Background
Whether the Respondent had valid and fair reasons for terminating the Claimant’s employment.
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Whether the Respondent had valid and fair reasons for terminating the Claimant’s employment.
Paragraph 1 →Whether Jubilee Holdings Ltd had valid and fair reasons to terminate Stanley Mwangi Chege; whether he was denied the statutory right to accompaniment at the disciplinary hearing; whether the disciplinary committee complied with the Respondent’s HR Policy; and…
The Claimant was employed as Group Chief Information Officer under a 11 December 2020 contract at Kshs 1,200,000 monthly. After concerns about vendor payments and a proposed Performance Improvement Plan, he was suspended on 1 December 2021, investigated,…
Get the complete brief with membership →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI
ELRC CAUSE NO. E284 OF 2022
(Before D. K. N. Marete.)
BETWEEN
STANLEY MWANGI CHEGE CLAIMANT
VERSUS
JUBILEE HOLDINGS LIMITED RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
This matter came to court by way of a Statement of Claim dated 5th May, 2022. The issue in dispute is therein cited as;
unfair termination of employment contrary to sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act.
The matter came to court variously until the 3rd April, 2025 when it was heard inter-parties.
The Respondent in a Statement of Response dated 30th June, 2022 denies the claim and prays that it be dismissed with costs.
The Claimant in a Reply to the Statement of Response dated 14th July, 2022 reiterates the claim and prays that it be awarded in their favour.
The Claimant’s case is that he was employed under a contract dated 11th December, 2020 as Group Chief Information Officer, on a consolidated salary of Kshs 1,200,000.00 per month, in a senior management role. In October, 2021 he met the Group Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Executive Officer of Jubilee Life Insurance Limited and its Chief Information Officer about delayed payments owed to vendors, among them Liquid Telecom and Info Tech.
The Claimant’s further case is that he escalated the matter to a director of the Respondent, Mr John Metcalf, who directed the Group Chief Operating Officer and the Life company’s Chief Executive Officer to ensure compliance. What followed, he says, was a campaign against him: an email placing him on a Performance Improvement Plan without prior warning, his suspension on 1st December, 2021 and then his dismissal. He attributes the campaign to the Group Chief Operating Officer and, in his Reply, to the Life company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Information Officer.
On 21st December, 2021 the claimant was served with a Notice to Show Cause, to which he responded, and he was then invited to a disciplinary hearing. He says he could not find a colleague to accompany him for fear of being profiled and that his request to be accompanied by his advocate was declined. The Respondent terminated his employment by a letter of 1st February, 2022. His appeal was dismissed by a letter of 4th March, 2022.
As to the process of termination of employment, the Claimant’s complaint is that the disciplinary committee was not properly constituted. The Respondent’s HR Policy called for two Chief Executive Officers. Only one sat. The second seat went to Mr Julius Orayo, whom the Claimant says was his subordinate and was placed there to embarrass him. He adds that Mr Orayo has since taken over as Group Chief Information Officer and so had an interest in his removal.
On these premises, the Claimant says that Mr Bivan Odima’s earlier employment at Madison Insurance was known to everyone on the interview panel and no one asked him to recuse himself, that shortlisting was a human resources function, and that Mr Odima declined the offer. On the issue of Systems Analyst post, the Claimant avers he only recommended the candidate. The Claimant had no authority on procurement and neither would he award contracts. On confidentiality he says the material shared with DataposIT was neither sensitive nor confidential.
The Claimant also pleaded that the Respondent violated his data privacy rights by using a WhatsApp message from his personal phone during the investigation. That complaint is not carried into his prayers or his submissions, and I make no finding on it.
In his submissions the Claimant argues that the Respondent failed to prove valid and fair reasons under sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 and did not follow its own HR Policy in constituting the committee. In his supplementary submissions he urges the band of reasonable responses test. He asks for a declaration, compensation of twelve months’ gross salary of Kshs 14,400,000.00 under section 49(1)(c), and costs.
