Background
The 2nd Defendant filed a preliminary objection dated 6/3/26 raising the following points of law namely;
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The 2nd Defendant filed a preliminary objection dated 6/3/26 raising the following points of law namely;
Paragraph 1 →Having considered the objection and the written submissions of the parties, the only issue for determination is whether the preliminary objection is merited.
Paragraph 19 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC NO. E017 OF 2025
LOUISE MUMBI MAHINDI - PLAINTIFF
VS
GEOFFREY NDICHU - 1ST DEFENDANT
AGNES NYAMU - 2ND DEFENDANT
NAIROBI CITY COUNTY - 3RD DEFENDANT
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY [NEMA] - 4TH DEFENDANT
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
AUTHORITY [NCA] - 5TH DEFENDANT
RULING
(In respect of the 2nd Defendant’s Preliminary Objection dated 6/3/26)
1. The 2nd Defendant filed a preliminary objection dated 6/3/26 raising the following points of law namely;
a) The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in the first instance as the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019 [PLUPA].
b) The instant dispute relates to construction and development activities falling within the primary mandate of the county government's Department of Physical Land Use Planning and Development Control as established under PLUPA and ought to have been lodged before the relevant county planning authority in the first instance.
c) That where a dispute concerns development permission, building approvals, or compliance with planning standards, the law provides a clear dispute resolution framework, beginning with the County Executive Committee Member [CECM] responsible for physical planning, followed by an appeal to the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee [Liaison Committee] before recourse to this Court.
d) That the Plaintiff has approached the Court prematurely and in blatant disregard of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which requires the parties to first pursue and exhaust all available statutory mechanisms before invoking the jurisdiction.
e) That the doctrine of exhaustion is now a well-established principle of law, affirmed by the superior Courts, including the Court of Appeal in Speaker of the National Assembly Vs Karume [1992] KLR 21, where the Court held that where the Constitution or statute provides a procedure for the redress of grievances, that procedure must be strictly followed.
f) That the Supreme Court in Geoffrey Muthinja & Anor Vs Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 others [2015] EKLR5 reaffirmed the doctrine of exhaustion and held that Courts ought to decline jurisdiction where parties have not exhausted available administrative remedies.
g) That the present suit is therefore incompetent, premature, and an abuse of the process of the Court for failure to comply with the mandatory statutory dispute resolution procedures provided under the PLUPA and other regulatory frameworks governing construction and development.
h) That this Court ought to down its tools as was pronounced in Owners of the Motor Vessel Lilian S Vs Caltex Oil [Kenya] [1989] KLR 1, once it becomes apparent that it lacks jurisdiction.
2. The 2nd Defendant therefore sought that the Plaintiffs suit be struck out with costs for being premature, incompetent and in contravention of the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies.
3. When the matter was scheduled for directions on 16/6/26, the parties mutually agreed to address the objection through written submissions. I have reviewed and taken into consideration the submissions submitted by the 2nd Defendant [objector], the Plaintiff, and the 3rd Defendant. The other Defendants have not opposed the objection.
The written submissions
4. The 2nd Defendant [objector] submitted that this Court's jurisdiction has been challenged on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the statutory remedies under PLUPA.
5. On whether the objection is a pure point of law, the Court was referred to the decision in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co Ltd v Westend Distributors Limited [1969] EA 696. It was submitted that, because the objection concerns the Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit, it is a pure point of law.
6. It was further submitted that the dispute concerns the construction and development of the 2nd Defendant and therefore falls within the Liaison Committee’s jurisdiction, not this Court, which has appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Plaintiff ought to respect the doctrine of exhaustion and defer the dispute to the Liaison Committee. The suit was filed in the ELC Court; the Plaintiff has approached the Court prematurely.
7. The Court was urged to decline jurisdiction outright in line with the decision of the Court in Speaker of the National Assembly Vs Karume [1992] KECA 42 [KLR] in light of the clear procedure set out in Section 61 [3] and [4] of the PLUPA Act, which provides that an applicant or interested party aggrieved by a CECM's decision on an application for development permission may appeal to the Liaison Committee within 14 days, and, if further aggrieved, to the ELC Court on appeal.
8. Further, the 2nd Defendant invites the Court to allow the objection and to strike out the suit with costs, leaving the Plaintiff to pursue the statutory remedies under the PLUPA and thereafter to return to this Court only on appeal under Sections 61 [4] and 80 of the PLUPA Act. In the alternative, the Court was urged to stay the suit and direct the Plaintiff to exhaust the mechanisms under PLUPA, EMCA/NEMA, and NCA, as well as the Liaison Committee.
9. The 1st Defendant submitted that the issues adverted to by the Plaintiff are multidisciplinary in nature, ranging from illegal construction and development of the suit land; trespass; and the development of a strip of land used as an access road to the main road; the construction violates the Plaintiffs' boundary wall and title rights; and the 2nd Defendant has constructed a wall-to-wall structure in utter disregard for statutory setbacks provided under the building code, thus compromising the foundation of the Plaintiffs' apartments. As a result, it was submitted that the Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 13(2) (a) of the Environment & Land Court Act, which outline the power of the Court to hear and determine disputes relating to land use, planning, title and tenure and boundaries.
10. Relying on the Court’s decision in Mugambi & Anor v Summerville Properties Limited [2024], EKLR the 1st Defendant submitted that where the issues in dispute are cross-cutting and there is an overarching necessity to determine them finally, nothing bars the Court from exercising its original jurisdiction to do so.
11. Maintaining that although the 3rd Defendant, through its CECM – in charge of Physical Planning – has power under Section 57 of PLUPA to, inter alia, consider and approve all development applications and grant all development permissions, the objector has not demonstrated that she has made any application to the CECM, Physical Planning, nor that the CECM has made any decision to grant or refuse any development licence.
12. It was further submitted that the Liaison Committee's jurisdiction is invoked only when the applicant or an interested party is aggrieved by the decision of the CECM responsible for Physical Planning, as provided for in section 61(3) of the PLUPA. As matters stand, the CECM has made no decision regarding the 2nd Defendant's construction activities; therefore, the Plaintiff, as an interested party, lacks standing to appeal to the Liaison Committee.
13. Consequently, the Court was urged to find the objection without merit and dismiss the same.
14. The Plaintiff submitted that the objection is incompetent and incurably defective because it is argumentative and disputatious, and fails to set out the grounds of law and the statutory provisions under which the 2nd Defendant seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court.
15. It was submitted that, prior to the commencement of the suit, the Plaintiff dispatched a demand letter to the Defendants on 3/10/2025, enquiring whether construction permits had been issued to the 2nd Defendant in respect of the construction on the suit land; however, this request went unanswered. Instead of addressing the queries, the 2nd Defendant lodged an objection, citing non-compliance with the mandatory dispute resolution procedures stipulated under the PLUPA.
16. It was submitted that the case revolves around violations of various laws, including the alleged violation of construction activities on the suit land without building permissions by the relevant CECM, as mandated by the PLUPA.
17. The Court was invited to observe that;
(a) There is no evidence that Building permissions were ever sought and issued in accordance with section 57 [1) of PLUPA.
(b) There is no decision that was made by the CECM in respect of the refusal and/or grant of the building approvals to the 2nd Defendant.
(c) The 3rd Defendant has not admitted that it made any such decision in its pleadings before this Court. The objector has also produced no evidence of such a decision to warrant the invocation of the internal dispute resolution mechanism contemplated under PLUPA.
(d) The mere fact of the Court inquiring as to the presence and propriety of the construction and development permission is in itself a fact-dependent activity, thus distinguishing the objection from being a pure point of law.
(e) The ownership of the strip of land is in issue, hence a fact to be established at the trial.
(f) The prayers sought are multifaceted, including the right to fair administrative action; a clean and healthy environment; compliance with the building regulations; damages to the Plaintiffs' property; trespass; and therefore, the suit raises matters that transcend the provisions of Section 61 (3) of PLUPA.
(g) The suit challenges the manner in which the construction is being carried out without valid licences, signboards, public participation, EAIA licences, and approvals by the NCA.
(h) Inter alia, the Plaintiff seeks additional reliefs being damages which are outside the mandate of the Liaison Committee.
(i) Section 61(3) of PLUPA, upon which the objection is based, strictly applies to decisions made on an application for development permission under section 58 of PLUPA.
18. It was further submitted that the circumstances of this case do not require the invocation of the doctrine of exhaustion, that the Court retains original jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter, and that holding otherwise would deny the Plaintiff the right to be heard. The Court was urged to hold the preliminary objection unmerited and to dismiss it with costs.
Analysis and determination.
19. Having considered the objection and the written submissions of the parties, the only issue for determination is whether the preliminary objection is merited.
20. As to whether the preliminary objection is a pure point of law, the starting point is the definition. The Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition defines a Preliminary Objection as; -
“… in a case before an international tribunal, an objection that, if upheld, would render further proceedings before the tribunal impossible or unnecessary.”
21. The parameters for considering a preliminary objection are now well settled. A preliminary objection must raise only issues of law. The Court of Appeal set out the principles the Court must apply in determining the merits or otherwise of the preliminary objection in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd vs West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. At page 700, Law JA stated:
“A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”
22. At page 701 Sir Charles Newbold, P added:
“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is usually on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of Judicial discretion...”
23. Additionally, in the case of Avtar Singh Bhamra & Another…Vs….Oriental Commercial Bank, Kisumu HCCC No.53 of 2004, the Court held that:-
“A Preliminary Objection must stem or germinate from the pleadings filed by the parties and must be based on pure points of law with no facts to be ascertained.”
24. From the foregoing definitions, therefore, the test to be applied in determining a proper preliminary objection can be culled as follows: -
(i) A preliminary Objection must be a pure point of law which if argued may dispose of the entire suit.
(ii) A Preliminary Objection should be based on the presumption that the pleadings and or facts as pleaded by the opposite side are correct or agreed facts.
(iii) A Preliminary Objection cannot be entertained where;
a. The facts are disputed/contested.
b. The facts are liable to be contested.
c. The facts are to be proved through process of evidence.
d. What is sought is an exercise of judicial discretion.
25. It is the 2nd Defendant's case that the dispute before the Court is a construction and/or development dispute. The Plaintiff has approached this Court prematurely for relief instead of filing his grievance with the CECM/Liaison Committee under the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies set out in the PLUPA.
26. The Plaintiff filed suit challenging the construction activities carried out by the 2nd Defendant on the suit land without the relevant development permissions provided for under the Act and the building code; excavated the strip of land used as an access road between beacons, leaving no setback at all; the excavation has compromised the foundations of the Plaintiff's apartments, exposing them to the risk of collapse and loss; the development has no signage to indicate the nature of the development and the developer; no public participation was ever undertaken.
27. It is the Plaintiffs' case that she wrote to the Defendants requesting any approvals, if any, and none responded.
28. The Environment and Land Court is established under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 to hear and determine disputes related to land and the environment. The Court was enacted through the Environment and Land Court Act 2011, and operationalized in 2012. Its mandate, as set out in the Constitution, has been operationalized under Section 13 of the ELC Act, which elaborately provides for the jurisdiction of the Court.
29. As a principle, the doctrine of exhaustion requires a party to exhaust any alternative dispute resolution mechanism provided by statute and/or law before resorting to Courts. Speaking to the ambit and rationale for this doctrine, the Court of Appeal in Geoffrey Muthinja & Another vs Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR observed as follows:
“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside Courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of Courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.”
30. The Supreme Court of Kenya explained the importance of the doctrine in the case of Benard Murage -vs- Fine Serve Africa Limited & 3 Others [2015] eKLR in the following words:
“Where there exists an alternative remedy through statutory law, then it is desirable that such statutory remedy should be pursued first.”
31. Courts have, over time, established that the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute. The exceptions include situations where the alternative forum is inaccessible; where the alternative forum cannot render the necessary remedies; where issues of constitutional interpretation are involved; where procedural fairness or illegality negate the jurisdiction of the alternative forum; where no decision exists to support a challenge in the alternative forum; and where an exception has been specifically sought and granted under section 4 of the FAAA.
32. Section 57 and 58 of PLUPA state as follows:
“57. Development permission
1) A person shall not carry out development within a county without a development permission granted by the respective county executive committee member.
2) A person who commences any development without obtaining development permission commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two months or to both.
3) A county executive committee member shall require a person who has commenced a development without obtaining development permission to restore the land on which the development is taking place to its original condition or as near to its original condition as is possible and that such restoration shall take place within ninety days.
4) Where a person who is required to do so fails to comply with the provisions of subsection (3), the relevant county executive committee member may undertake to restore the land as required and shall recover the cost of the restoration from the person required to undertake the restoration.
5) A county executive committee member may revoke development permission if the applicant has contravened any provision of this Act or conditions imposed on the development permission for any justifiable cause.
6) A county executive committee member may modify the conditions imposed on development permission where circumstances require it or for any justifiable cause.
58. Application for development permission
1) A person shall obtain development permission from the respective county executive committee member by applying for development permission from that county executive committee member in the prescribed form and after paying the prescribed fees.
2) An applicant for development permission shall provide documents, plans and particulars as may be required by the respective county executive committee member to indicate the purposes of the proposed development.
3) An applicant for development permission shall indicate the proposed uses to which the land shall be put, the population density to which that land shall be subjected and the portion of the land the applicant shall provide for easements as a consequence of the applicant's proposed development.
4) Where an applicant is not the registered owner of the land for which development permission is being sought, that applicant shall obtain the written consent of the registered owner of that land and the applicant shall provide that written consent to the respective county executive committee member at the time of applying for development permission.
5) The development permission granted by a county executive committee member shall be subject to compliance with the provisions of any other written law.
6) Where an applicant does not receive written response for development permission within sixty days, such permission shall be assumed to have been given in terms of this Act.
7) A person applying for development permission shall also notify the public of the development project being proposed to be undertaken in a certain area in such a manner as the Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe.
8) The notification referred to under subsection (7), shall invite the members of the public to submit any objections on the proposed development project to the relevant county executive committee member for consideration.”
33. In this case, it is not in dispute that the 2nd Defendant has neither sought nor obtained development permissions for the construction she is undertaking in the suit land as provided for under section 57 of the Act. In the absence of any approvals or decision by the CECM in charge of physical planning, the Plaintiff, as an interested party, has no pathway to challenge the decision at the Liaison Committee.
34. Another fundamental point is the remedies that have been sought by the Plaintiff in the suit, which included an order for permanent injunction. declaration of illegality of the construction; restoration of damaged perimeter wall and compensation in the form of general damages. These remedies, seen through the prism of the PLUPA, do not fall outside the mandate of the Liaison Committee.
35. Thirdly, the Court, appreciating the cross-cutting issues raised in this suit and so as to afford the parties the right to be heard on merit and expeditiously, will not hesitate to exercise its original jurisdiction in the matter.
36. Finally, the circumstances of this case fall within the exemption to the invocation of the doctrine of exhaustion.
37. The final issue for determination is who bears the costs. Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that costs generally follow the event. In Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court affirmed that costs must follow the event unless the Court has good reason to order otherwise. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant shall have the costs of the objection.
38. Ultimately, the final orders for disposal are;
a) The 2nd Defendant's preliminary objection is unmerited.
b) The preliminary objection is dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant.
39. Orders accordingly.
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 8th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.
J. G. KEMEI
JUDGE
Delivered virtually in the presence of:
1. Mr Masila for the Plaintiff
2. Ms. Njeri for the 1st Defendant
3. Mr. Thuo for the 2nd Defendant
4. N/A for the 3rd Defendant
5. CA- Mr Amos