Land law

Yellow Horse Inns Ltd & another v AA Kawir Transporters Limited & 14 others [2026] KEELC 7761 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case 747 of 2011
Judgment date
12 November 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

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Background

This matter is partly heard. When the same came up for the hearing of the 1st Defendant’s case, A. A. Kawir Transporters Limited, the Plaintiffs’ counsel raised objection to the production of several documents by the 1st Defendant’s Director, DW1. The documents objected to are found in the 1st Defendant’s list of pleadings and documents running from pages 512 to 558, being documents numbers 1 to 18.

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Upon considering the objections and responses, the sole issue for determination is whether the objections to the production of the disputed documents in the 1st Defendant’s bundle of documents dated 25th September, 2017 are merited.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC CASE NO. 747 OF 2011

YELLOW HORSE INNS LTD …………………………….…… PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

A.A. KAWIR TRANSPORTERS LIMITED ………… 1ST DEFENDANT

PHILMA FARM PRODUCE & SUPPLIES LTD …. 2ND DEFENDANT

THE COMMISSIONER OF LANDS ………….……….3RD DEFENDANT

CITY COUNCIL OF NAIROBI ………………...……… 4TH DEFENDANT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL ……….……….. 5TH DEFENDANT

THE CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR ……………………. 6TH DEFENDANT

NDUACHI COMPANY LIMITED …………..……….. 7TH DEFENDANT

CONSOLIDATED WITH

ELC CASE NO. 746 OF 2011

BROOKSIDE STUDIOS LIMITED ……………….…………. PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

A.A. KAWIR TRANSPORTERS LIMITED ………… 1ST DEFENDANT

PHILMA FARM PRODUCE & SUPPLIES LTD .… 2ND DEFENDANT

THE COMMISSIONER OF LANDS ………..…….…. 3RD DEFENDANT

CITY COUNCIL OF NAIROBI …………………...…… 4TH DEFENDANT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL ……….….…….. 5TH DEFENDANT

THE CHIEF LAND REGISTRAR ……………………. 6TH DEFENDANT

NDUACHI COMPANY LIMITED …………..……….. 7TH DEFENDANT

RULING

1. This matter is partly heard. When the same came up for the hearing of the 1st Defendant’s case, A. A. Kawir Transporters Limited, the Plaintiffs’ counsel raised objection to the production of several documents by the 1st Defendant’s Director, DW1. The documents objected to are found in the 1st Defendant’s list of pleadings and documents running from pages 512 to 558, being documents numbers 1 to 18.

2. The Plaintiffs’ advocate’s objection to the production of the documents by DW1 was based on the ground that the witness, the 1st Defendant’s Director, was neither the maker nor the recipient, and that even where the documents were addressed to the 1st Defendant, the same were photocopies.

3. In response, the 1st Defendant’s counsel informed the court that documents numbers 5 and 12 in the 1st Defendant’s bundle of documents dated 25th February, 2017 (at page 510) were not objected to by the Plaintiff, the same being letters authored by the 1st Defendant’s director.

4. The 1st Defendant’s counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant had filed an affidavit explaining why most of the original documents are not in possession of the 1st Defendant and that in some instances they had obtained certified copies of the documents. Counsel submitted that the documents that have since been certified as true copies of the originals include document item number 1 (the letter of allotment in favour of Nairobi City Commission dated 25/08/1992), which was certified by the Ministry of Lands.

5. It was submitted by the 1st Defendant’s counsel that the original of the Minutes of the Works Committee (document number 2) could not be traced, the same being in the custody of the Nairobi County Government, and that upon inquiry, they were informed that because of the fire at City Hall, most documents, including the said Minutes, were destroyed. For that reason, neither the original nor the certified copy could be availed.

6. The same explanation was given in respect of document numbers 3 (allocation of Temporary Occupation Licence to the 1st Defendant); document number 4 (Notice to the 1st Defendant by the Nairobi City Council); document number 6 (letter by Nairobi City Council to the Commissioner of Lands); document number 8 (copy of letter dated 05/11/2009 by the Commissioner of Lands to the Chief Land valuer), document number 13 (copy of the banker’s cheque to the commissioner of lands dated 01/07/2011) and document number 17 (correspondence between the 1st Defendant, the NCC and the Commissioner of Lands).