In buttressing their case the claimant chose to rely on the authorities of cited Joash Nyongesa Makokha v Amboseli Court Limited [2021] eKLR on the employer’s duty to prove its reasons, Wambui & 4 others v Kenya Utalii College [2023] eKLR and Emmanuel Mambo Odury v One Acre Fund, ELRC Cause No. 93 of 2020 on the duty to follow the employer’s own disciplinary process and Jacinta Wambua v Stanbic Kenya Limited, Cause No. 1487 of 2018 and British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91 on the band of reasonable responses.
He prays thus;
a) A declaration that the Respondent terminated the Claimant unfairly contrary to the provisions of the Employment Act.
b) Damages as calculated below;
i. General Damages for unfair termination.
ii. 12 months’ salary amounting to Ksh 14,400,000/=; or payment of monthly salary till he attains the requisite retirement age of 60 years.
iii. Payment for leave earned but not taken up during entire period of service; and
iv. Any other monetary benefits accrued and payable.
c) Costs of this suit.
d) Any other order that the Honourable Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances.
The Claimant filed a witness statement dated 29th September, 2022. The Respondent filed witness statements by Ann Karanu, its Group Head of Human Resources, and Jack Njuguna, its Head of Forensic and Security Services. Each side filed a list and bundle of documents. Hearing dates, and the witnesses who testified, to be inserted from the record of proceedings.
The parties then filed written submissions. The Claimant’s submissions are dated 1st August 2025. The Respondent’s are dated 19th January, 2026 and were filed on the directions of 25th November, 2025. The Claimant answered them in supplementary submissions dated 4th February, 2026.
This judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings, the witness statements, the documentary exhibits, and the rival written submissions.
The Respondent’s submissions refer to a whistle-blower report in its Supplementary List and Bundle of Documents dated 10th February, 2025. The Claimant asks that the report be disregarded because it was filed after the close of pleadings and was never made available to him. This court has not relied on it. This court decides the matter on the termination letter, the records of the disciplinary and appeal processes, and what the Claimant himself said and wrote.
The Respondent’s case is that it considered placing the Claimant on a Performance Improvement Plan, but the process never took off because, towards the end of November, 2021 it received a whistle-blower report about the Claimant’s conduct. The Plan was therefore not the reason for the termination. On 1st December, 2021 the Claimant was told of the allegations and suspended on half pay for thirty days to allow an investigation.
Mr Njuguna investigated and reported on 15th December, 2021. A Notice to Show Cause dated 21st December 2021 followed and the Claimant replied on 28th December, 2021. A hearing was fixed by a letter of 31st December, 2021 for 3rd January, 2022 and was held on 6th January, 2022. The committee recommended termination and the Respondent terminated the Claimant’s employment by a letter of 1st February, 2022. The Appeals Committee heard his appeal on 23rd February, 2022 and upheld the decision.
The Respondent says the reasons were three: sharing confidential information with third parties, failing to follow the Procurement Policy, and failing to declare conflicts of interest in recruitment. It says the duty to declare a conflict was the Claimant’s own, and that he admitted as much at the hearing. It adds that he recommended Mr. Kiiru as the only candidate for the Systems Analyst post and took part in the interviews and the salary discussions, and that the information he shared with DataposIT and Azeemi was confidential.
On the issue of procedure, the Respondent says its HR Policy lets a Chief Executive Officer appoint a representative to the disciplinary committee and that Mr. Orayo, then Group Head of Digital and Innovations, sat for that purpose at the same job grade as the Claimant. It says the policy allows only a workplace colleague to accompany an employee, not an advocate, that the Claimant was told so, and that nobody stopped him inviting a colleague. It says the complaint about the committee is an afterthought raised only on appeal.
The Respondent denies that the Claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs. It says general damages are not awardable for termination, that salary until retirement age cannot be awarded, and that the Claimant was paid his dues, including leave pay and three months’ pay in lieu of notice. It asks for costs under section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 thereof.
The Respondent chose to rely on the authorities of d Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR) on the standard of proof of reasons, Kuria v Cooperative Bank of Kenya Limited [2025] KEELRC 470 (KLR) and COO v GAIN [2025] KEELRC 2046 (KLR) on accompaniment at hearings, Were v Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals Limited [2025] KEELRC 3182 for the principle that employers are masters of their own procedure, and Kenfreight (E.A.) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] eKLR and Telkom Kenya Limited v Ngokonyo & 2 others [2024] KECA 880 (KLR) on remedies.
The issues for determination therefore are;
1. Whether the Respondent had valid and fair reasons for terminating the Claimant’s employment.
2. Whether the Claimant was denied his right to be accompanied at the disciplinary hearing.
3. Whether the disciplinary committee was constituted as the Respondent’s HR Policy required and, if not, what follows.
4. What reliefs, if any, the Claimant is entitled to, and who should bear the costs.
The 1st issue for determination is whether the Respondent had valid and fair reasons for terminating the Claimant’s employment.
Section 43(1) of the Employment Act, 2007 requires the employer to prove the reasons for termination. Section 43(2) defines those reasons as the matters the employer genuinely believed to exist at the time, and which caused it to terminate. Section 45(2) makes a termination unfair unless the reason is valid, is fair, and was reached by a fair procedure. Section 47(5) places the burden of justifying the grounds on the employer.
The standard of proof is one of the balance of probabilities. In Kenya Revenue Authority v Reuwel Waithaka Gitahi & 2 others [2019] KECA 300 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that it is improper to expect an employer to undertake a near forensic examination of the facts and that all the employer is required to prove are the reasons it genuinely believed to exist. This is the standard applied herein in the determination of this cause.
The termination letter of 1st February, 2022 gave three grounds. These include contravening the procurement policy by irregularly influencing and canvassing the award of tenders to preferred vendors; contravening the conflict of interest policy by influencing recruitment within the IT department and contravening the IT user policy by sharing confidential company data with unauthorised parties, including vendors.
This court wishes to open with the Claimant’s theory that these were not the true and actual reasons for the termination of his employment. The Respondent’s emails show that the Performance Improvement Plan was raised on 19th and 22nd November, 2021 with a planned start of 30th November, 2021 and that the Claimant was suspended on 1st December, 2021. The Claimant dates the Plan email 19th, November in his Claim and 26th, November in his witness statement. This is it and an indicator of the totality of the Claimant’s case.
The sequence is real, but sequence is not proof of motive. The Claimant offers no evidence of who made the whistle-blower report, none that the Group Chief Operating Officer or the Life company’s executives caused it, and none that the matters put to him were invented. The Plan is not among the grounds in the termination letter. As I show below, the grounds that carry this case rest on the Claimant’s own words. This court does not establish any proof of malice in the circumstances.
The Respondent’s belief was also formed in an orderly way. Mr Njuguna took statements from the Claimant and from Mr Kiiru and reported on 15th December, 2021. The Notice to Show Cause set out the allegations with particulars. The Claimant answered in writing. The hearing notice then put the Respondent’s findings on the answer to him, including two emails to DataposIT of 7th and 18th October, 2021. He knew the case he had to meet.
On conflict of interest, clause 2.3 of the HR Policy states: Selected interview panel members must declare any conflict of interest before the process and where deemed necessary, recuse themselves from the interview process for the position. The duty is on the panel member. It is not on the human resources partner to guess and it is not discharged by colleagues happening to know where a person used to work.
The Claimant accepts that he had worked with both Mr Odima and Mr Kiiru before. On Mr Odima he said to the committee on 6th January, 2022 that : In retrospect; I should have declared conflict of interest. On Mr. Kiiru he said; In retrospect, I should have told Helena of this. His answer was that the human resources partner should have known. This is not what the policy on conflict of interest states.
He also accepted that he asked for Mr Odima to be included in the shortlist after the Human Resources Business Partner’s list left him out, and that he played a part in the composition of the panel. Asked whether he specifically asked for Mr Odima’s inclusion, he said, Yes. That Mr. Odima later declined the offer is beside the point. The breach lies in the missing declaration and the influence exerted, not in how the recruitment ended.
On Mr. Kiiru, the Claimant accepted that he set up the interview, shared the candidate’s CV with the panel, and took part in discussions on the length of the contract. The Respondent’s investigator showed WhatsApp messages in which the Claimant urged a higher salary for the candidate, which he described as expert opinion. Whether he chaired the interview, which he denied and the investigator disputed from audio recordings, I need not decide. The undeclared relationship and his involvement are enough.
This ground is proved on the Claimant’s own admissions. It is also a fair reason relating to conduct. A Group Chief Information Officer is expected to keep recruitment into his own function clean, and the policy gave him a simple way to do so.
On confidentiality, the Claimant’s contract bars him from disclosing information about the business of the Group, and the HR Policy forbids employees to disclose the Company’s confidential and proprietary information unless duly authorised. At the hearing the Claimant confirmed that he shared an extract of a PwC audit report with Azeemi before Azeemi was contracted. Asked whether in his view it was confidential information, he answered, Yes.
His explanation was that Azeemi needed the scenarios for the Audit Vault project and that he meant no harm. Malice is not an element of the breach. The question is whether the disclosure was authorised, and he pointed to no authority for it. The contract lists unauthorised disclosure of confidential matters of the Group among the acts of gross misconduct. That one disclosure is enough to support this ground.
I therefore make no finding on how sensitive the material sent to DataposIT was. I note only that the Claimant accepted at the hearing that he shared internal communications with DataposIT, that the Respondent had no non-disclosure agreement with it and that on appeal he said that, looking back, he should have redacted some of the data. The Claimant’s point that DataposIT never accessed the Respondent’s systems does not answer the charge of unauthorised disclosure.
The procurement ground is harder to call. The Claimant’s explanation, that the Group Chief Operating Officer asked him to draft the request for proposals and that Procurement made the awards, has force on Salaam, and the Appeals Committee itself acknowledged the first part. He did accept that all five vendors sent their proposals to him directly that Procurement was not copied at first, and that he asked Salaam to help with a business case. Because the other two grounds are proved and sufficient, I do not decide whether each procurement episode was misconduct.
The Claimant also argues that he had no prior warnings and that his conduct did not reach the threshold for summary dismissal. The record answers this. He was not dismissed summarily in the sense of losing his notice. The Appeals Committee’s letter says the Respondent, on humanitarian grounds, downgraded the sanction to a termination, and he was paid three months’ salary in lieu of notice, Kshs 3,600,000.00 as his contract provides after confirmation.
Previous warnings under section 45(5)(e) of the Employment Act, 2007 are a factor and not a precondition. The contract treats serious breaches and unauthorised disclosure as gross misconduct. Even on the band of reasonable responses test that the Claimant urges, an employer faced with these proven breaches by its Group Chief Information Officer could reasonably choose to part with him on full notice pay. I therefore find that the Respondent has proved valid and fair reasons for the termination within sections 43 and 45(2)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act, 2007 and hold as such. This answers the 1st issue for determination.
The 2nd issue for determination is whether the Claimant was denied his right to be accompanied at the disciplinary hearing. Section 41(1) of the Employment Act entitles an employee to have another employee, or a shop floor union representative, of his choice present when the employer explains the reasons it is considering termination. Section 41(2) requires the employer to hear and consider the employee’s representations, and those of the person he has chosen. On its face the statute does not extend to an advocate. Clause 7.1.10.1 of the HR Policy likewise speaks of a workplace colleague or, for unionised staff, a union representative.
The hearing notice of 31st December, 2021 told the Claimant that he had a right to be accompanied by a fellow work colleague of your choice and asked him to advise the Company as soon as possible if he intended to be accompanied. At the start of the hearing the Human Resources Business Partner asked him again: Do you have any witness, as it is one of your rights?
The Claimant answered that nobody wanted to accompany him because they did not want to be profiled, and that his request for his advocate had not been allowed. He was told that under the policy only internal employees could accompany him. Asked whether he was in a good state to continue. He said, I am in a good state. The hearing then ran from about 3:20pm to 5:50pm.
The Respondent was bound to allow a colleague. It was not bound to find one. The Claimant names no colleague he asked and no one who refused. The minutes record no request for an adjournment to look further, and he confirmed that he was ready to proceed. The fear of profiling is a bare statement, and the Respondent denies any such practice. This court finds no denial of the right under section 41(1). As to the refusal of the advocates, this was lawful. The statute gives no right to one and the Respondent’s policy excludes external parties. We need not go beyond the statute and the policy. This answers the 2nd issue for determination.
The 3rd issue for determination is whether the disciplinary committee was constituted as the Respondent’s HR Policy required and, if not, what follows.
Clause 7.1.21.1 of the HR Policy provides that all first hearings will be heard by a committee constituting of the following: the line manager of the staff; Any 2 CEOs excluding the CEO whose staff is under disciplinary, with the CEO chairing; the investigating manager; the HR Business Partner; and a note taker.
The committee that sat on 6th January, 2022 was Juan Cazcarra, the Group Chief Operating Officer and the Claimant’s line manager; Ajit Kumar, Chief Executive Officer of Jubilee Life Insurance Limited, in the chair; Julius Orayo, Head of Digital and Innovations; Jack Njuguna, the investigator; Beatrice Njoroge, the Human Resources Business Partner; and Wallace Nzaui as note taker. There was one Chief Executive Officer, not two.
The Respondent says Mr Orayo sat in place of a Chief Executive Officer, representing Dr Gatonga of Jubilee Health Insurance Limited and Mr Humphrey Gathungu of Jubilee Financial Services Limited, and that the policy lets a Chief Executive Officer appoint a representative. Ann Karanu says so in her witness statement. The Appeals Committee said so in its observations and in the letter of 4th March, 2022.
This court has read the policy as produced. Clause 7.1.21.1 contains no power to appoint a representative. The only reference to a nominee that I find is in clause 7.1.12.3, and it concerns who receives the chair’s report on a recommendation to dismiss. It says nothing about who sits on the committee. The Respondent has pointed to no other provision. Nor is there evidence that any Chief Executive Officer was unavailable, or that one appointed Mr Orayo. The minutes list him in his own right as Head of Digital and Innovations, Jubilee Holdings Limited and do not say he represented anyone. The explanation first appears in the appeal papers, after the Claimant had complained. The Respondent filed no statement from Mr Orayo or from either Chief Executive Officer it names.
The Respondent argues that employers are masters of their own procedure. That is so where no procedure is prescribed, and so long as fairness is achieved. This Respondent prescribed a procedure in a policy that by the Claimant’s contract, governs the general terms of his employment. Having done so, it must follow the procedure, or show a fair reason for departing from it. It has shown neither.
The Respondent also says the complaint is an afterthought because the Claimant raised it only on appeal. I do not agree. Clause 7.1.13.2 makes a dismissal hearing that was materially flawed on procedural grounds a ground of appeal. The Appeals Committee considered the point and endorsed the composition on a basis the policy does not contain. The appeal was a review of the decision to dismiss and it did not cure the defect.
The Claimant adds that Mr Orayo was his subordinate, was put on the committee to embarrass him, and wanted his job. There is no evidence that Mr Orayo reported to the Claimant, and the Respondent says he was of equal grade. This may not require a resolution of this court. The point is that he was not a Chief Executive Officer. As to motive, Mr Orayo later took over the Claimant’s former post. That is a fact, but it is not proof that he sat on the committee to secure it.
The Claimant also says Mr Kumar should not have chaired, because many of the matters touched Jubilee Life Insurance Limited and the Claimant had reported that company to a director over the transitional services agreement. The policy requires a Chief Executive Officer to chair, and the same policy requires the line manager to sit. The Claimant raised no objection at the hearing, and the minutes show the findings turning on documents and on his own answers. There is no proof of bias whatsoever.
The Claimant’s Reply says the outcome was predetermined because he was suspended and asked to vacate his office before the investigation ended. Clause 7.1.16 of the HR Policy allows suspension while misconduct is investigated. Suspension is not a finding of guilt. He was then served with a Notice to Show Cause, answered it, and was heard. The minutes show the committee taking into account additional feedback he sent the day before the hearing.
What follows from the defect in the committee? Section 45(2)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 makes a termination unfair if it was not done in accordance with fair procedure, and section 45(5)(a) directs the Court to the procedure the employer adopted in reaching its decision. For a senior executive, the Respondent’s own policy guarantees a panel with two Chief Executive Officers sitting alongside the line manager. The Respondent gave him one. That departure from its own procedure makes the termination procedurally unfair.
This defect is not fatal in the sense of the Claimant’s arguments. He was told the allegations in writing, answered them in writing, was heard on the documents for about two and a half hours, and appealed. No member of the committee is shown to have been biased and the findings on which I have upheld the reasons rest on his own admissions. The defect goes to the remedy. It does not undo the validity of the reasons.
The 4th issue for determination is what reliefs, if any, the Claimant is entitled to and who should bear the costs.
The Claimant is entitled to a declaration in part. The reasons for the termination were valid and fair, but the termination was procedurally unfair because the committee was not constituted as the HR Policy required.
Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 allows compensation of up to twelve months’ gross salary. In fixing the amount the Court considers the matters in section 49(4). The Claimant does not seek reinstatement, so paragraphs (a) and (c) do not arise. He served a little over a year and had been confirmed on 29th July, 2021 which bears on paragraphs (e) and (f).
Paragraphs (b) and (k) weigh heavily against him. The termination was brought about by his own conduct, which I have found proved. Under paragraph (m), the Respondent paid him three months’ pay in lieu of notice of Kshs 3,600,000.00 released the half salary withheld during suspension of Kshs 1,200,000.00 and paid his untaken leave. The procedural defect, while real, did not change the outcome.
Weighing these matters, I consider two months’ gross salary a fair award. At Kshs 1,200,000.00 per month, that is Kshs 2,400,000.00. The claim for twelve months, Kshs 14,400,000.00 is out of proportion to a procedural lapse on a termination for proved misconduct.
The claim for general damages fails. Section 49 provides the remedy for unfair termination, and the Claimant’s own submissions recast the prayer as compensation under section 49(1)(c). His data privacy complaint was not pursued in his prayers or submissions, so no separate remedy arises from it.
The alternative prayer for monthly salary until the age of 60 has no basis. Section 49(1)(c) caps compensation at twelve months’ gross salary, and nothing in the contract guarantees employment to retirement age. It is dismissed.
On leave and other benefits, the termination letter computed 10.86 untaken leave days at Kshs 599,172.41 and included them in dues of Kshs 5,438,624.47. The Respondent’s bank advice shows a payment of Kshs 3,725,749.90 to the Claimant with a payment date of 5th April, 2022. The parties differ slightly on the net sum received, but the Claimant claims no shortfall, does not press these heads in his submissions, and identifies no other benefit owed. These prayers are dismissed.
On costs, the Respondent relies on section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. Costs in this Court are awarded under section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act and rule 29 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2016. The Claimant has succeeded in part and the Respondent in part. Each party shall bear its own costs.
In the result, I allow the claim in part and enter judgment for the Claimant against the Respondent in the following terms:
i) A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Respondent was procedurally unfair, contrary to section 45(2)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 despite being based on valid and fair reasons.
ii) Two (2) months salary as compensation for unprocedural termination of employment….Ksh. 1,200,000.00 x 2………………………………Ksh. 2,400,000.00
Total of award ……………………………………………………Ksh. 2,4000,000.00
iii) The sum of award in (ii) above shall accrue interest at court rates from the date of this judgment until payment in full.
iv) The other prayers in the Statement of Claim be and are hereby dismissed.
v) Each party shall bear its own costs of the claim.
Delivered, dated and signed this 30th day of October 2026.
D. K. Njagi Marete
JUDGE
Appearances:
1. Mr. Situma instructed by CS Advocates LLP for the Claimant.
2. Miss Hellen Mutua and Mr. John Mbaluto instructed by Oraro & Company Advocates for the Respondent.