REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: MILIMANI ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
CASE NUMBER: ELCLA/E153/2026
AGNES NJERI MURIITHI VS ANNROSE GATHATHU
RULING
A :Introduction
1. The dispute centers on a tenancy conflict over Door Number 7, situated on Plot No. 889, Umoja Inner Core (“the suit premises”), between the tenant, Agnes Njeri Muriithi (the appellant) and her landlord, Annrose Gathathu (The Respondent). In March 2026, the Appellant lodged Case No. E697 of 2026 at the Rent Restriction Tribunal in Nairobi (“the Tribunal”) against the Respondent and successfully obtained temporary restraining orders.
2. The matter proceeded to a hearing, culminating in the tribunal’s Orders/Judgment delivered on 8.7.2026 in the following terms:-
“68. In the circumstances, I find that the Respondent (Annrose) has proved her case on a balance of probability and I will enter Judgment in their favor and make the following final orders:
a. A declaration is hereby issued that the Applicant's conduct constituted nuisance and a breach of her obligations as a tenant, thereby entitling the Respondent to terminate the tenancy.
b. A declaration is hereby issued directing the Applicant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises, being Door Number 7 situated on Plot No. 889, Umoja Inner Core.
c. A declaration is hereby issued, that in default of compliance with Order (b) above, the Respondent shall be at liberty to recover vacant possession in accordance with the law, with the assistance of the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) if necessary.
d. A declaration is hereby issued directing the Applicant to restore the suit premises to the condition in which they were at the commencement of the tenancy.
e. Each party to bear their own costs.”
3. Being aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal The Applicant(appellant) moved this court by way of a chamber summons dated 17th July 2026 (“the Application) brought pursuant to Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Section 75 of the Land Act, the Rent Restriction Act and the Rules made thereunder, together with all other enabling provisions of the law seeking for following reliefs :-
i. spent
ii. THAT pending hearing and determination of this Application a temporary stay of Execution be granted staying the Orders/Judgment of Rent Restriction Tribunal granted /delivered on 8th July 2026 in Case No. E697 of 2026.
iii. THAT pending hearing and determination of this Appeal a permanent stay of execution be granted staying the Orders /Judgment of the Rent Restriction Tribunal given/delivered on 8th July 2026 in Rent Restriction Tribunal Case No. E697 of 2026.
iv. THAT any other order the court shall dim fit just to grant.
v. THAT the cost of this Application be provided for.”
4. The Application is supported by the affidavit of Agness Njeri Muriithi sworn on 17.7.2026 and grounds on its face of even date. She deponed that she is likely to suffer substantial loss if evicted out of the suit premise pending hearing and determination of the appeal. She averred that her appeal raises triable issues and shall be rendered nugatory if not granted stay of execution order pending hearing and determination. She deponed that she has complied with the orders of the court by paying monthly rent to the respondent on the due dates She urged that the respondent will not suffer any prejudice if application is allowed. she averred ha she has been served with notice to vacate the suit premise by the respondent and likely to evicted anytime.
5. The Respondent in opposition of the application filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by Annerose Nyaguthii dated 21st July 2026 contending that applicant was duly served with hearing notices for the counterclaim via her daughter’s cellphone number. She averred that the tribunal’s judgment was rendered on merit. The respondent deponed that the applicant has failed to demonstrate arguable appeal or that she will suffer substantial loss, arguing that simple relocation inconvenience does not constitute irreparable injury. Conversely, the Respondent submitted that staying execution of the decree prejudices her property rights by compelling her to tolerate ongoing nuisance, risk losing other tenants, and absorb unpaid rent and utility costs. The Respondent maintained that the tenant's application is a delaying tactic and prays that if a stay is granted, it be conditional on the tenant paying monthly mesne profits commensurate to monthly rent payable and utility charges as they fall due.
B. Directions of the Court:
6. On 23.07.2026, the Court, with the consent of the parties, directed that the Application be canvassed by way of written submissions. The Appellant/Applicant filed their submissions dated 28.07.2026, while the Respondents filed their submissions dated 15.09.2026.
C. Submissions by Parties:
7. The Appellant/Applicant Submitted that she has satisfied the threshold for stay of execution pending appeal as prescribed under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules and reaffirmed in Aden Yusuf Halable and Another v Mohamed Abdi Mohamed [2024] KEHC 7889 (KLR) (Civil Appeal E048 of 2023), that a stay of execution pending appeal is contingent upon the applicant/appellant demonstrating that substantial loss will be suffered unless the stay is granted, , filing the application without unreasonable delay, and providing security as the court may order. The applicant submitted that the application was filed without inordinate delay.
8. On Substantial loss likely to be suffered, The applicant urged that she will suffer financial hardship, if evicted out of the suit premise without being accorded adequate notice as her children, grandchildren and self shall be rendered destitute.
9. The Appellant submitted that the appeal raises arguable procedural and substantive issues. She contended that the Rent Restriction Tribunal failed to ascertain
whether the unrepresented Appellant was aware of the hearing date; erred in failing to specify a vacating period; neglected to extract a formal decree or serve notices of delivery or entry of judgment; and permitted an unauthorized person masquerading as the Plaintiff's advocate to fix the hearing date and notify only the Respondent.
10. The Appellant contended that the Rent Restriction Tribunal committed a dereliction of duty by declaring itself functus officio and refusing to entertain applications for stay and setting aside judgment. Under Rule 3 of the Rent Restriction (Appeals) Rules, the Civil Procedure Rules apply mutatis mutandis to appeals under Section 8(2) of the Rent Restriction Act (Cap 296), giving the tribunal the power to hear such applications. Furthermore, the landlady attempted an immediate eviction in direct violation of Section 75 of the Land Act 2012, which mandates serving a notice of not less than 30 days specifying the breach and granting an opportunity to remedy or compensate before exercising any right of forfeiture under a lease.
11. The Respondent contended that under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, a stay of execution cannot issue unless the applicant demonstrates that substantial loss will occur. The Respondent asserted that the tenant's claim of loss is speculative, unsubstantiated, and amounts to mere relocation inconvenience, which does not constitute substantial loss. While Citing Wafubwa v Wafubwa [2025] KEELC 4527 (KLR) and James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto (2012) eKLR, the Respondent submits that an applicant must establish specific factors demonstrating that execution will irreparably destroy the essential core of their position. The respondent Further contends that the conditions under Order 42 Rule 6(2) must be met sequentially, and that a failure to establish substantial loss invalidates the entire application.
12. The Respondent maintained that the tribunal afforded the parties procedural fairness, considering the tenant's reply and defense before rendering its decision. The respondent urged the court to balance the appellant’s right to appeal against the successful party’s right to enjoy the fruits of her judgment as reaffirmed in RWW v EKW [2019] eKLR. She urged that appellant concession of the appeal in her supplementary affidavit renders the instant application an academic exercise, calculated to delay the Respondent's constitutional right to repossess and occupy her property.
13. The Respondent contended that the tenant’s primary grievance challenges abuse of tribunal’s jurisdiction in the conduct of matter rather than the substantive merits of the decision hence the applicant should have moved the court via judicial review rather than an appeal citing the case of Republic v Deputy Chairperson, Rent Restriction Tribunal; Nabwire (Interested Party); Simiyu (Ex parte Applicant) [2026] KEELC 588 (KLR),where the court held that Rent Restriction Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court.
14. The Respondent maintained that granting a stay prejudices her property rights by forcing her to tolerate ongoing nuisance, risk tenant frustration, and face potential rental income loss. Additionally, the tenant has failed to provide or propose security for costs to restore the premises to their original state, despite receiving an itemized estimate of Kshs 32,000 (less the Kshs 15,500 deposit) from the Respondent pursuant to the
D. Issues for determination
15. Upon considering the Application, the Replying Affidavit, the Annexures, the rival submissions, judicial authorities and the Court’s record, the court identifies following issues for determination: -
1. Whether the Court has appellate jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s grievances arising from the Tribunal’s decision.
2. Whether the Court should grant an order for stay of execution pending the hearing and determination of the appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
E. Analysis and Determination
a) Whether the Court has appellate jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s grievances arising from the Tribunal’s decision.
16. The Respondent contended that the appellant ought to have invoked the court its supervisory jurisdiction (by way of judicial review) ,rather than appellate jurisdiction over the tribunal as the appellant principally challenges the exercise of discretion of the tribunal in the manner it conducted the matter. Respectfully the nature of the applicant’s complaint does not deprive this Court of its appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of this Court in appeals from the Rent Restriction Tribunal is expressly provided for under Section 8 of the Rent Restriction Act stipulating: -
“8. Appeals
1. Except as provided by subsection (2), every decision, determination and order of the tribunal under the provisions of this Act shall be final and conclusive, and no appeal shall lie therefrom to any court.
2. An appeal shall lie to the Environment and Land Court from any such decision, determination or order in the following cases—
1. in the case of an order under subsection (5) of section 6; or
2. on any point of law; or
3. in the case of premises whereof the standard rent exceeds one thousand shillings a month, on any point of mixed fact and law, and for the purposes of this subsection, the determination of any rent or of any sum shall be a matter of fact.
(3) Any person who is aggrieved by any decision, determination or order of a person acting under powers delegated to him under subsection (3) of section 5 may apply to the tribunal for a review of that decision, determination or order, and the tribunal may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.
(4) No appeal shall lie from the determination of an appeal given under subsection (2), or an order of the tribunal given under subsection (3), of this section.”
17. The jurisdiction of this Court is further reinforced by Section 13(4) of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011, which confers upon the Court appellate jurisdiction over decisions of subordinate courts or local tribunals in respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 13(2) further sets out the matters over which the Court is vested with jurisdiction, including disputes relating to the use and occupation of, and title to, land.
18. Further, Rule 3 of the Rent Restriction (Appeals) Rules, 1969 provides that the Civil Procedure Rules shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the procedure to be followed in an appeal under Section 8(2) of the Act, as they apply to an appeal from a subordinate court. The Rule therefore reinforces the statutory appellate framework governing appeals from the Tribunal to this Court.
19. It follows that the Applicant/Appellant was entitled, subject to the statutory requirements governing such an appeal, to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that some of the grounds raised may concern the manner in which the Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction, including alleged procedural or legal irregularities, does not, without more, convert the appeal into a supervisory proceeding or oust the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Such complaints may properly constitute questions of law falling for consideration in an appeal under Section 8(2) of the Rent Restriction Act.
20. The Court therefore finds that it is properly seized of the present matter in its appellate jurisdiction and is entitled, within that jurisdiction, to interrogate the grounds raised by the Applicant/Appellant.
b) Whether the Court should grant an order for stay of execution pending the
hearing and determination of the appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
21. It is trite that a stay of execution of a judgment/order pending appeal is governed by the principles as set in Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which stipulates: -
“6. Stay in case of appeal [Order 42, rule 6]
1. No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.
2. No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
1. the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
2. such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in subrule (2), the court shall have power, without formal application made, to order upon such terms as it may deem fit a stay of execution pending the hearing of a formal application.
3. For the purposes of this rule an appeal to the Court of Appeal shall be deemed to have been filed when under the Rules of that Court notice of appeal has been given.
3. An application for stay of execution may be made informally immediately following the delivery of judgment or ruling.
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in subrule (1) of this rule the High Court shall have power in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction on such terms as it thinks just provided the procedure for instituting an appeal from a subordinate court or tribunal has been complied with.”
22. The court in a persuasive case of RWW v EKW [2019] KEHC 6523 (KLR) stipulated that:-
“8. The purpose of an application for stay of execution pending an appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the rights of the appellant who is exercising the undoubted right of appeal are safeguarded and the appeal, if successful, is not rendered nugatory. However, in doing so, the court should weigh this right against the success of a litigant who should not be deprived of the fruits of his/her judgment. The court is also called upon to ensure that no party suffers prejudice that cannot be compensated by an award of costs.
9. Indeed, to grant or refuse an application for stay of execution pending appeal is discretionary. The Court, when granting the stay, however, must balance the interests of the Appellant with those of the Respondent.”
23. Based on the relevant statutory provisions and judicial precedent(s) , This Court is bound to determine the current application within the legal framework established in order 42 rule 6 of the civl procedure rules,2010.
i)Whether the application was filed without inordinate delay.
24. The impugned Judgment was delivered on 8.7.2026, while the present Application was filed on 17.07.2026. The Application was therefore lodged within nine (9) days of the delivery of the Judgment. The Court finds that the Application was filed timeously and without unreasonable delay.
(ii)whether the Applicant has demonstrated substantial loss is likely to result unless execution of the Tribunal’s Judgment delivered on 8.7.2026 is stayed pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal.
25. The court in Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates v East African Standard [2002] KEHC 1167 (KLR) on substantial loss held as follows: -
“. It is not enough merely to state that substantial loss will result, or that the appeal if successful will be rendered nugatory. That will not do. If the applicant cites, as a ground, substantial loss, the kind of loss likely to be sustained must be specified, details or particulars thereof must be given, and the conscience of the court, looking at what will happen unless a suspension or stay is ordered, must be satisfied that such loss will really ensue and that if it comes to pass, the applicant is likely to suffer substantial injury by letting the other party proceed further with what may still be remaining to be done or in execution of an awarded decree or order, before disposal of the applicant’s business (eg appeal or intended appeal).
Moreover, a court will not order a stay upon a mere vague speculation; there must be the clearest ground of necessity disclosed on evidence. Commonly, the applicant may obtain a stay of further proceedings or execution, if he shows facts which point to a conclusion that to allow execution or further proceedings to go ahead before appeal concluded would let an impecunious party to pocket and squander or pilfer what may be needed in restitution if the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Another common factor in favour of the applicant is whether to proceed further or to execute may destroy the subject matter of the action and deprive the appellant or intended appellant of the means of prosecuting the appeal or intended appeal. So, really, stay is normally not to be granted, save in exceptional circumstances.”
26. Similarly, in James Wangalwa & Another v. Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] KEHC 1094 (KLR) the court held:-
“11. No doubt, in law, the fact that the process of execution has been put in motion, or is likely to be put in motion, by itself, does not amount to substantial loss. Even when execution has been levied and completed, that is to say, the attached properties have been sold, as is the case here, does not in itself amount to substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6 of the CPR. This is so because execution is a lawful process.
The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the Applicant as the successful party in the appeal. This is what substantial loss would entail, a question that was discussed in the case of Silverstein N. Chesoni [2002] 1KLR 867, and also in the case of Mukuma V Abuoga quoted above. The last case, referring to the exercise of discretion by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the granting stay of execution, under Order 42 of the CPR and Rule 5(2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, respectively, emphasized the centrality of substantial loss thus: “…the issue of substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the appeal nugatory.”
27. The present application is not founded upon mere apprehension of eviction from the suit premise. Rather, The Tribunal issued an order directing the Applicant/Appellant to vacate the suit premise and restore it to the original condition at the commencement of the tenancy. The tribunal authorized the Respondent, in default of compliance, to recover vacant possession with the assistance of the OCS (if any) should applicant fail to comply. The Applicant/Appellant received formal communication from the Respondent's counsel dated 9.07.2026 directing her to vacate the suit premise on or before 12.07.2026 and indicating that eviction would follow upon default. The Applicant/Appellant sought an extension of time from the OCS and moved the Tribunal and this Court for protective relief. Execution of the impugned orders, if not stayed , would result in the Applicant losing possession of the premises in which, according to her evidence, she resides with her daughter and grandchildren.
28. The Respondent contended that her rental business is at risk of losing tenants, and consequently, income. In determining the matter, however, the Court must balance the competing interests of both parties in ensuring that justice is done to both.
29. In the present case any proven financial loss occasioned to the respondent may be adequately compensated by an award of damages or costs. More importantly, eviction at this stage would alter the prevailing factual position on the ground before the appeal is heard. Should the appellant ultimately succeed, restoration of possession of the suit premise may take time or if it materializes may not necessarily restore the Appellant/Applicant to the position subsisting prior to the execution of the decree. The Court, therefore finds that the Applicant/Appellant has demonstrated a real risk of substantial loss likely to be suffered if execution proceeds before the Appeal is determined.
1v).Whether the Appeal shall be rendered nugatory if stay of execution is not granted.
30. The Court of Appeal in Stanley Kangethe Kinyanjui v. Tony Ketter & 5 others [2013] KECA 378 (KLR) stipulated as follows: -
“...
iv) In considering whether an appeal will be rendered nugatory the court must bear in mind that each case must depend on its own facts and peculiar circumstances. David Morton Silverstein v Atsango Chesoni, Civil Application No. Nai 189 of 2001.
v) An applicant must satisfy the court on both of the twin principles.
vi) On whether the appeal is arguable, it is sufficient if a single bonafide arguable ground of appeal is raised. Damji Pragji Mandavia v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (K) Ltd, Civil Application No. Nai 345 of 2004.
vii) An arguable appeal is not one which must necessarily succeed, but one which ought to be argued fully before the court; one which is not frivolous. Joseph Gitahi Gachau & Another v. Pioneer Holdings (A) Ltd. & 2 others, Civil Application No. 124 of 2008.
viii) In considering an application brought under Rule 5 (2) (b) the court must not make definitive or final findings of either fact or law at that stage as doing so may embarrass the ultimate hearing of the main appeal. Damji Pragji (supra).
ix) The term “nugatory” has to be given its full meaning. It does not only mean worthless, futile or invalid. It also means trifling. Reliance Bank Ltd v Norlake Investments Ltd [2002] 1 EA 227 at page 232.
x) Whether or not an appeal will be rendered nugatory depends on whether or not what is sought to be stayed if allowed to happen is reversible; or if it is not reversible whether damages will reasonably compensate the party aggrieved.
xi) Where it is alleged by the applicant that an appeal will be rendered nugatory on account of the respondent's alleged impecunity, the onus shifts to the latter to rebut by evidence the claim. International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases v Kinyua, [1990] KLR 403.”
31. The court must first determine whether the Appeal is arguable. At this stage, it must not determine the merits of the Appeal. Consequently, an arguable appeal is one which raises at least one bona fide issue deserving of consideration by the appellate court; it need not be one that will ultimately succeed.
32. A cursory consideration of the Memorandum of Appeal reveals grounds challenging, the service of hearing notices and noncompliance with the statutory notice requirements for termination of the tenancy under the Act. These issues constitute questions of law and procedure that can be properly determined at the appellate stage. The appeal therefore raises Bonafide triable issue(s).
33. Having established that the Appeal is arguable, it is noteworthy that if the orders of the impugned tribunal are executed pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal, the Applicant/Appellant will likely be dispossessed of the suit premises which constitute the substratum of the appeal. Although possession could ultimately be restored if the Appeal succeeds, the attendant disruption cannot readily be undone. Accordingly, the court finds that the appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay of execution is not granted.
(v)Whether applicant has provided security for due performance of the decree:
34. The Respondent contends that the Application is defective for want of an offer of security. However, this contention is not fatal to the Application. The absence of an offer of security does not preclude the Court from determining the Application on merits or imposing such security as it considers appropriate. This position is supported by the persuasive authority of Obed Readon Onyango v Florence Juma Nabiswa & Another [2019] KEELC 1248 (KLR), where the Court held: -
“11. The last handle must be crossed by the applicants is whether the security has been given. Looking at the provisions of Order 42 rule 6
(1) (b) this court’s interpretation is that it is not fatal for an applicant not to offer any security in an application since the court may itself impose such security on the applicants. I do note that none was offered by the applicants and the respondent demand security in the form of a cash sum sufficient to compensate him for loss of use of the premises. It would be expected that the appeal filed by the applicants would take some time to conclude and therefore the respondent would be kept out of land which this court has already proclaimed to be his for much longer, indeed an indefinite period dependent on the vagaries of litigation.”
35. In the present case, the impugned order/judgement principally concern vacant possession, restoration of the premises to their condition at the commencement of the tenancy, and recovery of possession upon default. No monetary decree was issued against the Applicant. Of particular note is the Tribunal's order requiring the Applicant to restore the premise to the condition it was in at inception of the tenancy.
36. The Respondent contended that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate willingness to provide security towards restoration of the premise to its original condition, as ordered by the tribunal. The Respondent further averred that she proposed to the Applicant a sum of Kshs.32,000/=, less the Kshs.15,500/=rent deposit, to be applied towards the restoration works. However, the Applicant is adamant to undertake the works or propose an alternative arrangement.
37. The Court has considered the Applicant's continuous obligation to discharging her financial liabilities arising from the tenancy pending hearing and determination of the Appeal. As held in Francis Mureithi Gituku t/a Gituku Enterprises & Another v Francis Mwaura Mwega [2008] KEHC 3300 (KLR) the order for stay pending appeal is conditional on the applicant providing security for due performance of the
decree.
38. In the present case the applicant was granted temporary stay of execution on 17.7.2026 pending hearing of the application interpartes on 21.7.2026. The applicant/appellant has consistently paid monthly rent on the due dates. essence of depositing security pending appeal is to ensure that the fruits of the decree/judgement are not rendered nugatory, while balancing competing interest of the parties. In the circumstances the court deems it fit and orders the applicant to deposit kshs 15000/= as security for due performance of the decree in a joint interest earning account in the names of Counsels for the Applicant and Respondent, or alternatively, in Court within 30 days from the date of this ruling.
vi)Who shall bear the costs of the Application?
39. The supreme court in Rai & 3 Others v Rai & 4 Others [2014] KESC 31 (KLR) affirmed that the award of costs is a matter within the discretion of the Court, a discretion that must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with reason and justice. The Court further reiterated the general principle that costs follow the event, while recognizing that the Court may, for good reason, depart from that principle.
40. Costs in the present matter remains a discretion of the Court. Considering that the substantive appeal is yet to be heard and determined, the Court finds it appropriate that costs of the application shall abide by the outcome of the appeal.
41. Accordingly, the Applicant’s Application dated 17.07.2026 is allowed on the following conditions: -
a) There shall be a stay of execution of the Orders/Judgment of the Rent Restriction Tribunal delivered on 8th July 2026 in Tribunal Case No. E697 of 2026, pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
b) The Applicant shall continue to pay the monthly rent to the respondent on the due date pending hearing and determination of the appeal.
c) The Applicant to deposit a sum of kshs 15000/= as security for due performance of the decree in a joint interest earning account in the names of the counsels for the respondent and applicant or in court within 30 days from the date of this ruling.
d) In default of prayer b and c above, stay of execution granted by the court shall automatically lapse without further reference to court.
e) The costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the appeal.
f) The Applicant to file and serve the record of appeal upon the Respondent within 30 days from the date of the ruling.
g) Mention on the 9.11.2026 for directions on disposal of appeal.
It is ordered accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ON THIS 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 AT VOI
JECINTA ORWA
JUDGE
In the presence of:
Ms. Binah for the Respondent
Mr. Muthuri for the Applicant/Appellant
Mr. Letisia -Court Assistant