REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: MILIMANI ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
CASE NUMBER: ELCLA/E097/2025
MOTOR MANIA BODY BUILDERS LIMITED VS GAKUMO KIHORO & SONS LIMITED
JUDGMENT
(Being an appeal from the decision of the Learned Honorable H.M. Nyaberi, Chief Magistrate delivered on 31st January 2022 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Commercial Court Civil Case No. 6498 of 2010).
1. The Appellant, Motor Mania Body Builders Limited, occupied L.R. No. 209/8209/6, Nairobi (“the suit premises”), owned by the Respondent, Gakumo Kihoro & Sons Limited. The Appellant entered into an oral tenancy in January 2009 at Kshs. 200,000/= per month, which transitioned into a purchase agreement dated May 14, 2009, for Kshs. 30,000,000/= with a completion date of 90 days. The sale was not completed within the stipulated period.
2. The Appellant contended that upon execution of the Sale Agreement and payment of the deposit, it became a purchaser in possession and was no longer liable to pay monthly rent. The Appellant paid a 10% deposit of Kshs. 3,000,000/= and secured bridging finance of Kshs. 27,000,000/= from Equatorial Bank Limited by December 10, 2009, backed by a professional undertaking issued by M/S Wangai Nyuthe & Company Advocates.
3. The Respondent contended that, under Clause H of the Sale Agreement, the Appellant remained a tenant pending completion of the sale and payment of the purchase price. On 12 October 2010, the Respondent instructed M/S Garam Investments to levy distress for alleged rent arrears of Kshs. 2,200,000/= for the period January to October 2010, and subsequently counterclaimed for the same amount. The distress prompted the underlying suit, which was dismissed by the trial court.
4. The Appellant consequently filed Milimani CMCC No. 6498 of 2010 (“the trial court”) case, seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction against distress and damages for alleged unlawful distress.
5. The trial court in its judgment delivered on 31.01.2022 held:-
“The defendant has demonstrated that the plaintiff is in arrears of Kshs.
2.2 million. The plaintiff has not demonstrated to the contrary that the amount has been paid. The plaintiff averment in his reply to statement of defence and defence to counter claim are merely denials without any supportive evidence.
In conclusion, the plaintiff suit is dismissed and I hereby enter judgment for the defendant in its counter claim as against the plaintiff with costs.”
6. The Appellant being aggrieved by the said decision filed the appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 3rd June 2025 raising 12 grounds thereof. The Appellant sought the following reliefs:-
“1. That this Appeal be allowed. .
2. That, the judgment of Honorable H.M. Nyaberi, Chief Magistrate delivered on 31st January, 2022 in Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Commercial Court Civil Case No. 6498 of 2010 be set aside and this Honorable Court be pleased to substitute therefor its own judgment.
3. That the costs of this Appeal be awarded to the Appellant.”
7. The Respondent’s counsel filed the Notice of Appointment dated 18.03.2026.
8. On 21.07.2026, the Appeal was admitted. Further, the court with the consent from the Appellant directed that the matter be canvassed by way of written submissions.
9. The Respondent filed its submissions dated 24.09.2026, while the Appellant filed its submissions dated 25.06.2026 on 7.10.2026.
10. The Appellant submitted that the Respondent breached the Agreement for Sale dated May 14, 2009. The contract was subject to the Law Society Conditions of Sale (1989 Edition) with a 90-day completion period, making time of the essence. The Respondent failed to convey clear title within the completion timeline due to an existing restriction and caveat on the register, which was only cleared in October 2010. The Appellant argued that under the rule reiterated in Pius Kimaiyo Langat v. Co-operative Bank (K) Limited [2017] eKLR, parties are bound by the terms of the contract. Furthermore, applying Lord Diplock's maxim that every failure to perform a primary obligation constitutes a breach of contract, the Respondent failed to deliver completion documents within a reasonable time. The condition requiring delivery of completion documents was inserted for the Appellant's protection. Consequently, as established in Aikman v. Muchoki [1984] KLR 353, common law courts must uphold commercial rights, and a party in breach cannot benefit from its own default or be unjustly enriched by its delay.
