Background
This Honourable Court be pleased to strike out and/or dismiss the Claimant’s Statement of Claim dated 17th March 2026 for being premature and incompetent for want of jurisdiction.
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This Honourable Court be pleased to strike out and/or dismiss the Claimant’s Statement of Claim dated 17th March 2026 for being premature and incompetent for want of jurisdiction.
Paragraph 1 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT
AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E325 OF 2026
(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)
NAFISSA MESSAOUL……….....………………………………CLAIMANT
VS
CHAVDA EDUCATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED.........RESPONDENT
RULING
1 By a Notice of Motion dated 2nd April 2026, brought under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 6 of the Arbitration Act, Sections 3(1) and 15(1) and (4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Order 2 Rule 15 and Order 46 Rule 20 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and Rules 47 and 56 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, the Respondent/Applicant sought ORDERS that: -
1. This Honourable Court be pleased to strike out and/or dismiss the Claimant’s Statement of Claim dated 17th March 2026 for being premature and incompetent for want of jurisdiction.
2. In the alternative, this Honourable Court be pleased to stay these proceedings and refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the Claimant’s Contract of Employment dated 21st August 2024.
3. The costs of this Application and of the Claim be awarded to the Respondent
2 The application is supported by the affidavit of Sagar Chavda, a director of the Respondent, sworn on 2nd April 2026.
Respondent/Applicant’s Case
3 The Respondent/Applicant avers that the Claimant was engaged under a contract of employment dated 21st August 2024 which expressly provides for disputes arising from the employment relationship to be resolved through negotiation and, failing that, arbitration.
4 The Applicant avers that Clause 19 of the contract provides:"The parties shall attempt to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to this contract through negotiations between representatives of the parties, who have authority to settle the same. If the matter is not resolved by negotiation within 30 days of receipt of a written 'invitation to negotiate', the dispute shall be referred to arbitration by any party and the arbitration process shall be governed by the Arbitration Act 1995 and rules as agreed between the parties."
5 The Applicant avers that by filing the claim in this Court, the Claimant acted in blatant disregard of the binding arbitration clause the parties freely agreed upon, and failed to exhaust the internal and contractual dispute resolution mechanisms available under her contract.
6 It contends that the claim offends Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution, which enjoins the Court to promote alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation and arbitration.
7 It is the Applicant’s case that the claim offends Section 3(1) as read with Section 15(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, which recognizes and encourages the settlement of employment disputes through such mechanisms.
8 In support of its case, the Applicant relied on Louis Onyango Owoko v Kenya Railways Corporation [2021] eKLR, AMREF International University v Mwitari & Another [2025] KEELRC 3031 (KLR), Talewa Road Contractors Limited v Kenya National Highways Authority [2021] KECA 276 (KLR), Dock Workers Union Limited v Messina Kenya Limited [2019] eKLR and Nyakwara v Trivitron Healthcare Africa [Kenya] Limited [2024] KEELRC 1460 (KLR).
9 It is the Applicant's case that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim as presently framed, and that it is in the interest of justice that the claim be struck out with costs or, in the alternative, stayed and referred to arbitration as agreed.
Claimant/Respondent’s Case
10 The Claimant/Respondent opposed the application through Grounds of Opposition dated 10th April 2026 and a Replying Affidavit sworn by Nafissa Messaoui on the same date
11 In her Grounds of Opposition, the Claimant opposed the application on the following GROUNDS:
1. This Honourable Court has original jurisdiction over employment and labour relations disputes under Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution and section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.
2. The Respondent's primary prayer for striking out and/or dismissal of the Claim is misconceived in law, section 6 of the Arbitration Act being, at most, a stay-and-referral provision and not a strike-out or dismissal provision.
3. The dispute before Court is a post-termination employment dispute concerning the lawfulness of the Claimant's dismissal, terminal dues, deductions and/or set-off issues, employment records and statutory rights, and is therefore properly before this Court.
4. On the Respondent's own case and exhibited contract, Clause 19 was a staged dispute resolution clause requiring a written invitation to negotiate first, through representatives with authority to settle, and only thereafter, if unresolved within thirty (30) days, could arbitration follow.
5. The Respondent never issued any written invitation to negotiate within the meaning of Clause 19, never convened any negotiation meeting under that clause, and never proposed arbitration to the Claimant before or after termination.
6. Having failed to invoke Clause 19 in the manner prescribed by the contract, the Respondent cannot now selectively rely on the arbitration limb of that clause as a procedural bar against judicial scrutiny of the Claimant's dismissal and post-termination statutory claims.