7. It was submitted that the impugned Minutes were issued to the 1st Defendant who is mentioned therein as one of the people that was issued with a Temporary Occupational License. According to counsel, they were only in possession of the copies of the said documents.

8. In respect to document number 9 (the report compiled by the police Forensic Documents Examiner dated 07/05/2010), it was submitted that the document examiner who prepared it has since died. Relying on section 33 of the Evidence Act, counsel submitted that that the report was prepared by a public official who was discharging his duties in the ordinary cause of business.

9. In respect to document number 14 (the beacon certificate), it was submitted that the 1st Defendant is in possession of one original beacon certificate, while the rest are copies.

10. For document number 15, it was submitted that the witness has the certified copy (deed plan) while document number 15 and 16 being the copies of receipts are not in their original form. It was submitted that they could not get the certified copies of the receipts from the County Government because of the fire that gutted down documents.

11. It was submitted that Document number 17 constitutes copies of the correspondences by the deceased director while document number 18 constitutes the affidavits filed in Petition number 194 of 2011.

12. Counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that section 34 of the Evidence Act allows evidence given in previous proceedings to be produced. According to counsel, other than DW1, the 1st Defendant did not intend to call any other witness.

13. Counsel for the 4th Defendant associated himself with the submissions of the 1st Defendant’s counsel, while counsel for the 1st Interested Party supported the Plaintiffs’ counsel objection.

14. In response, counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that any document not addressed or copied to the 1st Defendant cannot be produced by the 1st Defendant’s witness. It was his submissions that for the documents addressed to the 1st Defendant, the original of the same must be produced.

15. In respect of copies which have been certified as originals, it was submitted that the person certifying the document should be called to produce the same for the purpose of cross examination.

16. For the argument that the 1st Defendant’s Director died, thus the reason for producing copies, it was submitted that the 1st Defendant is a company with perpetual succession and that in any event, the said Director died way after this suit had been filed in 2011. Therefore, the original documents must be availed.

17. In conclusion, the Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that the reason why the makers of documents should be called is to allow for cross-examination, which also pertains to certification of copies. On whether the affidavits in the Petition can be produced in evidence, counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that the deponent must be called for cross-examination.

18. In a brief rejoinder, the 1st Defendant’s counsel stated that section 68 and 81 of the Evidence Act allows the production of certified copies especially where the originals have been lost or cannot be produced within a reasonable time or are public documents. It was submitted that the certified copies are public documents and can therefore be produced in evidence by the 1st Defendant’s witness.

Analysis and Determination

19. Upon considering the objections and responses, the sole issue for determination is whether the objections to the production of the disputed documents in the 1st Defendant’s bundle of documents dated 25th September, 2017 are merited.

20. The contention here regards admissibility of documents by the 1st Defendant’s witness. Section 35 of the Evidence Act addresses the admissibility of documentary evidence concerning facts in issue. It states as follows:

“(1) In any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact if the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say—

a. if the maker of the statement either—

(i) Had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement; or

(ii) Where the document in question is or forms part of a record purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in so far as the matters dealt with thereby are not within his personal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal knowledge of those matters; and

b. If the maker of the statement is called as a witness in the proceedings: Provided that the condition that the maker of the statement shall be called as a witness need not be satisfied if he is dead, or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or if his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which in the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable.

(2)In any civil proceedings, the court may at any stage of the proceedings, if having regard to all the circumstances of the case it is satisfied that undue delay or expense would otherwise be caused, order that such a statement as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section shall be admissible or may, without any such order having been made, admit such a statement in evidence—(a)notwithstanding that the maker of the statement is available but is not called as a witness;(b)notwithstanding that the original document is not produced, if in lieu thereof there is produced a copy of the original document or of the material part thereof certified to be a true copy in such manner as may be specified in the order or the court may approve, as the case may be.

(3) Nothing in this section shall render admissible any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish.”

21. Speaking to the parameters thereof, the court in Njuguna & another vs Njuguna & another (Environment and Land Appeal E095 of 2025) [2025] KEELC 8268 (KLR) (25 November 2025) (Judgment) persuasively stated as follows:

“A witness should produce documents of which they have personal knowledge or, in circumstances where the witness, while performing a duty, recorded information in the document supplied by a person with knowledge of it. Therefore, there should be some reasonable connection between the witness and the document sought to be produced. When there is a dispute over whether the document was truly authored by the person stated and regarding its authenticity, even if the witness claims to be the recipient or addressee, fairness demands that the maker of the document produce it, provided that such production does not cause unreasonable delay or expense. Fairness and procedural justice should guide the admission of documents to prevent one party from being prejudiced by the opposing party’s production of such documents.”

22. Section 35 of the Evidence Act generally requires that the maker of a documentary statement have personal knowledge of the matters recorded and be called as a witness. However, the law recognizes exceptions where the maker is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence, or where securing the maker's attendance would occasion unreasonable delay or expense.

23. Section 35(2) further gives the Court discretion, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to admit documentary statements notwithstanding that the maker is available but has not been called, or that the original document has not been produced, provided that the statutory requirements relating to certification of the copy are satisfied.

24. It is therefore apparent that the requirement to call the maker is not absolute. The law does not intend to defeat the administration of justice merely because a maker has died or cannot reasonably be procured to attend court. However, the discretion under Section 35 must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the circumstances surrounding the document and the potential prejudice to the opposing party.

25. As stated above, when there is a dispute over whether the document was truly authored by the person stated and regarding its authenticity, even if the witness claims to be the recipient or addressee, fairness demands that the maker of the document produces it. Fairness and procedural justice should always guide the admission of documents to prevent one party from being prejudiced by the opposing party’s production of such documents.

26. Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides the circumstances under which secondary evidence may be produced. Section 68(1) (c) provides that secondary evidence may be produced when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in a reasonable time.

27. The significance of this provision is that the law does not insist on the production of an original document in every circumstance. Nevertheless, a party seeking to rely on secondary evidence must lay a proper foundation explaining the absence of the original. The mere assertion that a document is unavailable does not automatically entitle a party to tender a photocopy.

28. In the case of public documents, Sections 79, 80 and 81 of the Evidence Act provide a special regime. Section 79 defines public documents to include records of official bodies and public officers. Section 80 provides for the issuance of certified copies by public officers having custody of such documents, while Section 81 permits certified copies to be produced as proof of their contents.

29. It follows therefore that where the document is a public document, the party relying on it should ordinarily produce a properly certified copy in accordance with Sections 80 and 81. Further, under Section 68(1)(e) and (f), read with Section 68(2)(c), certified copies are the permissible form of secondary evidence in the circumstances contemplated by those provisions.

30. The Court must, however, distinguish between a certified copy of a public document and an ordinary photocopy. The two are not interchangeable. A photocopy does not acquire the evidential status of a certified copy merely because it is said to have originated from a public office.

31. As was held by the court in Njuguna & another vs Njuguna & another, Environment and Land Appeal No. E095 of 2025, [2025] KEELC 8268 (KLR), there must be a reasonable connection between a witness and the document sought to be produced. The Court further observed that where the authorship or authenticity of a document is disputed, fairness may require the maker to produce it, provided that doing so does not occasion unreasonable delay or expense.

32. I agree with that approach. The question is not simply whether DW1 authored a document, or whether he has a certified copy of the same. It is whether he has a sufficient connection with it, whether its authenticity can be established through him or another permissible mode of proof, and whether its admission would occasion prejudice to the other parties.

33. Further, if there is a dispute as to the authenticity of the certification of a public document, or the source of the document, in my view, the party objecting to the production of such a certified copy of a public document must be given an opportunity to cross examine the public officer certifying the document.

34. Document number 1 is the Letter of allotment dated 25th August 1992. This document is described as a letter of allotment in favour of the Nairobi City Commission and is said to have been certified by Muthoni Kaburu, Deputy Director, Land Administration, in the Ministry of Lands on 19th October, 2026.

35. A letter of allotment issued by a public authority in the exercise of its official functions is a public document for purposes of Section 79 of the Evidence Act. Its contents may therefore be proved through a properly certified copy under Sections 80 and 81.

36. The fact that DW1 did not make the document is not, in itself, a sufficient ground for excluding it. The document is an official record, and its production is governed by the statutory provisions relating to public documents.

37. I accordingly find that the objection to document number 1 is not merited, provided that the copy tendered bears the requisite certification by the competent public officer. Its admission shall not, however, prevent the Plaintiff from challenging its authenticity, the circumstances of its issuance or the legal effect of the allotment. The Plaintiff is also at liberty to apply for witness summons to issue to the person who certified it for cross examination.

38. Document number 2 are copies of the Minutes of the Works Committee dated 14th July, 19193. The same are not certified. The 1st Defendant's explanation is that the original Minutes were in the custody of the Nairobi City Council, now the Nairobi City County Government, and that they were destroyed by the fire at City Hall.

39. The Minutes of a committee of a local authority are public documents. The fact that the 1st Defendant is mentioned in the minutes as having been issued with a Temporary Occupation Licence does not, by itself, establish the authenticity of the copy sought to be produced.

40. The explanation concerning the fire is relevant to the application of Section 68(1)(c). Where the destruction of the original is satisfactorily established and is not attributable to the default or neglect of the party seeking to produce it, the law permits secondary evidence.

41. However, the Court must be satisfied that the document existed, that the original was destroyed or lost, and that the copy sought to be produced is a faithful reproduction of the original. The explanation must be supported by evidence and not merely by counsel's submissions. In the absence of evidence of the fire having gutted the document, I decline to allow the production of the uncertified photocopy of the said Minutes by the 1st Defendant’s witness.

42. In any event, if the original was lost in the fire at City Hall, one wonders how the witness managed to get a copy of the same, or why he could not get a certified copy from City Hall.

43. Documents number 3 and 4 are copies of letters to the 1st Defendant by the then Nairobi City Council. According to DW1, the originals are not available because they got lost after the 1st Defendant’s initial Director died. No evidence was laid about the said loss or that the loss of the original documents was reported to the police.

44. The 1st Defendant is a company. The perpetual succession of a company means that its legal existence does not terminate upon the death of a director or shareholder. It does not, however, follow that the company must necessarily retain possession of every document previously handled by that director.

45. Equally, the death of a director does not automatically entitle a company to tender photocopies of documents without satisfying the applicable requirements for secondary evidence. The company must still demonstrate the provenance and authenticity of the documents and explain the absence of the originals.

46. The relevant question is therefore not whether the 1st Defendant continues to exist as a legal person, but whether the statutory conditions permitting the admission of the particular documents have been satisfied. In any event, the court was informed that when the suit was filed, the said director was alive and should have preserved the original documents for production by any other witness of the 1st Defendant. I therefore sustain the objection.

47. Document number 5 was allowed by consent. Document numbers 6 and 8 are copies of correspondence of the Nairobi City Council and the Commissioner of Lands. The same were neither addressed nor copied to the 1st Defendant. The same have also not been certified by the two public bodies. The documents are disallowed.

48. Document number 7 is a copy of a Letter of Allotment dated 2nd November, 1995 addressed to the 1st Defendant. The original is said to be lost. Dw1 has produced a certified copy of the same. To the extend that it is a public document which was certified by Mr. Kaburu, I shall allow its production. The Plaintiff is at liberty to apply for the summoning of Mr. Kaburu for cross examination.

49. Document number 9 is Police Forensic Documents Examiner's Report dated 7 May 2010. The 1st Defendant’s counsel submitted that the maker of this report has since died and that the report was prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties.

50. It is true that the death of the maker is a relevant consideration under the proviso to Section 35(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. It removes the absolute requirement that the maker must be called, provided that the other requirements of the section are satisfied.

51. I must, however, distinguish the admissibility of a documentary statement from the evidential weight to be attached to an expert opinion. The mere fact that a document was prepared by a public officer does not automatically render every statement or opinion contained therein admissible.

52. The 1st Defendant must establish that the report was prepared by the deceased examiner in the discharge of his official duties, that the examiner had the requisite expertise, and that the report relates to matters properly within his knowledge and professional competence.

53. The Court must also be satisfied that the report is authentic and that the original or a legally admissible copy has been produced. If the report is tendered as a secondary document, the requirements of Sections 68, 80 and 81 of the Evidence Act must be satisfied, including its certification by a public officer.

54. If indeed the said forensic report is a public document, as argued by the 1st Defendant, then it should have been certified as a true copy of the original to enable the Plaintiff, if need be, cross examine the person certifying it. They did not do so. The objection to its production by DW1 is sustained.

55. Document number 10 was not objected to, while documents number 11, being Letters of Allotment dated 29th June, 2011 have been certified as true copies. Being public documents, I will allow the said documents to be produced in evidence by DW1. The Plaintiff is at liberty to have the person who certified them summoned by this court for cross examination.

56. Document number 12, being a copy of a letter by the 1st Defendant, was not objected to. Document number 13 is a copy of a bankers cheque addressed to the Commissioner of Lands. To the extent that it does not have the 1 Defendant’s name, only a certified copy of the same by either the bank that issued it or the Commissioner of Lands will suffice. The objection is sustained.

57. Document number 14 constitutes copies of beacon certificates purportedly issued by the then Nairobi City Council, and addressed to the 1st Defendant. The originals ought to be with the 1st Defendant. The objection to the production of the uncertified copies by the 1st Defendant is sustained. However, the witness can produce the original which he says is in his possession.

58. Document number 15 is a certified copy of the Deed Plan. A Deed Plan maintained or issued as an official survey record is a public document. A properly certified copy may therefore be produced under Sections 80 and 81 of the Evidence Act. The Plaintiff is at liberty to call the person who certified it for cross examination.

59. Documents number 16 are copies of receipts which were issued to the 1st Defendant. The same were not objected to. Documents number 17 are correspondence between the Ministry of Lands, Nairobi City Council and the Surveyor.

60. The Plaintiffs’ counsel objected to their production because they were not addressed to the 1st Defendant. Indeed, the letters dated 29th September, 2010, 11th November, 2010, 4th April, 2011 and the undated letter at page 548 were neither addressed to the 1st Defendant, nor copied to them. To the extent that the said letters are copies, and were not addressed or copied to the 1st Defendant, the same cannot be produced by DW1. The objection to their production is sustained.

61. Document number 18 constitutes Affidavits filed in Petition No. 194 of 2011. The 1st Defendant seeks to rely on affidavits filed in previous proceedings and invokes Section 34 of the Evidence Act.

62. Section 34 provides for the admissibility of evidence given by a witness in previous judicial proceedings, subject to specific statutory conditions. These include circumstances relating to the death or unavailability of the witness, identity or representation of the parties, the right and opportunity to cross-examine, and the substantial similarity of the issues in the two proceedings.

63. The mere fact that an affidavit was filed in another proceeding does not automatically make its contents admissible as evidence in the present proceedings. The Court must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed by Section 34 have been met.

64. In particular, the 1st Defendant must demonstrate that the affidavits sought to be relied upon were made in proceedings involving the relevant parties or their representatives in interest, that the parties against whom they are now tendered had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the deponents, and that the matters in issue were substantially the same.

65. Where those conditions have not been established, the affidavits remain statements made in separate proceedings and cannot simply be imported into the present suit as proof of the truth of their contents. To the extent that there is no proof to show that the deponents of the affidavits in the previous proceedings are dead, and the Plaintiff having not had an opportunity to cross examine the said deponents in those proceedings, I uphold the objection to the production of the affidavits in Petition No. 194 of 2011.

66. For the reasons I have given above, the production of the documents dated 25th September, 2017 by DW1 shall be comply with this Ruling.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 12th day of November, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Mr. Gitau for Kimondo for Plaintiff

Mr. Nyakoe for 4th Defendant

Mr. Chamoiwo for James Singh for 1st Defendant.

Court Assistant: Tracy

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