Land law

Kigondu & 4 others v Nairobi City County & 6 others [2026] KEELC 6384 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Case 1430 of 2016
Judgment date
8 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

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Background

Before this court for determination is the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion application dated 18th June 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 50 Rule 1 and Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following reliefs:

Paragraph 1 →

Decision / orders

In the end, the court finds that the Applicant has met the threshold for the grant of stay of execution pending appeal. This being so the plea for extension of time for purposes of vacating the property has been rendered moot. For those reasons, the application is allowed as follows:

Paragraph 51 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC NO. 1430 OF 2016

ANDREW GICEHA KIGONDU……………......................PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY……...............................1ST DEFENDANT

OMAR IDI OMARI.............................................2ND DEFENDANT

OMARI JUMA....................................................3RD DEFENDANT

OMARI IDI HASHII...........................................4TH DEFENDANT

AS CONSOLIDATED WITH ELC 657 OF 2016

OMARI IDI OMARI…….…….....................................1ST PLAINTIFF

OMARI JUMA………………….…................................2ND PLAINTIFF

ABUBAKHAR IDI HASHIL....................................3RD PLAINTIFF

OMARI IDI HASHIL…….….....................................4TH PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

ANDREW KIGONDU...........................................1ST DEFENDANT

PETER NDEGWA NGUGU..................................2ND DEFENDANT

SAMSOM OWITI................................................3RD DEFENDANT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion application dated 18th June 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 50 Rule 1 and Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following reliefs:

a) That the Honourable Court be pleased to extend the period of Thirty (30) days to Ninety (90) days to enable the Applicant give/grant vacant possession of the flats he occupies in L.R. No. 36/VII/758.

b) That this Honourable Court be pleased to stay the Judgement dated 5th June 2026, and all subsequent orders and/or Decree issued by Hon. O. A. Angote J. pending the hearing and determination of the Intended Appeal.

c) That costs of this application be provided for.

2. The Motion is premised on the grounds set out on its face and is supported by the affidavit of Andrew Giceha Kigondu, the Plaintiff/Applicant, sworn on an even date. He averred that, being aggrieved by the entirety of the judgment delivered by this court on 5th June 2026, he filed a notice of appeal on the same date and that he intends to lodge the record of appeal upon receiving the certified proceedings of the proceedings, which he applied for on 5th June 2026.

3. Mr. Kigondu deponed that he resides on the disputed parcel of land and is likely to be evicted upon the expiry of the 30-day period granted by the court for him to vacate. Unless stay is granted, he urged, he will suffer substantial loss, including the possible destruction of his property. In his view, a stay is necessary to preserve the suit property pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal.

4. He further averred that the Motion was filed without unreasonable delay and maintained that he has a constitutional right of appeal. According to him, the intended appeal is arguable and has a high likelihood of success because the court did not fully evaluate his evidence and would have reached a different conclusion had it done so.

5. The 1st Defendant/Respondent opposed the application through a replying affidavit sworn by its counsel, Ms. Caroline Munyasa, on 29th June, 2026. Counsel deponed that the application is prejudicial to the Respondents' proprietary rights as guaranteed under Article 40 of the Constitution. She deposed that the overriding objective of the court is to ensure that the enforcement of one party's rights does not defeat or derogate from the rights of another.

6. Consequently, she argued that if the orders of stay are granted, the proprietary rights of the 2nd and 5th Defendants/Respondents, who have been adjudged the lawful owners of the suit property, will be unjustifiably infringed. She asserted that it is the Respondents, as the declared lawful owners of the suit property, who continue to suffer substantial loss arising from the Applicant's continued unlawful assumption of ownership and occupation of the property.

7. She contended that the Respondents have endured this prejudice for several years and that litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In that regard, she urged the court to be guided by the principles of justice embodied in Article 159 of the Constitution.

8. It was further deponed that the present application is devoid of merit, as the Applicant has failed to demonstrate, through empirical evidence or otherwise, the substantial loss it is likely to suffer if the orders of stay are not granted. Consequently, she urged the court to dismiss the application.

9. In response to the Motion, Dominic Njuguna Mbigi, counsel on record for the 2nd to 5th Defendants/Respondents, swore a replying affidavit dated 10th July 2026.

10. He averred that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the conditions for the grant of a stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. In particular, he contended, the Applicant has neither demonstrated that he will suffer substantial loss unless stay is granted nor offered security for the due performance of the decree.

11. According to Mr. Mbigi, the Applicant cannot claim substantial loss or irreparable damage in respect of property which, after a full hearing on the merits, the court had found did not belong to him; that the Respondents’ remain the registered proprietors of the suit property whose title the court traced to the Estate of the late Idi Omari through Kadhi’s Court Succession Cause No. 41 of 1995 and the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 15th May 2014 and that their title is consequently protected under Section 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012.

12. It was further asserted that substantial loss, for purposes of an application for stay, must relate to a right actually held by the Applicant and not one that the court has already found never to have existed. Accordingly, the Applicant cannot rely on his continued occupation of property that has judicially been found not to belong to him as evidence of substantial loss.

13. Mr. Mbigi denied that the Applicant had demonstrated an arguable appeal with reasonable prospects of success. He maintained that the judgment followed a full trial during which the court considered and evaluated both oral and documentary evidence. In his view, the bare assertion that the trial court did not “evaluate the evidence wholesomely” did not disclose any identifiable ground of appeal.

14. Regarding the assertions on prejudice, he stated that it is the Respondents who continue to suffer prejudice because the Applicant remains in occupation of the suit property without paying rent. Equally, it was urged, the Applicant has not offered any security for the due performance of the decree or for the rent or mesne profits that might accrue during the pendency of the intended appeal. He maintained that the provision of security is a mandatory condition for the grant of stay and that, in its absence, the Motion is incompetent.

15. The Respondents also opposed the plea for an extension of the period for delivering vacant possession from 30 to 90 days. They contended that the prayer was founded on the same unsubstantiated grounds and that granting it would perpetuate the Applicant’s occupation of property judicially determined to belong to them, contrary to their right to property under Article 40 of the Constitution. In their view, granting a stay would actively prolong an illegality.

16. The Plaintiff/Applicant, Andrew Giceha Kigondu, swore a further affidavit sworn on 10th July 2026. He deponed that the appeal has a high likelihood of success because the court did not consider that the Respondents had neither established the root of their title nor produced any document relating to the suit property. He further contended that the documents relied upon by the Respondents belonged to one Fatuma Binti Sheikh, who died in 1958, whereas the scheme within which the suit property is situated came into existence in 1968.

17. He further averred that the application was filed promptly, only thirteen (13) days after the delivery of the judgment, and therefore without inordinate delay. He maintained that he would suffer substantial loss if the orders of stay were not granted, as he had undertaken extensive developments on the suit property, where he has resided since taking possession in 1968.

18. The Plaintiff deponed that the property houses valuable household belongings and antiques, some of significant historical value dating back to 1968, which would be exposed to destruction in the event of eviction, thereby occasioning him irreparable and substantial loss.

19. He therefore urged the court to grant a stay pending appeal or, in the alternative, extend the period for vacating the property by 90 days from the date of the order. He added that, unless stay was granted, he risked losing property accumulated over his lifetime and being rendered homeless, as he had no alternative land to which he could relocate. Lastly, he expressed his willingness to provide any security that the court might require.

20. The parties filed submissions and authorities which I have considered.

Analysis and determination

21. Having considered the pleadings, and submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether the Plaintiff/Applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated the conditions warranting the grant of stay of execution pending Appeal.

22. The law with respect to stay of execution pending appeal is found in Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provides as follows:

“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except appeal case of in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the Court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.

(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub rule (1) unless—

(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.

23.  In Vishram Ravji Halai vs. Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No. Nai. 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365, the Court of Appeal, discussing the High Court’s [read ELC’s] jurisdiction under this Order stated:

“The Superior Court’s discretion to order a stay of execution of its order or decree is fettered by three conditions. Firstly, the applicant must establish a sufficient cause, secondly the court must be satisfied that substantial loss would ensue from a refusal to grant a stay and thirdly the applicant must furnish security. The application must of course be made without unreasonable delay.”

24. What arises from the foregoing is that the grant of orders of stay of execution is subject to the court’s discretion, the court in this respect being guided by the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The question of how the court should exercise this discretion was extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in Butt vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 as follows:

“1. The power of the court to grant or refuse an application for a stay of execution is a discretionary power. The discretion should be exercised in such a way as not to prevent an appeal.

2. The general principle in granting or refusing a stay is; if there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay must be granted so that an appeal may not be rendered nugatory should that appeal court reverse the judge’s discretion.

3. A judge should not refuse a stay if there are good grounds for granting it merely because in his opinion, a better remedy may become available to the applicant at the end of the proceedings.

4. The court in exercising its discretion whether to grant [or] refuse an application for stay will consider the special circumstances of the case and unique requirements. The special circumstances in this case were that there was a large amount of rent in dispute and the appellant had an undoubted right of appeal.

5. The court in exercising its powers under Order XLI rule 4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, can order security upon application by either party or on its own motion. Failure to put security for costs as ordered will cause the order for stay of execution to lapse.”

25. Further to the above, this court is now enjoined to give effect to the overriding objectives in the exercise of its powers as expressed in Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act, to wit, the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes.

26. Briefly, the dispute herein revolved around parcel L.R. No. 36/VII/758, formerly L.R. No. 36/VII/619/140, which both the Applicant and the 2nd -5th Respondent’s laid claim to. The Applicant’s case was that he had been on the property, with the authority of the 1st Respondent since 1969 and had remained in exclusive possession thereof.

27. He maintained that he had paid the requisite rates and commenced the process of registering the property in his name, including undertaking a survey and obtaining a deed plan and lease. According to him, the 1st Respondent fraudulently frustrated that process by deleting his name from its records, barring him from its systems and refusing, without explanation, to issue him with a certificate of lease.

28. On their part, the 2nd to 5th Respondents maintained that the Applicant had at all material times been their tenant and that of their predecessors in title. They contended that his attempt to obtain title to the suit property was fraudulent and intended to defeat its transmission to them through the estates of Fatuma Binti Sheikh and Idi Omari.

29. The consolidated suits proceeded to a full hearing, culminating in the judgment delivered on 5th June 2026. In the Judgment, the court directed the Applicant herein to deliver vacant possession of the flat or flats occupied by him on L.R. No. 36/VII/758 to the Plaintiffs within 30 days of the judgment, failing which the Plaintiffs would be at liberty to evict him.

30. Aggrieved by this decision, the Applicant intends to appeal to the Court of Appeal. He asks this court to stay the execution of the aforesaid judgment and the decree arising therefrom pending determination of the pending appeal.

31. Turning to the question of whether the parameters for stay have been satisfied, the court observes that the parties have deponed to, and made submissions on, the merits of the intended appeal, taking differing positions on whether they raise arguable grounds.

32. It is however necessary to clarify that this court’s jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution pending appeal is anchored on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. This provision does not make the arguability of the appeal one of the conditions precedent for the grant of a stay. This position is well-founded. It would be both procedurally improper and logically untenable for this court to assess the arguability of an appeal arising from its own decision. The court will disregard any arguments under this head.

33. Moving to the pre-requisites under Order 42 Rule 6(2), the court will begin with the aspect of sufficient cause. What constitutes the same was explicitly discussed by the court in Antoine Ndiaye vs. African Virtual University [2015] eKLR, which persuasively stated:

“The relief of stay of execution pending appeal is governed by Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The relief is discretionary although, as it has been said often, the discretion must be exercised judicially, that is to say, judiciously and upon defined principles of law; not capriciously or whimsically. Therefore, stay of execution should only be granted where sufficient cause has been shown by the Applicant. And in determining whether sufficient cause has been shown, the court should be guided by the three prerequisites provided under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, that:

a) The application is brought without undue delay;

b) The court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the Applicant unless stay of execution is ordered; and

c) Such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the Applicant”.

34. The court concurs. In determining whether the sufficient cause has been established, the court will examine whether the Applicant has satisfied the three mandatory prerequisites to the grant of stay pending appeal.

35. Beginning with delay, the question of what amounts to unreasonable delay depends on the circumstances of each case. As was observed in Jaber Mohsen Ali & another vs Priscillah Boit & another [2014] eKLR, even a one-day delay may be deemed unreasonable depending on the nature of the orders issued and the timelines set by the court.

36. In the present case, the judgment was delivered on 5th June, 2026, the notice of appeal filed on the same day, and the present Motion filed on 18th June, 2026 approximately 13 days thereafter. In the circumstances, the court is satisfied that the application was filed timeously and without undue delay.

37. Moving to the aspect of substantial loss, the same was discussed in Rhoda Mukuma v John Abuoga [1988] eKLR, as follows:

“Granting a stay in the High Court is governed by Order XLI rule 4(2), the questions to be decided being – (a) whether substantial loss may result unless the stay is granted and the application is made without delay; and (b) the applicant has given security. The discretion under rule 5(2)(b) is at large, but as was pointed out in the Kenya Shell case substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. That is what has to be prevented, because such loss would render the appeal nugatory…”

38. Similarly, the court in Century Oil Trading Company Ltd vs Kenya Shell Limited as cited in Muri Mwaniki & Wamiti Advocates Vs Wings Engineering Services Limited [2020] eKLR, held:

“The word 'substantial' cannot mean the ordinary loss to which every judgment debtor is necessarily subjected when he loses his case and is deprived of his property in consequence. That is an element which must occur in every case and since the Code expressly prohibits stay of execution as an ordinary rule it is clear the words 'substantial loss' must mean something in addition to all different from that.”

39. The courts have also held that substantive loss must be demonstrated. This position was articulated by the Court of Appeal in Kenya Shell Limited v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & another [1986] eKLR thus:

“It is usually a good rule to see if Order 41 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules can be substantiated. If there is no evidence of substantial loss to the Applicant, it would be a rare case when an Appeal would be rendered nugatory by some other event. Substantial loss in its various forms is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions for granting stay.”

40. The court in James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR held that the mere commencement or completion of execution does not, of itself, amount to substantial loss, as execution is a lawful process. An applicant must therefore demonstrate additional factors showing that execution would create a state of affairs that irreparably affects the core of the appeal and renders it nugatory.

41. The court is equally mindful of the need to strike a balance between the competing interests of the parties. While an applicant seeks to preserve the subject matter so that the appeal is not rendered nugatory, a respondent is entitled to the fruits of a valid judgment. As aptly stated in Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates vs East African Standard [2002] eKLR, the court must avoid unduly favoring one party over the other, and instead exercise its discretion in a manner that upholds the overriding objective of doing justice and preventing abuse of the court process.

42. In the present case, the Applicant contends that he has occupied the suit property since 1968 or thereabouts and has undertaken extensive developments thereon. He states that the premises contain fixed fixtures, household goods and antiques accumulated over the years, some of which are of historical and sentimental value. He further asserts that he has no alternative land to which he can relocate and that his eviction would render him homeless.

43. The Respondents maintain that the threatened eviction is merely the lawful consequence of the judgment and cannot constitute substantial loss. They further contend that the Applicant’s continued occupation denies them possession and enjoyment of property that has been adjudged to belong to the 2nd and 5th Respondent’s, particularly as he remains in occupation without paying rent.

44. The court has considered the rival positions. Although eviction pursuant to a lawful judgment does not, by itself, amount to substantial loss, the circumstances disclosed in this case extend beyond the ordinary consequences of execution.

45. The Applicant has admittedly been in occupation of the suit property for several decades, during which time it has served as his home. He depones that the property contains permanent developments, household belongings, and antiques accumulated over the years, some of which are of historical significance. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that the property is more than merely a place of residence. It is a home containing personal effects and possessions amassed over many years, some of which hold both historical and sentimental value.

46. That being the case, an immediate eviction would consequently expose those items to the risk of destruction or loss, occasion significant disruption to the Applicant's life, and potentially render him homeless before his intended appeal is heard and determined.

47. While the court appreciates that a stay would delay the Respondents’ enjoyment of the fruits of their judgment, that prejudice may be mitigated through appropriate conditions, including the provision of security. In contrast, eviction and the possible destruction or loss of the Applicant’s property may create a state of affairs that cannot readily be reversed or adequately remedied should the appeal succeed.

48. The court is therefore satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated that he is likely to suffer substantial loss unless stay of execution is granted. The court further notes that the suit property remains registered in the Respondent’s name, and there is no risk of alienation by the Applicant.

49. Moving to the last issue regarding provision of security, its purpose was discussed by the court in Arun C Sharma vs Ashana Raikundalia t/a Rairundalia & Co. Advocates & 2 others [2014] eKLR, thus:

“The purpose of the security needed under Order 42 is to guarantee the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the applicant. It is not to punish the judgment debtor………. Civil process is quite different because in civil process the judgment is like a debt hence the applicants become and are judgment debtors in relation to the respondent. That is why any security given under Order 42 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules acts as security for due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the applicants. I presume the security must be one which can serve that purpose.”

50. In this regard, the Applicant has expressed his willingness to provide such security as the court may direct and as the decision is ultimately the court’s, this suffices.

51. In the end, the court finds that the Applicant has met the threshold for the grant of stay of execution pending appeal. This being so the plea for extension of time for purposes of vacating the property has been rendered moot. For those reasons, the application is allowed as follows:

a) There be a conditional stay of execution of this court’s judgement dated 5th June, 2026 pending the hearing and determination of the appeal before the Court of Appeal.

b) The stay of execution is granted on condition that the Applicant deposits the sum of Kshs 1,000,000 for any rent or damages that may be found due in a joint interest-earning account in the names of Counsel for the Applicant and the 2nd -5th Respondents within 45 days hereof. In default, the stay will lapse.

c) Parties to bear their own costs.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 8th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of:

Mr. Osoro for Plaintiff/Applicant

Mr. Wachira for Mbigi for 2nd – 5th Defendant/Respondent

Mr. Obuya holding brief for Munyasia for 1st Defendant

Court Assistant: Tracy

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