Employment law

Kimemia v Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Kenya and Judicial Service Commission [2026] KEELRC 4677 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
Dr. Jacob Gakeri

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The court held that the judicial-review suit was premature because the Applicant had not shown exceptional circumstances warranting exemption from the available internal disciplinary mechanism. It declined conservatory relief and struck out the suit, with no order as to costs.

Supporting judgment passages

For the foregoing reasons the court finds that the instant suit was instituted prematurely, and it is struck out with not orders as to costs.

Conclusion and orders →

Having found as above, the court finds that the instant suit is premature and it is liable for striking out.

Passage 132 →
Issue 1Whether the Applicant has made a case for exemption from exhausting internal mechanisms.

Held. No. An internal dispute-resolution mechanism under paragraph 25 of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act was available, with safeguards for fairness. The notice to show cause merely initiated an inquiry; it was neither an unlawful process nor a concluded finding by the Chief Justice. The Applicant did not establish exceptional circumstances to bypass exhaustion, so the suit was premature and liable to be struck out.

Ratio. Where a statutory internal dispute-resolution mechanism exists, it must ordinarily be invoked and exhausted before judicial review. An exemption under section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act requires exceptional circumstances and a judicial assessment of whether exemption serves the interests of justice. A notice to show cause can legitimately initiate the Chief Justice's fact-finding inquiry under paragraph 25 and, read as a whole, does not constitute a finding merely because it contains accusatory language.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

(i) Whether the Applicant has made a case for exemption from exhausting internal mechanisms.

Passage 82 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

In the courts view, the Applicant has not demonstrated why the doctrine of exhaustion should be excepted. There are overwhelming chances that the internal dispute resolution mechanisms will resolve the issue and as held in Chitembwe v Tribunal Appointed to Investigate the conduct of Justice said Juma Chitembwe, Judge of the High Court, (2023) KESC 114 (KLR) and demonstrated by the decisions in Wasilwa v Judicial Service Commission: KUDHELHA and 3 others (2025) KEELRC 281 (KLR) and Obwayo v Judicial Service Commission PET No. E052 OF 2026, if in the course of the process the Applicant feels that her rights or fundamental freedoms are likely to be, are being or have been violated, nothing will prevents her from invoking the court’s jurisdiction for redress.

Passage 131 →

Having found as above, the court finds that the instant suit is premature and it is liable for striking out.

Passage 132 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Notwithstanding sub-section (3), the High Court or a subordinate court may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the applicant exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if the court considers such exemption to be in the interest of justice.

Passage 102 →

The plain and wholistic reading of the letter leaves no doubt, in the courts view, that the letter merely opened the inquiry process by the Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya and neither a finding nor conclusion by the Chief Justice, and in any event the Chief Justice is required to act in coinsurance with the law as held in Mumba & 7 others v Munyao & others (Supra), where the Supreme Court held:

Passage 126 →
Issue 2Whether the threshold for grant of conservatory orders has been met.

Held. No. On the merits and public-interest considerations, the Applicant had not established a prima facie case for conservatory orders staying or restraining implementation of the notice to show cause. Such relief would prevent the Applicant from providing information needed for the Chief Justice to decide whether to close the inquiry, and responding to the lawful inquiry would cause her no prejudice.

Ratio. Conservatory orders in public-law litigation depend on the inherent merit of the case, assessed alongside public interest, constitutional values, and the relative magnitude and priority of the competing causes—not solely the private-law injunction criteria of irreparable harm or probability of success.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

(ii) Whether the threshold for grant of conservatory orders has been met.

Passage 83 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

Based on the inherent merit of the instant application and taking into consideration all other parameters including public interest, which is a core consideration in this case, the court is not persuaded the applicant had established a prima facie case for the grant of conservatory orders for inter alia a stay of operationalization, implementation or enforcement of the notice to show cause or restraining the respondent from requiring the applicant to respond as it would forestall the availment of information at the disposal of the applicant to enable the Chief Justice determine whether or not to close the inquiry, and the Applicant stood to suffer no prejudice by responding to a lawful inquiry.

Passage 136 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

“Conservatory Orders” bear a more decided public law connotation. For these are orders that facilitate ordered functioning within pubic agencies, as well as to uphold the adjudicatory authority of the courts, in the public interest. Conservatory orders, therefore are not unlike interlocutory injunctions, linked to such private-party issues as “the prospects of irreparable harm” occurring during the pendency of a case; or “high probability of success” in the supplicant’s case for the orders of stay.

Passage 134 →

Conservatory orders, consequently should be granted on the inherent merit of a case, bearing in mind the public interest the constitutional values, and the proportionate magnitudes and priority levels attributable to the relevant causes”

Passage 135 →
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Case at a glance

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SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

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Questions presented

Whether the Applicant should be exempted under section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act from exhausting the internal disciplinary mechanism; and whether she met the threshold for conservatory orders staying or prohibiting action on the Chief…

Material facts

The Applicant, a Chief Magistrate transferred from Makadara to Ruiru, granted bond/bail to an accused person after acting on the accused’s letter, without recorded coram or proceedings and after earlier directing counsel to file affidavits. A High Court…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW E098 OF 2026

(Before Hon. Justice Dr. Jacob Gakeri)

HON. BEARICE MUTHONI KIMEMIA……………..…... APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE HON. CHIEF JUSTICE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KENYA AND JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION……………………………………..………..RESPONDENT

RULING

Before the court for determination is the Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 24th September 2026 filed on even date under Certificate of Urgency seeking orders that;

1. Spent

2. Spent

3. Pending hearing and determination of the Originating Motion, a conservatory order do issue staying the operation, implementation and enforcement of the Notice to Show Cause dated 16th September 2026, Reference CJ 8/1 and restraining the Respondent’s from requiring the applicant to respond to it, from treating non-response as default, imposing sanctions or from commencing any disciplinary or other adverse employment action founded upon the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026.

4. Pending hearing and determination of the Originating Motion, an order of Prohibition do issue restraining the Respondents from interdicting, transferring, punitively, surcharging, charging, sanctioning or otherwise adversely affecting the Applicant’s employment on account of the facts recited in the Notice to show Cause dated 16th September, 2026.

5. The Applicant be and is hereby exempted, pursuant to section 9 (4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act from exhausting any internal mechanism in respect of the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026.

6. The costs of this application be provided for.

7. Any other interim order that is just and equitable.

The Motion is expressed under Articles 22, 23, 27, 47 and 54 of the Constitution of Kenya, Section 11 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, Part II of the Fair Administrative Action Act and Rule 10(3) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules 2024 and is based on the grounds enumerated on its face and the Supporting Affidavit of the Applicant sworn on 24th September 2026, who depones that she is a Chief Magistrate of the Republic of Kenya serving as Head of Station at Ruiru Law Courts and at the material time she was a Chief Magistrate stationed at Makadara Law Courts having been employed on 5th April, 2006 and confirmed vide letter dated 23rd October 2009.

The affiant deponed that she had received various recognition awards based on her performance being a person with disability, such as overall best performing Tribunal, 2019/2020, 2020/2021 and Top most consistent Tirbunal 2023/2024, when she served as the chairperson of the Co-operative Tribunal.

The Applicant deposes that on 22nd May 2026, Makadara CMCC No. MCCR/2945/2026 Republic v Ahmed Dime was placed before her for plea under a charge of stealing contrary to section 268 (1) read with section 75 of the Penal Code with an alternative count of handling stolen goods valued at Kshs.10.2 million, property of one Hussein Hirbo Galcha from Moyale Wholesalers Ltd Store, along Northen Airport Road, Embakasi and while counsel Mr. Sumba assisted by Mr. Kiptoo represented the accused, counsel Mr. Obore held watching brief or the complainant and Ms Kibugi appeared for the Republic and the accused pleaded not guilty.

That Mr. Sumba and Mr. Kiptoo orally applied for bond on lenient terms since the accused was arrested on 18th May, 2026 and was not produced until 22nd May 2026, charge sheet had different arrest dates and there were two sets of orders from Moyale Law Courts one said to be fake mistreatment of the accused while in police custody and the prosecution did not oppose bond but insisted on stringent terms and for time to consolidate the charge with MCCR/2901/2026 in which one Mohamed Haila Mikai had ploeaded guilty to a related count. Mr. Obore did not oppose bond but asked for stringent terms became a 3rd suspect and an exhibit (motor vehicle) were still at large.

That the applicant recorded the sentiments by counsel and accorded them time to file sworn Affidavits within 5 days with a mention for further directions on 28th May 2026. The issue of terms of the bond was reserved pending Affidavits and attendance by the Investigating Officer.

The affiant further disposes that on 25th May 2026, the accused wrote a letter to the court stating that he had discharged his advocates, was the sole breadwinners of a large family, hypertensive and diabetic and sought bond and the file was placed before the Applicant on 26th May 2026 and because the applicant would not be sitting on 28th May 2026 owing to a County Court Users committee at the Eka Hotel, and 27th May 2026 was a public holiday, the applicant granted bond after endorsing the accused’s letter as follows;

(i) Bond of Kshs.5,000,000.00 with one surety of a similar amount; or

(ii) In the alternative cash bail of Kenya Shillings 1,000,000.00 with one contact person.

That the terms were not lenient considering the value of the goods, a co-accused had pleaded guilty and the complainant’s concern about the 3rd suspect. That the accused elected bail and paid on 28th May 2026 at 14.34.

The affiant, further deposes that on 26th May 2026 she received a letter from the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary transferring her from Makadara to Ruiru Law Courts effective 1st July 2026 and directed to finalize all matters partly heard and not take fresh matters.

That on 28th May 2026, the affiant was not at the Makadara Law Courts but at the Eka Hotel for the committee meeting and stayed on with colleagues, after lunch and did not sit in the evening or hear an appeal from orders of Hon. Ndengeri PM who had directed a mention stand over by the Applicant on 29th May 2026 and the allegation by Mr. Obure that the Applicant sat after hours on 28th May 2026 and granted cash bail without surety was false.

The affiant deposes that after the complaint was filed with the Head of Station, the matter was referred to the High Court for revision and the Applicant provided a written account of the record and the criminal Division registered Reference Criminal Revision No. 1A of 2026, Republic v Ahmed Dime Dawa, Hussein Chebe Interested Party. The Lower court file was called, service directed, all parties heard and a ruling delivered. The High court found that the trial court could not be faulted for granting the orders but then orders ought to have been vide a ruling. It made no finding of bad faith.

That the Applicant reported to Ruiru Law Courts and took charge from 1st July 2026, but received a Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026 from the Chief Justice accusing her of having issued bail/bond terms on the face of a letter dated 25th May 2026 purportedly written by the accused person without any coram or proceedings being recorded on the file on 26th May 2026, in the absence of the parties ,that the actions were in bad faith and had brought the judiciary into disrepute and required a response within 14 days. That it is an administrative action and it was ultra vires and a collateral attack to the High Court’s reversionary order and was framed as a conclusion not as a charge and cannot have a fair hearing before the office that had published its conclusion.

That if the 14 days period lapsed, without stay the applicant would face an illegal process or be deemed a defaulter and her reputation as a magistrate would be irretrievably damaged having served for 20 years without a disciplinary finding, recognized variously for performance and acted because bond had not been opposed and a remand prisoner had written a letter to the court. The applicant prayed for the orders sought.

1st Respondent’s Case

The 1st Respondent filed Grounds of Opposition dated 28th September 2026 challenging the motion and originating motion on the grounds that the rest for conservatory relief had not been met as the Applicant had demonstrated neither a prima facie case or irreparable harm nor that public interest weighted in her favour. That the orders sought would grant the final relief in the originating motion.

Relatedly, the 1st Respondent contended that the Applicant had not exhausted internal mechanisms and had not show any exceptional circumstances citing section 9(2) and (3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act and the Applicants wish not to respond to the Notice to show cause or apprehension about the outcome were not exceptional circumstances. Counsel urged that the action was premature since the notice to show cause is neither a charge, determines no rights imposes no sanction and neither suspends or affect the Applicant’s employment status.

The other grounds raised such as revision by the High Court, independence of judiciary, prejudgment and no structural bias and the Applicants transfer were more relevant to the substantive motion as opposed to the Notice of Motion.

Similarly, the 2nd Respondent filed grounds of opposition dated 1st October 2026 objecting to the motion on the grounds that no decision act or omission of the 2nd Respondent was impugned, a fact the Appellant conceded the Application is premature and speculative as the Notice to show cause had not been responded to and the court was being invited to undo what did not exist and had neither exhausted available internal mechanisms nor established the exceptional circumstances for an exemption under section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act citing Muthinja & 3 others Muguna Henry & 1756 others (2015) eKLR and William Odhiambo Ramogi v Attorney General & 4 others (2020) eKLR.

Relatedly, counsel contended that the motion could not succeed against the 2nd Respondent as the threshold in Giella v Cassman Brown Co Ltd (1973) EA 358 had not been met, namely, prima facie case, irreparable harm and balance of convenience.

Applicants reply to the 1st Respondent’s reply

Counsel contested the fact that the 1st Respondent did not file an affidavit for a contextual and fact background.

Counsel stated that section 2 of the Fair Administrative Action Act was not confined to decisions only and there were other reliefs under the Act. That exhaustion did not mean submission to a legally flawed instrument.

In response to the 2nd Respondent’s reply, counsel for the Applicant contended although the 2nd respondent had done nothing, it was a necessary part so that it can be prohibited from treating the Notice as a Paragraph 25 referral or enter the finding of bad faith on the Applicant’s disciplinary file as a record or commence proceedings founded on the notice.

That the motion was not premature and no exhaustion was required where the notice to show cause had already found the person guilty. That guided by the decisions in Giella v Cassman Brown Co Ltd (Supra) and Munya v Kithinji (Supra), interlocutory orders exist against the 2nd respondent for a threatened act to prevent the 2nd Respondent from entering a finding of bad faith and disrepute.

Applicants’ submission

Counsel urged that Paragraph 25 as restated in Judicial Service Commission & another v LMN (2025) KESC 53 (KLR) separated what the Notice to show cause combined, namely invitation to exculpate and inquiry and the former comes after the latter.

That a lawful inquiry does not draw a finding in advance and neither respondent had filed a Replying Affidavit, thus the applicant’s evidence was is uncontroverted. That bad faith is a state of mind. Counsel urged that section 2 of the Fair Administrative Action Act encompasses administrative Acts affecting a person’s legal rights hence the relief of prohibition.

Reliance was placed on Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji & others (1997) eKLR as authority for restraining a contemplated act and urge that section 9(2) of the Act assumed a lawful mechanism.

Counsel submitted that the decisions in Muthinja & others v Henry & others (Supra) and Ramogi v Attorney General & others required the use of a lawful path not where guilt is inferred before the charge and in any case the High court cured the form the letter negated good faith and the threshold in Munya v Kithinji had been met, namely imputation of finding, public interest required compliance with statutes and irreversible harm. Counsel urged the court to grant a stay of the notice and prohibition of any adverse employment action founded on the notice.

1st Respondent’s Submissions

As to whether the Applicant had established a prima facie case with probability of success, reliance was placed on Munya v Kithinji (Supra) to urge the circumstances in which conservatory orders may be issued as explained by the Supreme Court of Kenya, namely, inherent merits of a case, public interest, constitutional values proportionate magnitude and priority levels.

In relation to Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd (Supra), counsel submitted that the requirements of prima facie and others had not been met as the notice was the inquiry stage under Paragraph 25(1) of the 3rd Schedule to the Judicial Service Act, citing Judicial Service Commission v LMN (Supra), and the Chief Justice has power to issue the notice unlike in JSC v KMN and no other step had been taken. That the sentence phrased as “Your actions were in bad faith and have brought the Judiciary into disrepute” was an allegation as opposed to a finding as the notice had to be read as a whole and requests for a response to “these allegations” within 14 days and could not have determined them citing Judicial Service Commossion & another v Shollei (2022) KESC 5 (KLR), on the need to inform the officer the basis of the complaint with details.

That the word “purportedly” was neutral and the High Court recorded that bond was issued on the strength of the letter and the advocates allegedly discharged by the accused continued acting for him before the High Court Was the letter verified before it was acted upon? Counsel wondered.

Counsel urged that the phrase

“without reference to you” did not threaten any sanction since the law prescribed a procedure and the next step would have been invoked, namely framing of charges and forward it with statement of the allegations to the JSC for its further action as necessary and if the investigation culminates into a disciplinary one a fresh notice must be given for a response and the Applicant had the requisite legal safeguards the words “without reference to you” notwithstanding.

