Employment law

H&M Aluminium Limited v Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services & another [2026] KEELRC 15016 (KLR)

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Court
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elrc Appeal E109 of 2026
Judgment date
30 October 2026
Judge(s)
D. K. Njagi Marete

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The appeal was dismissed. The Director’s assessment of Kshs. 3,225,600 was confirmed. The Appellant was directed to pay that sum within 30 days, with interest at court rates from 5 December 2025 until payment in full; its potential section 17(1)(b) claim against a third party was preserved. Each party was to bear its own appeal costs.

Supporting judgment passages

(i) The Director’s assessment of 5th December, 2025 of Kshs. 3,225,600.00, as upheld by his reply of 5th March, 2026, be and is hereby confirmed.

Passage 61 →

(ii) The Appellant shall pay Kshs. 3,225,600.00 within thirty (30) days of this judgment of court, in the manner the Director directs, failing which the Interested Party may take steps to enforce it as per the law.

Passage 62 →

The Appellant was entitled to test in this court whether a sub-contractor answers under the Act, and the Director defended a decision made in discharge of a statutory duty. It is therefore ordered that each party shall bear its costs of the appeal.

Passage 59 →
Issue 1Whether the appeal is properly before this court.

Held. Yes. The Court treated the appeal as challenging the Director’s reply of 5 March 2026 and the assessment it upheld. The misdescription caused no prejudice and did not warrant striking out. The record did not establish lateness, and section 52 did not restrict the appeal to grounds raised in the objection.

Ratio. An appeal under section 52 is from the Director’s written reply; a reply upholding an assessment carries the assessment with it. A non-prejudicial misdescription should not defeat the appeal, and section 52 does not confine appellate grounds to those advanced in the objection.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

1. Whether the appeal is properly before this court.

Passage 39 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

I treat the appeal as one against the reply of 5th March, 2026 and the assessment it upheld. The misdescription prejudiced no one, and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution forbids defeating an appeal on it. I decline to strike it out.

Passage 45 →

No party says the appeal is late, and on this record I cannot hold that it is. Nor does section 52 confine an appeal to the grounds taken in the objection, so I do not shut the Appellant out.

Passage 46 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Section 52(1) requires a written reply varying or upholding his decision and giving reasons and section 52(2) provides that an objector may, within thirty days of the Director’s reply being received by him, appeal to the Industrial Court against such decision.

Passage 44 →

A reply that upholds an assessment carries it along.

Passage 45 →
Issue 2Whether the Director erred in assessing compensation against the Appellant as employer, rather than against the owner, occupier or main contractor.

Held. No. The Appellant was the deceased’s direct employer, and its WIBA liability did not depend on ownership or control of the lift shaft. OSHA safety obligations and occupiers’ liability did not alter the compensation assessment. The Appellant must pay compensation first but may pursue a third party under section 17(1)(b); the Director had no authority to apportion compensation or join that party. The Court made no finding whether Paksa was a principal employer.

Ratio. Under section 10(2) of WIBA, the employer bears no-fault compensation liability for an employee injured at work. Liability is not conditioned on ownership or control of the workplace hazard. Section 17(1)(b) preserves the paying employer’s recovery action against a third party but does not empower the Director to apportion compensation or join a third party.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

2. Whether the Director erred in assessing compensation against the Appellant as employer, rather than against the owner, occupier or main contractor.

Passage 40 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

nothing in section 10(2) makes the employer’s liability depend on who owns or controls the place of work. To require the Director to settle that question first would read into the section a condition Parliament did not put there.

Passage 49 →

Whoever else may answer, the Appellant was the deceased’s direct employer. Grounds 1 to 5 and 8 fail.

Passage 54 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Section 10(2) of WIBA provides: An employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act to an employee injured while at work. Section 16 bars any claim against the employer for damages and provides that no liability for compensation arises on the employer’s part save under the provisions of this Act. The scheme is no-fault, and the burden falls on the employer.

Passage 47 →

The employer pays first and recovers afterwards, in court, within the limit in section 17(3). The section gives the Director no power to apportion compensation or join a third party and it did not block the Appellant’s remedy.

Passage 51 →
Issue 3Whether the Director’s inquiry, hearing and reasons were deficient.

Held. No. An inquiry into control of the lift shaft was unnecessary to determine WIBA employer liability. Although the Appellant complained that it was not heard before the initial assessment, it lodged an objection, placed its case and Trident report before the Director, received a reasoned reply, and was heard on appeal. The assessment disclosed its formula and figures and the reply gave reasons. The Court corrected aspects of the Director’s reasoning but held that they did not affect the result.

Ratio. Section 23(1) requires only inquiries necessary to determine the relevant claim or liability. Article 47 requires fair procedure, not a hearing at every stage; on the circumstances, the objection process, reasoned reply, and appeal afforded sufficient fairness. Non-dispositive errors did not alter a result resting on section 10(2).

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

3. Whether the Director’s inquiry, hearing and reasons were deficient.

Passage 41 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

Article 47 requires fair procedure, not a hearing at every stage, and the Appellant has been heard here. The 5th December letter shows the formula and figures, and the 5th March reply gives numbered reasons. Grounds 6, 7 and 9 therefore fail.

Passage 56 →

None of this affects the result, which rests on section 10(2).

Passage 57 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

Section 23(1) requires the Director to make such inquiries as are necessary to decide upon any claim or liability. The facts that carry liability came from the Appellant’s Form 1 and were never disputed. An inquiry into who controlled the lift shaft was not necessary to decide liability under section 10(2).

Passage 55 →

Article 47 requires fair procedure, not a hearing at every stage, and the Appellant has been heard here.

Passage 56 →
Issue 4What orders should issue, including on costs.

Held. The assessment of Kshs. 3,225,600 was confirmed. The Appellant was ordered to pay within 30 days in the manner directed by the Director, and the affirmed award bears interest at court rates from 5 December 2025 until payment in full. The judgment did not bar a section 17(1)(b) claim against a third party. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Ratio. The Court fixed a fresh payment period because the Director’s original payment date expired during the appeal. On costs, it recognized both the Appellant’s entitlement to test its liability as a subcontractor and the Director’s defence of a statutory decision.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

4. What orders should issue, including on costs.

Passage 42 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

(i) The Director’s assessment of 5th December, 2025 of Kshs. 3,225,600.00, as upheld by his reply of 5th March, 2026, be and is hereby confirmed.

Passage 61 →

(ii) The Appellant shall pay Kshs. 3,225,600.00 within thirty (30) days of this judgment of court, in the manner the Director directs, failing which the Interested Party may take steps to enforce it as per the law.

Passage 62 →

(iii) The Directors award of Ksh. 3,225,600.00 as affirmed shall bear interest at court rates from 5th December, 2025 until payment in full.

Passage 63 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

The Director’s date for payment has passed while this appeal was pending and so this court fixes a fresh period on such payments.

Passage 59 →

The Appellant was entitled to test in this court whether a sub-contractor answers under the Act, and the Director defended a decision made in discharge of a statutory duty. It is therefore ordered that each party shall bear its costs of the appeal.

Passage 59 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

THAT the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred in law by assessing damages under the provisions of Work Injury Benefits Act,2007 as opposed to provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act which places liability squarely on the “Occupier” and “Owner” of a workplace.

Paragraph 1 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the appeal was properly before the court; whether the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred by assessing WIBA compensation against H&M Aluminium Limited as employer rather than the owner, occupier or main contractor; whether the…

Material facts

John Muhoro Karanja, aged 25, was a casual aluminium fabricator engaged by H&M Aluminium Limited. On 20 February 2023, he fell through an unprotected lift shaft at Kowthar Luxury Apartments, Nairobi, and died. H&M was a subcontractor to Paksa Construction…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI

ELRC APPEAL NO. E109 OF 2026

(Before D. K. N. Marete)

H&M ALUMINIUM LIMITED ………………………………………………......… APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE DIRECTOR OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH SERVICES……………. ……………………………………………………………………………………….. RESPONDENT

AND

FRANCIS KARANJA MUHIA (Representative of the Estate of JOHN MUHORO KARANJA, deceased) ………………………………………………………………… INTERESTED PARTY

(Being an appeal from the decision of the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services dated 5th March 2026, upholding the assessment of 5th December 2025 under reference WIBA/NRB/10725-OL/03/2025 (OFFLINE.)

JUDGMENT

This matter was originated by way of a Memorandum of Appeal dated 6th April, 2026. It arises from the decision of the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services (the Director) dated 5th March, 2026 upholding his assessment of 5th December, 2025 of Kshs. 3,225,600.00 payable by the Appellant under the Work Injury Benefits Act, 2007 (WIBA) for the death of John Muhoro Karanja (Deceased).

It comes out as thus;

1. THAT the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred in law by assessing damages under the provisions of Work Injury Benefits Act,2007 as opposed to provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act which places liability squarely on the “Occupier” and “Owner” of a workplace.

2. THAT the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred in law and in fact in holding the Appellant liable under Section 30 of the Work Injury Benefits Act, which provides for an employer’s liability to compensate an employee for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without properly interrogating whether the circumstances of the deceased’s death fell within the Appellant’s control or were occasioned by a third party.

3. THAT the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred in law by failing to assess damages and apportion liability under Section 108 and 111 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

4. THAT Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services erred and misapprehended the law by failing to hold that under Section 77 as read with 63 (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it was the duty of the owner and /or occupier to ensure the Hoist, Lift area or any opening on the floor were protected by an enclosure or fenced off, to prevent persons from falling down the hoist way or lift way or coming into contact with any moving part of the hoist or lift.

5. THAT the Director erred in law in failing to give effect to Section 17 of the Work Injury Benefits Act as read with mandatory provisions of Occupational Safety and Health Act which contemplates third-party liability and entitles an employer to seek indemnity from a negligent third party, occupier and or owner of a defaulting workplace.

6. THAT the Director erred in law and in fact in disregarding the Appellant’s objection and representations, contrary to Section 23 of the Work Injury Benefits Act, which mandates the Director to conduct due inquiry and consider all relevant material before making a determination.

7. THAT the Director erred in law by failing to properly exercise his statutory mandate under Section 51 of the Work Injury Benefits Act, which requires a fair, reasoned, and evidence-based determination, and instead rendered a decision that is arbitrary, unreasoned, and prejudicial to the Appellant.

8. THAT the Director erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the evidence demonstrating that the deceased was, at the material time, under the supervision and control of an independent contractor, thereby misdirecting himself on the question of liability under the Act.

9. THAT the Director’s decision is unreasonable, irrational, and contrary to the principles of natural justice, having failed to consider relevant statutory provisions and the Appellant’s submissions, thereby arriving at a conclusion that is against the weight of evidence.

The Appellant prays for orders thus;

a) THAT the decision of the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Service rendered on 5th December 2025 under reference IBA/NRB/10725OL/03/2025 awarding compensation to the Respondent to the tune of Kes. 3,225,600.00 be VARIED, SET ASIDE and/or VACATED.

b) THAT consequently the impugned decision be SUBSTITUTED with a decision referring this case back to the Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services for re-assessment on the proper statutory framework and as against the correct parties.

c) THAT Cost of this Appeal.

The Record of Appeal indicates that the deceased, aged 25, was a casual aluminium fabricator engaged by the Appellant. On 20th February, 2023 he fell through an unprotected lift shaft on the M3 floor of Kowthar Luxury Apartments, Parklands 1st Avenue, Nairobi, and died. The Appellant was on site as sub-contractor to Paksa Construction Limited (Paksa), the main contractor. Its director, Haseeb Vayani, reported the death to Parklands Police Station the same day.

The Appellant held a work injury policy with Trident Insurance Company Limited. Trident’s report of 16th March, 2023 which the Appellant placed in the Record of Appeal from page 28, calls the deceased our insured casual labourer. It also records that the lift shaft opening had been sealed with cardboard, and faults the main contractor and its client on safety.

A DOSH Form 1 was lodged by the deceased’s father, Francis Karanja Muhia (the Interested Party), who holds a limited grant ad litem (Ol-Kalou E013 of 2024). Mr. Vayani signed it as the Appellant’s director, under the Appellant’s stamp dated 10th September 2024. It records the deceased’s occupation as “Casual Labourer - Aluminium Fabricator” and his earnings as “Casual @ 1200 per day x 28 days”, that is Kshs. 33,600.00 a month.

The Interested Party then moved this court in ELRC JR E063 of 2025 to compel an assessment. In that case Mr. Vayani swore on 2nd December, 2025 that the Appellant was neither owner nor principal contractor and that liability lay with Paksa and the owner. He did not deny that the deceased was the Appellant’s employee.

On 5th December, 2025 the Director assessed compensation at Kshs. 3,225,600.00, being 96 months’ earnings at Kshs. 33,600.00 under reference WIBA/NRB/10725-OL/03/2025 (OFFLINE). The Appellant objected under section 51 by a form dated 22nd January, 2026 and an advocates’ letter of 24th January, 2026. Its only ground was that, as a sub-contractor and not principal contractor or owner, it had no statutory duty over the premises, within section 17.

By a reply of 5th March, 2026 the Director declined the objection and upheld the assessment. He noted that the deceased died in the Appellant’s employ, that the Appellant had not reported the accident, that compensation is demanded from the employer and not the contractor, and that section 17 lets the Appellant recover from third parties. He called the objection an abuse of process and directed payment by 13th March, 2026.

The Record of Appeal was filed on 29th April, 2026 with the Interested Party’s Supplementary Record of 19th May, 2026. The Director replied by the affidavit of Bernard Simiyu sworn on 29th May, 2026 and the Appellant by that of Haseeb Vayani sworn on 27th July, 2026. The appeal was canvassed by written submissions.

It is the Appellant’s case and submission that the Director did not investigate the causative chain of the accident as section 23(1) requires, and did not join Paksa or the owners. It says OSHA, in sections 63 and 77, puts the duty to fence lift shafts on the owner and occupier, that a mere sub-contractor cannot answer for a site safety failure, and that it was not heard before the first assessment, contrary to Article 47.

The Appellant adds that section 17 entitles an employer to recover from a negligent third party, and that the Director defeated that right. It relies on Dock Workers Union (K) v Director of Occupational Safety and Health Services & 5 others [2025] KEELRC 51 (KLR), Western Steel Mills Limited v Rogoncho & another [2025] KEELRC 2923 (KLR), Manji Foods Industries Limited & another v Mugo & another [2026] KEHC 4232 (KLR) and Kundu v Vineyard International Company Ltd & 3 others [2026] KEELRC 2307 (KLR). Its affidavit also invokes the Occupiers Liability Act.

The Interested Party’s case and submission is first that the court cannot hear an appeal against the assessment of 5th December, 2025 since section 52 allows an appeal only against the Director’s reply, and that the Appellant may not argue grounds it did not raise in its objection. On the merits it says the Appellant admitted being the employer, section 10(2) makes it liable, and its remedy against Paksa lies under section 17(1)(b).

The Director’s case and submission is that WIBA is a no-fault compensation scheme payable by the employer, while OSHA concerns safety and is enforced by prosecution. He says sections 108 and 111 of OSHA provide for offences and penalties, that he has no standing to apply section 17, that the Appellant failed to report the accident, and that he owed no hearing before assessing. He seeks costs.

After a considered look and scrutiny of the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal and the submissions of the parties the issues for determination become;

1. Whether the appeal is properly before this court.

2. Whether the Director erred in assessing compensation against the Appellant as employer, rather than against the owner, occupier or main contractor.

3. Whether the Director’s inquiry, hearing and reasons were deficient.

4. What orders should issue, including on costs.

The facts that carry liability are not in dispute. The court’s task under section 52(2) of WIBA is to decide whether the Director applied the Act correctly to them.

The 1st issue for determination is whether the appeal is properly before this court. Section 51(1) lets a person aggrieved by a decision of the Director object within sixty days. Section 52(1) requires a written reply varying or upholding his decision and giving reasons and section 52(2) provides that an objector may, within thirty days of the Director’s reply being received by him, appeal to the Industrial Court against such decision.

The Interested Party is right that the appeal lies against the reply. The Memorandum describes the decision as that of 5th December, 2025 as upheld on 5th March, 2025 the year being a slip for 2026. A reply that upholds an assessment carries it along. I treat the appeal as one against the reply of 5th March, 2026 and the assessment it upheld. The misdescription prejudiced no one, and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution forbids defeating an appeal on it. I decline to strike it out.

The memorandum is dated thirty-two days after the reply, and the record does not show when the reply was received. No party says the appeal is late, and on this record I cannot hold that it is. Nor does section 52 confine an appeal to the grounds taken in the objection, so I do not shut the Appellant out.

The 2nd issue for determination is whether the Director erred in assessing compensation against the Appellant as employer, rather than against the owner, occupier or main contractor. Section 10(2) of WIBA provides: An employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act to an employee injured while at work. Section 16 bars any claim against the employer for damages and provides that no liability for compensation arises on the employer’s part save under the provisions of this Act. The scheme is no-fault, and the burden falls on the employer.

Liability under it turns on employment, an accident in the course of that employment, and earnings. None is disputed. The Form 1 signed by the Appellant’s director names the Appellant as employer, and its own insurer’s report treats the deceased as its insured’s worker. Casual engagement is no answer: section 5(2) covers a daily wage, and section 5(3)(a) excludes only casual work unconnected with the employer’s business. The deceased was fabricating aluminium for the Appellant.

The Appellant’s actual case is that the lift shaft was not his to guard. That may be so, but nothing in section 10(2) makes the employer’s liability depend on who owns or controls the place of work. To require the Director to settle that question first would read into the section a condition Parliament did not put there.

The statutory provisions of OSHA does not alter this. Sections 63 and 77, taken at their highest for the Appellant, impose safety duties on owners and occupiers. The Director’s affidavit says sections 108 and 111 deal with offences and penalties, and the Appellant did not controvert that. It has pointed to no provision of OSHA that assesses compensation for a work injury. The Occupiers Liability Act, raised only in the affidavit, concerns damages against an occupier, which is a different claim.

Section 17(1)(b) provides that the employer or insurer by whom compensation in respect of that accident or disease is payable may institute action in a court against the third party for the recovery of compensation that the employer or insurer … is obliged to pay under this Act. The employer pays first and recovers afterwards, in court, within the limit in section 17(3). The section gives the Director no power to apportion compensation or join a third party and it did not block the Appellant’s remedy. The Director pointed to it.

The Appellant’s authorities say the same. In the authority of Dock Workers Union, WIBA was treated as the compensation statute and OSHA as the statute that sets safety standards (paragraphs 99 and 100), and the Court held that “[t]he petitioner as the employer is liable to pay compensation under WIBA” (paragraph 117). In Manji Foods, section 17 let an insurer that had paid compensation recover from the tortfeasor by civil claim see paragraphs 15 to 19 thereof.

In that of Kundu, the employer was held fully liable to settle the award, and left at liberty to seek indemnity or contribution from its insurer, without the claimant being delayed by dispute(s) between them paragraphs 27 and 34. Western Steel Mills was a tort suit by a contractor’s worker against a premises occupier. It was not a WIBA assessment.

The Director’s affidavit says the contractor or occupier the Appellant refers to is non-existent under WIBA. That goes further than I need to go, since section 2 defines an employer to include a principal. Whether Paksa is one was not argued and I make no finding on it. Whoever else may answer, the Appellant was the deceased’s direct employer. Grounds 1 to 5 and 8 fail.

The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Director’s inquiry, hearing and reasons were deficient. Section 23(1) requires the Director to make such inquiries as are necessary to decide upon any claim or liability. The facts that carry liability came from the Appellant’s Form 1 and were never disputed. An inquiry into who controlled the lift shaft was not necessary to decide liability under section 10(2).

The Appellant posits that it was not heard before the first assessment. It then objected under section 51, put in its case with Trident’s report, and received a reasoned reply. Article 47 requires fair procedure, not a hearing at every stage, and the Appellant has been heard here. The 5th December letter shows the formula and figures, and the 5th March reply gives numbered reasons. Grounds 6, 7 and 9 therefore fail.

This court does not endorse all of the reply. An objection filed within sixty days under section 51 is not contrary to section 26(4), which governs the time for settling a claim, and is not fairly called an abuse of process. The duty to report an accident is in section 22(1), not section 21, and death compensation is payable under section 34, not section 30(1). None of this affects the result, which rests on section 10(2). Quantum is not challenged and Kshs. 33,600.00 x 96 months is Kshs. 3,225,600.00.

One last matter: At page 34 of the Record is a handwritten note of 24th February, 2023 in which the deceased’s father acknowledges Kshs. 40,000.00 from Mr. Vayani for the burial and disclaims any claim against him or his company. The Appellant did not rely on it, and it could not help: section 19(2) of WIBA voids any provision relinquishing a right to benefits.

The 4th issue for determination is what orders should issue, including on costs. The Director’s date for payment has passed while this appeal was pending and so this court fixes a fresh period on such payments. On costs, rule 29(1) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016 directs the Court to be guided by section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. The Appellant was entitled to test in this court whether a sub-contractor answers under the Act, and the Director defended a decision made in discharge of a statutory duty. It is therefore ordered that each party shall bear its costs of the appeal.

I therefore inclined to dismiss the appeal and order as follows;

(i) The Director’s assessment of 5th December, 2025 of Kshs. 3,225,600.00, as upheld by his reply of 5th March, 2026, be and is hereby confirmed.

(ii) The Appellant shall pay Kshs. 3,225,600.00 within thirty (30) days of this judgment of court, in the manner the Director directs, failing which the Interested Party may take steps to enforce it as per the law.

(iii) The Directors award of Ksh. 3,225,600.00 as affirmed shall bear interest at court rates from 5th December, 2025 until payment in full.

(iv) This judgment does not bar any claim the Appellant may have against a third party under section 17(1)(b) of the Work Injury Benefits Act, 2007.

(v) Each party shall bear their costs of this appeal.

Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.

D. K. Njagi Marete

JUDGE

Appearances:

1. Mr. Masaviru instructed by Masaviru & Ketoo Advocates for the Appellant.

2. Mr. Tobias Olaibon, State Law Offices for the Respondent.

3. Mr. Denis Maina instructed by James Denis Law Advocates for the Interested Party.

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