Land law

Simiyu & another (Suing on their behalf and 24 others, All Residents of Lang'ata Decanting Site) v Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development & 4 others [2026] KEELC 7406 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Environment and Land Court
Case number
PETITION NO. E098 OF 2025
Judgment date
8 October 2026
Judge(s)
LG Kimani

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

This is a Ruling in respect of the Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026, brought under Order 5 of the Judicature Act, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, in which the Petitioners/Applicants seek orders that this Honourable Court be pleased to cite the Applicants/Petitioners for contempt of court.

Paragraph 1 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

PETITION NO. E098 OF 2025

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 1(1), 1(3), 2(4), 19(3), 20, 22, 23(1), (3), 27(1), (28), 43(3), 47, 50(c), 60, 165, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA.

IN THE MATTER OF: UNIVERSAL DECLARATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF: FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE, ACTION ACT CAP 47 OF THE LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICES TO VACATE THE PREMISES ISSUED BY THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY

AND

IN THE MATTER OF: ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 43(1), AND 47 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF: LOCAL AUTHORITIES (RECOVERY OF PROCESSION PROPERTY) ACT, SECTION 3

BETWEEN

RICHARD SIBWANI SIMIYU AND

JANEROSE WANJIKU KUTOLO (Suing on their behalf and 24 others, All Residents of Lang'ata Decanting Site) ………...PETITIONERS/APPLICANTS

VERSUS

MINISTRY OF LANDS, HOUSING AND

URBAN DEVELOPMENT………………………………….1ST RESPONDENT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL………………...……2ND RESPONDENT

NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION………………………3RD RESPONDENT

VERSUS

KENYA NATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMISSION……....………………………………1ST INTERESTED PARTY

LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA………………………2ND INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

1. This is a Ruling in respect of the Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026, brought under Order 5 of the Judicature Act, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, in which the Petitioners/Applicants seek orders that this Honourable Court be pleased to cite the Applicants/Petitioners for contempt of court.

2. The Applicants’ application is based on the contention that on 1st December 2025, this Honourable Court issued interim orders restraining the Respondent from evicting them from the slum-upgrading houses pending the hearing and determination of the matter. Despite the existence of those orders, the Respondent allegedly circulated a notice revising the service fees and commenced measures intended to compel the Applicants to comply with the revised charges. The Applicants contend that such conduct threatens their right to remain in the premises and frustrates their legitimate expectation, as beneficiaries of a slum-upgrading programme, that their housing rights would be protected.

3. The Applicants further contend that the Respondent, through its representative Mr. Barasa, interfered with their occupation of the premises by blocking the main entrance gate on 11th April 2026, allegedly because they had failed to comply with the revised rates. They state that this action inconvenienced them and restricted their access to water and other essential social amenities.

4. The Applicants maintain that the Respondent’s actions have created a constant fear of eviction and threaten their continued residence in the premises. They argue that, having occupied houses constructed through UN-Habitat assistance under a slum-upgrading programme, they had a legitimate expectation that they would be allowed to remain in occupation and eventually acquire ownership upon payment of the agreed amounts. They therefore contend that the Respondent acted unfairly and unlawfully by unilaterally altering the terms of their occupation.

5. In his supporting affidavit, Richard Sibwani Simiyu states that following the filing of the suit, the Court issued orders on 1st December 2025 restraining the Respondent from evicting the Applicants. He alleges that the Respondent nevertheless proceeded to demand rent of Kshs. 2,000 per room from 26th January 2026 and issued notices requiring payment of the revised amounts, despite the Applicants’ position that the Respondent had no lawful authority to alter the existing terms of occupation.

6. The Applicants allege that the Respondent was fully aware of the court order but continued demanding the revised charges and threatening eviction for non-payment. They contend that such conduct amounts to disobedience of the court order and therefore constitutes contempt of court. They further state that the Respondent’s representatives have continued moving around the premises demanding payment, thereby causing the Applicants apprehension that they may be forcibly evicted.

7. The Applicants also rely on their constitutional rights to housing, dignity, equal protection of the law and social welfare. They argue that their status as low-income residents and beneficiaries of a slum-upgrading programme does not diminish their entitlement to constitutional protection. They are particularly concerned that any eviction or disruption of their occupation would adversely affect their children, who attend schools within the area, as well as their access to essential services.

8. The Applicants state that their advocates have written to the Respondent seeking confirmation that they may continue paying the previous rates, but the Respondent has allegedly failed to provide a clear response. They contend that, unless the Court intervenes, they may be coerced into paying the increased service fees or face eviction, contrary to the existing court order and their legitimate expectations.

9. Consequently, the Applicants urge the Court to exercise its powers to protect the existing order, prevent the Respondent from taking further action against them, and cite the Respondent for contempt. They maintain that such intervention is necessary in the interests of justice and to prevent what they regard as arbitrary government action and violation of their constitutional rights.

Respondents’ Replying Affidavit

10. The Application is opposed by the 1st Respondent through a Replying Affidavit dated 13th April 2026 and sworn by Mary Ndungu, the Director of the Slum Upgrading Department within the State Department for Housing and Urban Development.

11. The 1st Respondent contends that the Application is misconceived, misleading, legally defective and an abuse of the court process, and should therefore be dismissed with costs. The Respondent denies having disobeyed or acted in contempt of any lawful court order and maintains that it has at all times acted within the law and its statutory and administrative mandate.

12. The Respondent denies the allegations that it intimidated, harassed or threatened the Applicants, describing them as false, exaggerated and unsupported by evidence. It maintains that any communications concerning rent, occupation, management of the premises or related administrative matters were lawful, procedural and made in the ordinary course of managing the premises.

13. The Respondent asserts that the Applicants failed to disclose that it has a legal duty to manage and maintain the premises, including collecting rent and service charges and regulating occupation. It further explains that the revision of rental charges was undertaken for lawful administrative and operational reasons and was neither malicious nor intended to undermine or defeat the Court’s orders.

14. The Respondent argues that the Applicants have not identified any specific conduct constituting contempt, but have instead relied on speculation, apprehension and general allegations. It maintains that the orders relied upon did not prevent it from carrying out lawful administrative functions, including communicating with tenants and managing the premises, and denies blocking the Applicants’ access to the premises.

15. The Respondent further maintains that the Applicants have produced no evidence of deliberate and wilful disobedience of a clear and unambiguous court order. It points out that the order relied upon in the Application indicated that the status quo was to be maintained only until 19th January 2026, and that no subsequent order extending those directions has been produced. The Respondent therefore contends that the orders relied upon cannot sustain contempt proceedings, particularly given the quasi-criminal nature of contempt proceedings and the higher standard of proof required. It reiterates its respect for the authority of the Court and denies any intention to breach its lawful orders.

16. Ultimately, the 1st Respondent contends that the Application has been brought in bad faith and is intended to frustrate the lawful discharge of its statutory mandate and obligations. It therefore urges the Court, in the interests of justice, to dismiss the Applicants’ Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026 with costs to the 1st Respondent.

Applicant’s written submissions

17. The Applicants/Petitioners submit that the 1st Respondent’s conduct constituted deliberate disobedience of the Court’s subsisting orders and that reliance on its administrative mandate cannot justify conduct inconsistent with a binding judicial order. They contend that the Respondent’s interpretation of the duration and effect of the orders is contrary to the court record and cannot provide a lawful basis for non-compliance.

18. The Applicants rely on Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] All ER 567 for the established principle that a person against whom a court order has been made is under a plain and unqualified obligation to obey it unless and until it is discharged or set aside. They submit that even where a party considers an order irregular or invalid, the proper course is to seek its discharge rather than disregard it. The Applicants therefore contend that the 1st Respondent could not lawfully take steps inconsistent with the order while it remained in force.

19. It is further submitted that contempt jurisdiction exists to safeguard the effective administration of justice and the rule of law. Reliance is placed on Borrie and Lowe, Law of Contempt, Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd, Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another [2005] eKLR and Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 2 Others [2013] eKLR. The Applicants contend that deliberate disobedience of court orders undermines the authority of the Court and must therefore attract an appropriate judicial response.

20. On the applicable test, the Applicants submit that the requirements for contempt have been met, namely that there was a clear and binding order, the 1st Respondent had knowledge of it, its conduct was inconsistent with the order, and the breach was deliberate. Reliance is placed on Kisii Tea Factory Company Ltd v Stephen Mara Githiga & 14 Others [2019] KECA 92, which underscores the obligation of a party with knowledge of a court order to take appropriate steps to secure compliance.

21. The Applicants accordingly submit that the 1st Respondent cannot invoke its administrative powers as a defence to non-compliance with a subsisting court order. They maintain that the integrity and efficacy of judicial orders would be compromised if parties were permitted to determine for themselves whether or not to comply. They therefore urge the Court to find that the threshold for contempt has been satisfied and allow the Notice of Motion as prayed.

1st & 2nd Respondent’s written Submissions

22. The 1st and 2nd Respondents submit that the central question is whether the 1st Respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of the interim orders issued on 1st December 2025 and, consequently, whether the Applicants have satisfied the legal threshold for contempt. They maintain that the Application is legally untenable and seeks to improperly constrain the 1st Respondent in the discharge of its statutory mandate.

23. On the alleged breach, the Respondents submit that the order restraining eviction or interruption of occupation cannot properly be construed as prohibiting the 1st Respondent from undertaking lawful administrative functions within the housing scheme. In particular, the revision and enforcement of service fees are characterised as administrative measures arising from the Respondent’s responsibility to manage and maintain the premises, rather than acts of eviction or interference with the Applicants’ possession.

24. The Respondents rely on Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 Others [2021] eKLR to submit that, although the State has a constitutional obligation concerning access to adequate housing, that obligation does not displace its authority to lawfully administer public housing programmes. On that basis, they contend that the impugned fee revision and consequential access measures were within the Respondent’s administrative mandate and did not contravene the Court’s orders.

25. On contempt, the Respondents rely principally on Samuel M.N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 Others [2020] eKLR and Stephen Maina Githiga & 5 Others v Kiru Tea Factory Company Ltd [2023] KESC 41 (KLR). They submit that an applicant must establish the terms of the order, the respondent’s knowledge of it, breach of the order and deliberate disobedience, with the order itself being clear, unambiguous and binding. They further rely on the standard articulated in Mutitika v Baharini Farm Limited [1985] KLR 229, contending that contempt must be proved to the requisite heightened standard.

26. The Respondents consequently submit that the Applicants have not established any deliberate breach of the 1st December 2025 order. They maintain that the impugned conduct falls within lawful administrative action rather than the prohibited conduct contemplated by the order, and that the evidential and legal threshold for contempt has not been met. They therefore seek dismissal of the Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026 with costs.

Analysis and determination

27. Before considering the substantive merits of the application, the Court must address an apparent defect in the Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026.

28. The substantive prayer seeking citation for contempt is expressed against the Applicant/Petitioners. However, upon consideration of the grounds in support of the application, the Supporting Affidavit, the documents annexed thereto and the submissions on record, the complaints advanced therein appear to be directed at the conduct of the Respondents.

29. The Court is therefore confronted with a discrepancy between the person expressly identified in the prayer for contempt and the persons against whom the allegations of disobedience are substantively directed.

30. This is not a matter which the Court can simply overlook. Proceedings for contempt are penal in nature and may result in serious consequences for the person found to be in contempt. It is therefore necessary that the person against whom the finding is sought be clearly identified and afforded a proper opportunity to answer the allegations.

31. The Court must also distinguish between a defect in form and a substantive failure to give notice of the case which a party is required to meet.

32. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution requires courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. That provision, however, does not authorise the Court to disregard substantive requirements of fair hearing. A procedural error may be cured where no prejudice is occasioned, but the Court cannot, in the name of substantive justice, make a finding against a party on a case which that party was not called upon to answer.

33. Order 8 Rule 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules gives the Court power, for purposes of determining the real question in controversy or correcting a defect or error in proceedings, to order a document to be amended in such manner as the Court may direct and, on such terms, as to costs or otherwise as are just.

34. Further, in Kiru Tea Factory Company Ltd v Stephen Maina Githiga & 13 Others [2019] KECA 868 (KLR), the Court of Appeal affirmed that although leave is not required to institute contempt proceedings, leave is required where a party seeks to amend an already filed contempt application.

35. The Court therefore considers that the error in the prayer ought not to be corrected by judicial interpretation at the stage of determining the merits. The proper course is to afford the Applicant an opportunity to regularise the application so that the person against whom the prayer for contempt is sought is expressly and correctly identified.

36. Accordingly, the Court directs that the Applicant shall, amend the Notice of Motion dated 13th April 2026 so as to correct the person named in the prayer for contempt. The amended Notice of Motion shall be filed and served within 14 days from today upon such amendment, the amended application shall be served upon the Respondents, who shall be afforded an opportunity to respond to the contempt allegations made and/or rely on the response already o record.

38. The Court shall thereafter determine the contempt application on its merits. Mention for compliance and direction on 17/12/2026. The Petitioner to be served

Delivered, dated and signed via Microsoft Teams this 8th day of October 2026.

HON. L. G. KIMANI

JUDGE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT

The Ruling read in the presence of-

Ms Mutuku for Respondent

No appearance for Applicant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder