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Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT MACHAKOS
ELRC CAUSE NO. E004 OF 2024
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
MARTIN MUBEA MURITHI............................................CLAIMANT
VS
INSTA PRODUCTS (EPZ) LIMITED....……….………..RESPONDENT
RULING
1 The Respondent/Applicant filed a Notice of Motion application dated 19th March 2026 under Sections 3, 12(3)(i) and (viii) and 13 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rules 21, 44, 45(1) and 54 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A, 63 and 94 of the Civil Procedure Act, and Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 22 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following orders: -
1. Spent
2. THAT pending hearing and determination of this application inter-partes, there be a stay of execution of the judgment and decree of this Court [Honorable Lady Justice Stella Rutto] dated and delivered on 4th February 2026 and all consequential orders including the said decree execution proceedings arising therefrom.
3. THAT this Application be heard inter-partes on the earliest date possible.
4. THAT pending hearing and determination of the intended appeal against the of the judgment and decree of this Court [Honorable Lady Justice Stella Rutto] dated and delivered on 4th February 2026, there be a stay of execution the judgment and decree of the said judgment and decree of this court and all consequential orders including the said decree execution proceedings arising therefrom in this matter.
5. THAT the costs of this Application be in the cause.
2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and is supported by the Affidavit of Alice Mungai, the Applicant's Legal Manager, sworn on 19th March 2026.
Respondent/Applicant’s Case
3 The Applicant avers that on 4th February 2026 this Court delivered judgment in the absence of the parties against it, awarding the Claimant Kshs. 3,436,333.27 together with interest at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full and costs of the suit.
4 Being dissatisfied, it lodged a Notice of Appeal and a request for certified typed proceedings on 18th February 2026, which were served on the Claimant’s advocates on 19th February 2026 in compliance with Rules 77 and 79 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022.
5 It avers that the intended appeal is arguable with good chances of success, as set out in the annexed draft Memorandum of Appeal.
6 It is the Applicant’s case that the intended appeal stands at great risk of being rendered nugatory, as the Claimant on 10th March 2026 extracted warrants of attachment and sale of the Applicant’s movable assets, issued to Moran Auctioneers, and on 18th March 2026 the auctioneers visited the Applicant’s factory premises and threatened to proclaim and attach its assets, though they left without serving a proclamation notice.
7 The Applicant avers that it will suffer substantial and irreparable loss if stay is not granted, since the Claimant has no known assets or means to refund the decretal sum or compensate it should the appeal succeed.
8 The Applicant further avers that there is no pending party and party bill of costs and the costs awarded have not been taxed, so that execution commenced prior to taxation and without leave of the Court is irregular and contrary to Section 94 of the Civil Procedure Act as read with Section 13 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.
9 It states that it notified the Claimant by letter dated 17th February 2026 that execution could not proceed before costs were assessed or leave obtained, but the Claimant nevertheless proceeded to extract the warrants.
10 The Applicant expresses its willingness to deposit the decretal sum in a joint interest-earning account in the names of the parties’ advocates within 45 days of issuance of a certified order of the Court, and contends that the Application has been brought without unreasonable delay.
11 In response to the Claimant’s Replying Affidavit sworn on 27th April 2026, the Applicant filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 13th May 2026 by Alice Muigai, its Legal Manager.
12 The Applicant denies that it engaged in multiple filings or acted in bad faith, and avers that although the application was filed under certificate of urgency on 19th March 2026 at 12:03 p.m., the Machakos registry neither placed it before the trial judge, Rutto J., who had by then been transferred to Nyeri, nor reallocated it until on or about 23rd March 2026, when it was reallocated to Wasilwa J. No directions were posted on 23rd or 24th March 2026, and its advocates were informed by the registry that the Easter vacation had commenced and were advised to move the Court under the vacation rules, which they did by Chamber Summons filed on 25th March 2026. The matter was then placed before Manani J., who gave directions on 26th March 2026, and the application was served the same day.
