Employment law

Huge Share Ltd v Nyarango [2026] KEELRC 15020 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E012 of 2026
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

Case research

READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that no disciplinary hearing was conducted while the hearing invitation sent to Respondent and minutes of the disciplinary hearing were adduced as evidence.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

The court considered whether the respondent’s dismissal was unfair procedurally and substantively; whether compensation and notice pay should stand; whether leave pay was due; whether the magistrate erred by omitting the appellant’s counterclaim and whether…

Material facts

The respondent was a General Manager whose gross monthly pay was shown by payslips as Kshs. 66,777.64. Before taking 95 days’ leave from 20 April to 10 August 2022, she handed over responsibilities. The appellant alleged an unreconciled Kshs. 1,272,152…

Get the complete brief with membership →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E012 OF 2026

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

HUGESHARE LIMITED APPELLANT

VERSUS

SYDINE KERUBO NYARANGO RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the Judgment of Hon. Tom Mark Orlando, SPM delivered on 22nd December 2025 at the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani in MCELRC No. E2237 of 2024: Sydine Kerubo Nyarango v Hugeshare Limited.)

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated and lodged in court on 14th January, 2026. It emanates from a judgment delivered on 22nd December, 2025 in the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani in MCELRC No. 2237 of 2024.

The grounds of appeal come out as follows;

1. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that no disciplinary hearing was conducted while the hearing invitation sent to Respondent and minutes of the disciplinary hearing were adduced as evidence.

2. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that the termination of the employment relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent was unlawful and awarding her four (4) months’ salary as damages.

3. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by finding that the Respondent had pending leave days at the end of her employment with the Appellant despite her exhausting all her leave days.

4. THAT the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by not making any finding on the Counterclaim filed by the Respondent.

5. THAT the learned magistrate misdirected himself by failing to consider relevant facts in reaching the impugned decision.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) That the appeal be allowed as prayed.

b) That the judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025 by Hon. Tom Mark Orlando, SPM(DR) be set aside.

c) That this Honourable court be pleased to make any further orders it deems just and fit to grant.

d) That the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the subordinate court be awarded to the Appellant.

The Respondent sued the Appellant in this court as Cause No. E007 of 2023. By consent, the suit was transferred to the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Milimani on 31st October, 2024. She claimed a declaration of unfair termination, twelve months’ compensation of Kshs. 801,324, service pay of Kshs. 200,331.00 three months’ pay in lieu of notice of Kshs. 200,331.00 leave pay of Kshs. 33,388.50, interest and costs.

The Appellant defended the claim and raised a counter claim Kshs. 1,272,152.00 which they said the Respondent’s negligence had caused on them. The Respondent testified as PW1. The Appellant called one of its directors, Frasiah Waithira Njoroge, as DW1.

The trial court held that there was no notice to show cause and no invitation to a disciplinary hearing, and that the termination was unprocedural and unlawful. It awarded four months’ salary of Kshs. 267,080.00 one month’s pay in lieu of notice of Kshs. 66,770.00 and leave pay of Kshs. 33,388.50 a total of Kshs. 367,238.50 with costs and interest. It declined service pay. The judgment does not mention the counterclaim.

The Record of Appeal was filed in March, 2026 and the appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions, the Appellant filing on 8th April, 2026 and the Respondent on 17th April, 2026.

It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the trial court disregarded Exhibit 7, the WhatsApp invitation to the meeting of 8th July, 2022 and Exhibit 8, the minutes of that meeting. It says these show that the Respondent was invited to and heard in a disciplinary hearing. It submits that once an employer shows compliance with section 41 of the Employment Act, procedural fairness is satisfied. It further submits that it proved a valid reason under sections 43 and 45 and section 44(4)(c): the Respondent negligently performed her duties and Kshs. 1,272,152.00 was lost. It relies on her admission that she could not account for unbanked cheques and on her request to be forgiven.

As to remedies, the Appellant submits that compensation under section 49(1)(c) arises only where termination is unfair and that the trial court gave no justification for four months. On leave, it submits that Exhibit 6, the leave application and handover form, shows 95 days taken, so no leave was due.

On the counterclaim, it submits that a counterclaim is a separate suit joined for convenience and that the trial court was bound to determine it. Failure to do so denied it a fair hearing under Article 50 of the Constitution. In its written submissions it asks this Court to allow the counterclaim.

