Employment law

Banticha v Government Press & 15 others [2026] KEELRC 4653 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Petition E139 of 2025
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
Hellen Wasilwa

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC PETITION NO. E139 OF 2025

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)

HON. ABDULLAHI J ALDESA BANTICHA....................PETITIONER

VS

THE GOVERNMENT PRESS........................…......1ST RESPONDENT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL..............….......2ND RESPONDENT

AND

THE CLERK- ISIOLO

COUNTY ASSEMBLY.................................1ST INTERESTED PARTY

HON. MOHAMED ROBA KOTO……..………2ND INTERESTED PARTY

AND

HON. ABDIRASHID ALI DIBA...........…....3RD INTERESTED PARTY

HON. ABDINUR DIMA JILLO.......….........4TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. SALESIO KIAMBI.............……….....5TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. LOROT NICHOLAS....……................6TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. DAVID LEMANTILE.........................7TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. PETER LOSU.................………........8TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. DAVID WAITHAKA..........………......9TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. FOZIA J IBRIL BORE.........…........10TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. FRANCISCO HAJI LETIMALO........11TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. RAHMA ABDIKADIR..........…........12TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. AMINA OMAR ENOW....................13TH INTERESTED PARTY

HON. FATUMA ABDI.......…….................14TH INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

1 The 2nd Interested Party/Applicant filed a Notice of Motion dated 14th May 2026 brought under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A, 99 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Act and Orders 21, 22 Rule 22, 45 and 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, seeking the following orders: -

1. Spent

2. THAT pending hearing and determination of this application, the Court be pleased to review, vary and rectify the judgment delivered by the Court on 05.05.2026 and all other consequential orders and proceedings arising therefrom in this petition.

3. THAT the Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order to review, vary and rectify the findings at Paragraphs 123 and 126 of its judgment.

4. THAT the Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order to recall and rectify the Decree dated 06/05/2026 emanating from the judgment of the Honourable Court.

5. THAT the costs of this application abide the outcome of the Application.

2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and the supporting affidavit of Abdilatif Mohamed Jarso, Counsel on record for the Applicant, sworn on 14th May 2026.

2nd Interested Party/Applicant's Case

3 The Applicant avers that on 5th May 2026 the Court delivered its judgment dismissing the Petition, and did not grant any of the orders sought by the Petitioner.

4 It is the Applicant's case that at paragraph 123 of the judgment, the Court pronounced itself to the effect that it does not have jurisdiction to determine the question as to who is the Speaker of the County Assembly of Isiolo. The paragraph reads as follows: -"This court has no jurisdiction to determine motions of the County Assembly. That as it may be, this court has not been called upon to ascertain who between the petitioner and 1st interested party is the Speaker of the County Assembly. I will therefore not delve at that issue."

5 The Applicant further avers that at paragraph 126 of the judgment, the Court noted as follows: -"Having considered all the averments, it is clear that the petitioner was gazetted as speaker of Isiolo County Assembly on 27/6/25. This Court has not been presented with any other gazette notice that is in place purporting to degazette the petitioner and the one presented has been denied by the respondents as being a nullity. There is also no indication that there was any motion for removal of the petitioner as speaker of Isiolo County which has been passed by the Assembly."

6 The Applicant contends that the two paragraphs seem to contradict each other, as it appears that the Court delved into the issue of speakership yet it had held that it did not have jurisdiction to determine who is the actual Speaker. It avers that this needs clarification.

7 The Applicant also avers that the judgment refers to him as the 1st Interested Party, yet he is the 2nd Interested Party.

8 He states that at paragraph 128 of the judgment, the Court went ahead to dismiss the Petition, as the orders sought could not stand, not being based on existing facts and evidence.

9 It is the Applicant's case that the Petitioner subsequently extracted a Decree dated 6th May 2026 which contains orders that were never granted or issued by the Court.

10 He contends that the Decree is erroneous and in contradiction of the order dismissing the Petition, and that it should only be to the effect that the Petition has been dismissed with no order as to costs.

11 The Applicant avers that to avoid any misapprehension, misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the judgment, and any prejudice to him, there is need for the Court to exercise its inherent power and clarify its final orders.

12 He states that it is only fair and just that the Decree be made clear so as to settle all matters in issue between the parties with finality and avoid further protracted legal proceedings.

13 He further avers that unless the application is heard and determined urgently, his interest and the legislative function and authority of the County Assembly of Isiolo will be usurped and rendered mute, and that he stands to suffer substantial loss and damage.

14 It is the Applicant’s case that it is in the interests of justice that a conservatory order issues to prevent the implementation of the Decree.

15 The Applicant states that the application has been brought without undue delay, that the Petitioner and the Respondents will suffer no prejudice if it is allowed, and that it is in the public interest that the orders sought be granted.

Petitioner's Case

16 In opposition to the application, the Petitioner filed a replying affidavit sworn on 20th May 2026.

17 The Petitioner avers that the application does not disclose any clerical, typographical, arithmetic or accidental error apparent on the face of the record capable of correction under the law.

18 He avers that the Applicant's attempt to characterize substantive judicial findings, reasoning and conclusions as matters for rectification, clarification or review is legally untenable, and that the review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because a party is dissatisfied with the reasoning or conclusions reached by the Court.

19 It is the Petitioner's case that paragraphs 123 and 126 of the judgment did not arise accidentally, inadvertently or through clerical omission but formed part and parcel of the Court's substantive evaluation of the pleadings, affidavits, documentary evidence and submissions before it.

20 He contends that the Applicant, under the guise of rectification and clarification, invites the Court to reconsider, vary and reverse substantive findings already rendered on the merits.

21 The Petitioner avers that such an invitation falls outside the narrow confines of review under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rules 33 and 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and 2024 respectively, and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It is his case that the application is an incompetent appeal disguised as a review.

22 On the Decree, the Petitioner avers that the allegation that it contains orders never granted is misleading, unfounded and unsupported by any demonstrable inconsistency, and that the Decree was lawfully extracted from and remains consistent with the judgment.

23 He contends that the Applicant has deliberately failed to identify any specific clause, order or extracted portion allegedly inconsistent with the dispositive findings of the Court.

24 The Petitioner further avers that the Applicant fully participated in the proceedings and invited the Court to determine the issues before it, and cannot approbate and reprobate by accepting the favorable portions of the judgment while seeking removal of those deemed unfavorable.

25 It is his case that upon delivery of the judgment the Court became functus officio save for correction of accidental slips, clerical errors or minor omissions, which is not the case herein, and that the proper remedy lies in an appeal.

26 The Petitioner contends that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate discovery of new and important matter or evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, sufficient reason, or any accidental slip or omission.

27 He avers that granting the orders would occasion him grave prejudice by reopening conclusively determined issues and undermining finality in litigation, whereas the Applicant would suffer no prejudice incapable of redress through the appellate process. He urges that the application be dismissed with costs.

Respondents' Case

28 The Respondents opposed the application through Grounds of Opposition dated 15th June 2026 on the following grounds:

1. THAT the Application is misconceived, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Honorable Court's process as the Applicant has failed to meet the legal threshold for review, clarification, rectification or amendment of the Judgment and Decree issued by this Honorable Court.

2. THAT the Judgment delivered on 5th May, 2026 is clear, unambiguous, and self-explanatory, and therefore does not require any clarification, interpretation, rectification, or amendment as sought by the Applicant.

3. THAT the Applicant is in abuse of the Court process as the application improperly seeks to invite the Honorable Court to sit on appeal over its own Judgment under the guise of clarification or rectification. The alleged contradictions between paragraphs 123 and 126 of the Judgment are misconceived, as the Court merely addressed the evidence placed before it without assuming jurisdiction over questions relating to the speakership of the County Assembly of Isiolo.

4. THAT the Decree extracted is consistent with and flows from the Judgment delivered by the honorable Court. To the extent that any procedural or clerical errors exist in the extracted orders, the same can be rectified administratively without affecting the substance of the Judgment.

5. THAT the Applicant has not demonstrated any prejudice, substantial loss or irreparable harm capable of warranting the exercise of this honorable Court's discretion in his favor.

6. THAT the Application offends the principles of finality of litigation and is intended to unnecessarily prolong and reopen matters that have already been conclusively determined by the Court.

7. THAT the Application is devoid of merit, discloses no sufficient basis for the orders sought, and ought to be dismissed with costs.

29 The Respondents pray that the Motion dated 14th May 2026 be dismissed with costs as an abuse of the court process.

1st Interested Party's Case

30 The 1st Interested Party opposed the application through Grounds of Opposition dated 15th May 2026, on the following grounds:

1. THAT this Honourable Court is functus officio having conclusively determined the issues in dispute in the ruling delivered on 5th May, 2026, and therefore lacks jurisdiction to reopen or re-determine the same issues, as espoused by the Supreme Court of Kenya in Raila Odinga & Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others.

2. THAT the 2nd Interested Party's Application for review does not meet the legal threshold for grant of review orders as it neither discloses discovery of new and important matter, nor demonstrates any error apparent on the face of the record, and is in substance an appeal disguised as an application for review.

3. THAT the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court has not been properly invoked since the provisions of Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 are inapplicable in view of the specific procedural framework established under the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024.

4. THAT the 2nd Interested Party is improperly inviting this Honourable Court to sit on appeal against its own decision, contrary to settled principles governing review jurisdiction.

5. THAT litigation must come to an end and the present Application offends the principle of finality of judicial proceedings.

6. THAT the Application is misconceived, incompetent, bad in law and an abuse of the court process and ought to be dismissed with costs.

3rd to 14th Interested Parties' Case

31 The 3rd to 14th Interested Parties opposed the application through a replying affidavit sworn on 19th May 2026 by Hon. Abdirashid Ali Diba, the 3rd Interested Party, on his own behalf and on behalf of the 4th to 14th Interested Parties.

32 The Interested Parties aver that they are elected Members of the Isiolo County Assembly and represent a majority bloc of 12 out of 18 Members. They aver that the application is misconceived, incompetent, bad in law and an abuse of the court process.

33 It is their case that the Decree dated 6th May 2026 was lawfully extracted from and is consistent with the judgment, and that the impugned paragraphs form part and parcel of the judgment upon consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, documentary evidence and submissions.

34 They aver that the Court was properly seized of jurisdiction to hear the Petition and to make such observations, findings and determinations as it deemed fit.

35 The Interested Parties contend that the Applicant cannot challenge substantive findings, reasoning and conclusions through review proceedings disguised as an application for rectification or clarification.

36 It is their case that the issues raised concern dissatisfaction with the merits and do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record, and that the application does not meet the threshold under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

37 They further aver that the Applicant is inviting the Court to sit on appeal against its own judgment, that his proper remedy lies in an appeal, and that the Court became functus officio upon delivery of its judgment save for correction of clerical or arithmetical errors, which is not the case herein. They pray that the application be dismissed with costs.

38 M/s Wamalwa and Echesa Co. Advocates, who are on record for the 3rd to 14th Interested Parties, also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 19th May 2026. It is labelled "Petitioner's Notice of Preliminary Objection" and signed as "Advocates for the Petitioner". The Notice of Preliminary Objection is expressed to be raised on pure points of law pursuant to the principles in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, and prays that the application be struck out with costs on the following grounds:

1. THAT the Application dated 14th May 2026 is incompetent, misconceived and an abuse of the process of the Honourable Court as the 1st Interested Party lacks the requisite locus standi to seek substantive review, variation and rectification orders in the manner sought.

2. THAT the 1st Interested Party, being merely an Interested Party in the proceedings, cannot introduce a fresh and substantive cause through an application for review contrary to the settled principles governing the role and scope of participation of Interested Parties as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Kenya.

3. THAT the orders sought in the Application are incapable of being granted as there existed no counter-petition, cross-petition or substantive claim by the 1st Interested Party upon which favorable reliefs capable of review, variation or rectification could issue.

4. THAT the Application improperly invites this Honourable Court to sit on appeal against its own Judgment delivered on 5th May 2026 under the guise of review and rectification.

5. THAT the issues raised in the Application concern the merits, interpretation and correctness of the Judgment and Decree of this Honourable Court and therefore fall within the province of an appellate court and not review jurisdiction.

6. THAT the Application does not meet the legal threshold for review under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010.

7. THAT this Honourable Court is functus officio in respect of the matters conclusively determined in the Judgment delivered on 5th May 2026 and therefore lacks jurisdiction to reopen, rehear or re-determine the merits of the dispute as sought.

8. THAT the Application is therefore fatally defective, legally untenable and ought to be struck out with costs to the Petitioner.

39 The same firm further filed Grounds of Opposition dated 19th May 2026, labelled "2nd Interested Party's Grounds of Opposition". The document describes the 2nd Interested Party as the Clerk, Isiolo County Assembly, and is signed as "Advocates for the 2nd Interested Party". It prays that the application be struck out with costs on the following grounds:

1. THAT the Application dated 14th May 2026 is incompetent, misconceived and an abuse of the process of the Honourable Court as the 2nd Interested Party lacks the requisite locus standi to seek substantive review, variation and rectification orders in the manner sought.

2. THAT the Decree dated 6th May 2026 was properly, regularly and lawfully extracted from the Judgment delivered by this Honourable Court on 5th May 2026.

3. THAT the impugned paragraphs of the judgment form part and parcel of the Judgment of this Honourable Court upon consideration of the pleadings, evidence, submissions and all materials placed before the Court.

4. THAT this Honourable Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the Petition and to make findings, observations and determinations arising from the matters placed before it.

5. THAT the Application does not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record to warrant review under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

6. THAT the Applicant is improperly inviting this Honourable Court to sit on appeal against its own Judgment under the guise of review, variation and rectification.

7. THAT the issues raised in the Application relate to dissatisfaction with the merits, reasoning and conclusions of the Court and the proper remedy available to the Applicant lies in an appeal and not review proceedings.

8. THAT the Application seeks to reopen and re-litigate matters already conclusively heard and determined by this Honourable Court.

9. THAT the Honourable Court is functus officio in respect of the substantive issues determined in the Judgment delivered on 5th May 2026.

10. THAT the Application is legally untenable and devoid of merit.

11. THAT it is in the interest of justice that the Application dated 14th May 2026 be dismissed with costs.

2nd Interested Party/Applicant’s Submissions

40 The 2nd Interested Party/Applicant submitted that the application seeks the recalling and rectification of the Decree dated 6th May 2026, together with rectification and clarification of paragraphs 123 and 126 of the judgment. He framed the sole issue for determination as whether the Court should recall and rectify the said Decree.

41 It was submitted that upon hearing and determining the matter, the Court in its final finding dismissed the Petition and made no order as to costs, and that no other order or relief sought was ever granted. The Applicant argued that the Petitioner nonetheless extracted a Decree that is erroneous and contains extraneous orders that were never granted by the Court and which should not form part of it.

42 The Applicant submitted that the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to recall and rectify the erroneous Decree. He relied on Order 21 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules on the contents of a decree, which provides at sub-rule (1) that:"The decree shall agree with the judgment; it shall contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, and particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit."

43 It is the Applicant's submission that the Decree as extracted contravenes this provision, in that it contains orders that were never granted or issued by the Court and is in contradiction of the order of dismissal of the Petition. He submitted that the Decree should only be to the effect that the Petition has been dismissed and that there shall be no order of costs.

44 The Applicant further argued that the Decree contains obiter dictum, which should not be the correct position legally, and that the paragraphs added by the Petitioner amount to the Petitioner granting himself orders that he never sought and that were never issued by the Court.

45 On the judgment itself, the Applicant submitted that at paragraph 123 the Court pronounced itself to the effect that it does not have jurisdiction to determine motions of the County Assembly, that it had not been called upon to ascertain who between the Petitioner and the interested party is the Speaker of the County Assembly, and that it would therefore not delve into that issue. At paragraph 126, however, the Court noted that the Petitioner was gazetted as Speaker of the Isiolo County Assembly on 27th June 2025, that it had not been presented with any other gazette notice in place purporting to degazette him, the one presented having been denied by the Respondents as a nullity, and that there was no indication of any motion for his removal having been passed by the Assembly.

46 It was submitted that the two paragraphs seem to contradict each other, as it appears the Court delved into the issue of speakership yet it had held that it did not have jurisdiction to determine who the actual Speaker is, and that the same needs clarification. The Applicant further submitted that the judgment refers to him as the 1st Interested Party yet he is the 2nd Interested Party.

47 The Applicant submitted that at paragraph 128 the Court went on to dismiss the Petition, as the orders sought could not stand for not being based on existing facts and evidence. He contended that it is therefore an uncontroverted fact that the Petition was dismissed and no single order was granted, and that the Decree should limit itself to that fact and order.

48 It is the Applicant’s submission that to avoid any misapprehension, misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the judgment, and any prejudice to the Applicant, there is need for the Court to exercise its inherent power and clarify its final orders. The Applicant maintained that it is only fair and just that the Decree is made clear for purposes of settling all the matters in issue between the parties with finality, and that its clarification or amendment will avoid further protracted legal proceedings.

49 In support of the Court's power to make the correction sought, the Applicant relied on the Supreme Court decision in Fredrick Otieno Outa v Jared Odoyo Okello & 3 others [2017] eKLR, where the Court held that:"By its nature, the Slip Rule permits a Court of law to correct errors that are apparent on the face of the Judgment, Ruling, or Order of the Court. Such errors must be so obvious that their correction cannot generate any controversy, regarding the Judgment or decision of the Court. By the same token, such errors must be of such nature that their correction would not change the substance of the Judgment or alter the clear intention of the Court. In other words, the Slip Rule does not confer upon a Court, any jurisdiction or powers to sit on appeal over its own Judgment, or, to extensively review such Judgment as to substantially alter it. Indeed, as our comparative analysis of the approaches by other superior Courts demonstrates, this is the true import of the Slip Rule."

50 It is therefore the Applicant’s submission that the Decree is erroneous and is meant to mislead the public and grant the Petitioner orders that were never issued. He urged the Court to find the application meritorious and allow it.

Petitioner’s Submissions

51 The Petitioner framed four issues for determination: whether the Applicant has established any of the statutory grounds for review; whether the matters complained of constitute an error apparent on the face of the record; whether the application amounts to an appeal disguised as a review; and whether the doctrine of functus officio bars the reliefs sought.

52 On the first issue, the Petitioner submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court to review its decisions is neither automatic nor unlimited, but is a special jurisdiction created by statute to be exercised within the strict confines prescribed by law. He relied on Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, which grants the Court limited power to review its judgments, awards, orders and decrees in accordance with the Rules.

53 He further relied on Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, which permits review only upon discovery of new and important matter or evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, clarification of a judgment or ruling, breach of written law, or any other sufficient reason.

54 It was submitted that Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules similarly confines the jurisdiction to discovery of new evidence, error apparent on the face of the record or other sufficient reason, and that an applicant must bring himself squarely within one or more of the recognized grounds.

55 The Petitioner contended that the Applicant has not demonstrated discovery of any new evidence, as no document has been identified as having been unavailable during the hearing and no material fact has been shown to have been discovered after delivery of the judgment.

56 He submitted that the Applicant has equally failed to demonstrate any accidental omission, typographical error, clerical mistake or arithmetic miscalculation, and, most importantly, has failed to identify any self-evident error discernible from a plain reading of the judgment. It is the Petitioner's submission that the application therefore fails to satisfy the threshold under Rule 33.

57 On the second issue, the Petitioner submitted that the application is principally directed at findings and observations made by the Court in its judgment, the Applicant's contention being that certain findings should not have been made and should now be removed, varied, clarified or reviewed. He argued that such complaints do not constitute errors apparent on the face of the record.

58 Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Njau [1997] KECA 71 (KLR), where it was held that:"A review may be granted whenever the court considers that it is necessary to correct an apparent error or omission on the part of the court. The error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established."

59 It was submitted that the Court of Appeal in that decision further held that a review cannot be granted merely because another judge could have taken a different view of the matter, and that an erroneous conclusion of law is a ground for appeal and not review. The Petitioner argued that an error apparent on the face of the record is one that is obvious, manifest and self-evident, capable of immediate identification without prolonged argument, re-examination of evidence or extensive legal reasoning. Where a party must invite the Court to revisit evidence, reconsider submissions, reassess legal principles and re-evaluate conclusions already reached, the matter ceases to be a review issue and becomes an appellate one.

60 The Petitioner submitted that the findings complained of were not accidental but were substantive judicial determinations made after consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, documentary evidence and submissions, and that the Applicant's disagreement with them cannot transform them into reviewable errors.

61 He relied on paragraph 29 of the Court of Appeal decision in Swai v Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] KECA 883 (KLR), wherein the Court reiterated that review is not available merely because a party considers a decision wrong. If every allegation of legal or factual error could find review proceedings, the distinction between review and appeal would collapse entirely. The Applicant has therefore failed to establish any error apparent on the face of the record.

62 On the third issue, the Petitioner submitted that the substance of an application takes precedence over its form, and that courts examine the true nature of the relief sought rather than the labels employed by litigants. He maintained that although the application is framed as one for review, in substance the Applicant seeks reconsideration of findings already made, alteration of conclusions already reached, re-evaluation of issues already determined, and the removal of portions of the Court's reasoning and their replacement with conclusions more favourable to his case.

63 It is the Petitioner's submission that these are classic appellate complaints falling outside the scope of review. He argued that a review court corrects obvious errors whereas an appellate court examines whether the decision itself was right or wrong, and that the Applicant's grievance is not that the Court made an accidental mistake but that it arrived at findings with which he disagrees. The proper remedy for such dissatisfaction is an appeal, and the law does not permit a litigant to convert review proceedings into a surrogate appeal.

64 On the fourth issue, the Petitioner submitted that the doctrine of functus officio is a fundamental principle of judicial administration: once a court has performed its adjudicative function and rendered a final determination, its authority over the substantive merits of the dispute is exhausted, save for the limited exceptions recognised by law.

65 It is the Petitioner’s submission that the doctrine safeguards certainty, finality and public confidence in judicial proceedings and prevents the endless reopening of concluded disputes. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Telkom Kenya Ltd v Ochanda (Suing on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of 996 Former Employees of Telkom Kenya Ltd) [2014] KECA 600 (KLR), where the Court stated at paragraph 21 recognized that once a court has conclusively determined a matter, it cannot revisit the merits except as expressly permitted by law.

66 The Petitioner submitted that judgment was delivered on 5th May 2026 after full consideration of the dispute, and that the Court thereby exhausted its adjudicative mandate over the issues raised in the Petition. Save for the correction of clerical mistakes or accidental slips, or review on legally recognized grounds, the Court cannot revisit substantive findings already made.

67 He submitted that granting the application would require the Court to reconsider its own reasoning, revisit its own conclusions and effectively sit on appeal over its own judgment, which would offend both the doctrine of functus officio and the principle of finality of litigation.

68 It is the Petitioner’s submission that the Applicant has failed to establish any lawful basis upon which the judgment delivered on 5th May 2026 may be reviewed, varied, clarified or set aside, and urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

Respondents’ Submissions

69 On the threshold for review, the Respondents submitted that the governing law is Rule 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024. Under Rule 74, a court may review its judgment only where there is discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge, where there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or where there exists any other sufficient reason.

70 It was submitted that the Applicant has not demonstrated the existence of any of these grounds and that the application instead seeks a re-evaluation of the Court's findings and conclusions.

71 The Respondents relied on the Supreme Court decision in Judicial Service Commission v Oduor & 5 others [2024] KESC 53 (KLR), where it was held:"as a general rule, the Supreme Court cannot sit on appeal over its own decisions, or review its decisions, save to correct obvious errors apparent on the face of the decision. However, in exercise of its inherent powers, the Court may, review its decision in exceptional circumstances, to meet the ends of justice."

72 They submitted that the Supreme Court went further to emphasize that once judgment is delivered the Court is generally functus officio, that any invitation to reopen a concluded matter must be founded on firm grounds, that the threshold for review is extremely stringent and exceptional, and that a party cannot use a review application to re-litigate issues already determined on merit.

73 The Respondents further relied on the Court of Appeal decision in National Bank Of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau [1997] eKLR, where it was held that:"A review may be granted whenever the court considers that it is necessary to correct an apparent error or omission on the part of the court. The error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established. It will not be a sufficient ground for review that another judge could have taken a different view of the matter."

74 They also cited Pancras T. Swai v Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal emphasized that review cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal.

75 It is the Respondents' submission that the application merely challenges the Court's reasoning and findings and therefore falls outside the ambit of review. They argued that where an applicant merely seeks to reopen, reinterpret, clarify or challenge issues already conclusively determined, without demonstrating any of the recognised exceptional grounds, the application is incompetent, offends the doctrine of functus officio and the principle of finality of litigation, and ought to be dismissed.

76 On whether the judgment requires clarification, the Respondents submitted that the contention that it contains contradictions is unfounded. They contended that a reading of the judgment as a whole demonstrates that the Court considered the evidence placed before it and arrived at a reasoned determination within the scope of the issues before it.

77 It was submitted that judgments must be read holistically and not in isolated paragraphs, reliance being placed on Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 Others [2017] eKLR, where it was observed that judicial pronouncements must be construed contextually and as a whole.

78 The Respondents submitted that the alleged inconsistency between paragraphs 123 and 126 is therefore a misapprehension of the judgment and does not warrant intervention by way of review or clarification.

79 The Respondents submitted that the substance of the application is a challenge to the merits of the judgment, which lies before an appellate court and not before the trial court under the guise of clarification or rectification. They relied on Abasi Belinda v Frederick Kangwamu & Another [1963] EA 557, where Bennett J of the High Court of Uganda held that review is not available where an applicant seeks a rehearing of the case or where the court would effectively be sitting on appeal over its own decision.

80 They further cited National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Njau (Supra) for the holding that a review cannot be granted merely because a party believes the court reached an incorrect conclusion. It was submitted that the Applicant's remedy, if dissatisfied, lies in lodging an appeal.

81 On the Decree, the Respondents submitted that under Rule 72 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, a decree is the formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties.

82 It is their submission that the Decree issued herein faithfully reflects the judgment and cannot be impeached merely because the Applicant disagrees with the Court's findings.

83 The Respondents submitted that if any clerical or typographical errors exist, the Court's powers under Rule 74 are limited to the correction of accidental slips or omissions and do not extend to substantive alteration of the judgment. They relied on Lakhamshi Brothers Ltd v Raja & Sons [1966] EA 313, where the Court recognized that the slip rule cannot be used to alter the substance of a judgment. They argued that no basis has been laid for interference with the Decree.

84 The Respondents further submitted that the law strongly favors finality in litigation, and that once a court has conclusively determined the issues before it, parties should not be permitted to perpetually reopen disputes through collateral applications. Reliance was placed on Raila Odinga & 2 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others [2013] eKLR, where the Supreme Court underscored the importance of finality and observed that there must be an end to legal disputes.

85 Relying on John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary, Transport and Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] eKLR, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigation must come to an end and that courts should guard against abuse of process through repeated attempts to reopen concluded matters; they submitted that the application seeks to revisit issues already determined and therefore undermines the doctrine of finality.

86 On prejudice, the Respondents submitted that the Applicant has not shown any prejudice, substantial loss or miscarriage of justice that would result if the judgment and Decree remain undisturbed.

87 They argued that the Court's discretionary jurisdiction must be exercised judiciously and only where sufficient cause has been shown, and that in the absence of demonstrable prejudice the application is merely speculative and intended to delay the implementation of the judgment.

88 It is the Respondents’ submission that the Applicant has failed to establish any of the grounds contemplated under Rule 74 and that the application is misconceived, incompetent and an abuse of the court process.

89 They submitted that the application is a disguised appeal which, under the pretext of clarification and rectification, invites the Court to revisit matters conclusively determined after hearing the parties.

90 The Respondents submitted that a court cannot sit on appeal over its own decision save in circumstances expressly permitted by law, which have not been demonstrated, and that the Court therefore stands functus officio.

91 In support thereof, they cited Telkom Kenya Limited v John Ochanda & 6 others [2016] KEHC 8498 (KLR), where the court stated that once a court has finally determined a matter and issued its judgment, it generally lacks authority to reopen or re-decide the dispute except in narrowly defined circumstances.

1st Interested Party's Submissions

92 The 1st Interested Party submitted that Rule 74(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024 sets out the parameters within which the Court may entertain an application for review, and that the present application does not pass that threshold and must be dismissed with costs.

93 It was submitted that a reading of the application shows that none of the grounds under the Rule has been made out. There is no discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the Applicant's knowledge or could not be produced at the time the decree was passed. Nor is there a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, a judgment requiring clarification, or any other sufficient reason.

94 On the discovery of new and important evidence, the 1st Interested Party relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Rose Kaiza v Angelo Mpanju Kaiza [2009] KECA 422 (KLR). The Court there held that applications on this ground must be treated with great caution, and that the court must be satisfied that the material placed before it proves the existence of the facts alleged. It was further held that before a review is allowed on this ground, the applicant must establish that he acted with due diligence and that the existence of the evidence was not within his knowledge. Where due diligence is not shown, it is not open to the court to admit the evidence on the ground of sufficient cause. The Court added that the ground extends beyond new evidence to any new and important matter which was not within the party's knowledge when the decree was made.

95 On what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates v Moses Kipkolum Kogo [2000] KECA 92 (KLR). The Court there held that such an error cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively and must be determined judicially on the facts of each case, there being a real distinction between a mere erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. A clear case is made out where an error on a substantial point of law stares one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions about it. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning, on points where there may conceivably be two opinions, does not qualify. Nor does a view adopted by the court which is a possible one, even though another view was possible. The Court concluded that a mere error or wrong view is not a ground for review, though it may be one for appeal.

96 The 1st Interested Party further relied on Republic v Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal Ex parte Apollo Mboya [2019] eKLR, where where Mativo J (as he then was) set out the principles to guide a court in an application for review. In summary, a court can review its decision only on the grounds enumerated in Order 45 Rule 1, and the expression "any other sufficient reason" is to be interpreted in the light of the other specified grounds. An error which is not self-evident and can only be discovered by a long process of reasoning is not an error apparent on the face of the record, such an error being one that is prima facie visible and requires no detailed examination. An erroneous decision cannot be corrected under the guise of review, nor can a decision be reviewed on the basis of a subsequent decision of a coordinate or superior court. The court must confine itself to the material that was available at the time of the initial decision, and subsequent events cannot be relied upon to impugn it. Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient, as the applicant must also show that it was not within his knowledge and could not be produced earlier even with due diligence. Lastly, the power of review is traceable to Section 80 of the civil procedure statute, and the limitations on its exercise are those set out in Order 45 Rule 1.

97 The 1st Interested Party submitted that the facts underpinning it are clear, albeit misinterpreted by the Applicant. By the judgment delivered on 5th May 2026, the Court dismissed the Petition dated 11th July 2025. It was submitted that the Applicant, being aggrieved by the findings at paragraphs 123 to 126 of the judgment, has opted to have the Court review the judgment instead of appealing to the Court of Appeal.

98 The 1st Interested Party submitted that the allegation that paragraphs 123 and 126 seem to contradict each other is an attempt by the Applicant to push a narrative that he is the Speaker of the County Assembly of Isiolo whereas he is not.

99 It was submitted that whilst the Court acknowledged that there was no gazettement purporting to degazette the Petitioner as Speaker, the ultimate conclusion on the face of the judgment is that the Petitioner is still the Speaker of the County Assembly.

100 The 1st Interested Party submitted that the Applicant is therefore proceeding from a misinterpretation of the judgment, and that no concrete basis has been laid to warrant its review.

101 It is the 1st Interested Party's submission that paragraphs 123 and 126 of the judgment are very clear and that there is no contradiction whatsoever as alleged. It was argued that the Applicant is evidently disgruntled by the fact that the Court did not make a finding as to who between the Petitioner and the Applicant was or is the Speaker of the County Assembly of Isiolo. That question, it was submitted, was not before the Court, and the Court was justified in not delving into it.

102 It is the 1st Interested Party’s submission that the application is one that could be termed pessimi exempli, being an appeal disguised as an application for review, and urged that it be dismissed.

3rd to 14th Interested Parties' Submissions

103 The 3rd to 14th Interested Parties framed three issues for determination: whether the Applicant has satisfied the legal threshold for review, variation, rectification and clarification of the judgment; whether the application improperly invites the Court to sit on appeal against its own judgment; and whether there exists any basis for the recall, variation or rectification of the Decree.

104 On the first issue, the Interested Parties submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court to review its decisions is donated by Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

105 It was submitted that an applicant must strictly demonstrate one of three grounds. These are the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge at the time of the decision, an error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason recognised in law.

106 They placed reliance on the Court of Appeal decision in National Bank Of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau [1997] eKLR, which they described as the locus classicus on the law of review in Kenya, where the Court stated: “A review may be granted whenever the court considers that it is necessary to correct an apparent error or omission on the part of the court. The error or omission must be self-evident and should not require an elaborate argument to be established." The Court further held in that decision that a wrong conclusion of law could be a good ground for appeal but not for review, as the judge would otherwise be sitting on appeal on his own judgment, which is not permissible in law.

107 It was submitted that the Court of Appeal thereby drew a clear distinction between a review and an appeal, review not being intended to afford a dissatisfied litigant a second opportunity to challenge the correctness of a court's findings, reasoning or conclusions. The Interested Parties argued that once a court has consciously considered the issues before it and rendered itself, an aggrieved party can only pursue the appellate process.

108 Applying these principles, the Interested Parties submitted that the Applicant's complaint is directed at paragraphs 123 and 126 of the judgment and the conclusions reached thereon, his contention essentially being that the Court ought not to have made the findings contained in those paragraphs. They argued that such complaints go to the merits, reasoning and substance of the judgment and not to any self-evident error on the face of the record.

109 Reliance was further placed on Pancras T. Swai v Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal cited with approval its earlier decision in Francis Origo & Another v Jacob Kumali Mungala [2005] eKLR, in which it was held that:"Our parting shot is that an erroneous conclusion of law or evidence is not a ground for a review but may be a good ground for appeal. Once the appellants took the option of review rather than appeal they were proceeding in the wrong direction. They have now come to a dead end."

110 The Interested Parties submitted that a grievance that a court misapprehended the law or reached an incorrect legal conclusion is accordingly a ground of appeal, and that review cannot be used to reopen a concluded decision merely because a party believes the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

111 It is their submission that the Applicant does not point to any clerical error, accidental slip, arithmetic mistake, omission or self-evident error, nor to any new evidence that was unavailable when the judgment was delivered. He instead invites the Court to revisit, reconsider and alter substantive findings made after a full hearing of the Petition, and the application therefore satisfies none of the grounds for review known in law.

112 On the second issue, the Interested Parties submitted that the gravamen of the Applicant's complaint is his dissatisfaction with the findings, observations, reasoning and conclusions reached by the Court, particularly at paragraphs 123 and 126. They contended that he does not contend that the Court inadvertently omitted any matter, committed a clerical error, made an accidental slip or overlooked evidence which could not previously be produced. His contention is that the findings ought to be revisited, reconsidered and interpreted differently, which is an appellate issue and not a review issue.

113 Relying again on National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Ndungu Njau, Francis Origo and Pancras T. Swai (supra), they submitted that where a party believes the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion of law, fact, reasoning or interpretation, the proper remedy lies in an appeal. Review, it was submitted, cannot be invoked as a mechanism through which a dissatisfied litigant seeks a second hearing before the very court whose decision is impugned, or as a substitute for an appeal.

114 It is the Interested Parties’ submission that whether the Applicant agrees or disagrees with the findings is wholly immaterial for purposes of the review jurisdiction. Once the Court rendered itself on the issues after considering the pleadings, evidence and submissions, any challenge to those findings could only properly be mounted before an appellate court.

115 The Interested Parties submitted that the application is nothing more than a disguised appeal clothed as an application for review, variation, rectification and clarification, and that to grant the orders sought would require the Court to sit on appeal against its own judgment.

116 On the third issue, the Interested Parties submitted that the contention that the Decree does not accurately reflect the judgment is misplaced both in fact and in law. They maintained that the Decree faithfully captures the findings, observations, determinations and consequential orders arising from the judgment.

117 It was argued that the Applicant's complaint is not directed at any clerical mistake, accidental slip, omission, typographical error or defect in the extraction of the Decree, but stems from the substantive findings at paragraphs 123 and 126. His challenge is therefore in reality directed at the judgment itself, and he is improperly seeking to alter substantive findings under the guise of rectifying the Decree.

118 The Interested Parties submitted that once a court has rendered a final determination it becomes functus officio and cannot reopen, reconsider or re-determine the substantive issues already adjudicated upon, except in the limited circumstances expressly provided by law.

119 They relied on John O Ochanda & others (Suing on his Own Behalf and on Behalf of 996 Former Employees of Telkom Kenya) v Telkom Kenya Limited [2015] KEHC 7153 (KLR), which cited the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 60 of 2013, Telkom Kenya Ltd v John Ochanda. The Court of Appeal there described functus officio as an enduring principle of law that prevents the re-opening of a matter before a court that rendered the final decision thereon. Tracing the doctrine to the English decision in In re St. Nazaire Co. (1879) 12 Ch. D. 88, it explained that the general rule that a final decision cannot be re-opened applied once the formal judgment had been drawn up, issued and entered, subject to two exceptions.

120 It was submitted that the doctrine safeguards the finality, certainty and integrity of judicial proceedings, prevents unsuccessful litigants from repeatedly inviting the same court to reconsider issues already determined, and preserves public confidence in the administration of justice.

121 The Interested Parties submitted that the Applicant is inviting the Court to do precisely what the doctrine prohibits, by asking it to vary, rectify and effectively rewrite portions of its judgment through the mechanism of decree rectification.

122 The Interested Parties further submitted that the findings complained of form part and parcel of the judgment. They were not inserted into the Decree independently of the judgment, nor introduced through any error in the extraction process, but arose directly from the Court's considered determination of the issues before it. Any challenge to them is therefore a challenge to the judgment itself and cannot be pursued through an application for recall or rectification of the Decree.

123 They submitted that dissatisfaction with the Court's conclusions cannot constitute a lawful basis for recalling or varying a Decree that faithfully reflects the judgment from which it emanates.

124 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. In principal, the applicant seeks review of this court’s judgment delivered on 5/5/2026 and variation of the decree contending that it is contradictory in terms of para 123 and 126 of the judgment. The applicant therefore seems to suggest that there is an error in the judgment which he wants corrected.

125 The judgment of this petition in essence dismissed the petition which had sought some declarations. The petitioner had sought orders barring the respondents from de-gazetting the petitioner as Speaker of the Isiolo County Assembly without adherence to the law.

126 In my judgment, I made the orders that there was no such evidence that action had been taken to de-gazette the petitioner as Speaker of the County Assembly and any such action could only be taken with adherence to the law. In essence, I was emphasizing the fact that the petitioner was speaker given the evidence before me.

127 I have not comprehended the point of departure from this judgment which the applicant contend is an error and in view of the judgment rendered against the petitioner who filed the petition. In the final judgment, I find no evidence to suggest that the gazettee notice of the petitioner had been revoked. This was confirmed by the State Law Office which is the entity responsible for gazettement and de-gazettement of government documents.

128 As to an invitation to amend the decree, it is also apparent that such an amendment will flow from a change in the judgment and which I find not tenable. What the applicant seems to suggest is to invite this court to either sit on appeal on its own judgment or alter its judgment both which I decline and find the application is not merited. The same is dismissed accordingly.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 14th Day of October 2026.

HELLEN WASILWA

JUDGE

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

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