Employment law

Mbole v United States International University [2026] KEELRC 4671 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Cause E544 of 2025
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
Hellen Wasilwa

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Background

This Honourable Court do certify this Application as urgent for hearing and disposal thereof without delay.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC CAUSE NO. E544 OF 2025

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)

DR. CHRISTOPHER UVYU MBOLE.........CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT

VS

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY……………………………….RESPONDENT/APPLICANT

RULING

1 The Respondent/Applicant filed a Notice of Motion dated 5th June 2026 brought under Article 50 of the Constitution, Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, Section 3 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rules 45 and 47 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002, seeking the following orders: -

1. This Honourable Court do certify this Application as urgent for hearing and disposal thereof without delay.

2. The Honourable Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, being the Judge hitherto seized of this matter, do disqualify herself from further conduct of this suit.

3. The suit be re-allocated to another Judge of the Court for hearing and determination.

4. Costs of this Application be provided for.

2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and the supporting affidavit of Helen P. Ambasa, the Applicant's Director, Legal Services, sworn on 5th June 2026.

Respondent/Applicant’s Case

3 The Applicant avers that on 24th March 2026 the suit was mentioned before the Court, when directions were taken that it would be heard on 22nd June 2026, upon confirmation that both parties had complied with pre-trial directions.

4 It is the Applicant's case that in or about May 2026 its Advocates became aware of an ongoing civil suit filed by the Judge in the year 2026, namely Nairobi HCCC No. E141 of 2026, Justice Hellen Wasilwa v Nelson Andayi Havi. In the said suit the Judge has retained Advocate Judith Guserwa, the principal and partner in the firm of J.A. Guserwa & Company Advocates, who are the Claimant's Advocates herein, to represent her.

5 The Applicant avers that the Judge has an enduring close personal relationship with the Claimant's Counsel, on the strength of which she retained the said Counsel.

6 It states that upon being informed of the discovery, it took the position that it was necessary to seek the disqualification of the Judge. It is apprehensive that the subsisting advocate-client relationship is premised on a close personal relationship, such as to create a perception or appearance of bias if the Judge continues to handle the suit.

7 The Applicant states that it instructed its Advocates to take up the matter with the Claimant's Advocates, whereupon they wrote a letter dated 12th May 2026 requesting that the matter be re-allocated to another Judge by consent of the parties.

8 It avers that by a letter dated 25th May 2026, the Claimant's Advocate declined the request, thus prompting the filing of this application.

9 It is the Applicant's case that by reason of the foregoing, there is a real possibility, and in any event a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a fair-minded and informed member of the public, that the Judge may not be impartial in the hearing and determination of the suit, arising from subconscious bias.

10 The Applicant avers that its right to a fair hearing before an impartial court under Article 50 of the Constitution is non-derogable, and will be undermined, impaired and infringed if the Judge does not disqualify herself.

11 It further avers that granting the orders sought will meet the imperatives of judicial independence and impartiality underpinned by the Constitution, the Judicial Service Act, the Judicial Service Code of Conduct and Ethics and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

12 The Applicant states that the application has been brought without delay, as soon as the facts were discovered, and that the Claimant will not suffer any prejudice if it is allowed. It therefore urges that it is in the interests of justice and fairness that the orders sought be granted.

Respondent/Applicant’s Case

13 In opposition to the application, the Claimant filed a Replying Affidavit dated 11th June 2026 sworn by Judith A. Guserwa, the Advocate on record for the Claimant.

14 Counsel avers that being a qualified and seasoned practitioner, she is entitled to represent any client irrespective of their rank or position in society, while observing professional conduct and ethics, and that her representation of the Judge in any matter in which she is appointed is no exception.

15 It is her case that her relationship with the Judge, in so far as any matter including the present one is concerned, is purely that of client and advocate.

16 She further avers that she has no control over the matters listed before any court or judge, as she does not guide the listing registry.

17 Counsel contends that the application is mischievous and intended to paint her person and profession in bad light, as it casts aspersions on her capability of making decisions as required by professional standards. She avers that the aspersions are personal and made with the intention of maligning her reputation in this Court, where she has served with a clean record for over 40 years.

18 She avers that the presumption of a likelihood of bias, conflict of interest and partiality is malicious and premised on a mindset that is scared of the outcome of the case.

19 She further states that there is no violation of any constitutional right by the Judge in hearing and determining this matter, and puts the Applicant to strict proof of its allegations.

20 Counsel states that the matter was listed for hearing before the Court on 22nd June 2026, and that if the Applicant is scared of her prosecution of the matter, she has assistants who can proceed with it to its logical conclusion.

21 It is her case that the application was strategically made in the face of the hearing scheduled for 22nd June 2026, without any basis and with malice, in order to scuttle the hearing.

22 She therefore denies all the accusations made against her and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs, to pave way for the hearing of this part-heard matter to its conclusion.

Respondent/Applicant’s Submissions

23 The Applicant filed written submissions dated 23rd June 2026 and identified one issue for determination, namely whether it has satisfied the threshold for recusal of the Court from hearing this matter.

24 At the outset, the Applicant submitted that it does not contend that the Claimant's Counsel has no right to represent a client of her choice, nor does it challenge her professional entitlement to act for any litigant.

25 It was submitted that the issue is whether the circumstances surrounding the advocate-client relationship create an objective and reasonable apprehension that the Court's impartiality may reasonably be questioned. The Applicant added that the application is not intended to challenge the integrity of the Judge, but to uphold the integrity of the proceedings and preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.

26 The Applicant submitted that the test for recusal is an objective one, founded on the need to safeguard the right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. It further relied on the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, which require judicial officers to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice, and on Regulation 21 thereof, which provides for recusal in proceedings in which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

27 It was submitted that the grounds for recusal are not exhaustive or rigidly defined, and that courts have discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the circumstances warrant recusal. In this regard, the Applicant relied on Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR, where the Court held: -"According to the definition in the Black's Law dictionary, it was evident that the circumstances calling for recusal for a judge were by no means cast in stone. The perception of fairness of conviction of moral authority to hear the matter was the proper test of whether or not the non-participation of the judicial officer was called for."

28 The Applicant argued that recusal is not founded on proof of actual bias, misconduct or improper influence, the test being whether a reasonable and informed observer, considering all the relevant circumstances, would apprehend a possibility of bias.

29 It cited Philip K. Tunoi & another v Judicial Service Commision & another [2016] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held: -"...In considering the possibility of bias, it is not the mind of the judge which is considered but the impression given to reasonable people..." It further relied on Stephen Njoroge Gichuha v Fred Nyagaka Ongarora & another [2014] KEHC 5456 (KLR), where the Court held that the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons applying themselves to the question and obtaining the required information.

30 Reliance was also placed on Gachagua & 40 others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 others [2024] KEHC 13654 (KLR), where it was held: -"The test for bias is objective and is typically framed around the question of whether a reasonable and informed observer, knowing all the relevant facts, would have a legitimate apprehension that a judge is not impartial."

31 Applying the test, the Applicant submitted that it is common ground that the Claimant's Counsel is acting for the Judge in the High Court proceedings. It acknowledged that every advocate is entitled to represent any client, and that there is nothing unlawful or improper in a judicial officer engaging an advocate. However, the propriety of the relationship is not the issue; the issue is whether its existence creates circumstances capable of giving rise to a reasonable perception of partiality.

32 It was submitted that an advocate-client relationship is founded on trust, confidence, loyalty and professional obligation, which is why the law protects communications arising from it through legal professional privilege.

33 The Applicant submitted that a reasonable observer, knowing that counsel appearing before the Judge is simultaneously entrusted with representing the Judge in another matter, would question whether the relationship is sufficiently close to create an appearance of partiality. It added that while no allegation of actual bias is made, the interests of justice require that proceedings be conducted in a manner that leaves no room for doubt as to the Court's impartiality.

34 The Applicant further submitted that it was the Court's duty to disclose that the Judge and the Claimant's Counsel have an ongoing relationship outside the current proceedings. It relied on Trust Bank Limited v Midco International (K) Limited & 4 others [2022] KEHC 176 (KLR), where the Court held: -"...it is not for the judge to decide in his mind without declaring or disclosing the fact to the parties and for them to consider and decide what is good for them or the implications."

35 It was argued that the duty of disclosure is founded on the principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, so that even where a judicial officer is satisfied that he or she can act impartially, circumstances capable of creating a perception of bias ought to be disclosed for the parties to make an informed decision.

36 The Applicant cited Home park Caterers v Attorney General & another [2006] KEHC 15 (KLR), where the Court held: -"...Judges have a responsibility to conduct a conflict check in respect of any matter or transaction or affairs dealt by them in the past so as to guard against any conflict or appearance of bias or any perceptions which might touch or impact on their independence or impartiality in the matters which come before them. In some of the matters, they would need to recuse themselves without being prompted. In others they make disclosures and if parties express satisfaction and confidence, they go on with the cases..."

37 Further reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Chitembwe v Tribunal Appointed to Investigate Into the Conduct of the Hon. Justice Said Juma Chitembwe, Judge of the High Court [2023] KESC 114 (KLR), where the Court stated: -"We stress that judicial impartiality is a significant element of justice. In order to maintain impartiality where there is a likelihood of conflict of interest, the proper thing to do is to recuse oneself and let the dispute be resolved by another impartial judge... The petitioner had a sua sponte duty to recuse himself from the case, or to disclose the nature of the interest in the matter."

38 The Applicant accordingly submitted that the non-disclosure of the advocate-client relationship gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

39 In response to the Claimant's Counsel's averment that she has no control over the listing of matters, the Applicant submitted that it does not dispute this and has neither alleged nor suggested that the matter was deliberately listed before the Judge. It maintained that its concern is that once the matter came before the Court, circumstances arose which may lead a fair-minded and informed observer to reasonably apprehend a lack of impartiality.

40 On the proposal that Counsel's assistants could prosecute the matter, the Applicant submitted that the law on recusal is concerned with preserving the impartiality, and the perceived impartiality, of the Court, and not with devising convenient alternatives to circumvent a legitimate apprehension of bias.

41 It argued that Counsel remains the principal partner of the firm representing the Judge, so the relationship giving rise to the application persists, and the apprehension cannot be extinguished merely by assigning the brief to another advocate within the same firm.

42 It is the Applicant’s submission that the cumulative effect of these circumstances satisfies the objective test for recusal, and that continuing with the proceeding’s risks undermining public confidence in the impartiality of the Court. It urged the Court to allow the application with costs.

Claimant/Respondent’s Submissions

43 The Claimant submitted that the claim is a personal interest claim, and that the Claimant was ready and willing to prosecute it on the hearing date of 22nd June 2026 when he was ambushed with the application seeking the Court's recusal.

44 The Claimant submitted that Counsel cannot and should not be estopped from representing any client, whether in the Judiciary or elsewhere, as her ability to differentiate between legal matters and personal matters is not in doubt. It was argued that the same applies to the Judge, who understands her parameters in law in handling any matter listed before her.

45 It is the Claimant/Respondent’s submission that any allegations made against the Judge must be subjected to the requirements of the law as to proof before she can be profiled and sidelined. The Claimant urged that the Court should not fall into the error of allowing parties or their advocates to profile and demean a Judge on the basis of malicious allegations made on social media or in the public space.

46 On the applicable test, the Claimant submitted that the grounds for recusal are premised on whether the circumstances cited give rise to a reasonable apprehension, in the mind of a fair-minded and informed member of the public, that the Judge would not apply his or her mind impartially to the matter placed before the Court.

47 In this regard, the Claimant relied on Universities Academic Staff Union - Egerton Chapter Branch v Egerton University & 3 Others, ELRC No. E020 of 2023, where the Court dismissed an application for its recusal brought on the ground that the respondents were apprehensive that they would not receive an impartial hearing, observing that it would hear and determine the matter on its merits based on the evidence and the law and nothing more.

48 The Claimant further cited Masila v Athi Water Works Development Agency & another [2025] KEELRC 3268 (KLR)in which the Court declined to recuse itself where no actual or perceived bias had been established, the application being found to be an afterthought and a delaying tactic by the applicant to keep the parties in court indefinitely.

49 Reliance was also placed on David & 303 others v Governor, County Government of Kilifi & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 1066 (KLR), where an application for recusal was dismissed on the basis that it was unfounded, unreasonable and could not form a justifiable basis for recusal.

50 It is the Claimant's submission that the Court has not displayed any signs of being biased in favour of Counsel merely because she is acting to defend the Judge in another forum.

51 It was submitted that the advocate-client relationship arose when the instant suit had already been processed and was awaiting hearing. The Claimant argued that the hearing should be concluded, and that a party dissatisfied with the outcome is at liberty to move to the Court of Appeal.

52 The Claimant further argued that the decision the Court is being asked to make would in effect sideline matters being prosecuted by Counsel before this Court, and delay their hearing and determination, thereby punishing Counsel on matters beyond her control, the listing of matters being an administrative role of the Registry.

53 It was submitted that a party who alleges possible bias and favoritism cannot rely on allegations against a Judge without evidence. The Claimant relied on Republic v Egerton University & 2 others; Kibue & 2 others (Ex parte Applicants); University Academic Staff Union (Interested Party) [2023] KEELRC 1707 (KLR), where the Court declined to recuse itself on the basis that the application was premised on speculation, innuendo and paranoia without any evidence to support it.

54 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. This court does not dispute the fact that the firm of J. A Guserwa is acting for her in another suit as submitted herein. This is pegged on the right of every individual to be represented by counsel of own choice and which fact arose before this cause was allocated to me.

55 I have noted that my integrity or competence is not in question in handling this matter. This is so given my oath of service to dispense justice to my utmost knowledge and ability without fear, favour, bias, affection, ill will prejudice and any political, religious or other influence.

56 That being the case and in order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, I will allow the application and respectfully recuse myself from hearing this claim forthwith. Costs in the cause.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 14th Day of October 2026.

HELLEN WASILWA

JUDGE

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