The decision in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji (Supra) supported the respondent case.

Counsel submitted that the High court revisionary jurisdiction is concerned with the record for the benefit of the parties to the criminal case and the Applicants conduct was not before the court nor were the respondents and the court regularized the record but did not certify the manner in which the order was made and Article 160 was not engaged.

That the motion will not be rendered nugatory if the orders sought were not made because staying a notice does not remove it, copying the notice to other offices is administrative and confidential responding to a letter causes no harm, but would avail her case to the Chief Justice and no sequence had been skipped.

On public interest, counsel submitted that litigant’s advocates complained in writing on bail granted in the absence of counsels yet it had been reserved for hearing and the law required such complaints to be investigated.

That issuing the orders sought would halt the process before the Chief Justice at its threshold thus making the court the supervisor of disciplinary process before decisions are made.

That granting prayer 4 would be granting a final relief of the originating motion at the interlocutory stage as would prayer No 5 on exemption that the Applicant could not escape exhaustion by characterizing the notice to show cause unlawful and any orders against the 2nd respondent made on the basis of the Notice to show cause would be in vain as nothing reaches the 2nd Respondent until after charges are framed and the officer called upon to exculpate herself.

Finally, counsel submitted that the Applicant accepted that the events of 20th May 2026 may lawfully be inquired into and had not met the threshold for grant of the orders sought.

2nd Respondents Submissions

Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted that it was common ground that, the 2nd respondent had done nothing, no orders of certiorari had been sought against it, or general restraint from receiving a complainant and the statutory mechanisms should take its course.

According to counsel, the only remaining issue was whether the court could make a prohibitory order restraining the Commission from treating the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026 as a referral withing the meaning of Paragraph 25 of the 3rd Schedule to the Judicial Service Act or entering a finding of bad faith upon the applicant’s disciplinary file and from commencing any process founded upon the Notice.

Counsel submitted that such an order should not be made because the commission had contemplated nothing and the statutes forbidded the apprehended act, entries on the applicant’s service file and expunction by against the author, the applicant had exhausted nothing against the Commission and the test for conservatory relief had not been satisfied as against the Commission.

Concerning the statutory framework, reliance was placed on the decisions in Chief Justice & President of the Supreme Court of Kenya & another v Khaemba (2021) KECA 332 (KLR), on the four stages required to be undertaken by the chief justice namely, inquiry, institution of disciplinary proceedings by way of framing and forwarding of the charge or charges, an invitation and opportunity to the officer concerned to state their case and response if any and in the case the officer fails to exculpate herself or himself, laying the charges and responses, if any, before the commission for a decision on whether the disciplinary proceedings should continue or not.

Also cited is the decision in Judicial Service Commission & another v LMN (Supra)

On the prohibitory order sought, counsel submitted that although prohibition was available for contemplated acts, the act must be of the body sought to be restrained and the contemplation must have a basis.

Reliance was placed on Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 others (Supra), to urge that the Commission had not made any decision or announced anything or done anything from which its contemplation could be inferred and relatedly, were the Commission to treat the Notice to show cause as a referral and act on it it would be acting in excess of its jurisdiction and in contravention of law?

Counsel urged that the Commission had no role in the entries on the service file of the Applicant as it never issued the letter nor had the matter reached the commission.

On exhaustion, counsel relied on the decisions in Muthinja & other v Henry & 1756 others (supra) and Ramogi v Attorney General & others (Supra) to urge that the Applicant was obligated to exhaust internal mechanisms and had exhausted nothing as against the Commission.

Counsel submitted that the Applicant had not demonstrated that test for the grant of conservatory orders. Counsel urged the court to decline to issue any conservatory Order, dismiss the motion as against the 2nd Respondent, dismiss the originating motion as against the 2nd Respondent and award costs.

The facts of the case as captured by the Applicant are uncontested. The Applicant admitted having granted an accused person bail on 26th May 2025 on the strength of a letter written by the accused on 25th May 2026 in the absence of counsels, court record, coram and after issuing directions to counsels to avail affidavit evidence for a hearing on 28th May 2025.

Subsequently, a ruling delivered by the High Court in exercise of its revision jurisdiction regularized the court record in Criminal Revision No. 1A of 2026 Republic v Ahmed Dime Dawa Hussein Chebe Interested Party.

It is also common ground that one Mr. Obore Advocate watching brief for the complainant filed a written complaint with the Head of Station on how the matter had been handled leading to the grant of bond on 28th May 2025 in the absence of the parties which triggered the revision.

Wakiaga J stated;

“…the Chief Magistrate referred the matter to this court under its supervisory jurisdiction to enable the court deal with the appropriateness and regularity of the order granting bond…

From the records herein it is clear that the trial court granted bond/bail to the accused person on the strength of his letter dated 25th May 2015 and endorsed on 26th May 2026 a fact that has not been denied by the same. When the matter came up before me Mr. Simba and Mr. Kiptoo for the accused person submitted that they too were aggrieved by the manner the matter was handled and that there ought to have been a ruling there on…

Mr. Nandwa and Mr. Obore for the complainant on the other hand proposed that the said proceedings be vacated so as to put the parties at the position ante, which position was supported by M/s Kariuki.”

The High Court converted the proceedings of the court in Chamber on 26th May 2026 into a ruling of the trial court. This is because the absence of a ruing rendered the proceedings of 26th May 2026 irregular.

The instant suit was precipitated by the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026, which the Applicant characterizes as a conclusion. The Applicant faults the Notice to show cause contending that the matters it relates to were regularized by the High Court and the Applicant exonerated and was unlikely to receive a fair hearing considering the fact that the Notice to show cause is a finding by the Chief Justice and seeks conservatory orders of prohibition and exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion under section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.

The issues for determination are;

(i) Whether the Applicant has made a case for exemption from exhausting internal mechanisms.

(ii) Whether the threshold for grant of conservatory orders has been met.

Before delving into these issues, it is essential to dispose of the issue whether there is an action capable of being acted upon by the court. As correctly submitted by the Applicants counsel the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act encompass actions and decisions.

Section 2 of the Act provides-

In this Act unless the context otherwise requires-

“administrative action” includes-

(a) The powers functions and duties exercised by authorities or quasi – judicial tribunals; or

(b) Any act omission or decision of any body or authority that affects the legal rights or interests of any person to whom the action relates.

Arguably, a Notice to show cause is an act by an administrator and falls within the statutory framework of the Fair Administrative Action Act.

On exhaustion of internal mechanisms, it requires no emphasis that the prevailing jurisprudence is that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists by dint of the Constitution or Act of Parliament, the same ought to be invoked and exhausted before the court’s jurisdiction is invoked, unless an exemption is granted by the court.

In Mumba & 7 others v Munyao & 148 others (2019) KESC 83 (KLR) the Supreme Court held;

“…and from the jurisprudence emanating from this court and the lower courts, which has been restated with notoriety to the effect that where there exists an alternative method of dispute resolution established by legislation the courts must exercise restraint in exercising their jurisdiction conferred by the constitution and must give deference to the dispute resolution bodies established by the statutes with the mandate to deal with such specific disputes in the first instance. See Alphose Mwangemi Munga & 10 others v African Safari Club Ltd (2008) eKLR, Narok County Council case v Trans Mara County Council (2000) IEA 161 Kones v Republic & another Ex Parte Kimani Wanyoike & 4 others (2008) 3 KLR (EP) Speaker of National Assembly v Njenga Karume (2008) 1 KLR (EP) 425, Francis Mutuku v Wiper Democratic Movement Kenya & others (2015) eKLR and David Ochieng Babu v Lorna Achieng & 2 others (2017) eKLR among others not referred to…

Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, first opportunity had to be given to relevant persons bodies tribunals or any other quasi judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute”.

Finally, in Muthinja & another v Henry & 1756 others (Supra), the Court of Appeal held:

“…It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exist outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call when a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanism in place for resolution outside courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.

We find and hold that the exhaustion doctrine applies even hwere as was argued by the appellants herein what is sought to be challenged is the very authority of the organs before whom the dispute was to be placed. We think there were sufficient safeguards in place for a valid determination of the various plaintiff’s disputes had they filed them within the church set up and there was always the right acknowledged by the learned judge of approaching the courts after exhaustion of the church mechanisms. By failing to do so and quite a part from the force of their apprehension, the appellants effectively failed to exhaust their remedies and essentially short-circuited the process by filing suits prematurely.”

These sentiments apply with equal force to the circumstances of the instant suit.

Similarly, it requires no gainsaying that the provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act codified the doctrine of exhaustion under section 9(2) which prohibit superior and subordinate courts, in mandatory tone, from reviewing an administrative action or decision unless the internal mechanisms and remedies at the party’s disposal have been exhausted.

As exemplified by the decisions cited above, the doctrine of exhaustion predates the Act.

Significantly section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides for exceptions as follows:

Notwithstanding sub-section (3), the High Court or a subordinate court may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the applicant exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if the court considers such exemption to be in the interest of justice.

The wording of the foregoing provisions is explicit that the courts discretion ought to be exercised judicially.

The foregoing position was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v National Environmental Management Authority (2011) eKLR where the court held:

“The principle running though these cases is where there was an alternative remedy and especially where parliament had provided a statutory appeal procedure it is only in exceptional circumstances that an order for judicial review would be granted and in determining whether an exception should be made and judicial review granted, it is necessary for the court to look carefully at the suitability of the statutory appeal in the context of the particular case and ask itself what, in the context of the statutory powers was the real issue to be determined and whether the statutory appeal procedure is suitable to determine it…” (Emphasis added)

In Anthony Miano & others v Attorney General & others (2021) eKLR, cited with approval by the Supreme Court in NGOs Co-ordination Board v EG & 5 others (2023) KESC 17 (KLR) a 5 -Judge Bench in Mombasa stated:

“What emerges from our jurisprudence in these cases are at least two principles: while, exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are not clearly delineated, courts must undertake an extensive analysis of the facts, the regulatory scheme involved, the nature of interests involved – including the level of public interest involved and the polycentricity of the issue (and hence the ability of a statutory forum to balance them to determine whether an exception applies…” (Emphasis added)

The foregoing provisions and propositions of law necessitate an examination as to whether there exists an internal dispute resolution mechanism.

It is common ground that one is available under Paragraph 25 of Part IV of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act which counsels made reference to. The mechanism comprises four stages as has been aptly captured by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Chief Justice and President of the Supreme court & another v Khaemba (2021) KECA 322 (KLR) and Judicial Service Commission & another v LMN (2025) KESC 53 (KLR).

In the latter the Supreme Court held:

“Our plain reading of paragraph 25 is that there is a four stage process to be undertaken by the Chief Justice before the dismissal of a judicial officer: the initiation of an inquiry; the commencement of disciplinary proceedings through the framing of the charge(s): an invitation to the officer to respond: and finally where the offer falls to satisfactorily exculpate himself or herself charges together with the officers response if any are laid before the JSC for the final determination by the whole commission”

Significantly, the JSC does not determine the culpability or otherwise of the officer. It determines whether the disciplinary proceedings are worth proceeding with or should be terminated altogether and in the case of the former paragraph 25 provides an elaborate procedure which guarantees observance of the principles of natural justice and the constitutional imperative of fair hearing and if the officer is aggrieved by the final decision of the Judicial Service Commission the officer is at liberty to invoke the courts jurisdiction and take advantage of the appellate process as necessary.”

As adverted to earlier in this ruling, the Applicant is challenging the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026, that it is a conclusion or finding by the Chief Justice and thus the Chief Justice’s decision under Paragraph 25 of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act. The Respondents submitted that the Notice to show cause was the first stage of the process, namely, inquiry. Paragraph 25 requires the Chief Justice conduct an inquiry. However, neither the provisions of the Judicial Service Act nor the Third Schedule define the term “Inquiry”

In simple parlance, the term inquiry denotes a request for information, a question or a formal investigation to find out more about something. It is a systematic investigation or research into facts, principles or a matter of public interest.

Evidently, Paragraph 25 is not prescriptive as to how the inquiry should be undertaken by the Chief Justice, and in the courts view, a Notice to show cause is a legitimate approach to initiation of the fact-finding mission.

Simply, a notice to show cause requires the person to whom it is sent to provide reasons to the inquirer why a particular action should not be taken against them. It is an information or detail seeking device under threat of further action.

A notice to show cause opens dialogue between the inquirer and the recipient and is thus the genesis of a process and a response could also conclude the inquiry.

The Applicant is however contesting the phraseology of the letter by the Chief Justice, specifically the sentence-

“Your actions were in bad faith and have brought the Judiciary into disrepute”

Notably, the opening sentence of the letter reads as follows:

“It has been brought to the attention of my office that while carrying out your judicial duties as a Chief Magistrate at Makadara Law Courts you issued bail/bond terms on the face of a letter dated 25th May 2026 purportedly written by the accused person in Makadara MCCR/E2945/2026 Republic v Ahmed DIMC.”

The letter concludes as follows:

“THEREFORE, TAKE NOTICE that you are required to give a written response to these allegations within fourteen (14) days from the date of this letter failure to which disciplinary action will commence without further reference to you.”

This paragraph lays it bare that the Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court was, by the letter requesting for the Applicant’s version of the alleged occurrence and explain why no further action could not be taken against her.

Needless to belabour, a notice to show cause is accusatorial in nature. It is inquisitorial and may be framed in the manner the accuser considers opportune in the circumstances. In sum there is no tabula rasa of notice to show cause.

The plain and wholistic reading of the letter leaves no doubt, in the courts view, that the letter merely opened the inquiry process by the Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya and neither a finding nor conclusion by the Chief Justice, and in any event the Chief Justice is required to act in coinsurance with the law as held in Mumba & 7 others v Munyao & others (Supra), where the Supreme Court held:

“where an Act of Parliament confers administrative power to an authority as a person there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair…”

In the courts view, the phrase “without further reference to you” meant that the process would be escalated to the next level namely framing of charges.

For the foregoing reasons the court is not persuaded that the Notice to show cause dated 16th September 2026 marked the inception of an illegal process or is itself illegal.

For all these reasons, the court finds that there exists an alternative dispute resolution mechanism available to the petitioner and which has the necessary guard rails to protect the Applicant’s interest, public interest and other parameters.

In the courts view, the Applicant has not demonstrated why the doctrine of exhaustion should be excepted. There are overwhelming chances that the internal dispute resolution mechanisms will resolve the issue and as held in Chitembwe v Tribunal Appointed to Investigate the conduct of Justice said Juma Chitembwe, Judge of the High Court, (2023) KESC 114 (KLR) and demonstrated by the decisions in Wasilwa v Judicial Service Commission: KUDHELHA and 3 others (2025) KEELRC 281 (KLR) and Obwayo v Judicial Service Commission PET No. E052 OF 2026, if in the course of the process the Applicant feels that her rights or fundamental freedoms are likely to be, are being or have been violated, nothing will prevents her from invoking the court’s jurisdiction for redress.

Having found as above, the court finds that the instant suit is premature and it is liable for striking out.

As to whether the Applicant’s motion meets the threshold for the grant of conservatory orders, the court is guided by the sentiments of the Supreme Court in Munya v Kithinji & 2 others (2014) KESC 30 (KLR) as follows;

“Conservatory Orders” bear a more decided public law connotation. For these are orders that facilitate ordered functioning within pubic agencies, as well as to uphold the adjudicatory authority of the courts, in the public interest. Conservatory orders, therefore are not unlike interlocutory injunctions, linked to such private-party issues as “the prospects of irreparable harm” occurring during the pendency of a case; or “high probability of success” in the supplicant’s case for the orders of stay.

Conservatory orders, consequently should be granted on the inherent merit of a case, bearing in mind the public interest the constitutional values, and the proportionate magnitudes and priority levels attributable to the relevant causes”

Based on the inherent merit of the instant application and taking into consideration all other parameters including public interest, which is a core consideration in this case, the court is not persuaded the applicant had established a prima facie case for the grant of conservatory orders for inter alia a stay of operationalization, implementation or enforcement of the notice to show cause or restraining the respondent from requiring the applicant to respond as it would forestall the availment of information at the disposal of the applicant to enable the Chief Justice determine whether or not to close the inquiry, and the Applicant stood to suffer no prejudice by responding to a lawful inquiry.

For the foregoing reasons the court finds that the instant suit was instituted prematurely, and it is struck out with not orders as to costs.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 14TH OCTOBER, 2026.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open court. In permitting this course, this court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this court the duty of the court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.

DR. JACOB GAKERI

JUDGE

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