Employment law

Kenya Engineering Workers Union v Bhachu Industries Limited [2026] KEELRC 14814 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Cause E657 of 2024
Judgment date
29 October 2026
Judge(s)
Hellen Wasilwa

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Background

THAT the Honourable Court deem fit to review and set aside partially the Judgment delivered on the 26th day of January, 2026.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT

AT NAIROBI

ELRC CAUSE NO. E657 OF 2024

(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)

KENYA ENGINEERING

WORKERS UNION....................................CLAIMANT/APPLICANT

VS

BHACHU INDUSTRIES LIMITED……………………….RESPONDENT

RULING

1 The Claimant/Applicant filed a Notice of Motion application dated 22nd April 2026 under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules and all other enabling provisions of the law. It seeks the following orders:

1. THAT the Honourable Court deem fit to review and set aside partially the Judgment delivered on the 26th day of January, 2026.

2. THAT the Honourable Court deem fit and grant the Orders as prayed by the Claimant/Applicant as per the Memorandum of Claim on service gratuity and notice pay in lieu.

3. THAT the costs of the Application be met by the Respondent.

4. THAT any other Relief the Honourable Court may deem fit to grant.

2 The application is premised on the grounds on its face and on the supporting affidavit of Wycliffe A. Nyamwata, the Claimant's General Secretary.

Claimant/Applicant’s Case

3 It is the Applicant's case that in its Judgment of 26th January 2026, the Court allowed the prayers for days worked and accrued leave, and directed the Respondent to file tabulations and make payment within 30 days.

4 It avers that on 23rd February 2026, the Respondent wrote to the Union disclosing that one of the grievants had already been paid service gratuity, a fact it never disclosed to the Court throughout the proceedings, which the Applicant terms new evidence.

5 The Applicant further avers that the Respondent did not disclose to the Court that it was its past practice to pay both notice pay in lieu and service gratuity to all its employees, including those summarily dismissed, so that the Court could make an informed decision.

6 The Applicant contends that by declining the prayers for notice pay and service gratuity, the Judgment discriminates against the grievants as compared with their colleagues who were summarily dismissed and paid those dues. It relies on records of payments made to such colleagues.

7 The Applicant further avers that the Judgment leaves one grievant, Francis Kyalo Kisua, discriminated against as compared with his colleague Nicholas Munywoki Mbatha, who had already been paid service gratuity of Kshs. 300,000.

8 The Applicant attributes any delay in bringing the application to the Respondent's failure to comply with the Court's order to file and serve tabulations within 30 days, which it has yet to do.

9 It is the Applicant’s case that unless the orders are granted, the Union and its members will suffer irreparable damage.

Respondent’s Case

10 The Respondent opposed the application through a Replying Affidavit sworn on 30th June 2026 by Gurveer Bhachu, its Director and Authorised Officer.

11 It is the Respondent's case that the application lacks merit, is an abuse of the court process and fails to meet the threshold for review under Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 and, to the extent applicable, Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

12 The Respondent avers that the Applicant seeks to reopen the judgment of 26th January 2026 under the guise of review, although the issues it now raises either formed part of the matters before the Court or ought, with reasonable diligence, to have been raised at the hearing.

13 The Respondent avers that the Applicant has neither disclosed when the alleged new evidence came into its possession nor shown what efforts it made to obtain and produce it before judgment.

14 It states that the evidence on previous payment practices, payroll records, terminal dues and the alleged advance payment to Nicholas Munywoki Mbatha concerns matters that existed long before judgment and were within the Applicant's knowledge, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

15 Had the Applicant considered those documents material, he contends, nothing prevented it from obtaining and producing them at the hearing through the available procedures for production and discovery.

16 It is the Applicant’s case that a party cannot, deliberately or inadvertently, fail to place evidence before the Court at trial and then seek to fill the gaps in its evidence by invoking the Court's limited review jurisdiction.

17 The Respondent asserts that review is not intended to give a dissatisfied litigant a second opportunity to prosecute its case or to persuade the Court to reach a different conclusion on the same facts.

18 The Respondent avers that the Applicant's complaints about the findings on notice pay, service gratuity and alleged discrimination among the grievants merely show dissatisfaction with the Judgment, and disclose no error apparent on the face of the record. No patent error, accidental omission, mathematical mistake or self-evident error has been identified. If the Applicant believes the Court misapprehended the evidence or reached an erroneous conclusion, he contends, its remedy lies in an appeal, not in inviting the Court to sit on appeal over its own Judgment.

19 The Applicant further avers that the complaint about the tabulation of decretal sums and the alleged delay in complying with post-judgment directions concerns the implementation and execution of the Judgment, and cannot be a lawful ground for reviewing the Judgment itself.

20 It is the Applicant’s case that the application was filed almost three months after judgment, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay or for the failure to place the alleged evidence before the Court at the hearing.

21 The Respondent contends that allowing the application would gravely prejudice it, by undermining the principle of finality of litigation and encouraging parties to withhold evidence at trial only to seek a rehearing after an unfavourable judgment.

22 It maintains that the Applicant has failed to establish the discovery of new and important evidence that could not, despite due diligence, have been produced before judgment, or any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason for review.

Claimant/Applicant’s Submissions

23 The Claimant/Applicant submitted that in the judgment of 26th January 2026, the Court allowed the claims for days worked and accrued leave but declined those for service gratuity and notice pay. It then received a letter from the Respondent disclosing that one of the grievants had already been paid service gratuity under the Respondent's internal arrangement, which was never disclosed to the Court during the hearing.

24 The Claimant/Applicant submitted that the disclosure prompted the present application. The Claimant also pointed out that the Respondent filed its Replying Affidavit dated 30th June 2026 outside the time granted by the Court, without leave and without seeking it at the mention.

25 It framed the issues for determination as whether the application meets the threshold for review and whether it is merited.

26 The Claimant submitted that several facts are undisputed. The Respondent forwarded to it information that was not within its reach before or during the proceedings. The Claimant had annexed to its Memorandum of Claim, at pages 44 to 47, samples of payments made to a dismissed colleague of the grievants, but the Respondent persuaded the Court to expunge them as irrelevant to the subject matter. All former employees dismissed before the grievants were paid service gratuity and notice pay in lieu, which amounts to a past practice. All the payment documents annexed to the application emanated from the Respondent. The documents forming the new information were forwarded on 23rd February 2026 and the application was drawn on 22nd April 2026, two months later and not three months, as the Respondent alleges.

27 On the threshold for review, the Claimant submitted that it had accepted the Court's finding that the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement does not provide for service gratuity and notice pay for a summarily dismissed employee, only to learn afterwards that the Respondent's policy or practice was to pay both to all departing employees, including those summarily dismissed.

28 Reliance was placed on Clause 33(a) of the CBA, which provides that "an employee who retires on ground of age, medical death, termination at the initiative of the employer or resigns, shall be entitled to a gratuity payment of 15 days for each completed year of service, for employees with above 10 years of service 21 days for each year."

29 It is the Claimant/Applicant’s submission that the documents forwarded with the Respondent's letter of 23rd February 2026 show an internal arrangement for paying gratuity while an employee is still in service, contrary to the CBA. These comprise the payment of service gratuity to Nicholas Munywoki Mbatha, copies of cheques, and letters from the Respondent and the grievant.

30 The Claimant submitted that these documents were beyond its reach before and during the proceedings, and that only the Respondent could have produced them but chose not to, using them as a "hidden card" until it sought to recover the gratuity paid in advance.

31 It relied on Rule 74(1)(a) and (d) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, which provides that a person aggrieved by a decree or order may, within a reasonable time, apply for review "(a) if there is discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of that person or could not be produced by that person at the time when the decree was passed or the Order made; … (d) for any sufficient reason." It urged the Court to find that this threshold is met.

32 On delay, the Claimant submitted that two months after receiving the documents is a reasonable time, relying on Simon v Oira [2025] KEHC 7211 (KLR). It argued further that the Respondent did not comply with the Court's direction to compute and pay the accrued leave and wages, confirming them only on 2nd March 2026. The application was therefore drawn about sixty days after that confirmation, and, it submitted, there is no fixed time limit and the Court has previously held that a delay of one and a half months is not undue.

33 On the merits, the Claimant submitted that although it agrees that the CBA does not provide for service gratuity and notice pay in these circumstances, the Respondent of its own motion went outside the CBA to pay both to the grievants' dismissed colleagues, a fact it has not disputed in its Replying Affidavit.

34 It further submitted that one grievant, Nicholas Munywoki Mbatha, was paid Kshs. 300,000 in service gratuity while still in employment, contrary to Clause 33(a) of the CBA, so that dismissing the application would leave the other grievant discriminated against.

35 Therefore, the Claimant/Applicant urged the Court to find that the internal arrangement had become a practice that gave the Respondent's employees, including the grievants, a legitimate expectation of such payments. It maintained that the application is not an appeal, because these facts were never disclosed to the Court and so were never considered.

36 The Claimant/Applicant relied on Section 5(2) and (4) of the Employment Act, which provide that "an employer shall promote equal opportunity in employment and strive to eliminate discrimination in any employment policy or practice," and that "an employer shall pay his employees equal remuneration for work of equal value."

37 The Claimant submitted that the figures tabulated in the Memorandum of Claim have never been disputed, other than on the ground that the CBA does not provide for them. It urged the Court to award the grievants as follows: Francis Kyalo Kisua: service gratuity of Kshs. 259,543 and notice pay in lieu of Kshs. 107,994, a total of Kshs. 467,537; Nicholas Munywoki Mbatha: service gratuity of Kshs. 838,930, less the advance of Kshs. 300,000, leaving Kshs. 538,930, plus notice pay in lieu of Kshs. 178,710, a total of Kshs. 717,640.

38 In conclusion, the Claimant urged the Court to find the application merited and allow it, with throw-away costs of Kshs. 100,000.

39 I have examined all the averments and submissions of the parties herein. From the averments, the applicant wants the court to review the judgment and make a finding that the applicant members were entitled to payment of service gratuity. They seek to rely on documents which came to their possession and in particular the letter dated 4/7/2023 from respondent to a former employee showing he was paid service gratuity despite this fact they had been summarily dismissed.

40 Despite this new evidence, the applicants have not annexed any contracts of the employees who were apparently paid as comparison that they did not provide for service gratuity yet were paid.

41 The applicants are inviting court to re-open this case and consider fresh evidence, which in my view goes beyond the province of review. In my view, the issues raised can only be resolved through an appeal. I decline to grant the orders sought accordingly and dismiss this application for review. There shall be no order of costs.

Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 29th Day of October 2026.

HELLEN WASILWA

JUDGE

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