Background
The Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence in arriving at his final conclusion.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
The Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence in arriving at his final conclusion.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC APPEAL NO. E310 OF 2025
(Before D. K. N. Marete)
EVANS ONDINGO AMING'A ………………………......………………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
SANA INDUSTRIES COMPANY LIMITED …………………………… RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th September, 2025 and subsequently amended vide an Amended Memorandum of Appeal dated 19th November, 2025. It arises from a judgment and Decree delivered on 8th August 2025 in Ruiru CMELRC No. E131 of 2024.
Here, trial court dismissed the Appellant's claim for unfair termination on account of redundancy and for terminal dues. It held that the Appellant had not rebutted the position that he remained in the Respondent's employment, that no termination had therefore been proved, and that the claim was premature and unsustainable. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the present appeal, which comes out on the following grounds;
1. The Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant's facts, written submissions and documentary evidence in arriving at his final conclusion.
2. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider the provisions of the Employment Act, 2007 thereby arriving at a wrong finding.
3. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the Appellant failed to prove his case on a balance of probability on unlawful termination on account of redundancy.
4. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to consider that the Appellant's employment was terminated without a valid reason and in breach of the fair procedure provided under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007 thereby arriving at a wrong finding.
5. The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to award the Appellant terminal dues resulting from the unfair termination on account of redundancy.
6. The Honourable Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Respondent failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of the allegations laid by it.
The Appellant prays for orders thus;
(a) The Honourable Trial Magistrate's judgment dated and delivered on 8th August 2025 be set aside in its entirety.
(b) Costs of this Appeal be awarded to the Appellant.
(c) This Court makes such further orders as it may deem just in the circumstances and in the interest of Justice.
It is the Appellant's case that he was employed by the Respondent on or about 28th August, 2012 as a general worker at a basic salary of Kshs. 18,980.00 per month. He served the Respondent until 29th June, 2023 when the Respondent's supervisor brought a list of employees bearing his name and informed them that their employment had been terminated on account of job reduction. He pleaded that no notice was issued to him or to the labour officer, that he was not paid in lieu of notice, and that the Respondent acted in disregard of Sections 40, 45, 49 and 51 of the Employment Act, 2007. He claimed a total of Kshs. 956,300.00 together with a certificate of service, interest and costs.
On the appeal, he submits that the Respondent alleged casual employment but adduced no evidence in support of that allegation, that under Sections 74 and 10(7) of the Employment Act, 2007 and Section 112 of the Evidence Act the employer is the custodian of employment records so that its failure to produce them supports the employee's version. Besides, the absence of proof to the contrary the engagement must be taken to have assumed permanency. The Appellant further submits that no evidence was adduced to show that the Appellant remained in active employment, that the show cause letter to which the Respondent alleges the Appellant responded was never produced, and that the response of 17th September, 2024 is manufactured, no sworn affidavit having been filed to that effect and no notice of change having been filed by the firm said to have been instructed.
It is the Respondent's case that the Appellant was retained as a casual worker earning a consolidated daily wage of Kshs. 672.00 payable fortnightly depending on the number of days worked. He never worked continuously but only intermittently and that he was never terminated on 29th June, 2023 or at all. The Respondent pleads that upon being served with summons it carried out due diligence, found the Appellant still in its employment, issued him a notice to show cause and received his response dated 17th September, 2024 stating that he was still at work and asking that the case be withdrawn.
On the appeal, its counsel submits that the decisive issue was never redundancy but whether any termination occurred or at all. Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 vests the burden of proving that an unfair termination has occurred rests on the employee, while the burden of justifying the grounds for termination rests on the employer; and that the Appellant failed at that first threshold. Counsel relies on the letter at page 22 of the Record of Appeal as a written confirmation by the Appellant himself that he remained in employment and had not instructed the advocates on record.
After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;
1. Whether there was evidence before the trial court capable of supporting the finding that the Appellant had not been terminated and remained in the Respondent's employment.
2. Whether, in the circumstances disclosed by the record, this court should determine the appeal finally or remit the suit for hearing.
The 1st issue for determination is whether there was evidence before the trial court capable of supporting the finding that the Appellant had not been terminated and remained in the Respondent's employment. Our duty as a first appellate court is that stated in Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123, namely to re-evaluate, re-assess and re-analyse the evidence on the record, bearing in mind that I did not see or hear the witnesses. Both parties cited this calling and duty to this court. Neither appears to have noticed the difficulty it creates in this appeal. The duty to re-evaluate the evidence presupposes that there is evidence to re-evaluate. In our circumstances and case, there is none.
The typed proceedings certified by the Ruiru Law Courts and appearing at pages 39 to 41 of the Record of Appeal disclose four appearances in all, being a mention for a pre-trial conference on 16th October, 2024 a direction to file a reply and a hearing date on 5th December 2024, a direction to file submissions on 11th March, 2025 and, on 8th August, 2025 the entry "Judgement ready and delivered."
That is all. No witness was sworn. No witness testified. No document was produced or marked as an exhibit. No party was cross-examined. No hearing, in any recognisable sense of that word, ever took place.
Notwithstanding this, the trial court recorded at paragraph 7 of the judgment that "The parties agreed to have the matter proceed by way of Affidavit evidence". The certified record does not bear this out. No such agreement is minuted anywhere and beyond the Appellant's verifying affidavit, which verifies the Memorandum of Claim and nothing more, no affidavit evidence was filed by either party. The statement of the Respondent's witness is not on oath. This court must deal with a submission that would, if correct, answer the point. At paragraphs 15 and 63 of its submissions the Respondent states that it "produced attendance records at pages 38–50 of the Record" and "permission slips and attendance records from page 40 onwards". That is not correct. The Record of Appeal ends at page 45, and pages 38 to 45 comprise only a letter requesting certified copies, the typed proceedings, the certified judgment and the decree. No attendance register, muster roll, payroll or permission slip appears anywhere in the Record, and none was listed in the Respondent's List of Documents. A submission inviting an appellate court to read into the record evidence that the record does not contain is a serious matter, and this court deprecates it.
The whole of the judgment appealed from rests on a single foundation, being the document at page 22 of the Record, described by the trial court as "The letter written by the Claimant indicating that the lodging of the claim was mistakenly done as he was still in employment". If that document goes, the judgment goes with it. It does not survive scrutiny. It is a handwritten note bearing no address and no addressee, and in the certified Record it is very largely illegible. It is not on oath, and nobody has deposed that it was written by the Appellant or received by the Respondent. It was never produced by any witness, because no witness was called, and a document merely listed but never produced proves nothing. The show cause letter to which it is said to be a response has never been produced. The note is dated 17th September 2024, some six weeks after the suit was filed and close to fifteen months after the alleged termination. On that material, the finding that the Appellant remained in employment was not open to the trial court.
The Respondent's submission that the finding was anchored in the absence of a termination letter, a redundancy notice, evidence of restructuring and notice to the labour officer inverts the burden of proof. Those are matters within the employer's keeping. In the authority of Empire Feeds Ltd v King'ou (Appeal 6 of 2020) [2022] KEELRC 1501 (KLR), this court held that Section 10(7) of the Employment Act places on an employer who fails to produce a written contract or written particulars the burden of proving or disproving an alleged term of employment and that in the absence of proof to the contrary the contract of service is taken to have assumed permanency. The absence of the documents the Respondent never produced is the Respondent's own default. It is not evidence that no termination occurred. None of this means that the Appellant is entitled to succeed on the merits, and this court make no such finding.
The Respondent is right that under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 the burden of proving that an unfair termination has occurred rests on the employee and that the employer's burden of justification arises only thereafter. The vice in what happened below is not that the trial court applied the wrong burden. It is that neither party was ever put to proof at all, and the Appellant was never given the opportunity to discharge his. The Respondent cannot in any event stand on desertion. At paragraphs 15 and 16 of its submissions counsel asserts that the Appellant "absconded duty" and "failed to report back to work". Desertion was never pleaded. What was pleaded, at paragraphs 5 to 7 of the Memorandum of Response, is that the Appellant is in employment and has not been terminated. A party is bound by its pleadings and cannot plead that an employee remained at work and then also submit on appeal that he absconded.
Two further matters bear on this issue. First, the reasoning of the judgment is, with respect, circular. The trial court set out Section 35 of the Employment Act, 2007 and observed that it "only applies where there was a termination", which is true but assumes the very fact in issue. Secondly, the authorities the trial court relied on for want of a live cause of action and lack of ripeness concern whether a pleading discloses a cause of action and whether a dispute is ripe for adjudication. The Memorandum of Claim pleaded in terms that the Appellant was employed on 28th August, 2012 and terminated on 29th June, 2023 without notice and without compliance with Section 40. On its face it disclosed a cause of action, and the dispute it raised was as live as any employment dispute can be.
What the Respondent said was not that the pleading disclosed no cause of action, but that the facts pleaded were untrue. That is a defence to be established by evidence at a trial, not a question of ripeness. Had the Respondent genuinely considered the suit an abuse of process, as it argued at length below, the proper course was to move the court by an application to strike out, which is the very provision it invoked in its submissions below. It never made any such application. A court cannot dispose of a suit on contested facts, without evidence, in the guise of a finding on ripeness. The 1st issue is therefore answered in the negative.
The 2nd issue for determination is whether, in the circumstances disclosed by the record, this court should determine the appeal finally or remit the suit for hearing. The Appellant asks that the judgment be set aside in its entirety and that this court make such further orders as it may deem just. He does not ask this court to substitute a judgment in his favour, and it is as well that he does not.
This appeal is properly before this court under Rule 12(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, which contemplates an appeal from a magistrate's court. Neither that instrument nor the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011 confers on thiscourt, sitting on appeal, an express power to remit a matter for retrial. Section 20(1) of the Act confers a general power to act without undue regard to technicalities and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction over a record such as this must, as a matter of the inherent nature of that jurisdiction, choose between determining the matter finally and sending it back for hearing, according to the state of the record before it.
Determining this case finally is not open or available to this court. I cannot find that the Appellant was a monthly paid employee, or that he earned Kshs. 18,980.00 per month, or that he was terminated on 29th June, 2023 or that he was declared redundant without compliance with Section 40, because no evidence on any of those matters has ever been taken. Whether he was a casual worker or a monthly employee is disputed. What he earned is disputed, and the Respondent's own pleading and witness statement give two different figures for it, being Kshs. 672/.00 and Kshs. 650.00 per day. To substitute my own findings on untested assertions would be to repeat the very error found in the judgment below, merely in the opposite direction.
Equally, this court cannot leave the dismissal standing. The Appellant came to court with a claim that on its face disclosed a cause of action and he has never been heard on it. The just course, and the one that gives effect to Article 50(1) and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, is to set aside the judgment and decree and remit the suit for hearing on the merits. The 2nd issue is answered accordingly.
The decree must also be addressed. The decree appearing at page 45 of the Record cannot stand alongside the judgment it purports to embody. It recites that the matter came up for judgment on 17th November, 2025 when judgment was delivered on 8th August, 2025 and it is given under the hand and seal of the court on 29th November, 2024 a date preceding the judgment by more than eight months. Most seriously, it decrees dismissal "with costs to the Respondent", whereas the judgment dismissed the claim "with each party to bear their own costs of the Claim". A decree must follow the judgment. This one does not, and it would have had to be set aside in any event.
As an observation and in finality, the judgment of the trial court refers to the Appellant, a male person, as "she" and "her" and names him "Evans Ondigo Aminga". The Respondent's witness statement does the same, and so do both sets of submissions filed before me. This carelessness is not confined to one side. A substantial part of the Appellant's own submissions is devoted to Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 and to the jurisprudence on termination for misconduct, when no misconduct was ever alleged against the Appellant by anybody, and those submissions refer to periods of service that do not sit with the pleaded case of continuous employment from 28th August, 2012 to 29th June, 2023. Parties and their advocates owe the court accurate documentation and courts owe litigants judgments that correctly identify these/them.
On costs, and in the exercise of the discretion of this court, the Appellant having succeeded on the appeal, he shall have the costs of the appeal, and the costs in the trial court shall abide the outcome of the retrial.
I am therefore inclined to allow the appeal and order as follows;
i) The judgment delivered on 8th August, 2025 in Ruiru CMELRC No. E131 of 2024, and the decree extracted thereon and issued on 5th January, 2026 are set aside in their entirety.
ii) Ruiru CMELRC No. E131 of 2024 is remitted to the Chief Magistrate's Court at Ruiru for hearing and determination on the merits before a magistrate of competent jurisdiction other than Hon. Joseph Were Chief Magistrate.
iii) The parties shall appear before the trial court for directions within thirty (30) days of the date of this judgment, and the trial court shall give directions on the mode of hearing and the taking of evidence, the hearing to be concluded within one hundred and eighty (180) days thereafter.
iv) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Judgment is to be taken as an expression of any view on the merits of the claim or of the defence, both of which fall to be determined afresh on evidence.
v) The Appellant shall have the costs of this appeal.
vi) The costs in the trial court shall abide the outcome of the retrial.
Delivered, dated and signed this 13th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mwangi holding brief for Mburia instructed by Samuel Mburia & Company Advocates for the Appellant.
2. Miss Pepela instructed by Eredi Mulama & Company Advocates for the Respondent.