7. By the time this Cause was filed, the employment relationship had already been terminated by the Respondent, and what remained for determination was a post-termination statutory dispute, not a live workplace disagreement to be internally managed.
8. Further and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Respondent's own exhibited copy of the contract does not bear the Claimant's signature on the employee execution page, notwithstanding Clause 25 thereof which provides that the contract is not binding unless
9. signed by the employer's authorised representative and the employee.
10. In the circumstances, and on the exhibited record placed before Court by the Respondent itself, the Respondent has not demonstrated a cleanly executed bilateral instrument upon which to found the drastic relief sought under section 6 of the Arbitration Act.
11. In the premises, the Respondent's Notice of Motion dated 2nd April 2026 does not satisfy the threshold for stay and referral under section 6 of the Arbitration Act and ought to be dismissed with costs.
12 In her Replying Affidavit, the Claimant depones that she was employed by the Respondent and that her Statement of Claim sets out the circumstances of her employment, her termination and the reliefs she seeks.
13 She avers that the dispute concerns the termination of her employment and the post-termination questions arising from it, including terminal dues, deductions or set-off, employment records and her statutory entitlements.
14 It is the Claimant/Respondent’s case that at no time after the dispute arose did the Respondent issue her a written invitation to negotiate as contemplated by Clause 19, that she was never called to any negotiation meeting under that clause, and that arbitration was never proposed to her before or after her termination. By the time she instructed her advocates and filed the claim, the Respondent had already brought the employment to an end without initiating any step under Clause 19.
15 The Claimant further avers that she has seen the copy of the contract exhibited by the Respondent, and notes that although Clause 25 provides that the contract is not binding unless signed by the employer's authorised representative and the employee, the employee execution page does not bear her signature. In her view, the document relied upon is therefore not a fully executed copy in the manner Clause 25 contemplates.
16 She avers that, as an individual former employee, being compelled into private arbitration with its attendant arbitrator's fees and related costs would place her at a serious practical and financial disadvantage.
17 It is the Claimant’s case that the application is intended not to advance genuine alternative dispute resolution as contemplated by Clause 19, but to delay and divert scrutiny of her dismissal and the matters raised in her claim.
18 The Claimant asserts that this Court's jurisdiction derives from the Constitution and statute and is not extinguished by the arbitration clause, that Section 6 of the Arbitration Act provides no basis for striking out or dismissing her claim, and that the Respondent has not met the legal threshold for stay and referral to arbitration on the record before Court.
19 The Claimant thus prays that the application be dismissed with costs and the cause proceed to hearing on the merits.
Respondent/Applicant’s Case
20 The Respondent/Applicant submitted on four issues: whether by virtue of the binding arbitration Clause 19 of the employment contract, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Claim in its present form; in the alternative, whether the proceedings should be stayed and the parties referred to arbitration under Section 6 of the Arbitration Act, 1995; whether the Claimant’s statutory rights under the Employment Act, 2007 render the arbitration clause inoperative and preclude a referral to arbitration; whether the Claimant's Grounds of Opposition disclose any legal basis to resist the Application; and what order should be made as to costs.
21 On jurisdiction, the Respondent submitted that jurisdiction is the bedrock of all judicial proceedings, relying on Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR, where the Supreme Court held: "…the issue as to whether a Court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, is not one of mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the Court cannot entertain any proceedings."
22 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution provides that alternative forms of dispute resolution including arbitration shall be promoted. It contended that this provision imposes an imperative duty on the Court rather than a discretionary aspiration, a mandate reinforced by Section 15(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.
23 It submitted that Clause 19 is an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, being an agreement to submit to arbitration disputes arising in respect of a defined legal relationship, and that both parties executed the contract freely, the Claimant's signature at page 11 not being disputed.
24 Relying on Talewa Road Contractors Limited v Kenya National Highways Authority [2021] KECA 276 (KLR), which adopted Dock Workers Union Limited v Messina Kenya Limited [2019] eKLR, and on AMREF International University & another v Mwitari & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 3031 (KLR), it submitted that parties who freely choose arbitration are bound by that choice and cannot turn around and denounce it.
25 The Respondent/Applicant further invoked the doctrine of exhaustion, citing Geoffrey Muthinja & another v Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 others [2015] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held:"It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews." It also relied on Louis Onyango Owoko v Kenya Railways Corporation [2021] KEELRC 1318 (KLR).
26 The Respondent/Applicant submitted that the Claimant filed her claim without issuing a written invitation to negotiate, allowing the thirty-day window to run, or proposing arbitration, which is precisely the conduct the exhaustion doctrine guards against and which offends Article 159(2)(c) and Sections 3(1) and 15(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act.
27 In the alternative, the Respondent urged a stay and referral under Section 6(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides: "A court before which proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than the time when that party enters appearance or otherwise acknowledges the claim against which the stay of proceedings is sought, stay the proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds— (a) that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; or (b) that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred to arbitration."
28 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that the word "shall" leaves the Court no general discretion, and that the burden of establishing either exception lies on the party resisting the stay.
29 It submitted that all the preconditions are met: there is a valid arbitration agreement, the application was made promptly without any step beyond entering appearance, and neither exception applies. The clause has never been repudiated, the Claimant's failure to invoke it does not render it inoperative, arbitrators are readily available, and there is plainly a dispute over the termination and dues.
30 On the third issue, the Respondent submitted that the test for arbitrability in Kenya is not whether a claim involves statutory rights, but whether the subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration and whether any statutory provision expressly or by necessary implication prohibits the arbitration of such disputes. The Employment Act, 2007 contains no such prohibition.
31 Relying on County Government of Nyeri & Another v Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu [2019] eKLR, AMREF International University & another v Mwitari & 2 others [2025] KEELRC 3031 (KLR) and the persuasive English decision in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40; the Respondent/Applicant submitted that an arbitral tribunal is not a forum of diminished competence. It can determine any question of fact or law, including whether a termination was fair under the Employment Act, and can award all appropriate reliefs including reinstatement, compensation, and statutory entitlements.
32 The Respondent/Applicant argued that the Claimant will suffer no prejudice from proceeding to arbitration, as she retains the full opportunity to advance all her statutory claims before a competent arbitral tribunal.
33 On the final issue, the Respondent/Applicant submitted that the Claimant's reliance on Article 162(2)(a) conflates the existence of jurisdiction with its exercise, since a stay under Section 6 presupposes jurisdiction but requires the Court to step aside in favour of the agreed forum.
34 Reliance was placed on Nyakwara v Trivitron Healthcare Africa [Kenya] Limited [2024] KEELRC 1460 (KLR) for the holding that where parties have positively rejected the Court's jurisdiction in favor of private mechanisms, the Court would be acting against their wishes by intervening.
35 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that Clause 19, covering any dispute arising out of or relating to this contract, is drafted in the widest terms and encompasses claims for unfair termination, terminal dues and statutory violations.
36 On the contention that the Respondent never invoked Clause 19, the Respondent submitted that the clause is available to either party, and that it was the Claimant, as the party with a grievance, who was obliged to issue the written invitation to negotiate before approaching the Court. She could not use her own failure as a sword against the Respondent, and to hold otherwise would allow any party to bypass an arbitration clause simply by filing suit first.
37 It further argued that a clause is inoperative only upon clear evidence of repudiation, waiver or conduct inconsistent with arbitration, none of which exists, the Respondent having consistently asserted the primacy of Clause 19.
38 On the Claimant's plea of financial hardship, the Respondent submitted that it is speculative and unsupported by any evidence of the likely costs, and that Clause 19 prescribes no institutional rules or fixed fees, leaving the parties free to agree on a cost-effective procedure. It relied on Nyakwara, where the Court held: "The issues raised by the Claimant, about the skewed authorship of the contract of employment and his inability to finance arbitration, are matters he ought to have foreseen, and raised, when he executed the contract… There is no violation of the Claimant's right of access to justice. The dispute resolution mechanisms Parties have elected, are themselves, avenues for exercise by the Parties, of their right of access to justice."
39 The Respondent also contended that the clause survives termination. The words "arising out of or relating to" are of the widest import, and accepting the Claimant's construction would mean every dismissal dispute escapes arbitration, a result rejected in Talewa Road Contractors and AMREF International University, where arbitration clauses were enforced after the employment had ended.
40 Lastly, on the execution point, the Respondent submitted that the exhibited copy is the one retained in its possession, that its lack of the Claimant's signature does not establish that no duly executed original exists, and that a signed copy is annexed to the Claimant's own List of Documents dated 17th March 2026.
41 It is the Respondent/Applicant’s submission that the Claimant does not positively depone that she never signed the contract, and that the burden of proving non-execution lies on her. Further, she cannot approbate and reprobate, relying on the contract to found her employment claim while denying its binding force to escape Clauses 19 and 25.The Respondent therefore urged the Court to allow the application with costs.