13 The Applicant denies that any directions were given on 19th March 2026, contending that the registry only purported to post orders of that date after the orders of 26th March 2026 had been served, despite having been in contact with its advocates throughout that period without mentioning any such orders.
14 The Applicant further denies the allegation that no appeal has been filed, averring that the Claimant’s acknowledgement of the Notice of Appeal and request for proceedings admits compliance with Rules 77, 79 and 84 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022, and that it is deemed to have filed an appeal by virtue of Rule 73(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 as read with Order 42 Rule 6(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
15 It avers that the request for typed proceedings stops time for filing the record of appeal until the Court notifies it that the proceedings are ready, that no such notification has issued, and that it has paid for and is following up on the proceedings. It further avers that there is no requirement for it to argue the appeal before this Court.
16 The Applicant contends that the Claimant has acknowledged that execution was initiated prior to taxation without leave, and that his concession that the warrants were issued prematurely and would be withdrawn is an afterthought and a prima facie admission of an intention to execute so as to render the appeal nugatory.
17 It avers that taxation of costs was only halted by reason of the Court’s orders on the present Application, failing which the Claimant would have proceeded with execution, and urges that the Claimant will suffer no prejudice should the Application be allowed.
Claimant/Decree Holder’s Case
18 The Claimant/Decree Holder opposed the application through a replying affidavit sworn on 27th April 2026.
19 The Claimant avers that the application was filed and considered twice, resulting in two separate sets of directions by different judicial officers before it was served upon him.
20 He states that, according to the Judiciary e-filing platform, the Application was brought under certificate of urgency on 19th March 2026 and considered by Wasilwa J., who issued directions, but that on 25th March 2026 the Applicant, in what he terms a blatant abuse of the court process, re-filed the same Application under certificate of urgency, had it placed before Manani J. and obtained separate directions.
21 He contends that he is left uncertain as to which of the two sets of directions he is to comply with, and relies on an extract from the e-filing platform.
22 The Claimant avers that on 4th February 2026 this Court declared the termination of his employment unlawful and awarded him Kshs. 3,436,333.47 together with interest and costs, and that a decree was issued on 23rd February 2026.
23 He states that although the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal and a request for typed proceedings, it has knowingly or otherwise neglected to follow up with the registry to ensure timely preparation of the proceedings and the filing of the record of appeal.
24 He further avers that the draft Memorandum of Appeal merely expresses dissatisfaction with the findings of the Court without showing how the learned Judge misdirected herself on the facts or erred in law, and therefore raises no triable issues.
25 It is his position that no appeal has been filed which could be rendered nugatory, and that execution, being a lawful process, cannot by its commencement alone ground an order for stay.
26 The Claimant avers that the Applicant has not demonstrated the substantial or irreparable loss it stands to suffer, and that the setting in motion of execution does not in itself amount to substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
27 He admits that warrants of attachment and sale were issued to Moran Auctioneers but states that no action has been taken on them, no proclamation notice has been issued, and neither he nor his counsel instructed any auctioneer to visit the Applicant's premises as alleged.
28 He contends that the warrants cannot be executed without a proclamation notice under the Auctioneers Rules, 1997, and avers that, on the advice of his counsel, the warrants were issued prematurely and he intends to seek their withdrawal until the costs are taxed, whereupon he will seek their re-issuance for the consolidated outstanding sum.
29 In response to the averment that costs have not been taxed, the Claimant states that there is a pending party and party bill of costs dated 2nd March 2026, which came up for taxation before Hon. M. Thibaru on 23rd April 2026 and has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of this Application, in view of further costs that may arise from these post-judgment proceedings.
30 The Claimant denies the averment that he has no known assets, terming it false, misplaced and unsupported by evidence, and states that the judgment shows he served the Applicant as its Logistics and Clearing Manager for over a decade, earning a monthly salary above the average wage.
31 He contends that the Applicant seeks a stay pending an intended appeal without demonstrating prudent steps towards filing the record of appeal or the substantial loss it would suffer.
32 The Claimant therefore argued that the orders sought are discretionary and ought to be exercised judiciously, and that in the absence of evidence satisfying the legal requirements for stay, the Court should not exercise its discretion in a manner that delays or denies him the fruits of his judgment.
Respondent/Applicant’s Submissions
33 The Respondent/Applicant filed written submissions dated 13th May 2026 and supplementary submissions in response to the Claimant's submissions of 24th June 2026. It framed a single issue for determination, namely whether it has met the threshold for stay of execution of the judgment and decree of 4th February 2026 pending the intended appeal.
34 The Applicant submitted that the Court's jurisdiction to grant stay is anchored in Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, Rules 22 and 73(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 and Section 12(3) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, and that under Order 42 Rule 6 an applicant must show that the application was brought without unreasonable delay, that substantial loss may result unless stay is granted, and that security has been offered for the due performance of the decree.
35 The Applicant relied on Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 for the principle that the Court must balance the interests of both parties and that stay is appropriate where an appeal risks being rendered nugatory, and on Odima v Maya Freight Limited [2025] KEELRC 24 (KLR) as an instance of this Court applying those principles in employment matters.
36 On delay, the Applicant submitted that it filed its Notice of Appeal and requested typed proceedings within fourteen days of the judgment, which the Claimant has admitted, and that it moved the Court on 19th March 2026 immediately after the warrants were extracted on 10th March 2026 and the threat of execution became real.
37 On the alleged abuse of process, the Applicant submitted that the claim that the Application was filed twice before different judges is without factual or legal basis. It argued that there was only one Application, filed on 19th March 2026, which the registry failed to place before any judge owing to the transfer of the trial judge, and that the subsequent Chamber Summons of 25th March 2026 was filed on the registry's own advice to have the matter heard under the vacation rules.
38 It is the Applicant’s submissions that the orders purportedly dated 19th March 2026 were posted only after the directions of 26th March 2026 had been served, which it termed highly suspicious given that the registry was in contact with its advocates throughout.
39 The Applicant argued that the authorities relied on by the Claimant concern blatant forum shopping and deliberate evasion of adverse orders, which bear no resemblance to the present facts, and that the clean hands doctrine cannot be weaponized against a party that merely followed the registry's guidance. It maintained that the procedural complaint is in any event a side issue to the substantive question of whether the conditions for stay are met.
40 On the arguability of the appeal, the Applicant submitted that the Claimant's contention that no appeal exists is misconceived, since it lodged a Notice of Appeal and requested typed proceedings in compliance with Rules 76 and 77 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022, and under Rule 84 of those Rules the sixty-day period for filing the record of appeal does not run until the Court notifies it that the proceedings are ready, which has not happened.
41 It is the Applicant’s submission that the appeal is therefore properly constituted within the meaning of Order 42 Rule 6(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
42 Relying on National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd v Aquinas Francis Wasike & another [2006] eKLR, it submitted that an applicant need only show that the appeal is not frivolous, the Court of Appeal having held that "in an application such as this the grounds are not to be argued; all an applicant is required to do is to point out to the Court the ground or grounds which he believes are arguable and leave it to the Court to decide on the issue of whether or not the matters raised are arguable."
43 In respect to its draft Memorandum of Appeal, the Applicant submitted that the trial court misdirected itself on Sections 43 and 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act and the evidence in finding that valid and fair reasons for termination were not proved, took into account irrelevant considerations while ignoring relevant ones, and erred in awarding compensation, unpaid salary and leave entitlements.
44 The Applicant further submitted that it is undisputed, and indeed conceded by the Claimant, that execution was commenced without leave contrary to Section 94 of the Civil Procedure Act while taxation of costs remained pending, rendering it illegal and warranting stay.
45 The Applicant dismissed the Claimant's assertion that there is no looming threat of execution as an afterthought, submitting that the warrants were extracted on 10th March 2026, the auctioneers visited its premises on 18th March 2026, and the Claimant's bill of costs, though dated 2nd March 2026, was only filed on 19th March 2026 and mentioned on 23rd March 2026, after the application was on record, making it a reactive measure rather than a genuine safeguard against premature execution.
46 It is therefore the Applicant’s submission that it would be absurd to require an applicant to wait until its assets are carted away before seeking stay, since the very purpose of Order 42 Rule 6 is to intervene before irreparable harm occurs.
47 On substantial loss, the Applicant submitted that the forced attachment and sale of its operational assets would cause irreparable disruption and loss.
48 It argued that once it raised the Claimant's inability to refund the decretal sum, the evidential burden shifted to the Claimant to demonstrate his means, relying on National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd v Aquinas Francis Wasike & another [2006] eKLR, as applied in Stanley Karanja Wainaina & another v Ridon Anyangu Mutubwa [2016] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that "while the legal duty is on an applicant to prove the allegation that an appeal would be rendered nugatory because a respondent would be unable to pay back the decretal sum, it is unreasonable to expect such an applicant to know in detail the resources owned by a respondent or lack of them. Once an applicant expresses that a respondent would be unable to pay back the decretal sum, the evidential burden must then shift to the respondent to show what resources he has since that is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge."
49 The Applicant thus submitted that the Claimant's bare assertion that he has the means to refund falls far short of discharging that burden, and that his reference to his former position as a senior manager earning above-average wages speaks to his past earnings rather than his present capacity to refund.
50 The Applicant argued that the Claimant's own Statement of Claim undermines his position, as he pleaded that his termination at the age of 49 locked him out of the labour market and effectively ended his career, which raises the question of the source from which he would refund over Kshs. 3.4 million, a question on which his replying affidavit is conspicuously silent.
51 Reliance was placed on Odima v Maya Freight Limited (supra), which it described as nearly identical, where this Court held that "The Respondent stated in his affidavit that he was a man of means but did not demonstrate his means. He lost his employment with the Applicant and did not state his subsequent source of livelihood. The court finds that there is a high likelihood of the appeal being rendered nugatory in the event the applicant is successful in the appeal." It also relied on Johnson Mwiruti Mburu Vs Samuel Macharia Ngure [2004] eKLR and on Lawrence Musyoka Ndambuki & another v Daniel Kato Ndambuki [2018] eKLR.
52 The Applicant submitted that the Claimant's suggestion that garnishee proceedings or committal to civil jail would be available if the appeal succeeds is speculative. It thus argued that such remedies are only effective where the judgment debtor has assets or income, which in light of the Claimant's own admission remains wholly uncertain.
53 On security, the Applicant reiterated its offer to deposit the full decretal sum of Kshs. 3,436,333.27 into a joint interest-earning account in the names of the parties' advocates within 45 days of issuance of a certified order, which it submitted affords the Claimant complete security and properly balances the interests of both parties. It placed reliance on James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] KEHC 1094 (KLR), where a stay conditioned on such a deposit was affirmed as an equitable and just term.
54 It is therefore the Applicant’s submission that the allegation of abuse of process is without merit, that it has satisfied all the conditions for stay, and that the appeal risks being rendered nugatory if the Claimant proceeds with execution while his present means remain unknown.
Claimant/Decree Holder’s Submissions
55 The Claimant/Decree-Holder submitted that the Applicant abused the court process. The record and the activities log on the case tracking portal show that the application was first placed before Wasilwa J. on 19th March 2026, who declined to certify it urgent and directed that it be served and mentioned on 28th April 2026.
56 It was submitted that rather than serving the application and those directions, the Applicant caused the same application to be placed afresh before Manani J., who certified it urgent and granted interim stay; he was only then served on 26th March 2026. The Claimant argued that by so doing the Applicant instituted a multiplicity of processes over the same subject matter before different judicial officers in order to obtain favourable orders, and that its failure to serve the initial directions demonstrates malice and a desire to pervert the course of justice.
57 He submitted that stay of execution is not a right but an equitable remedy available at the Court's discretion only to a deserving party, relying on the Court of Appeal decisions in ARH v MAA [2022] KECA 450 (KLR) and James Waweru Muturi v Paul Thuo Njambi [2017] KECA 228 (KLR) for the proposition that a party who is not candid with the Court or who abuses its process does not deserve an equitable remedy.
58 The Claimant further relied on Satya Bhama Gandhi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others [2018] eKLR, where the Court observed that abuse of process arises where "the process of court has not been resorted to fairly, properly or honestly to the detriment of the other party," including where a party institutes "a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues," where "two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right," and where "a party has adopted the system of forum-shopping in the enforcement of a conceived right." Invoking the maxim that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands, the Claimant urged the Court to decline to exercise its discretion in favour of the Applicant.
59 On the conditions for stay under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Claimant conceded that the Application was brought without unreasonable delay, and confined his arguments to substantial loss and security.
60 On substantial loss, which he described as the cornerstone of a stay application, the Claimant submitted that it is not enough for an applicant to assert that loss will occur; it must demonstrate the specific particulars of such loss.
61 He submitted that the commencement or likelihood of execution does not in itself amount to substantial loss, relying on James Wangalwa & Another V Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, where the Court held that "the fact that the process of execution has been put in motion, or is likely to be put in motion, by itself, does not amount to substantial loss... This is so because execution is a lawful process. The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the applicant as the successful party in the appeal."
62 He argued that in any event there is no looming threat to the Applicant's assets, since no proclamation has been issued despite the warrants of 10th March 2026, no auctioneer has been set upon the Applicant, and he has unequivocally stated that he does not intend to attach any assets until taxation of his bill of costs dated 2nd March 2026 is complete.
63 On the contention that he is a man of straw, the Claimant submitted that the Applicant's bare allegation was expressly traversed in his replying affidavit, where he affirmed that he has the means to refund the decretal sum. He contended that the burden of proving substantial loss lies with the Applicant and that the evidential burden only shifts to the extent warranted by the evidence on record, so that where an applicant has adduced no evidence beyond a bare assertion, there is nothing to shift.
64 He relied on Mutua Kilonzo V Kioko David [2008] eKLR, where the court, faced with a similar allegation, observed that "It is now a catchphrase that every Respondent in an Application for Stay of Execution is called a man of no means. That is all fine if there is evidence to back up that position." He also relied on Kenya Shell Limited v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & anorther [1986] eKLR for the position that proof of loss must be substantiated by the party alleging it, and that absent such evidence it would be difficult to justify depriving a successful litigant of the fruits of a regular judgment.
65 The Claimant further asubmitted that the intended appeal would not be rendered nugatory merely because the decretal sum is paid out, since having employed him for over a decade, the Applicant holds his personal details, including his residence, bank accounts and next of kin, and would therefore be well placed to pursue other modes of recovery, such as garnishee proceedings or committal to civil jail under Order 22 Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Rules, should the appeal succeed.
66 On security, the Claimant submitted the Applicant's offer to deposit the decretal sum in a joint interest-earning account within 45 days and left the matter to the discretion of the Court.
67 The Claimant relied on Vishram Halai & Another v Thornton & Turpin (1963) Ltd [1990] KLR, as cited in Wycliffe Sikuku Walusaka v Philip Kaita Wekesa [2020] KEELC 1576 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal held that "The Superior Court's discretion is fettered by three conditions. Firstly, the Applicant must establish sufficient cause, secondly the Court must be satisfied that substantial loss would ensue from a refusal to grant stay, and thirdly the Applicant must furnish security." He argued that the Applicant must satisfy all these conditions, and that having abused the court process and failed to prove substantial loss, it has not done so.
68 I have examined all the averments and submissions herein. The applicant seeks stay orders on the ground that they have filed an appeal and which they aver has good chances for success.
69 The notice of appeal was filed on 18/2/2026 and this is evident of the applicant filing an appeal. The applicants are also willing to deposit the decretal sum in a joint interest earning account.
70 Due to the fact that an appeal is pending and in order to preserve the substratum of the appeal, I allow stay of execution on condition that the respondents applicants deposit the entire decretal sum in a joint interest earning account held in joint names of counsels on record within 45 days, in default, execution may proceed. There shall be no order of costs on this application.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 30th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE