REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC NO 696 OF 2014
PETER XAVIER INDINDI OJIAMBO - 1ST PLAINTIFF
CONCILIA AKUKU ODUNDO - 2ND PLAINTIFF
REGINAL OCHAMI ODUORI - 3RD PLAINTIFF
[ALL suing as Trustees of The
RegieChristies Church Ministry]
VS
KEN NGONDI - 1ST DEFENDANT
JAIRO ATENYA ASITIBA - 2ND DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
The pleadings
1. The Plaintiffs aver that they are the Trustees of RegieChristies Ministries [hereinafter referred to as the Plaintiff /Church], having been appointed as such under a Trust Deed registered on 17/3/2010 under RDA No 1326 D1 47/761 MMX.
2. It is averred that the Church is the registered proprietor of Land Reference Number 209/14854 [suit land] situated at Villa Franca Estate in Nairobi Imara Daima area, having been allocated the land by the Government of Kenya and obtained title on 30/1/2003.
3. It is the Plaintiff's case that the Defendants have illegally encroached and trespassed onto the suit land, taken possession and developed flats /structures without its permission and consent. The Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage. Despite demand to vacate, the Defendants have persisted in their illegal trespass; hence the filing of the suit.
4. The Plaintiff sought the following orders against the Defendants;
a) A declaration that they are the lawful exclusive owners of Land Reference Number 209/14854 [suit land].
b) A permanent injunction do issue against the Defendants, their servants and/or employees, from trespassing, attempted destruction, subsequent construction, evicting the Plaintiffs from the suit land and/or otherwise howsoever interfering with the said land.
c) Damages and mesne profits
d) Costs of the suit and interest.
5. The 1st Defendant denied the Plaintiffs' case in its entirety in his statement of defence dated 1/3/2015. He denied carrying out any construction or occupation, causing any destruction, and/or attempting to evict the Plaintiff from the suit land, and sought to put the Plaintiff to strict proof.
6. On a without prejudice basis, the 1st Defendant contended that the alleged suit land was sold to Mazao Properties before the institution of the suit; the alleged suit property has been subdivided by Mazao Properties Limited into several plots; the 1st Defendant acquired a plot from Mazao Properties Limited by purchase, with the full knowledge and participation of the Plaintiff, who no longer has any proprietorship interest in the suit land; the 1st Defendant's developments were approved by Mazao Properties Limited and, as such, are lawful.
7. The 1st Defendant maintains that the suit against him is not maintainable and urged the Court to dismiss it with costs.
8. In its reply to the defence, the Plaintiff denied the averments of the 1st Defendant and reiterated the contents of its plaint. In particular, it denied receiving either Kshs 400,000/- from the 1st Defendant or Kshs 10 Million from Mazao Properties Limited and sought strict proof.
9. The 2nd Defendant denied the Plaintiffs' claim, conceded that it is the registered proprietor of the suit land, but denied that the Plaintiffs have developed the suit land in accordance with the terms and conditions of allocation by the Government of Kenya. Trespass is expressly denied. That the Plaintiff has sold all its interest in the suit land, which property has been subdivided, and the parcels have sold to third parties, leaving the Plaintiff with no interest in the suit land. The suit herein is a sham and ought to be dismissed.
The evidence adduced by the Plaintiff on trial
10. At the hearing, Peter Xavier Indindi Ojiambo, one of the trustees, testified on behalf of the Plaintiff and stated that he is authorised to do so. He relied on his witness statement in his evidence-in-chief and produced documents in support of the Plaintiff's case, marked as PEX Nos. 1-5.
11. He stated that the Defendants are known to him as members of the County Assembly of Nairobi City, with the 1st Defendant serving as the Deputy Speaker of Nairobi and the 2nd Defendant a the Member of the County Assembly for Imara Daima Ward. He further stated that the Plaintiff has been the registered proprietor of the suit land since 2001 and that the Defendants, through their agents/workers, trespassed onto the suit land without consent and constructed two blocks of flats thereon despite the existence of Court orders restraining them from doing so. He denied that the land had been sold to Mazao Properties Limited.
12. When shown the approval notification for development permission dated 24/5/2012, which purported to subdivide the suit land, the witness stated that he was unaware of any subdivision of the suit land and did not know the planner, namely Ndichu & Associates, who purported to have carried out the subdivision. He also stated that the Plaintiff has not sold the suit land to Mazao Properties or any other third party. He stated that original land title has not been surrendered to the Government in lieu of the alleged subdivision. The title has never been cancelled.
13. With that, the Plaintiff closed its case on 21/2/2022.
14. The Court record attests to several applications for adjournment by the Defendants citing various reasons.
The consent terminating the Plaintiff's case against the 1st Defendant
15. On 31/07/2024, the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant appeared before the Court and recorded a consent, which was subsequently adopted as an order of the Court. The details of this order are documented in an agreement dated 17/05/2024, which terminates the Plaintiff's case against the 1st Defendant. Consequently, the Plaintiff's claim against the 1st Defendant is been deemed settled through termination or withdrawal.
16. Subsequently, the matter was scheduled for a hearing on 23/2/26 regarding the 2nd Defendant's case. During the proceedings, Mr Wanganga, Counsel for the 2nd Defendant, informed the Court that an application dated 19/2/26 had been filed seeking to strike out the suit on the grounds of frivolity. Thereafter, the counsel marked the 2nd Defendant's case as closed without calling any witnesses, and the Court duly obliged.
The 2nd Defendant's Notice of Motion dated 19/2/26
17. The 2nd Defendant’s application dated 19/2/26 seeks orders that the suit be dismissed because the Plaintiff has no locus to bring any claim in respect of the suit land; that the Court do make a site visit to the suit premises; and that the costs of the suit be borne by the Plaintiff.
18. The application is premised on the grounds set out in the application itself, as well as in the supporting affidavit of Jairo Atenya Asitiba, deposed to on the same date.
19. The deponent averred that the suit property is public land and that the Plaintiff has no proprietary interest whatsoever. The Plaintiff was served with a notice to vacate the suit land by a letter dated 5/5/25 from the office of the President, Ministry of Interior and National Administration. The Plaintiff has ignored the notice and remains in situ on the suit land. The Plaintiff therefore has no locus to prosecute the suit in respect of the suit land. The Plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit from an illegality by commencing a claim on non-public land, and the Court should visit the suit land to ascertain this position.
20. In opposing the application, the 1st Plaintiff deponed that;
a) The application is devoid of any merit and meant to unnecessarily protract the suit and is therefore an abuse of the process of the Court.
b) The suit is not beyond redemption, and therefore the application to strike it out is not merited.
c) The application was brought too late in the day, after the Plaintiff's witness had testified and the Plaintiff had closed its case. Instead of tendering evidence, the 2nd Defendant chose to scuttle the suit mid-air to evade his day of reckoning at the trial.
d) The Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the suit land as shown in the title before the Court. The allegation that the suit land is public land is unfounded and unsubstantiated.
e) The Plaintiff is unaware of the letter dated 5/5/25 allegedly asking the Plaintiff to vacate the suit land.
21. All in all, the Court was urged to dismiss the application
Directions on written submissions
22. Despite directions to file written submissions in respect of the application and the main suit, only the Plaintiff complied. I have read and considered the said submissions.
Analysis and determination.
23. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence led at trial, the written submissions, and the particulars and rival affidavits, the key issues for determination are as follows.
a) Where the Plaintiff has locus to file the suit; if in the negative, whether the suit should be dismissed
b) Whether the Court should make a site visit to the suit land.
c) Whether the Plaintiff has proven its case
d) What relief should the Court grant, if any.
e) Costs of the suit
Locus standi
24. The Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (page 1026) defines locus standi as;
“the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum”.
25. In the case of Alfred Njau and Others v City Council of Nairobi [1982] KAR 229 it was held that;-“The term Locus Standi means a right to appear in Court and conversely to say that a person has no Locus Standi means that he has no right to appear or be heard in such and such proceedings”.
26. Locus standi is essential in civil proceedings because, without it, a party does not have the right to initiate or maintain a suit even if there is a valid cause of action. It is like a Court acting without jurisdiction. The question of locus standi relates to the substantive importance of the suit. It concerns the sufficiency and directness of a person’s interest in the litigation, which qualifies them to be a party to the case. It also involves a person’s capacity to perform a legal act.
27. In this case, the Plaintiffs’ case is that they are the registered proprietors of the suit land. The Plaintiff has gone to great lengths to explain the basis of its title. Unchallenged evidence was led that the Plaintiff was allocated the suit land in 2001, paid all the requisite charges, and obtained a title in its name, issued in 2003, a certified copy of which was produced before the Court. The presence of a rent clearance certificate attests to the Plaintiff meeting its obligations in respect of the suit land.
28. The 2nd Defendant asserts that the suit land constitutes public land and contends that the Plaintiff lacks locus standi to bring the current proceedings. Furthermore, the Government, through the Ministry of Interior and National Administration, issued a letter dated 5/5/25 to the Plaintiff, demanding that the Plaintiff vacate the land. Upon review, I note that this letter is not addressed to the Plaintiff, nor does it refer to the suit land. It is addressed to no specific individual, and the Court will assign it no significance, nor will it lend credence to the 2nd Defendant's assertion that the land is public land.
29. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff is the registered owner of the suit land. Section 26 of the Registration of Land Act provides as follows;
“(1) The certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration, or to a purchaser of land upon a transfer or transmission by the proprietor shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions contained or endorsed in the certificate, and the title of that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge, except—
(a) on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party; or
(b) where the certificate of title has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme.
(2) A certified copy of any registered instrument, signed by the Registrar and sealed with the Seal of the Registrar, shall be received in evidence in the same manner as the original.“
30. The provision of the law cited above clearly states that a title may be challenged on the grounds of fraud and/or misrepresentation. In this case, the 2nd Defendant has not demonstrated any of the above grounds to justify impeaching the Plaintiff's title.
31. The 2nd Defendant asserted that the suit land had been sold to Mazao Properties Limited, subdivided, and that the title no longer exists. However, he did not substantiate this allegation with any evidence. He did not submit documents such as the sale agreement, transfer, approved subdivision scheme, or details of third-party buyers for the Court's consideration.
32. Without much, I find that the Plaintiff has locus to assert their rights of proprietorship under its title. This objection is therefore rejected.
Site visit
33. The 2nd Defendant sought orders for a site visit by the Court in order to ascertain that the suit land is public land. The Plaintiff asserted that a site visit is totally unnecessary to determine private property and insisted that it has provided sufficient evidence to prove title and, if in doubt, the 2nd Defendant is at liberty to inspect the register of the suit land at the Land Office.
34. Order 18 Rule 11 Civil Procedure Rules empowers the Court, at any stage of the suit, to inspect any property or thing in respect of which any question may arise. Thus, the Court may visit the locus in quo to gather further evidence to assist its decision-making.
35. The purpose of the practice of visiting the locus in quo is to check on the evidence of witnesses and not to fill gaps in their evidence, lest the Court run the risk of turning itself a witness in the case. Visiting a locus in quo is not mandatory and depends on the circumstances of the case; even in ordinary civil proceedings where the Court deals with the merits of the case, a visit to the locus in quo is the exception rather than the rule.
36. It is the rule of thumb that site visits must be capable of yielding admissible evidence and the Court in session must perform judicial functions and resist distractions that take it away from its mission. See Cyrus Nyaga Kabute v Kirinyaga County Council Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1985 (Nairobi Court of Appeal); Beatrice Ngonyo Ndungu & another v Samuel K. Kanyoro & 2 others [2017] eKLR (Nakuru ELC). As a result, if the site visit raises issues that were not part of the proceedings; the parties must be afforded an opportunity to address them (Republic v National Environmental Tribunal & 4 others Ex parte China Road and Bridge Corporation [2016] eKLR (High Court at Nairobi)).
37. The Ugandan High Court in Badiru Kabalega v Sipiriano Mugangu Kampala HCCS No.7 of 1987 [1992] II KALR 110 reiterated the procedure to be followed on visits to the locus in quo, which requires each party to indicate-
a) what he is claiming;
b) testify on oath and be cross-examined;
c) where witnesses have already testified, at the locus in quo they are required to clarify what they stated in Court and to indicate features or boundary marks if any;
d) any observations made must be noted and recorded and form part of the record;
e) unless it is requested and intimated in advance, the Court should not allow fresh witnesses to be called
f) Ensure that all the parties, their witnesses, and advocates (if any) are present
g) Allow the parties and their witnesses to adduce evidence at the locus in quo
h) Allow cross-examination by either party, or his/her counsel
i) Record all the proceedings at the locus in quo.
j) Record any observation, view, opinion or conclusion of the Court, including a drawing sketch plan, if necessary.
38. Considering the foregoing, the 2nd Defendant has not demonstrated the appropriateness of conducting a site visit for the purpose of determining land ownership. The Court concurs with the Plaintiff that ownership is most effectively established through documentary evidence.
39. The Plaintiff has presented unchallenged evidence, including visual documentation, demonstrating the continuous construction of a residential block. The 2nd Defendant has provided no evidence in opposition, aside from admitting that he constructed a block of flats on the subject land.
40. That said, the Court finds that the 2nd Defendant's prayer for a site visit, in the Court's considered view, was unnecessary under the circumstances. I state this because the 2nd Defendant chose not to present any evidence, and it is questionable whether the site visit would have added any value to his defence, which he did not tender in any event.
Whether the Plaintiff has proven its case
41. The rights of a property owner under the statute include the peaceful and enjoyable possession of the land, subject to the limitations and modifications provided for in the Act, which include overriding interests. See the provisions of section 24 and 25 of the Registration of Lands Act.
42. Section 3 (1) of the Trespass Act, Cap 294 stipulates provides that:
"Any person who without reasonable excuse enters, is or remains upon or erects any structure on, or cultivates or tills or grazes stock or permits stock to be on, private land without the consent of the occupier thereof shall be guilty of an offence.”
43. The authors of Clerks and Lindsell on Torts, which characterises trespass as an unjustified entry onto land in the possession of another. Broadly, trespass to land encompasses entry onto the land or any direct and immediate act that interferes with the possession of another person's land. Trespass constitutes a breach of the right to possession, and the Plaintiff is required to demonstrate that it possessed the immediate and exclusive right to the land in question, and that the Defendant entered the land during such possession. It is trite that an honest belief that the land belonged to the Defendant is not a good defence nor an excuse to trespass.
44. In the case of Charles Ogejo Ochieng Vs Geoffrey Okumu [1995] EKLR, the Court of Appeal held that;
“Trespass is an injury to the possessory right, and therefore the proper Plaintiff in an action for trespass to land is the person who has title to it or the person who is deemed to have possession of the land at the time of trespass.”
45. In this instance, the 2nd Defendant has acknowledged entry onto the Plaintiff's land and the construction of a block of flats. He asserts that he acquired one parcel from Mazao Properties Limited with the Plaintiffs' knowledge and active involvement. The Plaintiffs have denied these allegations. These claims have not been substantiated, except for the admission of trespass, albeit for different reasons.
46. The Court observes that the Plaintiffs' case against the 2nd Defendant remains predominantly unchallenged and unsupported by substantive evidence. Consequently, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has successfully established their case against the 2nd Defendant.
Reliefs
47. In the case of Park Towers Limited Vs John Mithamo Njika & 7 others [2014] EKLR, the Court stated that where trespass is proved, a party need not prove that he suffered any specific damage or loss to be awarded damages. … the Court has a duty to assess the damages awardable based on the unique facts and circumstances of the case.
48. Halsbury 4th ed, Vol 45 at para 26, 1503 provides as follows on computation of damages in an action of trespass: -
a) If the Plaintiff proves the trespass he is entitled to recover nominal damages, even if he has not suffered any actual loss.
b) If the trespass has caused the Plaintiff actual damage, he is entitled to receive such amount as will compensate him for his loss.
c) Where the Defendant has made use of the Plaintiffs land, the Plaintiff is entitled to receive by way of damages such sum as would reasonably be paid for that use.
d) Where there is an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional trespass by a government official or where the Defendant cynically disregards the rights or the Plaintiff in the land with the object of making a gain by his unlawful conduct, exemplary damages may be awarded.
e) If the trespass is accompanied by aggravating circumstances which do not allow an award of exemplary damages, the general damages may be increased.
49. In the case of Nakuru Industries Limited (supra) the Court cited the case of Duncan Ndegwa V Kenya Pipeline HCC No. 2577 of 1990 (Nairobi) where the Court held: -
“The general principles as regards the measure of damages to be awarded in cases of trespass to land where damage has been occasioned to the land is the amount of diminution in value or the cost of reinstatement of the land. The overriding principles is to put the claimant in the position he was prior to the infliction of the harm.”
50. It is trite that having made a positive finding on trespass, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages without having to prove it [ per se]
51. The Plaintiff has claimed Kshs 10 Million for trespass against the 2nd Defendant. However, considering the size of the land, the duration of the trespass, the loss incurred by the Plaintiff, and the fact that the 2nd Defendant remained on the disputed property despite a restraining order, I hereby award the Plaintiff Kshs 2,000,000/- as damages for trespass.
Costs
52. The final issue for determination is who bears the costs. Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that costs generally follow the event. In Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court affirmed that costs follow the event unless the Court has good reason to order otherwise. The Plaintiff has succeeded in its case, and I see no reason to deny it costs. I so award.
Final orders for disposal
53. Ultimately, the final orders for disposal are;
a. The Plaintiff's case against the 2nd Defendant succeeds.
b. It is hereby declared that the Plaintiff is the lawful exclusive owner of Land Reference Number 209/14854 [suit land].
c. The 2nd Defendant be and is hereby ordered to vacate the suit premises and hand over vacant possession to the Plaintiff within the next 45 days; in default, eviction shall ensue.
d. It is hereby ordered that any building in the suit land shall be demolished at the cost of the 2nd Defendant within the next 45 days.
e. That a permanent injunction do issue against the Defendants, their servants and/or employees, from trespassing, attempted destruction, subsequent construction, evicting the Plaintiffs from the suit land and/or otherwise howsoever interfering with the said land.
f. The 2nd Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay damages to the Plaintiff in the sum of Kshs 2 Million payable within the next 45 days.
g. The costs of the suit shall be borne by the 2nd Defendant.
54. Orders accordingly
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 8th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.
J. G. KEMEI
JUDGE
Delivered virtually in the presence of:
1. Mr. Ojiambo for Plaintiff
2. N/A for the 1st Defendant
3. Mr. Wanyanga for the 2nd Defendant
4. CA- Mr Boniface