Background
There are two applications pending before this court. The 1st one is dated 27.6.2025 while the 2nd one is dated 31.12.2025. In the 1st application the 1st defendant seeks;
Paragraph 1 →Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in
The 1st defendant’s application for security for costs was found to lack merit and was denied. The 2nd defendant’s application for a temporary injunction and mandatory reconnection of water and power was dismissed with costs.
108. Therefore, it cannot come from the mouth of the 1st defendant that the plaintiff, of which she is a shareholder, has no known assets, yet the mother title to the suit property has an existing charge against the title, which indicates who the owner is. The court, in the ruling, found the application for security of costs lacking merits.
Paragraph 108 →
118. The absence of a prima facie case means that the court cannot leapfrog to consider the other, in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] E.A. 358.There are also no exceptional circumstances to grant a mandatory injunction. The upshot is that I find the 2nd defendant's application lacking merits.
Paragraph 118 →
119. It is dismissed with costs.
Paragraph 119 →
Held. No. The application for security for costs lacked merit. The 1st defendant did not substantiate the asserted risk that the plaintiff could not satisfy a costs order, did not justify the proposed amount, delayed without explanation, and could not credibly assert that the plaintiff—of which she was a shareholder and which held the charged mother title—had no known assets.
Ratio. Security for costs is discretionary and requires a justified basis. Relevant considerations include the plaintiff’s means, genuineness and prospects of the proceedings, whether security would stifle access to justice, and proportionality. A bare apprehension of non-recovery is insufficient; the applicant must provide cogent evidence, explain delay, and substantiate the sum sought.
Issue
a) Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to order security for costs.
Passage 73 →
Held
108. Therefore, it cannot come from the mouth of the 1st defendant that the plaintiff, of which she is a shareholder, has no known assets, yet the mother title to the suit property has an existing charge against the title, which indicates who the owner is. The court, in the ruling, found the application for security of costs lacking merits.
Paragraph 108 →
Ratio
87. The guiding principles on this issue were set out in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD v Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others (Petition 16 (E023) of 2021) [2023] KESC 11 (KLR) (17 February 2023) (Judgment). They include the imperilment of the plaintiff, the genuineness of the proceedings, the prospect of success or merits of its proceedings, whether an order for security would stifle the proceedings or impede access to justice, whether there had been admission or payment in court, and whether the security sought is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter.
Paragraph 87 →
105. Five, the fear and apprehension that the plaintiff company may not honor any order for costs in the event the 1st defendant succeed has to be substantiated with turgid and cogent evidence. None has been availed by the 1st defendant.
Paragraph 105 →
106. Six , the basis of the figure mentioned has not been laid. The 1st defendant has not filed any defense or counterclaim. Her alleged basis to own part of common areas under the Sectional Properties Act is under challenge by the plaintiff and the 3rd and 4th defendants.
Paragraph 106 →
Held. No. The 2nd defendant failed to establish a prima facie right or serious question requiring protection: its alleged five-year lease had expired in 2022, and there was no evidence of renewal or extension. Its alleged losses were quantifiable and compensable in damages. As no prima facie case was shown, the court did not proceed to the other injunction factors, and no exceptional circumstances justified a mandatory injunction. The application was dismissed with costs.
Ratio. An applicant for an interim injunction must establish an infringed right or interest and irreparable loss that cannot be compensated by damages. Failure to establish a prima facie case precludes consideration of the remaining Giella factors. A mandatory injunction additionally requires exceptional circumstances.
Issue
b) Whether the 2nd defendant is entitled to an order for temporary injunction, and mandatory order for reconnection of water and power in the suit premises.
Passage 74 →
Held
118. The absence of a prima facie case means that the court cannot leapfrog to consider the other, in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] E.A. 358.There are also no exceptional circumstances to grant a mandatory injunction. The upshot is that I find the 2nd defendant's application lacking merits.
Paragraph 118 →
119. It is dismissed with costs.
Paragraph 119 →
Ratio
109. As to the application for an injunction, Order 40 CPR allows the court to issue interim orders of injunction where there is a breach of contract. In this matter, the applicant has to establish a right or interest which has been infringed by the opponent, as held in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR), Civil Appeal No. 39 of 2002,
Paragraph 109 →
111. The loss or damage must be real, imminent, apparent, and not speculative or imagined, as held in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR The lease alleged to be held by the 2nd defendant was to run for five years. The expiry date was in 2022.
Paragraph 111 →
118. The absence of a prima facie case means that the court cannot leapfrog to consider the other, in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] E.A. 358.There are also no exceptional circumstances to grant a mandatory injunction. The upshot is that I find the 2nd defendant's application lacking merits.
Paragraph 118 →
Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
There are two applications pending before this court. The 1st one is dated 27.6.2025 while the 2nd one is dated 31.12.2025. In the 1st application the 1st defendant seeks;
Paragraph 1 →The issues calling for my determination are;
Paragraph 58 →The absence of a prima facie case means that the court cannot leapfrog to consider the other, in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] E.A. 358.There are also no exceptional circumstances to grant a mandatory injunction. The upshot is that I find the 2nd defendant's application lacking merits.
Paragraph 118 →The court considered whether the 1st defendant should obtain security for costs under Order 26 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and whether the 2nd defendant should receive a temporary injunction and mandatory orders reconnecting water and power at the suit…
The plaintiff management company claims that the swimming pool and health club at Connaught Apartments are common areas, that the 1st defendant lacks proprietary rights over them, and that commercial use is prohibited. The 1st defendant asserts that she…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MILIMANI- NAIROBI
ELC SUIT NO. E265 OF 2022
MAPLE MANAGEMENT LIMITED ……….………PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
VERSUS
JULIANA NJAMBI KIHARA …………………… 1ST DEFENDANT/APPLICANT
SGEBO TUNDURA GAGI T/A
GAGI INVESTMENT LIMITED ………………………….…. 2ND DEFENDANT
SANDIP P.SHAH …………………………………………….. 3RD DEFENDANT
APUL N.SHAH ……………………………………………….. 4TH DEFENDANT
RULING
1. There are two applications pending before this court. The 1st one is dated 27.6.2025 while the 2nd one is dated 31.12.2025. In the 1st application the 1st defendant seeks;
a) The plaintiff to deposit Ksh 3 million or any other amount the court may deem just and efficient as security for the defendants' costs to be deposited in the joint name of the parties' advocates within 30 days of the order.
b) The suit be stayed pending provision of such security.
c) The suit be struck out with costs in default of the provision of the said security.
2. The reasons are contained on the face of the application and in a supporting affidavit sworn by Juliana Njambi Kiahara on 27.6.2025. The 1st defendant states that she is a widow and the sole breadwinner for her children, some of whom are in school, and is paying school fees for them.
3. The 1st defendant states that she is the legal and registered owner of the Health Club erected 4 lower ground floors of the 1st and 2nd Connaught apartments situated on LR No. 1870/VI/85, the suit property herein, which she purchased from the plaintiff by a sale agreement dated 27.8.2008 attached as annexure marked JNK “1”.
4. The 1st defendant states that following a charge instrument dated 24.11.2008, Investment and Mortgage Bank Limited extended to her a credit facility to enable her to purchase the suit property as per a copy of the charge attached as annexure JNK “2”.
5. The 1st defendant states that she derived the deposit from the proceeds paid to her pursuant to her husband’s death payment, whereafter the plaintiff transferred to her the suit property as per a transfer lease dated 24.11.2008 and 22.12.2002 respectively attached as annexure JNK “3” & “4”.
6. The 1st defendant states that from clauses No. 2.6 and 2.10 of the leases, she has been advised by her lawyers that the suit property is not part of the common or retained parts to be used by other apartment owners.
7. The 1st defendant states that she has also been advised that clause E of the lease is a standard lease, whose terms and conditions are similar to the terms of this lease.
8. The 1st defendant states that the plaintiff is the manager of Connaught Apartment as per a copy of the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, a copy attached as annexure JNK “5”
9. The 1st defendant deposes that she is a shareholder of the plaintiff by virtue of being a legal and registered owner of the suit property as per attached CR 12 marked “6”.
10. The 1st defendant states that, by a plaint dated 11.8.2022, the plaintiff sued her for declaratory orders that she did not possess any valid legal ownership or proprietary right over the suit premises and for an order that she deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to them.
11. The 1st defendant states that, in her defencev and counterclaim, she has stated her status and attached a bundle of documents including the agreement for sale, the transfers, charge and lease, all confirming ownership rights over the suit property.
12. After the service of the defence and counterclaim, the 1st defendant says that the plaintiff amended its plaint on 23.7.2024 to say that she had colluded with the other co-defendants to defraud it of the suit property, even though she bought the suit property from the plaintiff, whose board of directors even endorsed its consent on the said transfers and diary instrument permitting the transfer to be effected in her name; the plaintiff is termed as approbating and reprobating at the same time, which is unacceptable in law.
13. The 1st defendant deposes that she is fearful that the plaintiff intends to unconstitutionally deprive her of ownership of the suit property which she legally acquired, and is acting in bad faith by instituting a suit against her 14 years after purchasing and taking possession of the suit property.
14. The 1st defendant terms the plaintiff's conduct mala fide, unjust, and prejudicial.
15. The request for security according to the 1st defendant is a reasonable prayer; otherwise, she has a bona fide defense in the suit, more so when the plaintiff has no known assets within the jurisdiction of Kenya, other than the common areas of all that property known as LR No. 1870/VI/85.
16. It is deposed that the plaintiff is not a profit-making company as its mandate is to own and manage the common areas of the property erected on LR No. 1870/VI/85 and to collect service charges from the owners of the units.
17. The 1st defendant says that she has been advised that there is a need for security for costs to ensure that the 1st defendant, after success in defending the claim, will be able to recover her costs.
18. The 1st defendant expresses fear that she is likely to experience difficulty in serving them, as the plaintiff is not a profit-making entity and as a shareholder of the management, too. She is aware that the plaintiff does not have any reserves to facilitate her recovery of costs.
19. The 1st defendant states that if the plaintiff is an entity of means, it will suffer no prejudice if the orders sought are granted, as the money will be deposited in an interest-earning account in the bank, which she has proposed a figure of Ksh 3 million or any other amount the court may find just and sufficient.
20. The application is opposed through a replying affidavit sworn by Roy Nderitu Wachira, a director of the plaintiff, as gravely misconceived, misplaced, mischievous, frivolous, scandalous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process.
21. The plaintiff deposes that the suit before the court queries the legality of the 1st defendant's purported acquisition of the swimming pool and health club, which form part of the common areas.
22. The plaintiff deposes that the suit raises serious and bona fide issues relating to fraud and illegal acquisition of property deserving adjudication on the merits.
23. The plaintiff deposes that the claim as presented is neither frivolous nor vexatious but supported by documentary evidence.
24. The plaintiff deposes that the effect of granting the orders sought would be unjust, and shall stifle its genuine claims, since it is not in a position to raise the arbitrary sum of Ksh 3 Million demanded as security, whose basis is doubtful, and may lead to suffering, undue hardship and the stifling of its ongoing obligations to homeowners.
25. The plaintiff states that the figure is excessive and aims to intimidate the plaintiff, delay and frustrate the expeditious disposal of the suit contrary to section 1A & 1B of the Civil Procedure Act.
26. The plaintiff deposes that most of the issues averred in the supporting affidavit are matters that should be heard at the main hearing, for the court cannot prematurely interrogate the narrative and documents adduced at this juncture.
27. It is deposed that to determine the substantive issues raised would be to determine the merits of the case before the hearing, and it would be draconian for the court to put a financial bar against a party from prosecuting their case against the tenant of access to justice.
28. The plaintiff deposes that this court has discretion to refuse to order security for costs where such an order would be unjust, oppressive or stifle access to justice.
29. The plaintiff deposes that it is a duly registered company in Kenya, possessing sufficient means to satisfy any costs that may lawfully be awarded against it in these proceedings, as it continuously collects service charges as well as other contributory expenses from its members.
30. The plaintiff deposes that the foregoing circumstances make the 1st defendant's supposed apprehension a red herring aimed at distracting it from the subject matter with no cogent basis to warrant grant of the reliefs sought.
31. In the 2nd application, the 2nd defendant asks for a;- temporary injunction to restrain the plaintiff, its agents, servants, employees, contractors, or anyone laying claim from interfering with or disrupting the 2nd defendant's quiet and peaceful possession, occupation and/or business operating on the suit premises; and b) an order for reconnection of water and power in the suit premises and for the OCS Kileleshwa Police Station to ensure full compliance with and enforcement of the order.
32. The grounds are set out on the face of the application and in a supporting affidavit of Segbo Tundura Gagi, sworn on 31.12.2025. The 2nd defendant deposes that he is the proprietor and director of the 2nd defendant, who holds a lease dated 6.9.2021 to lawfully occupy and operate a health club facility at the suit premises as per annexure marked STG “1”.
33. The 2nd defendant deposes that the lease is valid, subsisting and remains in full force until 2026, for which it has at all material times diligently paid rent and performed all required obligations as a tenant.
34. The 2nd defendant deposes that he has invested substantive capital, time, effort and resources in establishing, equipping, renovating and operating the business at the suit premises until 24.12.2025 at around 9.30 pm.
35. It is deposed that while the 2nd defendants’ employees and security guards were at the premises, a group of approximately 20 unknown persons, goons and thugs claiming to be acting on behalf of and under the instructions of the plaintiff, unlawfully and forcibly invaded the business premises, aggressively and violently, and threatened them.
36. It is deposed that without any court order, eviction notice, warrant or any form of lawful authority, the said goons proceeded to willfully, maliciously and systematically destroy, vandalize and render inoperable valuable business equipment, machinery and infrastructure belonging to the 2nd defendant and which are essential to the operation of the business, among them, swimming pool heat pump system, water filtration and purification system, electrical generator and backup power systems, water piping and plumbing infrastructure, pool cleaning and maintenance equipment, and other operational machinery and fixtures.
37. It is deposed that upon notification, the deponent rushed therein and witnessed, causing him shock, distress, and devastation, his investments lying in total ruin and in an inoperable state, worth Ksh 2,489,400 to purchase, install, repair, and maintain, and out of which the damage was estimated at Ksh 2 million. The deponent has annexed the receipt, invoices, and cost schedules as annexures marked STG.
38. The deponent states that, due to this, the business has been completely paralyzed and rendered non-operational, for he is unable to serve his customers or generate any revenue.
39. The 2nd defendant deposes that the said business used to serve schools, corporate clients, individual members, and the general public. He says that these acts have led to substantial daily losses of revenue and income, as demonstrated in the annexed revenue statement for February and March 2025, marked as annexure STG March /February.
40. The 2nd defendant deposes that he has been forced to breach existing contracts with the referenced clients above, due to his inability to operate, thereby damaging his business reputation and goodwill built over the years.
41. The 2nd defendant deposes that he immediately made a report at Kileleshwa Police Station under OB No. 15/26/12/2025 and obtained an abstract, both attached hereto as annexure marked STG (A-OB).
42. The 2nd defendant deposes that, in further acts of malice, sabotage and deliberate destruction, the plaintiff has caused or allowed a massive volume of water to flow into and flood the business premises, rendering the entire facility completely unusable, uninhabitable and hazardous.
43. It is deposed that the foregoing acts constitute the plaintiff's continuation and escalation to unlawfully destroy the business and forcefully evict him through extrajudicial means.
44. The 2nd defendant deposes that the water flooding has caused destruction of tenancy equipment and property, structural damage, creation of health and safety hazards, breeding grounds for mosquitoes and water-borne diseases, total paralysis of the business, operating damage to electrical systems and creation of electrocution risks, mold, mildew, and deterioration of the entire premises, and complete loss to the investment and livelihood of the 2nd defendant as per attached photos, and copy of lease, marked STG /B /Photos and STG/C/Copy of lease.
45. The 2nd defendant deposes that the business premises were submerged in water, making it absolutely impossible to operate, access equipment, serve customers, or conduct any business whatsoever unless the court intervenes.
46. The 2nd defendant deposes that every hour of delay causes exponential damage as water continues to accumulate, destroy property, and render the business premises beyond salvage, making him suffer total, complete, and irreversible loss which may not be recovered by way of damages.
47. The 2nd defendant deposes that he had previously obtained orders from the Rent Restriction Tribunal directing and instructing him to operate peacefully, and enjoy quiet possession of the suit premises without interference, which orders unfortunately the plaintiff chose to disregard and resorted to extrajudicial, violent and unlawful self-help remedies.
48. The 2nd defendant deposes that the plaintiff's action was a blanket and deliberate attempt to unlawfully evict him from the suit premises and frustrate his legitimate business operation through intimidation, violence and destruction of property.
49. The 2nd defendant deposes that he has suffered complete loss of business, destruction of substantial corporate investment, breach of contractual obligation, loss of reputation and goodwill, severe emotional distress and deteriorating health, financial strain and inability to meet his obligations, due to the harassment, intimidation and destruction of his life’s work and investment; hence the orders.
50. The application is opposed through a replying affidavit sworn by Roy Nderitu Wachira, a director of the plaintiff, on 21.2.2026. It is deposed that the 2nd defendant in another suit land, the 1st defendant, swore that, and showed proof of having terminated the tenancy for non-payment of rent, through a replying affidavit sworn on 12.3.2025 and 14.2.2024 attached hereto as annexures marked RNW “1” and RNW “2”.
51. The plaintiff deposes that the suit premises could only be used for residential purposes and thus the original grant expressly prohibits any commercial use; hence the alleged business was illegal for the court to be called upon to endorse. A copy of the title with special conditions is attached as annexure marked RNW “4”.
52. The plaintiff deposes that following termination of the tenancy, the 2nd defendant was not operating or conducting any activities on the suit premises for almost 3 years and, in fact, moved all the equipment from the premises, and as such the assertion that there existed any occupation capable of being restored by this court, or that any of its equipment were at the premises is a sham, only intended to bring back the 2nd defendant into the premises through the back door by overriding the termination of his tenancy to manufacture a compensation claim.
53. The plaintiff deposes that it is the 1st defendant who has taken occupation of the premises and wherein she has been using it as a residence, where she sleeps and resides as if the same were an apartment, whilst having procured the necessary national and county approval.
54. The plaintiff deposes that the 1st defendant and the2nd defendant acted without the consent of the management company, and erected the alleged developments without any construction permits and approvals whatsoever, installed a roof structure above the lower ground space where the swimming pool and health also are located so that the said roof was connected to the retaining wall and covered the common area of the apartment including the flower bench, and then turned the space created underneath into her personal space, further using the said space as a home.
55. The plaintiff states that, as a result of the said roofing structure, thieves started climbing the rear wall and, by the roof constructed by the 1st defendant, would gain entry into the apartment and steal from the homeowners.
56. The plaintiff also states that the 1st defendant has unlawfully installed a solar panel on the roof and blocked the emergency fire exit at the back of the building.
57. The plaintiff deposes that, as a result of the foregoing, the other homeowners had raised a complaint during the AGM meeting, as shown in the minutes of 6.12.2025; minute 45, leading to resolution no. 5 for the said roofing structure to be brought down, copies attached as annexure marked RNW “5” .
58. The issues calling for my determination are;
a) Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to order security for costs.
b) Whether the 2nd defendant is entitled to an order for temporary injunction, and mandatory order for reconnection of water and power in the suit premises.
59. The primary pleadings by the plaintiff are the plaint dated 11.8.2022, later amended by leave of this Court. It seeks a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from allowing or undertaking any commercial activities on any premises erected upon the suit premises, specifically within swimming pool and health cub.
60. Declaration that the 1st defendant lack valid legal ownership and or proprietary interest over the swimming pool and health club, delivery of vacant possession of the swimming pool and health club, mespe profits on the 1st defendants use of the swimming pool and health club, and special damages of Ksh.1.6.14200 against the 1st defendant being the outstanding service charge arrears as 2nd August 2022.
61. The plaintiff describes itself as the management company that manages all the apartments and common areas, on LR No. 1870/VI/85 situated at Westlands known as Connaught Apartments.
62. It is averred that the 1st defendant alleges to own the swimming pool and the health club facilities despite lack of evidence by way of documentation, records, or proof of purchase or ownership, as the said areas are ordinarily common areas for use by all of the premises residents.
63. The plaintiff avers that as and when the said common areas were excused, sold off, and transpired to the 1st defendant remains a mystery.
64. The plaintiff avers that, despite lack of proof, the 1st defendant has, without approval of the plaintiff, gone ahead to let out the same on a five-year lease to the 2nd defendant, who now uses the same for carrying out commercial activities which are open to the general public, causing substantial nuisance to the premises of the homeowners in view of vast traffic of people coming in and out of the said premises.
65. The plaintiff avers that notwithstanding the specific conditions imposed by the grant of title in respect of the land upon which the premises stand, to be expressly used for residential purposes and not for the conduct of commercial purposes, and further restated in the residents' handbook, at page 16, which remains unlawful, the defendants have refused to cease and desist from running the said activities.
66. The plaintiff avers that, over and above the foregoing unlawful activities, the 1st defendant has fallen into substantial service charge arrears currently standing at Ksh 1,614,200, which she has refused to pay, over and above an outstanding electricity bill of Ksh83,3076.4 disconnecting the power for the entire common areas on the allegations that the plaintiff is aiding the 1st defendant's non-payment.
67. The plaintiff avers that to bypass paying the outstanding electricity bill, the 1st defendant has without approval installed a generator note said premises and mischievously filed a BPAT case no E 628 of 2022 alleging interreference with quiet run of the swimming pool ad the health club, where exparte others were issued making the 1st defendant more bold, issuing insults and threats to the plaintiff's directions and as a result allowing the 2nd defendant to continue operating a commercial business within the suit premises, which is prohibited and causing nuisance to other homeowners; hence this suit.
68. The 1st defendant opposed the suit through a defence and counterclaim dated 24.11.2023 which contents are reflected entirely in the supporting affidavit.
69. The 2nd defendant opposed the suit through a preliminary objection dated 19.4.2024, a defense and counterclaim dated 5.9.2024, denying the contents of the plaint.
70. It is averred that Tribunal inspection officers had validated the suit premises as semi-residential and semi-business premises.
71. It is averred that the mere fact that the plaintiff was marrying the 1st defendant, service charge was a clear indication that she was a recognized rightful owner of the said swimming pool and the health club, making the claim malicious and a play to mislead the court.
72. The 2nd defendant avers that the plaintiff was the author of his misfortune by allowing him to operate his business, where there existed a lawful land subsisting lease with the 1st defendant.
73. By way of a counterclaim, the 2nd defendant insists he had a valid lease agreement until 10.7.2022, when the plaintiff denied him access without notification and interrupted his business; yet he had a proper strategic plan for his business for 5 years, which interruption has caused him immense losses both in revenue and anticipated contracts.
74. The 2nd defendant avers that, as a result of the careless act of the plaintiff, he lost income from the business; his heat pump and generator got damaged by rust; he had to pay employees for redundancies; and the contracted companies, including Lithe Buzz Kid Limited.
75. The 2nd defendant pleaded damages for the cost of repairs of the generator Ksh 375 000, cost of repair of the heat pump ksh 200, 000 cost of piping Ksh 80,000, loss of profit, not compensation for idle machines and equipment, and interest.
76. The 2nd defendant's counterclaim for the cost of repairs for the generator Ksh 275,000, cost of repair of heat pump Ksh 150,000, cost of piping Ksh 40,000, loss of yearly revenue, loss of anticipated contracts, loss of profits, and compensation for idle machines and equipment.
77. The plaint by the plaintiff was accompanied by an application dated 11.8.2022 for vacant possession, mesne profits and special damages.
78. The 1st defendants had also filed an application dated 11.11.2022 seeking variation of interim orders, and that the application dated 11.8.2022 is sub judice in view of the BPRT ruling and orders made on 29.7.2022.
79. The preliminary objection was that the court, by virtue of Sections 20 & 30 of the sectional properties, lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter, for it has to go to the internal Dispute Resolution Committee. The court, by a ruling dated 27.4.2023, upheld the preliminary objection, struck out the application dated 11.8.2022 and discharged the interim orders.
80. The court record shows that another preliminary objection was dismissed on 14.11.2023 for want of prosecution.
81. Parties were, by an order dated 3.11.2023, given an opportunity to engage in a possible out-of-court settlement.A motion dated 29.11.2023 was also stayed pending amendment of the plaint on 30.11.2023.The application was seeking to amend the defense.
82. Another preliminary objection dated 2.4.2024 was also filed by the 2nd defendant on lack of a stand by the plaintiff. By a ruling dated 18.7.2024, the plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint. The preliminary objection by the 2nd defendant was also dismissed in that ruling.
83. Another preliminary objection dated 26.6.2025 was filed by the 3rd & 4th defendants mulling the jurisdiction of the court on account of limitation of actions act.
84. It was submitted that the plaintiff had charged the suit property with I & M Bank by a deed and a charge dated 30.8.2000 and 27.4.2006, which, upon default, the 3rd & 4th defendants had been appointed as receiver managers, to which, acting under statutory authority, the receiver sold the health club number LIT 004, ground floor, on LR No 1870/VI/85 pursuant to a transfer registered dated 24.11.2008.
85. It was submitted that the plaintiff's cause of action straddles both contract and recovery of land, both caught by cap 22.
86. The court declined to strike out the suit on account of insolvency by a ruling dated 12.2.2026. With this context in mind, and the history of this file, the first question is whether the court should invoke Order 26 civil procedure rules to grant security for costs.
87. The guiding principles on this issue were set out in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD v Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others (Petition 16 (E023) of 2021) [2023] KESC 11 (KLR) (17 February 2023) (Judgment). They include the imperilment of the plaintiff, the genuineness of the proceedings, the prospect of success or merits of its proceedings, whether an order for security would stifle the proceedings or impede access to justice, whether there had been admission or payment in court, and whether the security sought is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matter.
88. In Sweeney and The Limerick Private Limited v The Voluntary Health Insurance Board [2026] IESC 32. the Supreme Court of Ireland set out a clear, graduated framework for assessing delay as a special circumstance.
89. The court found that the length of intervening delay and the absence of any explanation for it constituted a special circumstance to defeat the application.
90. The court said that the court must balance justice in these applications without forming a strong view of the underlying claims. The court said that public interest in the efficient use of court resources is a material factor and that the length of the delay matters to the overall balance of justice.
91. The court said that prejudice must generally be proven, but the weight of evidence required decreases as the delay lengthens.
92. The court said that insufficient lengthy unexplained delay stifles the balance against ordering security even without proof of prejudice.The court said that the obligation is to apply as sworn with tiered consequences as the delay lengthens.
93. The court said that delay is measured from the point at which the defendant had sufficient knowledge to bring the application, not necessarily from when the defense was filed.
94. Applying the foregoing case law to the instant matter, the history of this suit shows that it was filed in 2022. The respondent attacked the suit initially through a preliminary objection dated 11.11.2022.
95. One of the grounds was that the law applicable was the Sectional Properties Act 2020 and the matters should have gone first to he alternative dispute resolution mechanism set out under sections 20 & 30 of the SPA.
96. The 1st & 2nd defendants filed a replying affidavit sworn on 11.11.2022 to the application dated 11.8.2022. The 1st defendant deposed that she had become a registered owner of the title to the health club & swimming pool vide a transfer & lease between the plaintiff and her dated 6.11.2000 and registered on 22.12.2000, attached as JNK (1), becoming the permitted user.
97. The 1st & 2nd defendants deposed that there was a consent by the Board of Directors of the plaintiff dated 12.8.2008 to advertise for and open up the facility to the public on the condition that there would be no obstruction or nuisance, as per minutes attached as annexure marked JNK (2).
98. The 1st & 2nd defendants deposed that there was a lease between them, annexed as JNK (3), which, however, met with a restraining order from the plaintiff as per letter attached as JNK (4).
99. The 1st & 2nd defendants raised by oath the capacity and appropriateness of the plaintiff in view of the CPA 2020.The 2nd defendant also swore an affidavit dated 19.4.2024 opposing the applicant's application dated 8.2.2024 to amend the plaint and remove the Scoboo Tundura Gagi from the suit.
100. He specifically said that the removal was malicious, to make him lose compensation for the loss and destruction of his business after he was denied access to the suit premises.
101. He attached a CR 12 as annexure marked STG (30 with the above averments on oath and material placed before the Court; just and foremost, the 1st defendant has not exhibited any statement of defense which she says is challenging the plaintiff’s plaint with a probability of success compared to the plaint claim.
102. Secondly, there is a C.R. 12 showing that the plaintiff company has shares and owns the entire Suitland charged with I & M Bank Limited.
103. Third, the 1st defendant cannot approbate and reprobate; the preliminary objection based on sections 20 & 30 of the SPA was upheld. The 1st defendant sought that the dispute be referred to other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under sections 20 and 30 of the SPA. Report on the outcome of the same is missing.
104. Fourth, the delay since 2022 to the present in seeking the security is not explained at all.
105. Five, the fear and apprehension that the plaintiff company may not honor any order for costs in the event the 1st defendant succeed has to be substantiated with turgid and cogent evidence. None has been availed by the 1st defendant.
106. Six , the basis of the figure mentioned has not been laid. The 1st defendant has not filed any defense or counterclaim. Her alleged basis to own part of common areas under the Sectional Properties Act is under challenge by the plaintiff and the 3rd and 4th defendants.
107. Seven , the 1st defendant in paragraph 13 & the supporting affidavit depose that she is a shareholder of the plaintiff as per CR 12 attached as JNK (60.
108. Therefore, it cannot come from the mouth of the 1st defendant that the plaintiff, of which she is a shareholder, has no known assets, yet the mother title to the suit property has an existing charge against the title, which indicates who the owner is. The court, in the ruling, found the application for security of costs lacking merits.
109. As to the application for an injunction, Order 40 CPR allows the court to issue interim orders of injunction where there is a breach of contract. In this matter, the applicant has to establish a right or interest which has been infringed by the opponent, as held in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR), Civil Appeal No. 39 of 2002,
110. Secondly, the applicant has to establish irreparable loss or damage, which may not be compensated by an award of damages.
111. The loss or damage must be real, imminent, apparent, and not speculative or imagined, as held in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR The lease alleged to be held by the 2nd defendant was to run for five years. The expiry date was in 2022.
112. This application is filed after the expiry of the lease. Evidence of its renewal or extension is lacking. In the replying affidavit sworn on 19.4.2024, the 2nd defendant attached annexure STG 1A-D, a court order and letters permitting access to the suit premises.
113. There is admission that the 1st defendant had ceased operations the swimming pool and the health club. The annexed lease agreement (annexure STG 95) to that affidavit had an expiry date.
114. The 2nd defendant has qualified his claim in the defense and counterclaim and its prayers. It is therefore not true that the 2nd defendant's loss or damage, if any, cannot be qualified or compensated through an award of damages.
115. As to balance of convenience, it refers to the level of inconvenience being suffered by an applicant compared to the respondent in the absence of an injunction and the suit ultimately succeeding.
116. See Tenai vs Kogo, where the right or interest exists but it breach is denied the court look at the lower risk of injustice as held in Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd v Afraha Education Society [2001] 1 E.A. 86.
117. A court is not expected to conduct a mini trial to make definitive findings of both law and fact, but to weigh the relative strength of the parties' cases as held in Mbuthia v Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & another [1988] KLR 1 (CA)Sufficient likelihood of success is key. A serious question for determination at the trial on an alleged breach of a right or interest is missing in this matter.
118. The absence of a prima facie case means that the court cannot leapfrog to consider the other, in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] E.A. 358.There are also no exceptional circumstances to grant a mandatory injunction. The upshot is that I find the 2nd defendant's application lacking merits.
119. It is dismissed with costs.
120. Orders accordingly.
Dated, signed and delivered on this 21ST Day of October in Milimani, Nairobi.
Hon JUSTICE C.K NZILI
JUDGE
In the presence of ;
Mr Kinuthia for the plaintiff
Miss Kiama for 1st Defendant
Mr. Momanyi for 2nd defendant
Miss Mutisya for 3rd & 4th Defendant
Julius ; Court assistant
Bevalyn N. LegaL Researcher