed.
j) A parking facility for 1,300 vehicles is far beyond the needs of an animal orphanage, and the pedestrian bridge across Lang’ata Road connects directly to the BICC. The dominant purpose of a substantial part of the development is to serve the BICC by using national park land.
k) The harm is irreversible. Unless the works are halted, the Petition will be rendered nugatory.
4. The 1st Respondent, KWS, opposed the application through the replying affidavit sworn by Michael Nicholson, its Director, Wildlife and Community Service. In summary, he stated:
a) The orphanage was established in 1964, occupies about 7.4 acres and receives over 17,000 visitors on peak days.
b) After six decades, the facility suffers from congestion, undersized enclosures, carnivores housed close to herbivores, the absence of a modern veterinary hospital, a hospital located next to staff quarters, and inadequate quarantine and rehabilitation facilities.
c) Expansion in situ, relocation to the Southern Bypass near Wilson Airport, and relocation to Athi River were considered but found unsuitable. The Galleria–Bomas site was chosen because it is largely open glade habitat with minimal indigenous tree cover.
d) No excision or variation of the Park’s boundaries is involved, so no consultation with the National Land Commission or resolution of the National Assembly is required. The relocation is an internal operational matter within the Park.
e) The construction at the Bomas of Kenya is a separate Government project on land that is not part of the Park and has no connection to the relocation.
f) An EIA was undertaken, culminating in the licence issued on 3/12/2025. The present site will be rehabilitated and rewilded with no loss of acreage.
g) A public participation forum was held on 2/10/2025, attended by stakeholders and the 2nd Petitioner, who shared his views.
h) The EIA Report and the licence are public records accessible on NEMA’s website. The Petitioners made no request for them before suit, and the claim under Article 35 of the Constitution is therefore untenable.
i) The application is misconceived and undeserving of the orders sought.
5. Despite service, the 2nd Respondent did not oppose the application and did not file any response.
6. The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th Respondents opposed the application by filing a replying affidavit from Timothy Ikime. Among other things, he deposed that rising human-wildlife conflict and the bush-meat menace have increased the number of distressed and orphaned animals requiring care; that suspending the relocation would perpetuate conditions injurious to animal welfare; and that KWS has no land other than the Park suitable for the upgraded orphanage.
7. He stated that the alleged discrepancies in the EIA Report are immaterial and do not affect the substance of the environmental assessment or mislead National Environment Management Authority [NEMA] in the performance of its functions. He further noted that a licence is not an end in itself, as the law requires ongoing evaluation, monitoring, and audits to verify compliance with licence conditions throughout its life cycle. He stated that the
8. He opined that the right to a clean and healthy environment must be balanced against the State’s obligation to promote sustainable development and the responsible use of its natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations
9. He contended that conservatory orders would disrupt ongoing third-party contracts, likely resulting in financial losses to public resources, and that suspending the project would serve no public interest. Rather, the public interest favours allowing the relocation to proceed, as any delay would continue to leave the animals more vulnerable given the current congestion at the orphanage.
10. Regarding public trust, the deponent stated that the Petitioners had not demonstrated any breach of fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine, as the relocation would neither alienate public land nor diminish public access, but would instead seek to optimise conservation benefits within the existing protected framework.
11. The 6th Respondent filed a preliminary objection against the Petition and the application on the following grounds;
a. Under the Petitioners’ own pleadings, the basis of both the Petition and the application is the validity of the licence and the sufficiency of the Study Report. Under section 129(1) and (2) of EMCA, first-instance jurisdiction over such a challenge is vested in the National Environment Tribunal [NET]. Under section 130, this Court’s jurisdiction is appellate only.
b. Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 [FAAA] bars a Court from reviewing an administrative action unless the available remedies are exhausted, and section 9(3) requires the Court to direct that they be exhausted.
c. Where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament prescribes a clear procedure for the redress of a grievance, that procedure must be strictly followed. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the art of drafting pleadings.
d. The Petition discloses no cause of action against the 6th Respondent. It is neither the proponent of the project, nor the holder of the licence, nor the owner or occupier of the Park land. No act, omission or threat is attributed to it, and the only averment concerning it is that it is developing the BICC.
e. As against the 6th Respondent, the Petition fails the precision test in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979] KLR 154 and under Rule 10(2) of the Mutunga Rules.
f. Prayer d of the application, which seeks discovery from other Respondents only, concedes that the 6th Respondent holds no licence, approval or record relating to the impugned works. No conservatory order can therefore be competently issued against it.
12. The 6th Respondent urged the Court to strike out the Petition and the application, or in the alternative to strike out its name from both, with costs.
13. Despite service, the 7th Respondent did not oppose the application and did not file any response.
14. Pursuant to the orders dated 28/6/2026, the Deputy Registrar, Hon. Kiplagat (DR), visited the site on 21/7/2026 in the presence of the parties' counsel and filed a report [the site visit report]. The Report observed as follows.
a) The proposed relocation site is within the Park, directly opposite the Bomas of Kenya on Lang’ata Road.
b) The project area covers about 89 acres, of which about 10 acres [Phase I], intended for the administration block and the animal hospital, have been excavated and fenced off.
c) Phase II, the area proposed for the orphanage itself, is not fenced off and consists of open grassland.
d) There were no ongoing construction activities at the time of the visit.
e) The existing orphanage has an ageing, constrained layout, with deteriorating enclosures, inappropriate predator-prey proximity, behavioural signs of stress, and inadequate veterinary, quarantine and nursery facilities.
15. The Court directed that the preliminary objection and the application be heard together by way of written submissions. The Petitioners and the 6th Respondent filed their submissions. I have read and considered them.
The written submissions
16. The 6th Respondent submitted that jurisdiction is everything, citing Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 and Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR. Relying on Kibos Distillers Ltd & 4 Others v Benson Ambuti Adega & 3 Others [2020] eKLR, it argued that a challenge to an EIA licence must first be brought before the NET, and that prayers outside the NET’s competence do not confer original jurisdiction on this Court. It also relied on Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] KLR 21, Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR and In the Matter of the Mui Coal Basin Local Community [2015] eKLR for the doctrine of exhaustion, and on D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Joseph Mbaria Muchina [1982] KLR 1 for the striking out of a party against whom no cause of action is disclosed.
17. In the alternative, the 6th Respondent submitted that no prima facie case had been established against it; that an order restraining it from undertaking works it was not carrying out would be futile; and that the broad terms of prayers b and e threatened to halt its separate and lawful development of the BICC on its own land outside the Park.
18. The Petitioners submitted that the grounds of misjoinder and want of a cause of action are not pure points of law under Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, and that a petition is not defeated by misjoinder. They argued that the 60-day window to appeal to the NET under section 129 of the EMCA closed on 2/2/2026, long before the Petition was filed on 28/6/2026, so no remedy remained to be exhausted. They also relied on Article 70(1) of the Constitution, which allows a person to apply to Court in addition to any other legal remedies, and on Nicholas Abidha Nicholus v Attorney General & 13 Others (Petition E007 of 2023) [2023] KESC 113 (KLR).
19. Regarding the conservatory orders, the Petitioners relied on Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KESC 30 (KLR), Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly [2013] eKLR and Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7 Others v Attorney General [2011] eKLR. They asked the Court what remedy would remain if the Petition succeeded after 89 acres had been cleared and the orphanage built. They undertook to hear and conclude the Petition within twelve months.
Analysis and determination
20. I will address the preliminary objection at the outset, for obvious reasons. If it succeeds on jurisdiction, the Petition and the application shall stand struck out. If it fails, I will proceed to determine the application on its merits.
21. The issues for determination are;
a) Whether the preliminary objection is merited on the ground of exhaustion.
b) Whether the 6th Respondent is misjoined and ought to be struck out.
c) Whether the conservatory orders sought are merited.
d) Whether the prayer on discovery of documents is merited
e) Costs of the preliminary objection and the application.
Discovery of documents
22. Let me start with Prayer d of the application. This prayer seeks orders compelling the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th Respondents to supply, within 10 days, certified copies of all licences, approvals, permits, studies, County approvals, publication records, lead-agency consultation records and hearing records pertaining to EIA Licence No. NEMA/ENVIS/CPR/LIC-0940, together with the Kenya Gazette for the NEMA publication, to the Court and the Petitioners.
23. It is not in dispute that this prayer was not objected to, and in the overall administration of justice, I see no reason to decline it. It is allowed.
Whether the preliminary objection is merited on the ground of exhaustion
24. The parameters for considering a preliminary objection are well settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, at page 700, Law JA stated:
“A preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”
25. At page 701, Sir Charles Newbold P added:
“A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.”
26. An objection to jurisdiction is a pure point of law. To that extent, the objection is properly before the Court, and it must be decided on the assumption that the Petitioners' pleaded facts are correct.
27. It is a well-established principle of law that a Court’s jurisdiction derives from the Constitution, a statute, or both. See Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR. This Court’s jurisdiction derives from Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, read together with section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. Section 13(3) of that Act expressly preserves this Court’s authority to hear applications seeking redress for the denial, violation, or infringement of, or threat to, the right to a clean and healthy environment under Articles 42, 69, and 70 of the Constitution.
28. As a principle, the doctrine of exhaustion requires a party to exhaust any alternative dispute resolution mechanism provided by statute before resorting to the Courts. In Geoffrey Muthinja & Another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal addressed the doctrine’s ambit and rationale, observing as follows:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside Courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.”
29. Section 129(1) of Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act [EMCA] provides that any person aggrieved by the grant of a licence, the imposition of a condition on a licence, or the revocation, suspension or variation of a licence may, within sixty days of the event, appeal to the NET. Section 129(2) extends this right to other decisions of the Director-General, NEMA or its committees. Under section 130 of EMCA, a party aggrieved by a NET decision may appeal to this Court.
30. Courts have established over time that the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute. Exceptions include circumstances in which the alternative forum is inaccessible or unable to provide the necessary remedies; constitutional interpretation issues are involved; procedural unfairness or illegality deprives the alternative forum of jurisdiction; or an exemption is granted under section 9(4) of the FAAA in exceptional circumstances.
31. Having reviewed the Petition and the supporting affidavit, I find that the licence is but one strand of the dispute, not the whole. The Petitioners also complain that the use of gazetted park land and indigenous forest for the project required a resolution of the National Assembly; that the project contravenes the Management Plan, which is said to be binding under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act; that KWS, as trustee of public land under Article 62, is deploying park land for facilities whose dominant purpose is to serve a commercial convention centre outside the Park; and that the works commenced without county planning, building and traffic approvals.
32. None of these complaints constitutes a decision of NEMA, nor do any fall within the NET’s appellate jurisdiction under section 129 of EMCA. They concern KWS’s statutory authority over parkland, Parliament's role, the binding effect of the Management Plan, the public trust under Article 62 of the Constitution, and the conduct of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th Respondents. Even if the Petitioners had first approached the NET, it could not have resolved these matters. Here, the licence is part of a broader constitutional dispute over the use of protected public land, which falls squarely within Article 70 of the Constitution and section 13(3) of the Environment and Land Court Act.
33. There is also the question of timing. The licence was issued on 3/12/2025, and the 60-day period for appealing to the NET expired on 2/2/2026. The Petitioners have deponed that the licence and the Study Report were not made public until February 2026, and that NEMA disregarded their requests for information during the intervening period. KWS maintains that the documents were available on NEMA’s website throughout. This is a disputed fact. However, on a preliminary objection, the facts pleaded by the Petitioners are taken to be true. On that basis, the NET appeal period had expired, or was about to expire, before the Petitioners could access the decision they would have needed to appeal. Should the Petitioners be held responsible for this time bar? I think not. A party cannot be faulted for failing to appeal a decision that it had no means of accessing.
34. Finally, in my considered view, splitting the dispute would serve no useful purpose. The NET would consider a challenge to the licence, while this Court would determine the remaining questions concerning the same site, works, and parties. Such an approach would risk multiplying proceedings and producing conflicting decisions. In view of the interconnected issues raised in this Petition, and to ensure that the parties have an opportunity to be heard on the merits without undue delay, the Court will exercise its original jurisdiction.
35. I should add that whether the specific relief of certiorari quashing the licence can be granted, in light of sections 129 and 130 of EMCA, is a matter for the Petition’s hearing. It does not oust the Court’s jurisdiction over the dispute as a whole.
36. Ultimately, I find that the circumstances of this case fall within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion. Accordingly, grounds (a), (b), and (c) of the preliminary objection are dismissed. As the Court is seized of the dispute, the contention that the application falls within the Petition is likewise dismissed.
Whether the 6th Respondent is misjoined and ought to be struck out
37. The 6th Respondent’s second line of attack is that the Petition fails to disclose a cause of action against it. Unlike the objection to jurisdiction, this ground does not meet the Mukisa Biscuit threshold because it requires the Court to look at the facts as set out in the pleadings.
38. That said, the Petition, at paragraph 7, and the supporting affidavit, at paragraphs 5 and 19, plead that the location of the new orphanage next to the BICC is deliberate; that a 1,300-vehicle car park far exceeds the needs of an animal orphanage; that the pedestrian bridge across Lang’ata Road connects directly to the BICC; and that the dominant purpose of a substantial part of the development is to serve the BICC, including through a parking-fee revenue stream. KWS, on the other hand, deposes that the two projects are entirely distinct. Whether there is a link between the impugned works and the BICC is a question of fact that can be determined only on the evidence adduced at the hearing. It cannot be resolved by way of a preliminary objection.
39. In any event, Rule 5(b) of the Mutunga Rules provides that a petition shall not be defeated by the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. The power under Rule 5(d) to strike out an improperly joined party is discretionary and must be exercised with caution. In D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Joseph Mbaria Muchina [1982] KLR 1, the Court of Appeal cautioned that a suit should not be summarily dismissed unless it is so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and cannot be cured by amendment. This is not such a case.
40. The Petitioners have pleaded that the 6th Respondent’s facility is the intended beneficiary of certain aspects of the impugned works, including a bridge that would terminate at its premises. Whether that plea is established is a matter for the hearing. However, a party whose interests may be directly affected by the final orders is entitled to be heard before those orders are made. Striking out the 6th Respondent at this stage would deny it the opportunity to respond to the very connection on which the Petitioners rely.
41. The fact that prayer d is not directed at the 6th Respondent does not alter this position. It indicates only that the 6th Respondent is not alleged to hold the licence or the approvals in question. It does not establish that the 6th Respondent has no interest in the outcome.
42. That said, the Court agrees with the 6th Respondent on one point. Prayers b and e are framed so broadly that they would extend to the 6th Respondent’s own works on its own land outside the Park, in respect of which no allegations have been pleaded. Accordingly, any conservatory order issued must be confined to the disputed site within the Park. Subject to that limitation, the 6th Respondent would suffer no prejudice by remaining a party.
43. In the end, I find that grounds d, e and f of the preliminary objection are unmerited, and the alternative prayer to strike out the 6th Respondent is declined.
Whether the conservatory orders sought are merited
44. This Court is mandated under section 13(7)(a) of the Environment and Land Court Act to issue interim or permanent preservation orders. The Supreme Court set out the principles that guide the Court in determining applications for conservatory orders in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KESC 30 (KLR). The Court held that conservatory orders bear a “more decided public-law connotation” than interlocutory injunctions; that they are not governed by the private-law tests of irreparable harm and probability of success; and that they are granted on the inherent merit of the case, bearing in mind the public interest, constitutional values, and the relative magnitude and priority of the relevant causes.
45. Drawing on that decision and on the decision in Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7 Others v Attorney General [2011] eKLR, the Applicant must show a prima facie case with a likelihood of success; that unless the order is granted, the Petition or its substratum will be rendered nugatory; and that the public interest favours the grant of the order. At this stage, the Court must not make definitive findings that would prejudice the Petition.
46. On the purpose of such orders in relation to public projects, I find persuasive the reasoning of the High Court in Gachoka & Another v Cabinet Secretary, The National Treasury and Economic Planning & 7 Others (Petition E051 of 2026 & E836 of 2025 (Consolidated)) [2026] KEHC 6877 (KLR), at paragraphs 160 and 161:
“Besides, conservatory orders are temporary in nature. They do not constitute a final decision regarding the validity of the intended sale. The reason behind the issuance of such an order is to ensure the subject matter in dispute is preserved, until the final decision is made, and so that the petition, if found to be meritorious, is not rendered nugatory.
Consequently, we do not buy in the argument that constitutional adjudication automatically results in loss of confidence by investors. Such an argument if accepted by this Court would lead to immunity from judicial review for public dealings on the grounds that those dealings are economically motivated. That argument would run afoul the supremacy of the Constitution. In our opinion, the greater threat to investor confidence, would be from situations where, important public transactions are allowed to take effect in a climate of unresolved concerns of lack of transparency, due process and constitutional compliance and where no judicial remedy is available”
47. Have the Petitioners established a prima facie case? Without making any final finding, the Court notes the following;
a. The Study Report gives three figures for the site area, 26, 64 and 76.6 acres. The Deputy Registrar observed a project area of about 89 acres. A licence founded on a report that cannot consistently state the project's size raises a serious question.
b. KWS says no parliamentary resolution is required because the Park’s boundaries are not altered. The Petitioners say that converting park and forest land to permanent development requires one. That is a substantial question of law.
c. The Petitioners plead that the Management Plan designates the site as a Low Use Zone, in which the construction of new roads and permanent facilities is not permitted. According to KWS’s own description, the project includes an animal hospital, enclosures, an administration block, parking and roads. KWS has not yet shown how the project complies with the Plan.
d. The adequacy of public participation is disputed. KWS relies on a single forum held on 2/10/2025, whereas the Petitioners contend that the Study Report was neither shared nor discussed at that forum, and that the statutory publication and hearing steps were not observed. Public participation is now a constitutional tenet under Article 10 of the Constitution, which calls for inquiry at the plenary.
e. The Petitioners plead that the licence’s pre-commencement conditions were not met before clearing commenced. They refer specifically to Regulation 17 for the Project proponent and to Regulations 20, 21 and 22 for NEMA. No evidence has been placed before the Court demonstrating compliance with those Regulations.
48. In my view, these are triable issues that require the Respondents to provide an explanation or rebuttal. Ultimately, I hold that the Petitioners have established a prima facie case and a likelihood of success.
49. Will the Petition be rendered nugatory if the orders are not granted? The site visit report addresses this question. Approximately 10 acres of Phase I have already been excavated and fenced. Phase II, which comprises the larger portion of the site, remains unfenced open grassland, and no construction was underway at the time of the visit. Accordingly, the substratum of the Petition remains largely intact and capable of preservation.
50. If the works proceed, that position will change. KWS itself describes the site as open glade habitat. Once that habitat within a protected area has been excavated and built upon, no judgment of this Court can restore it. If the Petition subsequently succeeds, the Court would be confronted with a completed facility on park land and no effective remedy. Section 3(5) of EMCA requires the Court to be guided by the precautionary principle, which leads to the same conclusion: where there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental harm, the absence of full certainty is no reason to postpone protective measures.
51. Where does the public interest lie? The Respondents raise a genuine public-interest concern. The site visit report confirms that the existing orphanage is ageing, undersized, and inadequate to ensure the welfare of the animals in its care. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Respondents depone that demand for its services is increasing. The Court does not take these concerns lightly.
52. However, the two sides of the balance are not equivalent. The constraints at the existing orphanage have been managed for more than six decades and can be mitigated in the interim. Nothing in this ruling prevents KWS from caring for the animals or from improving conditions at the existing facility. By contrast, the loss of protected habitat would be permanent. There is also a public interest in avoiding further public expenditure on works whose lawfulness is seriously challenged. If the Petition fails, the project can resume after a delay of a few months. If it succeeds after the works have proceeded, the environmental loss will be irreversible. The balance therefore favours preservation of the substratum.
53. The orders must, however, be proportionate. The status quo to be preserved is that described in the site visit report dated 21/7/2026, or, at the delivery of this Ruling, whichever reflects the latest situation on the ground, rather than the status quo as at the date of filing, as sought by the Applicants. The orders shall be confined to the disputed site within the Park. KWS shall remain at liberty to take steps strictly necessary to secure the excavated Phase I area against safety hazards, erosion, and degradation. The orders shall not affect the 6th Respondent’s works on its own land outside the Park.
54. The Court notes that, as this dispute concerns an ongoing public project, time is of the essence. The Petitioners have undertaken to have the Petition heard on a priority basis. Accordingly, the conservatory orders shall remain in force for no more than four (4) months from the date of this ruling, during which period the Petitioners should prosecute the Petition to its logical conclusion. Any party may apply for an extension or variation of the orders for good cause.
Costs of the preliminary objection and the application
55. Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that costs generally follow the event. In Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court affirmed that costs follow the event unless the Court has good reason to order otherwise. The 6th Respondent’s preliminary objection has failed; accordingly, the Petitioners shall be awarded the costs of the objection. As the application raises public interest issues that remain to be determined in the Petition, the costs of the application shall be in the cause.
56. In the end, the final orders for disposal are;
a) The 6th Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection, dated 22/7/2026, is unmerited and is hereby dismissed with costs to the Petitioners.
b) The alternative prayer to strike out the name of the 6th Respondent, Bomas of Kenya Limited, from the Petition and the application is declined.
c) Prayers c and e of the Notice of Motion dated 28/6/2026 are allowed on the following terms: pending the hearing and determination of the Petition, a conservatory order is hereby issued, restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, employees, contractors, sub-contractors, or any other person acting under their authority, from clearing vegetation, felling trees, excavating, grading, fencing, constructing roads, or undertaking any construction works within the Park in relation to the relocated orphanage, the associated car park, the connecting/access road, and the pedestrian bridge across Lang’ata Road, at the disputed site within the National Park.
d) The status quo of the disputed site, as recorded in the site visit report dated 21/7/2026, shall be maintained.
e) Notwithstanding orders c and d, KWS is at liberty, with leave of the Court, to undertake such works as are strictly necessary to secure the excavated and fenced Phase I area against safety hazards, erosion and degradation.
f) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in these orders restrains KWS from the care, treatment and welfare of animals at the existing orphanage, nor does it restrain the 6th Respondent from carrying out works on its own land outside the Park.
g) In the interests of the expeditious disposal of the Petition, the conservatory orders are limited to four (4) months from the date of this ruling, during which time the Petitioners ought to have prosecuted the Petition to its logical conclusion, unless extended by the Court.
h) The Respondents who have not yet filed their responses to the Petition shall do so within 14 days. The Petitioners may file any further affidavits within 14 days of service.
i) Prayers a, b and f are spent.
j) Prayer d is not contested; therefore, it is allowed.
k) The cost of the application shall be in the cause.
57. Orders accordingly.
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.
J G KEMEI
JUDGE
Delivered online in the presence of:
1. Mr. Gichohi/Kabata for the Petitioners
2. Mr. Kalisto for the 1st Respondent
3. N/A for the 2nd Respondent
4. Mr. Odongo for the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th Respondents
5. Mr. Kipkorip H/B for Mr. Kiplangat for the 6th Respondent
6. Ms. Wangari H/B for Mr. Kihara for the 7th Respondent
7. N/A for the Interested Party
8. CA – Mr. Oglen