REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION
PETITION NO. E001 OF 2026
ISSA OMAR AHMED………………………………………….…..PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL……………………….1ST RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS………... 2ND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner, Issa Omar Ahmed, is an inmate at Kamiti Maximum Prison (prison number KAM/69/2024/LIFE). He was convicted of robbery with violence contrary to section 296(2) of the Penal Code in Machakos Chief Magistrate's Court Criminal Case No. MCCR 1476 of 2008 and sentenced to death. That sentence has since been commuted to life imprisonment.
2. By his petition dated 8 January 2026 he says the High Court declared section 296(2) unconstitutional in Joseph Kaberia Kahinga & 11 Others v Attorney General [2016] KEHC 2053 (KLR) (Petition No. 618 of 2010). He seeks declarations that his continued incarceration violates Articles 27, 28 and 50(2)(p), that the proceedings in MCCR 1476 of 2008 violated Article 50(2)(b) and (n) and the principle of legality, and that the Attorney General's omission to advise against prosecutions under section 296(2) contributed to the violation of his right to a fair trial. He also seeks an order of acquittal and, alternatively, a sentence re-hearing.
Proceedings
3. On 4th May 2026 the court directed that the petition proceed by written submissions to be filed and exchanged within 30 days. The respondents filed no submissions.
The petitioner's case
4. He states that he was charged with one other person on 26th June 2008, sentenced to death on 20th May 2009 and had his appeal dismissed by Lenaola J on 31st July 2009. The death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment by presidential decree. His application for resentencing was dismissed by Maina J on 4 December 2025 in Ahmed v Republic (Criminal Appeal 001 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 18125 (KLR). He deposes that he has served seven years since the 18-month suspension in Kaberia (supra) lapsed.
5. He relies on the declaration in Kaberia (supra) that sections 295, 296(1), 296(2), 297(1) and 297(2) of the Penal Code fail the constitutional threshold of precision needed for an accused to answer a charge and prepare a defence, and on order 5 of that judgment, which he says allows convicts under those sections to petition the High Court for a remedy. His grounds are:
(i) His charge, conviction and sentence under an unconstitutional section violated Article 50(2)(b) and (n).
(ii)Remaining in prison under that section violates Articles 27 and 28 because he is treated as inferior to the petitioners in Kaberia (supra).
(iii)The dismissal of his resentencing application breached Article 50(2)(p) because acquittal is the "least severe sentence" once the section is void.
(iv) The prosecution was not lawful, reasonable or procedurally fair under Article 47 and offended the rule of law under Article 10.
(v) The Attorney General failed to advise against prosecutions under the section and the Director of Public Prosecutions disregarded the orders in Kaberia (supra).
6. The submissions add that an unconstitutional law is void ab initio, citing Jacqueline Okuta & Another v Attorney General & 2 Others [2017] eKLR and Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) & 2 Others v Republic of Kenya & Another [2015] eKLR. They also argue, relying on Barasa v Republic (Criminal Appeal E037 of 2021) [2024] KEHC 8908 (KLR), that where a robber only threatens violence the offence is simple robbery and not robbery with violence, and that there were no aggravating factors in his case.
The respondents' position
7. The petition is unopposed on the record. That does not entitle the petitioner to the orders sought. A constitutional petition must be proved and the court must satisfy itself on the law and on the evidence before it, whether or not the respondents take part. The court has considered the petition on its merits and the absence of a response has not been treated as an admission.
Issues for determination
8. The court finds that the following issues arise.
(i) Whether the court has jurisdiction and whether the petition is an appeal or review of earlier decisions in disguise.
(ii) Whether the declaration in Kaberia (supra) voided the petitioner's conviction or entitles him to acquittal and whether his rights under Article 50(2)(b) and (n) were violated.
(iii) Whether Article 50(2)(p) applies and whether acquittal is the "least severe sentence".
(iv) Whether Articles 27, 28, 47 and 10 were violated and whether the respondents are liable as alleged.
(v) Whether the alternative prayer for a sentence re-hearing should be granted and what orders follow.
Analysis and Determination
Issue (i)
9. I am guided by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others (Application 2 of 2011) [2012] KESC 8 (KLR) where it stated at paragraph 68:
“A Court's jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law."
10. The court has considered the petition, the supporting affidavit and the petitioner's submissions. The High Court has jurisdiction under Articles 22, 23, 165(3)(b) and (d) and 258 of the Constitution to hear a claim that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened, and to determine whether any law is inconsistent with the Constitution. A person imprisoned under the law retains all the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights except those clearly incompatible with the fact of imprisonment (Article 51(1)). The court therefore has jurisdiction.
11. Jurisdiction to hear a petition is not entitlement to the relief sought. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal in 2009 and his application for resentencing was dismissed by this court in Ahmed (supra). A constitutional petition is not an appeal or a review and cannot be used to re-open a matter already decided. The court will not revisit the 2009 appeal or the ruling in Ahmed (supra). Any challenge to either lies on appeal.
12. The petition must also set out its complaint with precision. I am persuaded by the decision of Justices Trevelyan and Hancox in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] eKLR where they stated:
“We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.”
13. I am also guided by the Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) [2013] KECA 445 (KLR) which stated at paragraph 41:
“However, we also note that precision is not coterminous with exactitude.”
Issue (ii)
14. In Kaberia (supra) the court declared:
"We hereby declare that Sections 295, 296(1), 296(2), 297(1) and 297(2) of the Penal Code do not meet the constitutional threshold of setting out in sufficient precision, distinctively clarifying and differentiating the degrees of aggravation of the offence of robbery and attempted robbery with such particularity as to enable those accused to adequately answer to the charges and prepare their defences."
15. The effect of that declaration was suspended for 18 months from 15th September 2016. The petitioner relies on order 5 of the judgment. Orders 4 and 5 read:
"As regards the Petitioners, and those other convicts in the same situation as them, we direct the Attorney General, in consultation with other relevant authorities, to consider the shortcomings identified in this judgement in relation to those charged and convicted under Sections 295, 296(1), 296(2), 297(1) and 297(2) of the Penal Code, with a view to remedying any prejudice that may have suffered and prescribe appropriate solution. The Attorney General is granted eighteen (18) months to give a report to this court."
"If the above orders are not complied with within the stipulated period, the Petitioners shall be at liberty to apply."
Order 5 gives liberty to apply to the Petitioners in that case and only if the orders are not complied with within the stipulated period. The petitioner was not a party to Kaberia (supra). Order 4 deals with convicts in his position by directing the Attorney General to consider a remedy. Neither order gives him a right to petition this court for a remedy.
16. The petitioner's case rests on the premise that, once the suspension lapsed, section 296(2) became void ab initio and every conviction under it fell. The court cannot accept that premise for three reasons.
(i) Kaberia (supra) held the sections wanting in precision for fair trial purposes. It did not hold that robbery with violence ceased to be an offence or that convictions under the section were a nullity. The complaint is about prejudice to an accused's ability to answer the charge, which is why order 4 directs the Attorney General to consider a remedy for convicts in the same situation as the petitioners in that case and not their automatic release.
(ii) A declaration of invalidity under Article 23(3)(d) does not automatically undo final convictions. Its effect depends on the terms of the order, the nature of the defect and the principle of finality. The authorities cited by the petitioner, Okuta (supra) and CORD (supra), are cited for the general proposition that an unconstitutional law is void.
(iii) Article 50(2)(n) protects a person from being convicted for an act that was not an offence in Kenya or under international law when it was committed. Robbery with violence was an offence when the petitioner is said to have committed it on or about 26th June 2008. The challenge in Kaberia (supra) concerned the precision and gradation of the section and not the absence of an offence, so Article 50(2)(n) is not engaged.
17. What remains is whether the petitioner has shown prejudice under Article 50(2)(b), meaning that the lack of precision actually impaired his ability to answer the charge. He has not. His affidavit says nothing about the charge sheet, the evidence or the facts found by the trial court. The assertions in his submissions that the complainant was only threatened, that no aggravating factors existed and that Barasa (supra) therefore applies are not evidence.
18. After the State noted on 16th March 2026 that the petition came without proceedings, the court gave the petitioner time to serve the relevant documents. On 4th May 2026 he stated that he had served his documents on the State. The trial judgment of S.M. Mungai, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 20th May 2009 in Machakos CMCR 1476 of 2008 and the order of Lenaola J in Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 2009 are now before the court. The petitioner and Musa Ahmed were jointly charged with robbery of a mobile phone. The trial court found that they were together when they robbed the complainant and convicted both of them as charged. The conviction was therefore for robbery in company. Section 296(2) of the Penal Code provides:
"If the offender is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument, or is in company with one or more other person or persons, or if, at or immediately before or immediately after the time of the robbery, he wounds, beats, strikes or uses any other personal violence to any person, he shall be sentenced to death."
The petitioner was heard in mitigation before sentence. His appeal was summarily rejected by Lenaola J on 31st July 2009 under section 352(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The record does not support the claim that he was convicted on facts that did not support section 296(2).
19. Even on the reading of section 296(2) in Barasa (supra), that a threat without actual violence does not suffice, the conviction here rests on the offence having been committed jointly. In any event Barasa (supra) is a decision of a court of coordinate jurisdiction and is not binding on this court.
Issue (iii)
20. Article 50(2)(p) gives an accused person the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments for an offence if the prescribed punishment has changed between the time the offence was committed and the time of sentencing. The petitioner was sentenced on 20th May 2009. Kaberia (supra) was delivered on 15th September 2016, more than seven years later. The law does not apply retrospectively. Decisions delivered long after his sentencing do not apply to him since what is catered for is the law applicable at the time of his sentencing. The prescribed punishment did not change between the offence (2008) and sentencing (2009), so Article 50(2)(p) is not engaged on its terms.
21. The petitioner's further argument that acquittal is the "least severe sentence" is misconceived. Article 50(2)(p) chooses among prescribed punishments. Acquittal is the result of a failure of the prosecution's case. It is not a punishment.
22. The petitioner's real grievance on sentence is that the death sentence for robbery with violence was mandatory. I am persuaded by the decision of Justice J. Kamau in Mbugua & 9 Others v Attorney General & 3 Others (Constitutional Petitions E002 & E003 of 2024 (Consolidated)) [2025] KEHC 1248 (KLR) where at paragraphs 51 to 53 he held:
"Indeed, Sections 296(2) and 297(2) of the Penal Offence limited the trial courts to mete out appropriate sentences due to non-differentiation of the circumstances of the offence. The provisions ought to have allowed the exercise of discretion of the trial courts to mete out the least severe sentence where there were aggravating circumstances."
"It was therefore the considered view of this court that while the death sentence was not unconstitutional under the Kenyan law, the mandatory nature of the death sentence irrespective of the gravity of the offence rendered Sections 296(2) and Section 297(2) of the Penal Code unconstitutional for the reason that the said Sections were discriminatory against persons who had been convicted of the offence of robbery with violence and attempted robbery with violence."
"Even so, this court observed that time had reached as a country to re-consider the place of death sentence as a form of punishment. It had not been carried out for years but yet the same continued to be handed down to persons who had been convicted for robbery with violence and attempted robbery with violence causing the convicts to suffer from the death row syndrome. The emotional and psychiatric trauma that those on death row suffer before their sentences are commuted to life imprisonment is immense. It damages the convicts who are maladjusted and unable to be properly reintegrated in the society."
The remedy for that grievance is a resentencing, which is addressed under Issue (v).
Issue (iv)
23. The petitioner says that remaining in prison under section 296(2), when the petitioners in Kaberia (supra) benefited from the declaration, treats him as inferior. Those petitioners obtained a declaration and orders in their own proceedings. The petitioner was not a party to those proceedings and order 4 dealt with convicts in his position by directing the Attorney General to consider a remedy. Not receiving the orders made in another case is not discrimination. The petition gives no particulars of any indignity beyond the conviction and sentence themselves, which are dealt with elsewhere in this ruling.
24. Article 47 governs administrative action. The charging, trial and sentencing of the petitioner were judicial proceedings governed by Article 50, and the petition does not identify any administrative action that was unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair.
25.The national values in Article 10 guide the interpretation and application of the Constitution and law. They are not a free-standing basis for relief unless tied to a specific breach, and the petition ties none to them beyond repeating the Article 50 complaint.
26. The petitioner was charged in 2008, convicted in 2009 and lost his appeal the same year. Kaberia (supra) was delivered more than seven years later. When the prosecution was brought there was no declaration to advise on and no order to disobey. The allegations of "contempt" by the Director of Public Prosecutions and of a failure by the Attorney General to advise the Government have no particulars, no evidence and no identified order that was served and disobeyed. The prayer for a declaration against the Attorney General fails.
27. The submissions refer to the right to legal representation at State expense (Article 50(2)(h)), section 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the right to mitigation (sections 216 and 329 of that Code). None is pleaded in the petition or supported by the affidavit. Submissions cannot enlarge pleadings and the respondents have had no notice of these claims. The trial judgment shows that the petitioner was heard in mitigation before sentence. The court makes no further finding on these claims. This ruling does not prevent the petitioner from raising them by seeking review by a higher court as provided in Article 50(2)(q) of the Constitution.
Issue (v)
28. The petitioner's alternative prayer is that he be presented before the sentencing court for a sentence re-hearing in line with paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.4 of the Judiciary Sentencing Guidelines (2023). The petition appears to number this prayer (e) and refers back to "order (e)", which the court reads as the prayer for acquittal. In Ahmed (supra) the court considered his application dated 8 January 2025 for the life sentence to be declared unconstitutional and for resentencing to a determinate term. It dismissed that application at paragraph 14 in these terms:
"In light of the above decisions and in view of the doctrine of stare decisis, this court cannot grant the prayer sought and accordingly the application dated 8th January 2025 is dismissed."
29. I am guided by the Court of Appeal in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Kiai & 5 Others (Civil Appeal 105 of 2017) [2017] KECA 477 (KLR) (23 June 2017) on the elements of res judicata, all of which must be satisfied:
(i) "The suit or issue was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit."
(ii) "That former suit was between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim."
(iii) "Those parties were litigating under the same title."
(iv) "The issue was heard and finally determined in the former suit."
(v) "The court that formerly heard and determined the issue was competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue is raised."
30. All five elements are met. The prayer for a sentence re-hearing seeks, as the application in Ahmed (supra) did, a review of the petitioner's sentence and the imposition of a determinate term. The Republic, in whose name the 2nd respondent prosecutes, was the respondent there, and the petitioner litigated in his own right in both. The application was heard on written submissions and finally determined by this court, which is competent to hear the present prayer. Re-casting the same relief as a constitutional petition does not change its character. The prayer is res judicata. The proper recourse is review by a higher court as provided in Article 50(2)(q) of the Constitution.
Disposition
31. For the reasons above, the court makes the following orders.
1. The prayers for declarations (a), (b) and (c) in the petition are declined.
2. The prayer for an order of acquittal is dismissed.
3. The prayer for a sentence re-hearing is dismissed for being res judicata.
4. The petitioner is at liberty to seek for review in a higher court as provided in Article 50(2)(q) of the Constitution.
Judgment dated, signed and delivered virtually via Microsoft teams on this 29th day of October, 2026.
E. N. MAINA
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Madam Otieno for the State
The petitioner
Miriam – Court Assistant/Interpreter