REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI (MILIMANI)
E.L.C. NO. 582 OF 2011 (O.S.)
IN THE MATTER OF THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ACT
AND
IN THE MATTER OF LAND PARCEL NO. KIAMBAA/KIHARA/4694
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTERED LAND ACT
BETWEEN
EDAH NGENDO MORU (Suing as legal representative and widow of the estate of the late EVANS MUURU DAVID) ……............................ PLAINTIFF
AND
TERESIA WAITHIRA NJENGA (Administrator ad litem of the Estate of JAMES NJENGA NDUNGI, Deceased) ………….......... 1ST DEFENDANT
LOISE WAMBUI MWAURA
(Alias WAMBUI MWAURA) ……………………………… 2ND DEFENDANT
JUDGEMENT
1. By a Further Amended Originating Summons dated 14th March 2025, taken out under Order 37 Rules 7 and 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, the Plaintiff claims to be entitled to the land known as KIAMBAA/KIHARA/4694 by way of adverse possession and seeks determination of the following questions:
a) Whether the title to the suit premises has been extinguished by operation of law;
b) Whether the Plaintiff has acquired title and become the proprietor of the suit premises by way of adverse possession;
c) Whether the Plaintiff should be registered as proprietor of the suit premises in place of James Njenga Ndungi, now deceased and represented by Teresia Waithira Njenga, the Administrator ad litem of his estate, as the 1st Defendant herein;
e) Whether the Deputy Registrar of this Honourable Court should be authorised to execute all forms and documents necessary to effect rectification of the register accordingly; and
f) Who should bear the costs of the Further Amended Originating Summons.
2. The Further Amended Originating Summons is grounded on the supporting affidavit of Edah Ngendo Moru, sworn on 14th March 2025, in her capacity as the widow of the deceased original Plaintiff, Evans Muuru David. The claim centers on an assertion of title acquired by adverse possession over a plot measuring approximately 50 feet by 25 feet (the suit premises), which currently forms part of the land formerly identified as Kiambaa/Kihara/1909 but now identified as Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 and is registered in the name of the 1st Defendant, James Njenga Ndungi.
3. The factual background traces back to 1973, when the late Evans Muuru David and his late brothers, Evans Gitau Kamuiru and Caxton Karuri Kimuiru, orally agreed to purchase roughly one acre out of Kiambaa/Kihara/739 from the registered owner, the late Mwaura Ndungi. Mwaura Ndungi subsequently transferred portions of the land to Evans Gitau Kamuiru (who held his share in trust for himself and Caxton Karuri Kimuiru) and to the 1st Defendant as tenants-in-common in unequal shares. The brothers took immediate possession and commenced development, culminating in a formal transfer of their portion to the three brothers in 1999.
4. The Applicant stated that around 1989, Evans Muuru David entered into a separate oral agreement with Mwaura Ndungi to purchase a portion of the adjacent suit premises measuring 50x 25 feet for Kshs. 60,000/=, with transfer conditioned upon full payment. Although the entire purchase price was paid in 1989 and Evans Muuru David took immediate possession, Mwaura Ndungi failed to transfer the legal title. Despite this failure, the Plaintiff's family maintained open, continuous, and uninterrupted occupation of the suit premises from 1989 onward.
5. Beginning in 1999, following approved building plans, they constructed residential-cum-business premises on Kiambaa/Kihara/1907 that extended onto part of the suit premises, while using another section as a driveway to their home.
6. Dispute arose over the construction and escalated around 20th September 2011, when the 1st Defendant entered the suit premises, uprooted the common boundary fence, and erected temporary structures blocking the Plaintiff's long-standing driveway. A subsequent search at the Kiambu Land Registry revealed that the 2nd Defendant had transferred the suit premises to the 1st Defendant on 7th May 2011. The deponent contends this transfer was fraudulent, as both Defendants were well aware of the Plaintiff’s long-standing occupation and extensive development of the land. Furthermore, during succession proceedings for Mwaura Ndungi’s estate (Kiambu SPM Succession Cause No. 100 of 2003), the 2nd Defendant failed to disclose the prior sale or the Plaintiff's physical possession to the court.
7. Ultimately, the Plaintiff asserts that because they held open, peaceful, continuous, and non-permissive possession of the suit premises for over twelve years since 1989, during which time neither Mwaura Ndungi nor the Defendants interrupted or challenged their occupation, title was acquired by adverse possession under the Limitation of Actions Act. Consequently, the Plaintiff maintains that the 2nd Defendant's legal title had already been extinguished by operation of law prior to 2011, rendering the subsequent transfer to the 1st Defendant null and void.
Replying Affidavit of the 1st Defendant
8. The 1st Defendant, James Njenga Ndungi (deceased), opposed the Plaintiff's claim by way of two replying affidavits sworn on 9th January 2012 and 5th March 2012. The 1st Defendant asserted that parcel L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/4694 ceased to exist following a further subdivision on 21st September 2011, and that he is the registered proprietor of the resulting larger parcel, L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 (supported by mutation forms and official searches). He pointed out a discrepancy between the Plaintiff’s claimed dimensions (approximately 50 feet by 25 feet) and the actual recorded area of parcel 4694 (approximately 0.030 hectares with different measurements). He stated that he legally purchased the pathway and an adjoining portion from the 2nd Defendant in 2009, incorporating it into parcel 5139.
9. Denying the element of exclusive occupation, the 1st Defendant stated that the Plaintiff did not hold exclusive or uninterrupted control over the suit premises. He stated that since as early as 1972, the area was continuously used by himself, his tenants, the 2nd Defendant’s family, and the general public, including school children and churchgoers, as a general pathway, as well as for dumping rubbish and cutting fencing trees. He produced school receipts and notices to evidence this historic community use and denied that Mwaura Ndungi ever sold or gifted the portion to the Plaintiff.
10. The 1st Defendant characterized the conflict as an attempted encroachment rather than an adverse possession claim. He stated that in or around 2002, the Plaintiff attempted to construct a stone house across the boundary line, but construction was halted after a surveyor confirmed that the structure encroached onto neighboring land. Furthermore, he denied that the Plaintiff was left landlocked, noting that the Plaintiff already maintains functional access and a gate through parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/1907.
11. Finally, the 1st Defendant disputed the accuracy of the Assistant Chief’s minutes from the 2004 elders' meeting. He explicitly denied that either the 2nd Defendant or her son ever admitted that Mwaura Ndungi had sold, gifted, or permitted the Plaintiff to occupy the disputed land.
Plaintiff's Evidence
12. The Plaintiff/Applicant, Edah Ngendo Moru (PW1), testified as the wife and legal representative of the estate of the late Evans Muuru David. She adopted her witness statement dated 17th May 2025 and produced the documents contained in the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents, which were marked as exhibits. She also adopted the Further Amended Originating Summons dated 14th March 2025 and confirmed that the prayers sought.
13. The written statement, oral testimony, cross-examination, and re-examination of Edah Ngendo Moru (PW1) built upon the facts claimed in the supporting affidavit, but provided further details. She clarified the historical subdivision of the parent land, Kiambaa/Kihara/739 (originally held by Njenga Ndungi and Mwaura Ndungi), which eventually became parcel numbers Kiambaa/Kihara/1907, 1908, and 1909. While the Plaintiff’s family owns parcel 1907, the disputed 50 ft by 25 ft strip acquired orally in 1989 for Kshs. 60,000/= paid in installments, was a passage that had no title meant to re-route their homestead access to the Kihara-Gachie Road.
14. Following Mwaura Ndungi’s death in 2001 and subsequent Kiambu Succession Cause No. 100 of 2003, parcel 1908 was subdivided into parcels 3825–3829, and further into parcels 4693–4696. The suit premises specifically fell within parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/4694.
15. On cross-examination, PW1 explicitly distinguished the claim, emphasizing that she does not claim the entirety of parcel 4694 (which measures approximately 0.03 hectares), but strictly the 50 ft by 25 ft portion used as their pathway and driveway.
16. PW1 testified that Mwaura Ndungi personally planted croton tree seeds (Mukinduri) to mark the new boundary and instructed his family not to interfere or cultivate the section. When the commercial development commenced in 1999 on parcel 1907, it extended onto this strip with Mwaura’s full knowledge and acquiescence. PW1 noted that during boundary changes, fences were lowered in the presence of family members and Mwaura's brother, James Ndungi.
17. PW1 detailed an earlier attempt at dispute resolution following a 2004 complaint by Mwaura’s son, Peter Ndungi Mwaura, to the Assistant Chief of Kihara Sub-location. At an elders' meeting on 26th August 2004, the elders confirmed the sale and Mwaura’s directive to respect the Plaintiff's occupation. Crucially, PW1 testified that both the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant's husband attended this meeting and expressly admitted being aware of Mwaura Ndungi's instructions not to interfere with the Plaintiff’s possession.
18. Despite the 2004 elders' confirmation, PW1 stated that the 2nd Defendant transferred parcel 4694 to the 1st Defendant’s husband on 7th May 2010 without the Plaintiff’s knowledge. In September 2011, the 1st Defendant's husband destroyed the common fence, blocked the long-standing driveway, demolished a portion of the Plaintiff's structure, and began constructing a multi-storey stone building. Confronted with missing written sale documentation on cross-examination due to the deaths of the original contracting parties, PW1 grounded her prayer both on the underlying oral purchase and on uninterrupted, open, and adverse possession exceeding twelve years prior to the 2011 interference.
Defence Evidence
19. The 1st Defendant, Teresia Waithera Njenga (DW1), widow of the late James Njenga Ndungi, testified that she was defending the suit on behalf of his estate. She adopted her witness statement dated 23rd August 2022 as her evidence, and produced the documents contained in the Defendant's list of documents dated 10th May 2016, marked as exhibits. The written statement, oral testimony, cross-examination, and re-examination of Teresia Waithera Njenga (DW1), built upon the facts claimed in the replying affidavit, but provided further details.
20. DW1 opposed the adverse possession claim in its entirety, and confirmed that former parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/4694 ceased to exist following its 2011 subdivision and subsequent consolidation into parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 (measuring 0.044 hectares), which her late husband acquired from the 2nd Defendant, Loise Wambui Mwaura, for a consideration of Kshs. 2,000,000/=. She highlighted the discrepancy between the Plaintiff's claimed strip (50 feet by 25 feet, or approximately 0.012 hectares) and the former parcel 4694 (0.030 hectares), explaining that because the smaller portion was too small to hold an independent title, it was merged into parcel 5139, upon which her husband built a multi-storey stone structure.
21. DW1denied the allegation of exclusive and uninterrupted possession by the Plaintiff, and reiterated that the disputed path had historically been subjected to shared public and private use. She testified that since 1972, the portion was continuously used for passage and garbage disposal by her family, the 2nd Defendant’s family, and members of the public, including parents and students attending "Ann Monte" nursery school, which her husband had operated on parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/1909 from 2003 until its closure. She denied that the Plaintiff was ever landlocked or blocked from accessing her home, maintaining that the Plaintiff’s family had maintained their own independent access gate directly from the main road onto parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/1907 since 1972.
22. DW1 testified that the suit stemmed from boundary encroachment rather than adverse possession. She stated that in or about 2002, the Plaintiff attempted to erect a stone structure across the boundary, but construction was halted after a surveyor determined that the wall stood on what became parcel 5139, leading to a direction for its demolition.
23. During cross-examination, however, DW1 made notable admissions regarding the Plaintiff's prior connection to the land. As long-time neighbors and family friends, she conceded that she was well aware that the Plaintiff's family had at one point used the disputed strip as a pathway and parking area, though she asserted that this usage stopped once her family purchased the property. She further acknowledged that a house constructed by the Plaintiff's late husband was already standing near the boundary at the time of her family's purchase, and she admitted that she did not know whether the 2nd Defendant had ever notified or consulted the Plaintiff before selling the land to her husband. In re-examination, DW1 clarified that parcel 4670 was bought from the 2nd Defendant and merged with the path to form parcel 5139, maintaining that their family’s stone house was not constructed on the specific 50 feet by 25 feet portion claimed by the Plaintiff, but rather on part of the former path now contained within their legal title.
The Plaintiff's Submissions
24. The Plaintiff filed written submissions dated 20th May 2026. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant, Loise Wambui Mwaura, though served, neither entered appearance nor filed a defence. It was therefore submitted that the Plaintiff's evidence against the 2nd Defendant remained uncontroverted.
25. The submissions set out the requirements for the doctrine of adverse possession, constructive trust, and statutory land provisions to be proved.
26. The Plaintiff asserts that her family acquired title to the 25 feet by 50 feet strip via adverse possession, having maintained open, continuous, and exclusive occupation from 1989 until the 1st Defendant’s interference on 20th September 2011. Relying on Sections 7, 13, 17, and 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act alongside Lucy Wanjiku Mwenda v Benson Gicho Wainaina and Chevron (K) Ltd v Harrison Charo Wa Shutu, counsel contends that the statutory 12-year limitation period expired in 2001, extinguishing the registered owner's title well before the subsequent transfers.
27. Addressing the initial 1989 oral purchase, counsel cites Peter Mbiri Michuki v Samuel Mugo Michuki and Christian Muchiri Mburu v Abubakar Hussein Sadik to argue that entry under an oral agreement accompanied by full payment and physical possession validly grounds an adverse possession claim. The Plaintiff further invokes a constructive trust under Shah v Mombasa Bricks & Tiles Limited, submitting that a vendor who receives full payment holds the land in trust. Citing Francis v Saul and Joseph Muoki Kakenyi v David Hopcraft, counsel maintains that subsequent subdivisions, changes in parcel numbers (from Kiambaa/Kihara/1908 down to 4694 and 5139), or the lack of an independent title do not interrupt accrued adverse possession rights or prevent the court from ordering the survey and excision of an identifiable portion.
The 1st Defendant’s Submissions
28. The 1st Defendant’s written submissions, filed on 28th May 2026, opposed the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons by challenging the factual history, the legal nature of the Plaintiff’s occupation, the identification of the suit premises, and the validity of the reliefs sought.
29. The 1st Defendant contends that the Plaintiff’s claim must fail on grounds of title indefeasibility, permissive occupation, non-exclusivity, and flawed land identification. Relying on Sections 24(a) and 26(1) of the Land Registration Act and Esther Ndege Njeru v Leonard Gatei, counsel asserts that Title No. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 is protected under Article 40 of the Constitution, noting that the former parcel 4694 ceased to exist after being lawfully merged into parcel 5139 through regular administrative processes.
30. Counsel argues that because the Plaintiff’s entry was based on an oral sale agreement, her possession was inherently permissive and consensual, not hostile. Citing Sisto Wambugu v Kamau Njuguna and Samuel Miki Waweru v Jane Njeri Richu, the defense maintains that entry under a contract of sale cannot constitute adverse possession; under James Maina Kinya v Gerald Kwendaka, the proper remedy lies in contract law rather than land acquisition by prescription. Furthermore, relying on Mtana Lewa v Kahindi Ngala Mwagandi, counsel submits that the Plaintiff failed to establish exclusive possession over a clearly defined parcel, as the strip served as a historic public pathway for local families, churchgoers, and nursery school students.
Analysis And Determination
31. Having considered the Further Amended Originating Summons, the affidavits filed in support and in opposition thereto, the oral evidence of PW1 and DW1, the documentary evidence produced by the parties, the respective submissions, the questions for determination are as set out in the prayers in the Further Amended Originating Summons further amended on 14th March 2025. The said prayers are set out in full at the commencement of this judgement.
32. The doctrine of adverse possession is founded under Section 7, 13, 37 and 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows:
An action may not be brought by any person to recover land after the end of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.
Section 13 “(1) A right of action to recover land does not accrue unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (which possession is in this Act referred to as adverse possession), and, where under sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act a right of action to recover land accrues on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, a right of action does not accrue unless and until some person takes adverse possession of the land…”
33. In Kasuve V Mwaani Investments Limited & 4 others 1 KLR 184, the Court of Appeal restated what a Plaintiff in a claim for Adverse Possession has to prove in order to be entitled to land by Adverse Possession, the claimant must prove that he has been in exclusive possession of the land openly and as of right without interruption for a period of 12 years either after dispossessing the owner or by discontinuation of possession by the owner on his own volition.
34. The Plaintiff/Applicant claims that entry to the suit premises was initially based on a sale of a plot measuring approximately 50 feet by 25 feet (the suit premises), out of land, which at the time of filing this suit formed part of the land identified as Kiambaa/Kihara/1909. The Court of Appeal dealt with this kind of situation in the case of Public Trustee V Wanduru Ndegwa [1984] KECA 72 (KLR) where Kneller JA held as follows:
“The position of a vendor and a purchaser of registered land is this. The vendor as the registered owner retains the legal estate and becomes the trustee of it for the purchaser when the purchaser pays a deposit for it. The vendor retains a lien on the property for the balance of the purchase money which disappears when it is paid and the purchaser then becomes the sole beneficial owner and the vendor becomes a bare trustee for the purchaser. If the vendor trustee allows the purchaser cestui qui trust to remain in possession the latter is in adverse possession because the vendor as the absent registered owner always retains the legal estate and this prima facie entitles him to resume possession from the purchaser in possession.
35. The limitation period will begin to run from the date of the payment of the purchase price in full or last instalment of it. This was held in the case of East Africa Pentecostal Church through the Registered Trustees V Hezekiel [2024] KEELC 4589 (KLR) where the court held as follows
“:…For adverse possession arising out of an aborted sale agreement or license, the time for adverse possession starts to run after the payment of the entire purchase price or when the license terminates…”
36. On the question of onus of proof of a claim for adverse possession, the Court of Appeal stated in Wines & Spirits Kenya Limited & another vs George Mwachiru Mwango [2018] eKLR that:
“…It therefore follows that the onus is on the person or persons claiming adverse possession to prove that they have used this land which they claim as of right. This is the Latin maxim of nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (which means that the occupation of the land must have no force, no secrecy, no evasion). Accordingly, the respondent herein was beholden to not only show his uninterrupted possession, but also that the 1st appellant had knowledge (or the means of knowing) actual or constructive of the possession or occupation. The possession must be continuous. It must not be broken for any temporary purpose or by any endeavours to interrupt it or by any recurrent consideration.”
37. Comprehensive detail as to the above elements is provided by the Court in Gabriel Mbui vs Mukindia Maranya [1993] eKLR as follows:
a. The person claiming land by adverse possession must make physical entry and be in actual possession or occupancy of the land for the statutory period.
b. The entry and occupation must be with, or maintained under, some claim or colour of right or title made in good faith by the stranger seeking to invoke the doctrine of adverse possession as against everyone else.
c. The occupation of the land by the intruder who pleads adverse possession must be non-permissive use, ie without permission from the true owner of the land occupied.
d. The non-permissive actual possession hostile to the current owner must be unequivocally exclusive, and with the evinced unmistakable animus possidendi, that is to say occupation with clear intention of excluding the owner as well as other people.
e. Acts of user by the person invoking the statute of limitation to found his title are not enough to take the soil out of the owner or his predecessors in title and to vest it in the encroacher or squatter, unless the acts be done which are inconsistent with the owner’s enjoyment of the soil for the purpose for which he intended to use it.
f. The possession by the person seeking to prove title by adverse possession must be visible, open and notorious, giving reasonable notice to the owner and the community of the exercise of dominion over the land.
g. The possession must be continuous uninterrupted, unbroken for the necessary statutory period.
h. The rightful owner or paper title holder against whom adverse possession is raised must have an effective right to make entry and to recover possession of the land throughout the whole of, and during, the statutory period.
i. The rightful owner must know that he is ousted. He must be aware that he had been dispossessed, or he must have parted and intended to part with possession.
j. The land, or portion of the land adversely possessed must be a definitely identified, defined or at least an identifiable portion, with a clear boundary or identification. The absence of a plot or title number need not present any difficulty, nor should it be a bar to establishing a claim of adverse possession.”
38. The Court has considered the legal nature of entry into the suit land, permissive use, and accrual of time. The Plaintiff/Applicant claims that the suit land, which was part of the land owned by Mwaura Ndungi, Kiambaa/Kihara/ 1908 was purchased in 1989 for the purpose of relocating their entry into their parcel of land 1909. The Applicant claims that her family took peaceful possession with the knowledge of Mwaura Ndungi including his wife and children and they proceeded to relocate and use the land as a driveway to their homestead.
39. The 1st Defendant denied that sale and asserted that the plaintiff’s possession was not exclusive, alleging that the suit land was used as a shared public path which his family and that of the 2nd Defendant, other local families and parents and children of a school "Ann Monte" nursery school that he built on his land in 2003.
40. From the totality of the evidence adduced, the Court is satisfied that the Applicant made physical entry and took actual possession or occupancy of the suit land after purchase from Mwaura Ndungi in 1989. The Court has considered that under Section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act (as it applied prior to the 2003 written-contract amendment), oral contracts for land accompanied by part performance, ordinarily consisting of payment and entry into possession, were valid.
41. To corroborate the evidence of the oral sale agreement, the Plaintiff relied on the following distinct set of facts:
i) She relied on physical acts on the land to show that there was part performance of the contract: PW1 testified upon payment of the purchase price her family rerouted the entrance to their land to the newly acquired driveway. PW1 further stated that Mwaura Ndungi personally planted Mukinduri (croton) trees to mark the new boundary. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in Kenyan customary land practice, planting specific boundary trees like Mukinduri, is recognized as a formal physical act of boundary demarcation following a transaction.
ii) The Plaintiff claims that beginning in 1999, following approved building plans, they constructed residential-cum-business premises on land parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/1907 that extended onto part of the suit land, while using the rest of the suit land as a driveway to their home. This claim was confirmed by the Defendants. In the Court’s view this construction was an assertion of right and title to the suit parcel of land.
iii)The Plaintiff further relied on the minutes of the 2004 Chief's Elders Meeting. It is noted that the Defendants do not deny that the meeting indeed took place. The first defendant spoke at the meeting but contests the assertion that the 2nd defendant and her son admitted at the meeting that her husband had given the land to the Plaintiff. On this issue, the Court noted that the initial Plaintiff, Evans Muuru David (deceased), the 1st Defendant James Njenga Ndungi (deceased) and the current 2nd Defendant Loice Wambui Mwaura were present at the meeting. Loice admitted the portion of land was given to the Plaintiff and that they planted the mikinduri fence. The son stated that the Plaintiff was given the portion of land to use for tending his sheep.
iv) Even though the 1st Defendant contests a portion of the proceedings as untrue, he did not present to the Court the minutes that were, in his opinion, the correct reflection of what transpired. In the Court’s view, the minutes form a strong documentary corroboration. The meeting was held in 2004, long before this court case and before the 1st Defendant’s purchase of the land. The Assistant Chief convened an elders' meeting following a complaint by Mwaura’s son. The minutes recorded that the elders confirmed the sale, and of great significance, the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant's husband were present. The 2nd Defendant admitted that Mwaura had told them not to interfere with the Plaintiff's occupation.
v) Further to this, DW1 conceded under oath during cross-examination that her family and the Plaintiff were long-time friends and neighbors. She confirmed that the owner of the land (2nd Defendant) sold to them the land which the Plaintiff and her family had been given to use as a path. She further stated that when she bought the land, the path ended because the owner sold it to them. DW1 further confirmed that the Plaintiff had built a structure which traversed the boundaries with part of it standing on the pathway. Under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, facts admitted need not be proved.
42. On the other hand, the 1st Defendant’s claim that he was in use of the suit land as a path, seems to have started in 2003 when he constructed the nursery school, An Mande and also the use by churchgoers. The receipts produced by the 1st Defendant were all dated 2007. In the Court’s view such use, if at all, was after the expiry of the limitation period. The other claim by the 1st Defendant that he was in occupation of the land since 1972 does not seem tenable since the 1st Defendant was not then claiming ownership or use and occupation of the land.
43. The 1st Defendant strenuously argued that because the Plaintiff entered the land pursuant to an oral purchase agreement in 1989, occupation was consensual and permissive, thereby barring an adverse possession claim under the authority of Sisto Wambugu v Kamau Njuguna [1983] KLR 172.
44. While initial entry under a contract of sale is permissive, there is a clear distinction between a purchaser who enters under an unfulfilled agreement and a purchaser who pays the full purchase price, takes physical possession, and whose vendor neglects or refuses to execute a conveyance. In Peter Mbiri Michuki v Samuel Mugo Michuki [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that where a transaction predates the statutory requirement for written land contracts, and full consideration is paid accompanied by delivery of possession, the purchaser’s possession becomes adverse to the vendor once the vendor fails to convey title within a reasonable time. As held in Public Trustee v Wanduru Ndegwa [1984] KLR 314, a vendor who collects the full purchase price and surrenders physical control holds legal title as a bare constructive trustee. The continued holding of legal title by the vendor in such circumstances is adverse to the purchaser's full equitable ownership.
45. To determine precisely when statutory time began to run under Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act, the Court must examine the register extract for parent parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/739. The Plaintiffs evidence is that full payment for the 50 ft × 25 ft strip occurred in 1989, and physical possession in the form of use of the driveway commenced immediately. As stated earlier, the sale and taking of possession was corroborated by certain acts of the parties that have convinced the Court that indeed there was a sale and occupation of the suit land as claimed by the Plaintiff. In the Courts view, upon payment of the purchase price in 1989 accompanied by delivery of possession, the purchaser’s possession became adverse to the vendor once the vendor failed to convey title within a reasonable time.
46. Consideration of the history of the suit land involving the extract of the parent title number for land parcel KIAMBAA/KIHARA/739, shows that on 15th November 1991, the land was formally partitioned, subdivided, and closed. Parcel 1907 (0.405 ha) was registered to the three brothers to fulfill the older 1973 joint purchase. Parcel 1908 (0.703 ha) was issued solely to Mwaura Ndungi. It is noted that Mwaura Ndungi failed to execute a separate mutation plan to excise and transfer the 1989 strip of land to Evans Muuru David, leaving it legally comprised within parcel 1908 while Evans retained physical possession on the ground.
47. The Court finds that the entire process of creation of parcel 1908 and issuance of title on 15th November 1991 without conveying the suit premises constituted a clear failure and refusal by Mwaura Ndungi to fulfill his transactional obligation. Consequently, permissive possession terminated, and statutory time under the Limitation of Actions Act began running against Mwaura Ndungi, in 1989 when the full purchase price was paid or alternatively at the very latest, on 15th November 1991.
48. The other issue for consideration is whether the Plaintiff established exclusive, open, and continuous possession. To succeed in a claim for adverse possession, an applicant must establish possession that is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (without force, without secrecy, and without permission) for an uninterrupted period exceeding twelve (12) years (Titus Mutuku Kasuve v Mwaani Investments Limited [2004] 1 KLR 184).
49. The Defendants asserted that possession was not exclusive, alleging that the strip operated as a shared public path which his family and that of the 2nd Defendant, other local families and "Ann Monte" nursery school attendees.
50. The Court evaluated this defense against the physical evidence and admissions on record: In 1999, while still within the statutory timeframe, the Plaintiff erected a permanent residential-cum-commercial building extending onto the disputed strip under approved plans, utilizing the remainder as their exclusive homestead driveway. This, in the Court’s view was a clear sign of assertion of right to ownership and title to the land.
51. According to the evidence adduced, there were physical demarcations where Mwaura Ndungi personally planted Mukinduri (croton) trees to mark the boundary and explicitly instructed his family not to cultivate or enter the portion. Further, DW1, under cross-examination candidly acknowledged that the Plaintiff's family had used the strip specifically as their pathway, and confirmed that a structure built by the Plaintiff stood on the site prior to the 2011 interference.
52. Finally, the proceedings of the 2004 Elders' meeting convened by the Assistant Chief on 26th August 2004 establish that local elders and family members confirmed Mwaura’s prior sale and his express directive respecting the Plaintiff’s occupation.
53. The Court further considers that the real question is whether the owner of the suit land exercised possession and control over the portion, inconsistently with the Plaintiff's occupation, during the statutory period. In the Court’s view, there is no sufficiently cogent evidence that Mwaura Ndungi did so, or that he resumed possession before twelve years had run. The defence evidence of public use relates principally to the period after about 2003. The Plaintiff's family used the strip continuously to reach its homestead, and it was physically identifiable as the route serving that property. Use by others does not defeat the claim.
54. The 1st Defendant also relied on a construction incident in about 2002, when work by the Plaintiff's late husband was allegedly stopped after a surveyor found that part of the structure encroached on land belonging to James Njenga Ndungi. That evidence does not show that the Plaintiff's family was dispossessed of the specific 50 feet by 25 feet portion. DW1 said the structure was near the boundary and that construction stopped because of encroachment, but she did not establish that use of the driveway ceased in 2002. The Plaintiff's evidence is that the family continued using the portion after that event. The further dispute in 2004 over the same occupation is inconsistent with any suggestion that the Plaintiff was completely dispossessed in 2002. The 2002 incident was not an effective recovery of possession by the registered owner and did not interrupt the Plaintiff's possession.
55. The Court finds that temporary or incidental passage by neighbors across an open driveway does not break the exclusive physical dominion (animus possidendi) established by the Plaintiff's structural developments and daily driveway usage. The Plaintiff held open, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive possession from 1989 through to September 2011, a total period of 22 years.
56. The other issue for consideration is whether the Defendants’ titles to the suit land had been extinguished and the effect of subsequent dealings. Under Section 7 as read with Section 17 of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22), in the Court’s assessment of all the evidence adduced and considered above, the statutory 12-year period required to extinguish a registered proprietor's title commenced in 1989 and at the very latest on 15th November 1991 and expired at the latest on 15th November 2003.
57. Consequently, on 15th November 2003, the legal title of Mwaura Ndungi over the 50 ft × 25 ft suit premises was extinguished by operation of law. On that date, the possessory and equitable title of Evans Muuru David crystallized into an absolute legal right to be registered as proprietor under Section 38 of the Act.
58. The legal consequences of the above extinguishing of legal rights are that when Mwaura Ndungi died and Succession Cause No. 100 of 2003 was conducted, parcel 1908 devolved to the 2nd Defendant encumbered by the Plaintiff’s fully crystallized rights.
59. Further, when the 2nd Defendant subdivided parcel 1908 and transferred parcel 4694 to James Njenga Ndungi on 7th May 2010, she purported to pass legal title over the suit premises that had already been extinguished in 2003 (nemo dat quod non habet).
60. As established in Githu v Ndeete [1984] KLR 776, Francis v Saul [2023] KEELC 21478, and Inziani v Makuda [2022] KEELC 2357, subsequent subdivisions, alterations of parcel numbers (from 1908 to 3825, 4694, and ultimately 5139), or registered transfers cannot revive an extinguished title or defeat accrued adverse possession rights.
61. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act. DW1 admitted under cross-examination that her family were immediate neighbors who knew the Plaintiff was occupying, using, and building upon the strip prior to their 2010 purchase. Under Section 28 of the Land Registration Act, overriding interests, including rights acquired by adverse possession and constructive trusts, bind all subsequent registered proprietors.
62. Regarding land identification, the lack of an independent title deed for the 50 ft × 25 ft strip is not fatal. Courts retain full jurisdiction to order survey, excision, and boundary adjustments to hive off an identifiable portion from a larger registered parcel. In the case of Gabriel Mbui v Mukindia Maranya [1993] KEHC 161 (KLR), the Court held that;
“The land, or portion of the land, adversely possessed must be a definitely identifed, defined or at least an identifiable portion, with a clear boundary or identifcation. For this purpose, that which can be ascertained is certain; that which is definitive is positive. It must at least be so plotted that if not certain it can be made certain. The absence of a plot or title number need not present any difficulty; nor should it be a bar to establishing a claim of averse possession (Madan, J (as he then was)|”
63. The 1st Defendant objects that the Plaintiff claims an area of about 50 feet by 25 feet that was never separately registered, and that parcel 4694 itself measured about 0.030 hectares. The objection does not answer the Plaintiff's case. She has never claimed the whole of parcel 4694. Her claim has consistently been for a defined portion of approximately 50 feet by 25 feet. Section 38 permits acquisition of registered land by adverse possession and does not require that every portion claimed within a registered parcel must previously have had its own title. The difference between the acreage of the larger parcel and the size of the strip does not make the claim uncertain.
64. The Plaintiff gave the dimensions of the portion, its approximate location, its use, and its relationship to the family property and the access road. DW1 acknowledged that the Plaintiff's late husband used the disputed area as a pathway, that the pathway was only part of the larger parcel 4694, and that it ceased to be available when the land was sold to them.
65. The disputed pathway formed part of land later incorporated into Kiambaa/Kihara/5139. DW1 stated that the land her late husband purchased from the 2nd Defendant was merged to become parcel 5139, and the 1st Defendant's written submissions traced the land in the same way. The Court accepts that the defined portion is presently comprised in parcel 5139. That does not make the whole of 5139 the subject of the claim. It means only that the physical portion once forming part of the predecessor land now sits within a larger parcel bearing that number.
66. A proprietor cannot defeat an accrued right in land by changing the parcel number. Adverse possession concerns possession of land and the owner's failure to assert the right to recover it within the statutory period, not the continued use of a particular register number.
67. The Court further finds that change of ownership does not interrupt adverse possession or a change in registration particulars, provided the land occupied remains identifiable. The relevant question is therefore whether, before the subdivisions and later registration, the Plaintiff had already acquired enforceable rights in the defined portion, and whether that portion can be traced into parcel 5139. On the evidence, it can.
Conclusion
68. The Plaintiff has proved the essential ingredients of adverse possession. The
disputed land was identifiable as a defined portion of approximately 50 feet by 25 feet. Her late husband took possession in or about 1989 following payment of the agreed price and remained in possession. Further, the subdivision of the parent title for land parcel KIAMBAA/KIHARA/739 and creation of titles for Parcel 1907 registered to the three brothers, and Parcel 1908 registered to Mwaura Ndungi and failure by Mwaura Ndungi to execute a separate mutation plan to excise and transfer the 1989 strip to Evans Muuru David, leaving it legally comprised within parcel 1908 while Evans retained physical possession on the ground led to termination of any permissive possession that may have existed. From the foregoing, statutory time under the Limitation of Actions Act began running against Mwaura Ndungi, in 1989 when the full purchase price was paid or alternatively, at the very latest, on 15th November 1991.
69. The possession was open and known to the original owner and his family, and was shown by use of the portion as a driveway and by boundary demarcation and development. It continued for at least twelve years without effective dispossession or recovery of possession by the owner. The challenge in 2004 and the interference in 2011 came after the limitation period had expired and could not revive the extinguished right. The change of parcel numbers and incorporation of the portion into parcel 5139 did not extinguish the accrued rights. The Court finds that the Plaintiff acquired the defined portion of land by adverse possession.
Registration and the appropriate relief
70. Section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act provides the means for a person
who has acquired land by adverse possession to be registered as proprietor in
place of the person then registered. Parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/4694, referred to in
the Further Amended Originating Summons, no longer exists as a separate title.
It would be inappropriate to order transfer of the whole of the former parcel
4694 as though it still existed independently, and equally inappropriate to order
registration of the Plaintiff as proprietor of the whole of parcel 5139.
71. The proper relief gives effect to the finding on the defined portion now comprised in parcel Kiambaa/Kihara/5139. The land registration and survey authorities must delineate that portion from the larger parcel and amend the register to reflect the Plaintiff's entitlement. The 1st Defendant is required to give effect to the survey process, excision and registration and execute the documents lawfully required, failing which the Deputy Registrar of this Court may execute them.
72. The Plaintiff has proved her claim for adverse possession of the defined portion measuring approximately 50 feet by 25 feet, presently comprised in L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139.
73. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:
A. A declaration is issued that the rights and title of the proprietor to the defined portion measuring approximately 50 feet by 25 feet, formerly comprised in the land identified as L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/4694 and now comprised in L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139, were extinguished by operation of the Limitation of Actions Act upon expiry of the statutory period.
B. A declaration is hereby issued that the Plaintiff acquired the said portion by adverse possession.
C. The 1st Defendant shall, within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, surrender the original title for L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 to the relevant land registration and survey authorities for the purpose of identifying, surveying and excising the defined portion, and shall execute all documents necessary to register that portion in the name of the Plaintiff, EDAH NGENDO MORU as the legal representative of the estate of the late EVANS MUURU DAVID.
D. Upon compliance with order 3, the Land Registrar and Surveyor shall undertake the survey, delineation and excision of the defined portion from L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139 and effect the resultant registration in accordance with this judgment.
E. In default of the 1st Defendant executing or delivering any document necessary to give effect to these orders, the Deputy Registrar of this Court is authorised to execute the documents on behalf of the 1st Defendant and/or the estate of the late James Njenga Ndungi, to the extent permitted by law.
F. For avoidance of doubt, these orders affect only the defined portion and do not confer on the Plaintiff ownership of the remainder of L.R. Kiambaa/Kihara/5139.
G. The Plaintiff shall have the costs of the suit as against the 1st Defendant.
H. There shall be no order as to costs against the 2nd Defendant.
Delivered, dated and signed via Microsoft Teams this 8th day of October 2026.
HON. L. G. KIMANI
JUDGE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
The Judgement read in the presence of-
Otieno Holding Brief for Njoroge for Plaintiff
Kinyanjui Holding Brief for Kinuthia for Defendant