Claimant/Respondent’s Case
42 The Claimant/Respondent framed the issues for determination as whether the Respondent’s prayer for striking out and/or dismissal of the suit is legally competent; whether the existence of Clause 19 extinguishes this Court’s constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over this post-termination employment dispute; whether, on the facts and law of this case, the Respondent has satisfied the threshold for stay and referral under section 6 of the Arbitration Act; and what orders ought to follow.
43 On the primary prayer for striking out, the Claimant submitted that Section 6 of the Arbitration Act is a stay and referral provision and not a strike-out or dismissal provision. Its language is one of suspension and not extinction. She argued that the Respondent was therefore asking for relief the statute does not provide.
44 The Claimant submitted that Section 15 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act is likewise preservative rather than destructive, since it allows the Court to stay proceedings and refer a dispute appropriately. Even if a proper case under Section 6 had been made out, which she denied, the lawful remedy would be a stay and not the striking out of the suit.
45 On jurisdiction, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent conflates two distinct questions. One is whether the Court has jurisdiction over employment disputes. The other is whether, given a contractual ADR clause, the Court should stay its hand in a particular case.
46 She submitted that this Court's jurisdiction flows from Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, and is neither donated nor taken away by contract.
47 She contended that Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR, on which the Respondent relied, in fact supports her position, as it holds that:"A court's jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the constitution or other written law."
48 She relied on Okeyo v Board of Directors HHI Management Service Ltd & another [2024] KEELRC 1006 (KLR), where Gakeri J. held:"Only the Employment and Labour Relations Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to employment and labour relations pursuant to article 162(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 read with section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, 2011. Relatedly although section 15 of the Act confer upon the court jurisdiction to refer a dispute to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms suo motu or on application or request of the parties… the provision is silent on arbitration."
49 She also cited Sammy Onyango Ochieng v Abno Softwares International Limited [2020] KEELRC 5 (KLR), where the Court held that "the arbitration clause of the employment contract was meant as an internal dispute resolution mechanism and which does not oust the application of the law." In the case, the Court further held that under Section 26 of the Employment Act it is mandated to override the terms of an employment contract where the statutory terms are more favourable to the employee.
50 On the construction of Clause 19, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent must take the clause as it finds it. She contended that Clause 19 is a staged clause and not a direct-to-arbitration clause. The sequence begins with a written invitation to negotiate, followed by negotiations between authorized representatives and a thirty-day window, and only thereafter arbitration.
51 It is the Claimant’s submission that her filed affidavit is that no written invitation was issued, no negotiation meeting convened and no arbitration proposed goes to the heart of the application. She argued that a party cannot ignore the front end of a staged clause and then seek refuge in its tail end once suit has been filed.
52 She conceded that either party could in the abstract have invoked the clause. However, she argued, the Respondent is the party seeking relief under Section 6 and must therefore show that the clause was operative and properly invoked. Having terminated her employment first and bypassed the staged process, it cannot blame her alone for not activating a clause it never invoked itself.
53 The Claimant cited Agnes Waruguru Gaita & another v RSM Eastern Africa LLP & another [2021] KEELRC 1846 (KLR), where the Court held:"…an arbitration clause does not oust the jurisdiction of the court, but is available for the parties to opt for or opt out of. The court thus retains jurisdiction until parties or one of the parties opts out of the same………….. It is for these reasons that I find that the application herein is premature. I also find that the conditions precedent to the arbitration being consultation in good faith, is incapable of being met by the parties at this stage of the proceedings.”"
54 She also relied on Nanchang Foreign Engineering Company (K) Limited v Easy Properties Kenya Limited [2014] eKLR, where the Court held:"Attempt of an amicable settlement was a condition precedent before the dispute was referred to arbitration. Neither the plaintiff nor the Defendant provided the court with any evidence to show that they had indeed attempted such amicable settlement. On this ground alone, Defendant's application would automatically fail as referral to arbitration would be premature."
55 The Claimant further submitted that the dispute is a post-termination claim concerning the legality of her dismissal, terminal dues, deductions or set-off, employment records and statutory entitlements, and not a live workplace grievance. This, she argued, goes to the appropriateness of the remedy sought.
56 In support thereof, she cited Rono v Delish Nail & Beauty Ltd [2023] KEELRC 2996 (KLR), where Baari J. held:"It is my considered opinion that the wording of Clause 19 of the employment contract between the parties herein, was to allow negotiation, mediation and subsequently arbitration to disputes arising in the course of employment and not after the contract of employment has been terminated…………. The respondent/applicant has not shown that it did try the alternative methods of dispute resolution prior to terminating the Claimant’s contract.” She also relied on Jane Muthoni Mukuna v Fsi Capital Limited [2015] eKLR.
57 It is the Claimant’s submission that the Respondent terminated first and invoked Clause 19 only after the Claimant came to Court. By the time this suit was filed, what remained was not a dispute about how to manage an ongoing relationship but a dispute about the legality of what had already been done and the statutory consequences flowing from it.
58 On the threshold under Section 6, the Claimant accepted that the Respondent moved promptly by entering appearance under protest and filing the application at the earliest stage. She argued, however, that promptness is only one part of the inquiry, and that the Respondent had not demonstrated a sustainable basis for a stay. Clause 19 was never invoked as prescribed, and the dispute is a post-termination statutory one materially different from the commercial disputes that typically animate Section 6 applications.
59 Without making it the main plank of her opposition, she submitted that the Respondent's exhibited copy of the contract does not bear her signature on the employee execution page, despite Clause 25.
60 The Claimant submitted that she does not invite a finding that there was no employment relationship, her suit being founded on one. Her point, she argued, is narrower and procedural: the Respondent, as the party seeking to shut the suit out of Court, bears the burden of laying a clear contractual foundation, and on its own record that foundation is not pristine.
61 She further urged the Court to bear in mind the unequal bargaining power in employment contracts, as recognized in Okeyo:"It is common ground that prospective employees are seldom involved in the negotiation of terms of employment other than salary and allowances. The document is drawn by the employer in its language and inserts terms and clauses formulated in its words and prospective employees are in most all cases eager to sign the dotted line to secure employment to return the favour."
62 It is the Claimant’s submission that the Respondent's dismissal of her concern about arbitral costs as speculative was too casual, given the obvious asymmetry between an institutional employer and an individual former employee already off payroll.
63 She further submitted that while cost alone does not nullify every arbitral clause in employment, it forms part of the context in which the Court must decide whether a stay has been earned.
64 The Claimant then addressed the Respondent's authorities. She accepted that Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 others supports the general doctrine of exhaustion, however, she submitted that it is not a Section 6 employment case and does not address a staged clause never invoked before termination and suit.
65 She characterised Talewa Road Contractors Ltd v Kenya National Highways Authority as a commercial arbitration authority vindicating party autonomy between corporate actors at arm's length, which does not answer the distinctive concerns of a post-termination employment claim and does not turn Section 6 into a strike-out weapon.
66 She submitted that AMREF International University v Mwitari & another affirms respect for contractual ADR in its proper context, but does not establish that every employment arbitration clause automatically defeats a filed suit regardless of the facts.
67 As for Nyakwara v Trivitron Healthcare Africa (Kenya) Limited, she argued that it cannot erase the distinction between jurisdiction and stay, rewrite Section 6 into a striking-out provision, or cure the Respondent's failure to invoke the negotiation precondition.
68 In her submission, her own authorities fit the record more closely, since they address arbitration clauses in employment contracts, staged clauses with unperformed preconditions, and the post-termination setting.
69 On the Respondent's argument that she cannot approbate and reprobate, the Claimant submitted that an employee may sue on the existence of an employment relationship and the statutory rights arising from it without conceding that every clause in the employer's document is enforceable in the manner later asserted.
70 The Claimant submitted that must she concede that every precondition was properly invoked, or that the exhibited contract is procedurally immaculate for Section 6 purposes.
71 She further submitted that her position is coherent: there was an employment relationship, the Respondent terminated it, statutory consequences now arise, and the Respondent has not earned the relief sought.
72 The Claimant therefore urged the Court to decline the invitation to bury or divert the suit, to dismiss the application, and to allow the cause to proceed to hearing on the merits.
73 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. The applicant seeks orders to either strike out the claim or stay further proceedings and refer the claim to arbitration as per the contract of employment between the claimant and respondent.
74 It is indeed true that clause 19 of the contract between the claimant and respondent provides for arbitration in case of a dispute between the parties. There is no indication that the claimant has tried this channel before filing this suit. It is indeed true that the claimant has approached this court prematurely. I will proceed and stay any further proceedings on this cause and refer the parties to arbitration as per their contract. Costs in the cause.
Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 19th Day of October 2026.
HELLEN WASILWA
JUDGE