11. The Appellant contended that it ceased to be a tenant after December 2009, becoming a purchaser in possession pending completion. Upon execution of the sale agreement and payment of the deposit, the tenancy converted into a tenancy with an option to purchase, as recognized in Simon Ngatunyi Chabi v. Solomon Kiragu Thande (Nairobi HCCC No. 602 of 2005). Citing Government of the United States of America v. Joseph Muiruri Githongo (Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1999), the Appellant asserted that sums paid after securing bridging finance should account towards the purchase price.
12. The appellant submitted that the Respondent's direction in January 2010 for the Appellant to pay municipal rates and land rent directly demonstrated an acknowledgment of the Appellant's status as beneficial owner. The sale agreement contained no express term requiring continued rent payments past the ready-for-completion date of December 2009. Under Section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act, land contract terms must be in writing. Applying the parole evidence rule and principles of contractual interpretation, equity precludes the Respondent from charging rent ad infinitum due to its own failure to lift the caveat.
13. The Appellant asserted that the distress for rent levied on October 12, 2010, was excessive, wrongful, and illegal. Under Section 5 of the Distress for Rent Act (Cap 293), the right to distrain after determination of a lease exists only within six months and during the continuance of the landlord's title. The tenancy determined in December 2009; thus, distress in October 2010 fell outside the six-month statutory window. Moreover, title had passed to the Appellant by registration on October 11, 2010, extinguishing the Respondent's landlord interest. The Respondent also held a deposit of Kshs. 3,000,000/= and an undertaking for Kshs. 27,000,000/= prior to rescission attempt. Additionally, the goods seized constituted tools of trade and implements, which are statutorily exempt from distress.
14. The Appellant submitted that it established a prima facie case on a balance of
probabilities, satisfying the evidential standards under Sections 3(2), 107, 108, and 109 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80). Relying on Gichinga Kibutha v. Caroline Nduku [2018] eKLR, Bwire v. Wayo & Sailoki (Civil Appeal 32 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 7 (KLR), Miller
v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, Kirugi & Another v. Kabiya & 3 Others [1987] KLR 347, and Kanyungu Njogu v. Daniel Kimani Maingi [2000] eKLR, the Appellant proved that its account was more probable than not. The Appellant prays that the appeal be allowed, the trial magistrate's judgment set aside, and costs awarded pursuant to Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v. Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, Hussein Muhumed Sirat v. Attorney General & Another [2017] eKLR, and Cecilia Karuru Ngayo v. Barclays Bank (K) Limited [2014] eKLR.
15. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant remained liable to pay rent until completion and transfer of the property. It contended that pursuant to Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a vendor is entitled to the rents and profits of the property until legal ownership passes to the purchaser. This principle was judicially recognized in Jayne Wangui Gachoka v In Time Limited & Another [2006] eKLR. The respondent contended that the contractual terms were entirely consistent with that position. Specifically, Clause H of the Sale Agreement expressly provided that the Appellant was not entitled to possession as purchaser until payment of the purchase price in full. Furthermore, Clause 1 incorporated the Law Society Conditions of Sale (1989 Edition),of which Condition 6(4) stipulates that where a purchaser is a lessee or tenant, the contract does not determine or affect the existing lease or tenancy.
16. The respondent contended that the parties’ conduct supported the continuation of the tenancy. In particular, by its advocates’ letter dated 5th January 2010, the Appellant expressly described Kshs. 400,000 as “advance rent paid by our client on account.” Consequently, the appellant’s continued possession of the premises and subsequent payment of rent were consistent with a subsisting monthly tenancy.
17. The Appellant cannot, in the circumstances, recharacterize its occupation so as to avoid its contractual obligation to pay rent. The court is bound to give effect to the parties’ agreement and cannot rewrite it, a settled principle underscored in Lalji Karsan Rabadia & 2 Others v Commercial Bank of Africa Limited [2015] eKLR and National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd [2002] 2 EA 503.
18. The Respondent submitted that judicial authorities cited by the Appellant are distinguishable both on their facts and contractual terms. The Appellant was not entitled to possession in the capacity as purchaser prior to payment of the full purchase price and subsequent transfer of title. Having remained in possession as a tenant, it was liable to pay rent accruing during that period.
19. The Respondent submitted that it demanded for rent arrears amounting to Kshs. 2,200,000/= was legally tenable and d substantiated. In support of the claim the Respondent produced itemized Statements of Accounts and supporting invoices for the period running up to October 2010, which gave full credit for advance payments made by the Appellant (including Kshs. 400,000 in January 2010 and Kshs. 500,000 in September 2010). The Appellant failed to introduce any rebuttal evidence or establish the arithmetical accuracy of respondent’s statements.
20. The Respondent submitted that it was fully entitled in law to levy distress for rent against the Appellant. The Appellant's assertion that the distress was illegal on the ground that no rent was due fails upon the ground that a valid tenancy existed.
21. Furthermore, the Appellant's contention that the Respondent should have offset the rent arrears against the purchase deposit cannot stand . rent constitutes an independent obligation ar.ising out of occupation. Consequently, setting off rent against the deposit would merely create a corresponding shortfall in the purchase price.
22. The Respondent urged that the appeal is devoid of merit. be dismissed with costs and the Judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
23. Having considered the entire record of appeal, the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal and rival submissions filed by the respective parties this court identifies the following issues for determination:-
1. Whether the parties executed a valid and binding Agreement for Sale on 14th May 2009 and the legal effect of its terms and conditions on the rights and obligations of the parties.
2. Whether the Appellant continued in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant of the Respondent pending full payment of the purchase price and transfer of title
3. Whether the Appellant was in rent arrears of Kshs. 2.2 million.
4. Whether the Respondent was entitled to levy distress for rent.
5. Whether the appellant is entitled to the reliefs sought
6. Who should bear the costs of the Application?
24. This Court is mindful of its appellate jurisdiction which imposes a duty to reassess
, evaluate, and independently determine the evidence presented on record as settled in the case of Selle and Another vs. Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd & Others, [1968] EA 123 and Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93t that an appellate court will only interfere with the findings of a trial judge where it has been demonstrated that such discretion was exercised on wrong principles, or where a manifest miscarriage of justice has occurred.
i) Whether the parties executed a valid and binding Agreement for Sale dated 14th May 2009, and the legal effect of its terms and conditions on the rights and obligations of the parties .
25. It is undisputed that the parties executed a Sale Agreement dated 14th May 2009 in respect of L.R. No. 209/8209/6 situate in Nairobi at a consideration of Kshs. 30,000,000/= .it was an express condition of the agreement that the tenant/appellant had the option to purchase the plot upon paying a deposit of 10% of the purchase price.
26. In its judgment dated 31.1.2022 the trial court found that the Appellant remained a tenant with an option to purchase and was consequently liable to pay the agreed monthly rent until completion. The Appellant challenges this finding on the basis that, upon execution of the Sale agreement and payment of the 10% deposit, it became a purchaser in possession and its obligation to pay rent thereby ceased.
27. The Court has considered the respective rival arguments advanced by the parties on the issue. Previously, courts in such cases as Simon Ngatunyi Chabi V Solomon Kiragu Thande [2005] KEHC 571 (KLR) have underscored the position that Upon the execution of a sale agreement and the payment of the deposit, the tenancy converted into a vendor -purchaser relationship(tenancy with an option to purchase).
28. Over time the position of Simon’s case (supra) has been refined with courts moving to a deeper understanding of the contracts. The Court of Appeal in National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2001] KECA 362 (KLR) reiterated the principle that a court cannot rewrite a contract for the parties and must give effect to the terms voluntarily agreed upon.
29. Furthermore, The Supreme Court in the case of Kwanza Estates Limited v Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (Petition E001 of 2024) [2024] KESC 74 (KLR) reaffirmed the principle of pacta sunt servanda- a Latin phrase meaning agreements must be kept. It is a fundamental legal principle stating that valid contracts, compacts and treaties are binding upon the parties who sign them.
30. The court is guided by the settled principle of contract that the intention of contracting parties must primarily be ascertained from the terms of their agreement. In Eldo City Limited v Corn Products Kenya Ltd & another [2013] KEHC 5916 (KLR) stipulating: -
“It is trite law that in deciding disputes, it is the court’s duty to give effect to the intention of the parties. The parties’ intention is discernible from the documents and conduct of the parties. However, onerous a document or contract may be, the court’s duty is to give effect to it. In the case of Smith –vs- Cook (1891) AC 297 at 303 the court held: "The duty of the court is to give the natural meaning to the language of the deed unless it involves some manifest absurdity or would be inconsistent with some other provision of the deed and would therefore be contrary to the intention of the parties as appearing upon the face of the deed.”
31. Further, the Supreme Court of Kenya decision of Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others v Okoiti & 3 others [2023] KESC 38 (KLR) stipulates that:-
“116. From the above definition, an MoU is preliminary to a contract and or agreement between parties and is characterized as non-binding and unintended to create any contractual obligations on either party. This does not mean that courts are not faced with the question of establishing the binding nature of an MoU. When that happens, a court considers the wording and the apparent intention of the parties. In stating so, we are persuaded by the findings of HH Humphrey Lloyd QC in ERDC Group v Brunel University [2006] EWHC 687 (TCC) in the following words: “Letters of intent come in all sorts of forms. Some are merely expressions of hope; others are firmer but make it clear that no legal consequences ensue; others presage a contract and may be tantamount to an agreement ‘subject to contract’; others are contracts falling short of the full-blown contract that is contemplated; others are in reality that contract in all but name. There can therefore be no prior assumptions, such as looking to see if words such as ‘letter of intent’ have or have not been used. The phrase ‘letter of intent’ is not a term of art. Its meaning and effect depend on the circumstances of each case.”
117. In establishing the intent of the parties, we are further persuaded by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in RTS Flexible Systems v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG [2010] UKSC 14 & 38 where it expressed itself as follows: “The general principles are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if so, upon what terms depends upon what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind, but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and had agreed upon all the terms which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation of legally binding relations. Even if certain terms of economic or other significance to the parties have not been finalized, an objective appraisal of their words and conduct may lead to the conclusion that they did not intend agreement of such terms to be a pre-condition to a concluded and legally binding agreement.”
32. In the present case, the parties expressly agreed under Clause H of the Sale Agreement that:-
"The purchaser shall not be entitled to possession as a purchaser until the purchase price is paid in full.”
33. The contractual intention is therefore clear. Execution of the Sale Agreement and payment of the deposit did not, by themselves, confer upon the Appellant the status of a purchaser in possession. That status was expressly made conditional upon payment of the purchase price in full.
34. The position is further reinforced by Clause 1 of the Sale Agreement, which incorporated the Law Society Conditions of Sale (1989 Edition). Clause 6(4) thereof, under the heading “Possession before Completion,” provides that where the purchaser is a lessee or tenant, the contract does not determine or otherwise affect the existing lease or tenancy. The Sale Agreement therefore preserved, rather than extinguished, the Appellant’s pre-existing tenancy pending completion.
b. whether the Appellant continued in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant of the Respondent pending full payment of the purchase price and transfer of title
35. From the record, the fact that the stipulated 90-day completion period expired without completion did not alter that position. The Special Conditions in Clause G provided for termination and refund of the deposit upon failure to complete, but neither party exercised that right. Instead, the parties continued to pursue completion. The Respondent obtained the order removing the caveat and furnished the completion documents on 23rd April 2010, while the Appellant continued with payment of the purchase price. Their conduct demonstrates acquiescence to completion beyond the original contractual period.
36. The court in George Njenga Kagai v Samuel Kabi Njoroge & Another [2019] eKLR stated:-
“With regard to time being of the essence, the principles as set out by this Court in the case of Sagoo v Dourado (1983) KLR 366 are as follows: “In contracts of all types, time will not be considered to be of essence unless: (i) The parties expressly stipulate those conditions as to time must be strictly complied.
(ii) The nature of the subject matter of the contract or the surrounding circumstances show that time should be considered of the essence, and/or (iii) A party who has been subjected to unreasonable delay gives notice to the party in default making time of the essence”.
37. The mere expiry of a stipulated completion period therefore did not, in the circumstances of this case, terminate the agreement or extinguish the parties’ continuing contractual obligations.
38. Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 further recognizes the vendor’s entitlement to rents and profits until legal ownership passes to the purchaser. The Appellant’s obligation to pay rent was therefore not displaced merely because a sale agreement had been executed.
39. The parties’ correspondence is particularly instructive. The payments made by the Appellant were expressly described as “advance rent”, demonstrating that the parties continued to treat the Appellant’s occupation as a tenancy pending completion. There is no sufficient evidence that the parties agreed to convert such payments into part of the purchase price or otherwise extinguish the tenancy. The Court therefore finds that the Appellant remained a tenant until registration of the transfer.
40. The record shows that the Appellant became the registered proprietor on 21st October 2010. Consequently, rent accruing up to completion date remained payable. The subsisting landlord-tenant relationship also entitled the Respondent, subject to the applicable law, to invoke the remedy of distress for rent before completion.
41. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court correctly concluded that the Appellant remained in occupation as a tenant pending full payment of the purchase price and transfer of title. The execution of the Sale Agreement and payment of the deposit did not extinguish the tenancy or relieve the Appellant of its obligation to pay rent. The trial court properly considered the express contractual terms, the parties’ subsequent conduct, the documentary correspondence and the evidence of PW1 and DW1. There is therefore no basis for interfering with that finding.
ii) Whether the Appellant was in rent arrears of Kshs. 2.2 million and whether, in the circumstances, the Respondent was entitled to levy distress for rent.
42. The trial court found that between 30.06.2009 and 15.10.2010, the Appellant had paid only Kshs. 1 million, leaving rent arrears of Kshs. 2.2 million. Having found that a tenancy relationship existed, that finding must be considered against the statutory framework governing the parties’ relationship. Section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301 defines a landlord as the person entitled to the rent and profits payable under a tenancy, a tenancy as a relationship arising from a lease, agreement or operation of law, and a tenant as the person entitled to the tenancy, whether or not in occupation.
43. The evidence established that the Appellant initially occupied the premises pursuant to an oral month-to-month tenancy at a monthly rent of Kshs. 200,000. PW1, Victor Mwaura, admitted the agreed rent, while DW1, David Kihoro, confirmed that rent remained payable until 15 October 2010.
44. The Respondent’s entitlement to levy distress must, however, be considered in light of the date on which the Appellant acquired ownership of the suit property. Section 5 of the Distress for Rent Act, Cap. 293 provides that:-
“Any person having rent in arrear and due upon a demise, lease or contract after the ending or determination of the demise, lease or contract, may distrain for the arrears after the ending or determination in the same manner as he might have done if the demise, lease or contract had not been ended or determined: Provided that distress under this section shall be made within the space of six months after the determination of the demise, lease or contract and during the continuance of the landlord's title or interest, and during the possession of the tenant from whom the arrears became due”
45. The record shows that the Appellant became the registered proprietor of the suit property on 21 October 2010, while the Respondent levied distress on 12 October 2010. The distress was therefore levied before the Appellant acquired registered ownership and during the period when the Respondent retained its interest as landlord. The fact that the Appellant subsequently became the proprietor did not retrospectively invalidate a distress lawfully levied on 12 October 2010. The Respondent was accordingly entitled to distrain for rent that had accrued and remained due during the subsistence of the tenancy.
46. The Appellant nevertheless contends that the Respondent’s receipt of both rent and the purchase price amounted to unjust enrichment. In Samuel Kamau Macharia vs Kenya Commercial Bank Limited, Kenya Commercial Finance Company Limited [2003] KEHC 725 (KLR) the Court observed:-
“Broadly founded upon the aim of equity to do justice between parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the remedy of restitution to counter unjust benefit proceed upon the realization that to allow a defendant to retain such a benefit would result in his being unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s expense, and this, subject to certain defined limits, will not be tolerated by the law, and owing to the importance and aim of this doctrine in every advanced and civilized system of justice: “Woe unto the day when it is lost sight of in Kenya, which would also be contrary to the spirit of Section 3(c) of the Judicature Act. I trust that in future, in appropriate cases, there will be less smothering of just equitable rights” on the basis of technical objections and artificial distinctions oblivious to justice and substance.
This was the emphatic language of Madan, JA (as he then was), in the Court of Appeal of Kenya, in the case of Chase International Investment Corporation and another v Laxman Keshra and others , [1978] Kenya LR 143, at p 154, where it was firmly and unequivocally laid down that in Kenya a claim may properly be founded for restitution where it would be unjust to allow a party to retain the benefits of an unjust enrichment.
And, on the authorities approved by Madan and Wambuzi, JJA (as they then were) in the Chase International Investment Corporation case (supra), the basic elements presupposed by the doctrine of unjust enrichment are (1) that the defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) that he has been so enriched at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain the benefit in the circumstances of the case. These subordinate principles of the general principle of unjust enrichment are interrelated. They clearly show the nature of restitutionary claims, and how people incur restitution ARY obligations.
A full exposition of the general and subordinate principles is not practically possible within the compass of a judgement. Awesome in its comprehensiveness and insight, the widely acclaimed work of Lord Goff of Chieveley and Professor Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, 5th edn (1998), which is a masterly integration of principles drawn from many different branches of law, provides a good guide on the issue raised in the instant case. In particular, pages 16-41, are instructive on the issue before us.”
47. The Court of Appeal in Nandlal Jivraj Shah & 2 others (all trading as Jivaco Agencies v Kingfisher Properties Limited [2015] KECA 176 (KLR) stipulated as follows:-
“Similarly, the proposition that a controlled tenancy continues to exist merely because the appellants are still in occupation of the premises is, with due respect to learned counsel, preposterous. No provision of law creates controlled tenancies by virtue of mere occupation of premises and with non-payment of rent no less! The fact that the respondent is yet to evict the appellants does not serve to resurrect a controlled tenancy which has already run its course and been terminated. For the above reasons, the authorities of Msa HCCC No. 363 of 2002; Mwai Limited & another v. Bridge-up Container Services Limited, Msa HC Misc. Appl No. 27 of 2010; and R v. The Chairperson Business Premises Rent Tribunal ex parte Kenya Safari Lodges and Hotels Limited & another (citation) as cited by the appellant in support of this proposition fail to find any persuasive application in this appeal.”
48. From the foregoing, the Appellant’s contention cannot succeed merely because the Respondent received rent during the period preceding completion of the sale and subsequently received the purchase price. The two payments arose from distinct legal obligations: rent was payable under the subsisting tenancy for the Appellant’s occupation and use of the premises, while the purchase price was payable pursuant to the Sale Agreement for the transfer of ownership.
49. There is, therefore, no evidential basis for treating the payments as duplicative consideration for the same obligation. The receipt of rent for the period during which the Appellant occupied the premises as a tenant, followed by receipt of the agreed purchase price upon completion of the sale, did not, without more, constitute unjust enrichment.
50. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Respondent’s levy of distress on 12 October 2010 was lawful, and that the Appellant has not established that the Respondent was unjustly enriched by receiving rent in addition to the purchase price.
51. Accordingly, the trial court was correct to find that rent was payable during the subsistence of the tenancy and to assess the arrears proved by the evidence as Kshs 2.2 Million.
Who should bear the costs of the Application?
52. The award of costs is a matter within the discretion of the Court, which must be exercised judiciously and on sound legal principles. In Rai & 3 Others v Rai & 4 Others [2014] KESC 31 (KLR), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that costs follow the event, while emphasizing that costs are compensatory and not punitive.
53. In the present case, the Appellant has failed to successfully challenge the judgment of the trial court. Finding no exceptional circumstance or other sufficient reason to justify a departure from the general rule that costs follow the events , the costs of the appeal are awarded to the respondent.
54. The orders of the court in disposition of the appeal dated 3.06.2025 are as follows:
i) The Appeal is not meritorious and is dismissed
ii) The Judgment and decree of the learned trial magistrate dated 31.1.2022 is upheld.
iii) The Appellant to pay costs of the appeal to the respondent. It is so ordered accordingly.
DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED THIS 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 AT VOI.
JECINTA ORWA
JUDGE
In the presence of :
MR GIKARIA FOR THE APPELLANT
MR OMINO FOR THE RESPONDENT
MR LETISIA- COURT ASSISTANT