The Respondent’s case and submission is that no disciplinary hearing was held. The meeting of 8th July, 2022 was set up through a WhatsApp message, and the minutes show two attendees and were never signed by her. She was not told the meeting was disciplinary or that she could be accompanied, and no show cause letter was issued. She says DW1 admitted this in cross-examination.

The Respondent avers that her request for a meeting with the director was never granted. She was a General Manager and not an accountant, the physical cheques were in the accountant’s custody and she had only supervisory or view access. She relies on the authorities of Gilbert Mariera Makori v Equity Bank Limited, Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission and Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui.

On the issue of leave, the Respondent submits that the Appellant bore the burden of proving that all leave was taken and that an employer must keep employment records. On compensation, she submits that the award was within the court’s discretion under section 49. On the counterclaim, she submits that it lacked evidential support and was implicitly determined. She asks that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the Respondent’s termination was unfair, both as to procedure under section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 and as to the reason for it.

2. Whether the awards of compensation and notice pay should stand.

3. Whether the award of leave pay should stand.

4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to determine the counterclaim and, if so, whether the counterclaim succeeds.

5. Who should bear the costs of the appeal.

This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and to draw its own conclusions, bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify, as was pronounced in the celebrated authority of Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123. Under Rule 68(2) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, the court may uphold, set aside or vary the decision appealed against.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the Respondent’s termination was unfair, both as to procedure under section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 and as to the reason for it. The Respondent was employed by the Appellant as a General Manager. She says she joined on 1st July, 2016 as an accountant and was later promoted. The Appellant says it employed her as General Manager on 1st January, 2018, when it began operating as a distributor for Kenya Breweries Limited. Her payslips show a gross monthly salary of Kshs. 66,777.64.

In April, 2022 she applied for 95 days of annual leave, from 20th April 2022 to 10th August 2022, and a handover was done on 19th April 2022. The Appellant says the cash book balance of its cheque collection account that day was Kshs. 2,593,096.00 and that she handed over Kshs. 1,320,944.00 It says the difference of Kshs. 1,272,152 was a loss caused by her negligence. On 8th July 2022 she attended a virtual meeting with the Appellant’s human resource consultant, Ms. Monicah Ngarari. By a letter dated 13th July 2022, headed: Termination of employment due to negligent performance of duties amounting to gross misconduct, the Appellant terminated her employment with immediate effect.

The trial court’s reasoning on procedure is brief and to the point. It found, from the evidence of the Respondent and DW1, that there was no notice to show cause and that the Respondent was not invited to a disciplinary hearing. It said nothing about Exhibits 7 and 8.

The Appellant is partly right about the record. The trial court said DW1 confirmed in cross-examination that there was no disciplinary hearing and the certified proceedings do not bear that out. DW1 said the meeting of 8th July, 2022 was disciplinary. What she accepted was that there was no show cause letter and that the Respondent was never issued with a warning. She also accepted that no document showed the Respondent was entitled to a representative.

A meeting did take place on 8th July, 2022 as the Respondent states. A finding that no hearing of any kind was conducted was therefore too broad. That does not decide the matter. The question under section 41 is not whether a meeting was held but whether the employer did what the section requires before terminating.

Section 41(1) requires an employer, before terminating on grounds of misconduct or poor performance, to explain to the employee, in a language the employee understands, the reason for which it is considering termination. The employee is entitled to have another employee or a shop floor union representative present during that explanation. Section 41(2) requires the employer to hear and consider any representations the employee makes. The section does not use the words show cause and the trial court was wrong to treat the absence of a show cause letter as decisive in itself. A written notice is the usual way an employer proves it told the employee what was alleged and that termination was in view. Where there is none, the employer must prove compliance by other evidence.

The Appellant’s evidence falls short on each requirement. First, the invitation. Exhibit 7 is a WhatsApp message from the HR consultant asking the Respondent to confirm your availability for a meeting on 8th July, 2022, virtual or physical. It does not say what the meeting is about, mentions no misconduct, discipline or termination, and says nothing about a right to be accompanied.Second, accompaniment. DW1 accepted that no document showed the Respondent was entitled to a representative. There is no evidence that she was told so orally, and the minutes record two people present, the Respondent and the consultant.

Thirdly, on the issue of the explanation; The minutes, Exhibit 8, say the purpose of the meeting was reconciliation of the variance of Kshs.1,272,152.00 in the cash book by the GM (Sydney) and how she intended to clear the balance and way forward. That is an inquiry about a balance. It is not an explanation that the employer was considering terminating a General Manager for gross misconduct.

The Respondent’s evidence is that the meeting was not disciplinary and that the consultant was communicating a decision of the directors. DW1 was not at the meeting and did not shake that evidence.

Fourth, the hearing. The decision was the director’s, and the minutes record her as absent with apologies. They also record that the consultant would pass on the Respondent’s request for pardon to the director for consideration and that the Respondent would receive feedback. The WhatsApp messages end with the consultant saying she will have a discussion with the company director and get back.

The Respondent says she asked on 8th July, 2022 for a hearing with the director, and DW1 admitted that she had asked for a meeting with the directors. The record shows no such meeting, and no further engagement of any kind, before the termination letter of 13th July, 2022 five days later. The letter speaks of the Respondent’s written and oral submissions. Yet the only written communications from her on the subject in evidence are her emails of 11th April, 2022 and her WhatsApp messages of 8th July, 2022.

DW1 said in re-examination that an email to the Respondent was a show cause letter. She did not identify it. If she meant the director’s email of 11th April, 2022 at 5.18 pm, it does not do that work. It concerns the Respondent’s salary and leave, says the money was lost due to negligence from you part and says nothing about discipline or termination. The minutes are the Appellant’s own record. The HR consultant signed them and the Respondent did not, as DW1 accepted. They are some evidence that a meeting took place and of what the consultant says was said. They cannot supply what section 41 requires and the rest of the evidence shows was missing.

The Appellant also pleaded that the Respondent was invited on 19th July, 2022 to appeal and declined on 21st July, 2022 see Exhibit 10. Section 41 requires the hearing before termination, and an appeal offered after dismissal does not cure the want of one. Her reply, that she saw no reason to appeal over an offence she did not commit herself, is not an admission that she had been heard.

The Appellant submits that once compliance with section 41 is shown, procedural fairness is satisfied. That is correct, but this premise is missing. Ground 1 therefore succeeds on one narrow point only: a meeting took place on 8th July, 2022 and the trial court should have said so. It fails on the question that matters. The Appellant did not comply with section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007.

Section 45(2) of the Employment Act, 2007 makes a termination unfair if the employer fails to prove that the reason is valid, that it is a fair reason related to the employee’s conduct, capacity or compatibility or to operational requirements, and that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure. The breach of section 41 alone makes the termination unfair under section 45(2)(c).

The trial court did not examine the reason for termination at all. Ground 2 and the Appellant’s submissions put it squarely in issue and the record is complete, so I will decide it. The Respondent proved her dismissal. Under section 47(5), the employer must then justify the grounds.

Under section 43(1) the employer must prove the reason, and under section 43(2) the reason is the matter the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time and which caused it to terminate. The reason given in the letter of 13th July, 2022 is that the negligent and improper performance of your duties has led to the loss of money under your care which the company may not be able to recover.

The Appellant had to prove two things: that there was a loss, and that the Respondent’s negligent performance of her own duties caused it. On the first, its exhibits show an unreconciled difference in its own ledger. Exhibit 5, the cash book statement of the cheque collection account for 19th April, 2022 closes at Kshs. 2,593,096.68.

The Appellant avers thats the Respondent handed over Kshs. 1,320,944.00 as shown on the handover form, Exhibit 6, and that the difference of Kshs. 1,272,152.00 is the loss. A difference between a ledger balance and the figure handed over is a reconciliation difference. Without more, it does not prove that money was lost. And there is nothing more. DW1 said the physical cheques were with the accountant, who was responsible for banking. The Appellant called neither the accountant nor the HR consultant. It produced no audit, no investigation report, no bank statement and no evidence that any cheque was lost, stolen or dishonoured, or that it was never banked.

The Respondent’s answer, in her emails of 15th and 21st July, 2022 was that the transactions in question dated from April, 2021 when she had no rights in the system. She served a notice to produce bank statements for April to December, 2021 and the Appellant objected that they were confidential. I draw no adverse inference from that, but it left the court with only the Appellant’s own ledger.

The Respondent’s submissions say DW1 admitted that no police report was made. The certified proceedings do not record DW1 saying so, and I place no reliance on it.

On the second, attribution. DW1 accepted that the Respondent was not the accountant, that the accountant was responsible for banking and held the physical cheques, and that the Respondent’s role was supervisory over cash transactions. Exhibit 2, the Appellant’s own printout of the General Manager’s role permissions, shows that the role could add, edit and confirm receipts, payments and funds transfers but could only view bank reconciliation. On 11th April, 2022 the director herself asked accounts to explain the cheques and the variance.

The Appellant relies on the Respondent’s email of 11th April, 2022 at 5.35 pm. She wrote that she was sorry, that she fully owned up the collections in dfs and transfer to bank as I knew bilha was overseeing collection to ensure the right figures reflected, and that hence forth it is well noted. Read as a whole, it expresses regret and says that Bilha oversaw collection. It is not an admission that she lost Kshs. 1,272,152.00 or that banking was her duty.

This court does not ignore her WhatsApp message after the meeting, in which she asked the consultant to just look through and said that, apart from that one, no mistake had occurred. That acknowledges a mistake and seeks leniency, and I give it weight. But it does not prove the loss, does not identify the duty she carelessly performed and does not displace DW1’s evidence that banking was the accountant’s responsibility.

The request for pardon recorded in minutes she did not sign is not any stronger. It does not assist the Appellant’s case. Nor does section 44(4)(c) rescue the Appellant. Careless and improper performance of a duty may amount to gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal, but the employer must still prove what the duty was, that the employee performed it carelessly, and that the carelessness warranted summary dismissal. None of those is established. The Appellant has not proved the reason for termination, and by section 43(1) the termination is deemed unfair. Together with the breach of section 41, the finding that the termination was unfair stands. The trial court reached the right result, though without examining the reasoning.

Ground 5 is made out in part. The trial court did not consider Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, the reason for termination or the Counter Claim. Those omissions are corrected by this re-evaluation and they do not change the finding on liability.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the awards of compensation and notice pay should stand.

Section 49(1)(c) allows an award of up to twelve months’ gross salary and section 49(4) lists the factors to be considered. The Supreme Court held in Kenfreight (EA) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2019] KESC 79 (KLR), at paragraph 41, that a court making an award under section 49 must exercise its discretion judiciously and be guided by section 49(4.)

The Appellant is right that the trial court gave no reasons for four months. It stated the figure and the arithmetic, and Rule 68(4) of the Procedure Rules requires a decision to contain the reasons for it. That is an omission, but it does not follow that the figure is wrong. These factors have considered afresh.

As to length of service, section 49(4)(e), the date of engagement is disputed and the trial court did not decide it. On the Appellant’s date, 1st January, 2018 the Respondent served about four years and seven months. On hers, she served a little over six years. Nothing turns on the difference, as service pay was declined with no cross-appeal and four months is within range on either date.

As to the circumstances of termination and the Respondent’s contribution, section 49(4)(b) and (k), she was a General Manager with supervisory responsibility over cash transactions and she accepted that a mistake had been made. That counts against her. On the other side, DW1 accepted that she had never been issued with a warning, and she was dismissed summarily without a hearing that met section 41 and without proof of the reason.

There is no evidence on mitigation and she did not ask for reinstatement. Taking these together, four months’ salary is one third of the statutory maximum. It already allows for the Respondent’s contribution and I see no reason to disturb it.

The trial court used a salary of Kshs. 66,770.00 where the payslips show Kshs. 66,777.64. The difference is small and the Respondent has not cross-appealed, so I leave the figure as the trial court used it. The one month’s pay in lieu of notice is not challenged by any ground or in the Appellant’s submissions. At trial the Appellant itself submitted that if the termination was found unlawful, the Respondent would be entitled to one month’s pay in lieu of notice under sections 35(1)(c) and 36 of the Employment Act. The award of Kshs. 66,770.00 stands.

The 3rd issue for determination Whether the award of leave pay should stand. The trial court awarded Kshs. 33,388.50 for 15 days’ leave on the ground that the respondent did not prove that the claimant had taken all her leave days. It also said the Appellant never produced any of the records required by section 74, so that the Respondent’s evidence “remained unchallenged”. That is not what the record shows. Exhibit 6 is the Appellant’s leave application form. It records 95 days of annual leave from 20th April 2022 to 10th August 2022, with a balance carried forward of “nil”. Section 74(1)(f) requires an employer to keep a record of leave entitlement, days taken and days due. This is such a record, and the trial court did not mention it.

The Respondent’s pleaded case is a bare statement that she had 15 pending leave days. She did not say how they accrued or for which leave year. In cross-examination she accepted that she went on leave after the handover in April 2022. The payslips for April to July 2022 show her salary paid in full and the August payslip pays her to 13th August. The termination letter itself speaks of the remaining annual leave days which end on 10th August, 2022 being paid.

Section 107 of the Evidence Act puts the burden on whoever asserts a fact. Once the Appellant had produced its record showing a nil balance, it was for the Respondent to show how 15 further days were due, and she did not. The Respondent’s point that an employer must keep records is answered by the fact that it did and produced them. Ground 3 succeeds and the award of Kshs. 33,388.50 is set aside.

On the 4th issue for determination, the Appellant pleaded a counterclaim for Kshs. 1,272,152 with interest and costs in its Memorandum of Response and Counterclaim dated 21st February 2023. Rule 29(2)(g) of the Procedure Rules provides that a respondent’s statement of response may contain a counterclaim. Rule 68(4) requires a decision to contain a concise statement of facts and the reasons for the decision.

Ground 4 speaks of a Counter Claim filed by the Respondent, meaning the respondent at trial, who is the Appellant here. Both sides treat it as the Appellant’s. The trial judgment does not mention the counterclaim in its summary of pleadings, its issues, its findings or its orders. That is an error. A counterclaim is a claim and it must be decided.

The Respondent posits that the Counter Claim was implicitly determined when the trial court found the termination unlawful. This is not agreeable. Whether a termination was fair and whether the employee owes her employer money in negligence are different questions. The first turns on section 45. The second requires proof of a duty, a breach and a loss caused by it. A judgment that is silent on the second issue above cannot be taken to have decided it.

This court will not remit the Counter Claim. The suit was filed in January, 2023 the whole of the evidence is in the record and both sides addressed the counterclaim at trial and on appeal. Remitting it would add delay and cost with no prospect of a better record and therefore makes the decision the trial court should have made.

The Appellant bore the burden under section 107 of the Evidence Act. For the reasons given on the 1st issue, it has not proved a loss and it has not proved that the Respondent’s negligence caused one. The unreconciled ledger difference, DW1’s evidence that banking was the accountant’s duty and the absence of any investigation or bank evidence decide the counterclaim.

The pleading adds a difficulty. The Appellant said it would recover the sum in accordance with Section 19 of the Employment Act. Section 19(1) permits deduction from an employee’s wages for loss of property in the employer’s possession or custody “occasioned by the wilful default of the employee”. The Appellant pleaded and argued negligence, not wilful default. Outside section 19 an employee is liable in damages only on proof of a duty, a breach and a loss caused by it, and the Appellant proved none of them. The counterclaim is dismissed. Ground 4 succeeds to the extent that the trial court should have determined the counterclaim, but the Appellant gains nothing from that because the counterclaim fails on the evidence.

On the 5th issue, costs. The Respondent relies on section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, but costs in this Court are governed by Rule 70(1) of the Procedure Rules and section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. Under those provisions the court may make such orders as to costs as it considers just.

The Appellant has succeeded on leave pay and has failed on liability, on compensation and on the counterclaim. The Respondent has succeeded on the main claim and lost on leave pay. In these circumstances each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.

The trial court’s order that the Respondent have the costs of the suit was a proper exercise of discretion, as she established unfair termination and defeated the counterclaim. I do not disturb it.

I am therefore inclined to partially allow the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The finding of the trial court that the Respondent’s termination was unfair is upheld.

(ii) The awards of four months’ salary as compensation of Kshs. 267,080.00 and one month’s pay in lieu of notice of Kshs. 66,770.00 be and are hereby also upheld.

(iii) The award of leave pay of Kshs. 33,388.50 be and is hereby set aside.

(iv) The Judgment of the trial court delivered on 22nd December, 2025 in MC.ELRC No. E2237 of 2024 is varied accordingly and the total award is reduced from Kshs. 367,238.50 to Kshs. 333,850.00.

(v) The Appellant’s Counter Claim be and is hereby dismissed.

(vi) The sum of Kshs. 333,850.00 shall carry interest at court rates from 22nd December, 2025 until payment in full.

(vii) The order that the Respondent have the costs of the suit in the trial court is upheld.

(viii) Each party shall bear their costs of the appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Mullomi instructed by Mullomi & Co. Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Miss Obiria instructed by Muhatia Pala & Associates Advocates (MPA) for the Respondent.

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder