REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: MILIMANI ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
CASE NUMBER: ELC APPL 22 OF 2017
ELECTRICAL MARKETING (WHOLESALE LTD) VS THE NAIROBI CITY COUNCIL AND 2 OTHERS
RULING
A. Introduction:
1. Before this Court for ruling is the Notice of Motion dated 17.06.2026 (“the Application”), brought by the Intended Interested Party pursuant to Sections 80,1A,1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rules (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 as read with all enabling provisions of the law seeking for following reliefs:
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“1. THAT This Honourable Court be pleased to review, vary and/or set aside its ruling delivered on 21st May 2026.
2. THAT Upon review, the Court be pleased to reconsider the Applicant's application dated 21st April 2026 in light of the newly discovered evidence.
3. THAT Pending hearing and determination of this application, there be a stay of execution of all consequential orders arising from the ruling of 21st May 2026.
4. THAT Costs of this application be provided for.”
2. The Application is supported by the affidavit of Hellen Adhiambo Oburu sworn on 17.6.2026, alongside grounds on the face of the application of even date. The Application is premised on the discovery of new and important evidence .the intended interested party claims that , despite exercising due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or possession of the Intended Interested Party at the time the previous Application dated 21.04.2026 was heard and determined.
3. The Application is opposed via the Replying Affidavit sworn on June 26,2026 by Sunil
K. Patel, the Appellant’s Managing Director who deposed that the application is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the due process of the Court. The principal objection is that the matters raised are res judicata under Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act. The respondent deposed that these issues were already raised and determined in the Notice of Motion dated July 24.2019(decided in a ruling dated October 7,2020) and April 21.2026 (delivered on May 21.2026).
4. The Appellant urges that the Intended Interested Party has not demonstrated the discovery of any new and important evidence that could not have been produced earlier with due diligence. The Appellant contended that no sufficient reasons have been provided to justify a review of the Court’s previous determination either regarding res judicata or on the actual merits of the case.
5. The Appellant maintained that the Intended Interested Party claims ownership based on an alleged transfer ( 7th June 2016), or an alternative purchase (23rd July 2015). It is deponed that the official land registry records and Certificates of Official Search (dated 7th July 2015, and 6th June 2016) still show the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as the registered proprietors. Furthermore, on June 6th , 2016, the Magistrates’ Court issued an order prohibiting any transfer, disposition or dealing with the suit property.
6. The Appellant therefore contends that any subsequent transaction between the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, whether directly or through Gilbi Construction Limited, and the Intended Interested Party, was undertaken in breach of subsisting court orders and during the pendency of litigation. The Appellant consequently disputes the validity of the alleged transfer and the Intended Interested Party’s asserted interest in the suit property.
7. The Appellant contends that the Intended Interested Party has produced no primary evidence of the alleged transaction (such as sale agreement, evidence of payment of the purchase price, valuation documents or stamp duty receipts) to prove the intended interested party is a Bonafide purchaser for value without notice. The Appellant further relied on the Judgment delivered on 15th July 2019, which set aside the public auction sale of the suit property, and notes that the subsequent appeal by the Second and Third Respondents, being Civil Appeal No. 652 of 2019, was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14th October 2025.
8. The Appellant maintains that he has held continuous custody of the original Title Deed , which was charged to Middle East Bank. The appellant contends that the Intended Interested Party has not established any lawful basis upon which the orders sought by way of review can be granted and requests the Court to dismiss the application dated 17th June 2026 with costs.
B. Directions of the Court:
9. On 28.07.2026, the Court issued directions for the hearing of the Application alongside the Application dated 9th March 2026. Counsel for the 1st Respondent indicated that the 1st Respondent would not oppose the Application and would not file submissions.On 24.09.2026, with consent of the parties, the Court directed that the Application dated 17.06.2026 be canvassed by way of written submissions.
10. The Applicant/Intended Interested Party filed its submissions dated 10th August 2026 identifying four(4) issues for determination, while the intended interested party filed their submissions dated 26th August 2026, identifying three (3) issues for determination.
C. Submissions by Parties:
11. The Applicant contended that new and important evidence has emerged that satisfies the statutory threshold for review, refuting the Appellant’s claims that the application is barred by res judicata or the doctrine of lis pendens.
12. On the threshold for review, the Applicant relied on Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, particularly the discovery of new and important evidence alongside sufficient reason. Relying on Rose Kaiza v Angelo Mpanju Kaiza [2009] KECA 422 (KLR), the Applicant submitted that review on these grounds requires establishing that the applicant acted with due diligence and that the evidence was not within their knowledge or possession when the initial ruling was made.
13. The newly discovered evidence consists of an official paper trail regarding the title history and property transactions, including correspondence from the Ministry of Lands dated August 11, 2021, and investigative findings from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. The Applicant submitted that, because these documents were held by third-party public authorities, they could not have been produced earlier despite reasonable efforts. Further, the application was brought shortly after the ruling, demonstrating that there was no unreasonable delay.
14. On res judicata, the Applicant argued that invoking statutory review jurisdiction based on newly discovered material is fundamentally distinct from attempting to re-litigate a finalized issue. Relying on Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Kiai & 5 others [2017] KECA 477 (KLR), the Applicant submits that automatic dismissal under the doctrine would frustrate the explicit purpose of Order 45.
15. The Applicant further relied on Steyn v Ruscone [2025] KEHC 6196 (KLR) to argue that res judicata cannot shield a judgment or transaction tainted by fraud. The Applicant submitted that serious allegations and evidence of fraud surround the suit land’s title and possession and that, because fraud undermines judicial integrity, the court retains jurisdiction to re-examine its prior decisions when fraudulent conduct is properly raised and supported by new evidence.
16. On the materiality of the new evidence and lis pendens, the Applicant submitted that the newly discovered evidence directly impacts the authenticity and chronological transfer history of the property. While the Appellant alleged that the transfer to the Applicant occurred fraudulently during pending court proceedings, the Applicant demonstrated through the annexed title records that the transfer was executed on July 23, 2015, a full year prior to the court orders cited by the Appellant. Consequently, the Applicant argued that the doctrine of lis pendens does not defeat the validity of its acquisition, making the official investigation records highly material to determining genuine ownership.
17. Finally, the Applicant asserted that the protection of proprietary rights in immovable property warrants both review and preservation of the suit land. Invoking Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya, the Applicant submitted that the balance of convenience heavily favors preservation of the property. If the prior ruling stands unreviewed and consequential orders are executed before evaluating the new evidence, the Applicant risks suffering irreversible prejudice that monetary damages cannot remedy.
18. The Appellant/Respondent contended that the applicant’s application lacks merit, constitutes an abuse of the court process, and should be dismissed with costs. The Appellant submitted that the Intended Interested Party has failed to satisfy the requirements under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Furthermore, Review is limited to the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or sufficient reason. Relying on Mbarak & 4 others v Mikaya
[2024] KECA 637 (KLR), which cited Opondo v Rift Valley Railways Ltd [2023]
KECA 170 (KLR) and Black’s Law Dictionary, the Appellant submits that material openly available or within a party’s knowledge does not qualify as new evidence.
19. The Appellant contended that the Applicant’s claim that a newly recovered 2016 transfer document was previously lost due to theft in 2017 cannot be a ground for a review because this alleged loss was never disclosed in its earlier applications filed in August 2019 or April 2026. Further, secondary documents relied upon, such as correspondence from the Land Registrar and a May 2017 Directorate of Criminal Investigations letter, were available years prior and could have been obtained through ordinary diligence. Relying on D. J. Lowe & Company Ltd v Banque Indosuez (1998) and Rose Kaiza v Angelo Mpanju Kaiza [2009] eKLR, the Appellant emphasized that review applications based on newly discovered evidence must be treated with great caution so that losing parties do not simply attempt to bolster a weak case or get a “second bite at the cherry”.
20. On res judicata, the Appellant submitted that the application is barred under Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, as the court previously determined in its ruling of May 21, 2026, that the Intended Interested Party’s application duplicated its earlier application dated August 23, 2019, which was decided on October 7, 2020. Relying on Muriuki & 2 others v Njagi [2024] KEELC 647 (KLR), the Appellant argued that when an issue is res judicata, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it, rendering any subsequent decision null and void. Review jurisdiction cannot be used as a backdoor mechanism to circumvent statutory bars or re-litigate issues that have been conclusively decided. The Appellant therefore submitted that, because the Intended Interested Party identified no error apparent on the face of the record regarding the res judicata finding, the court remains deprived of jurisdiction.
21. The Appellant submitted that the Intended Interested Party engaged in active non-disclosure and abuse of court process by concealing its previous unsuccessful application to the Court of Appeal, dismissed on February 25, 2022, while falsely claiming to have discovered the proceedings “by sheer chance”. The Appellant submitted that evidence shows that the Intended Interested Party shared legal counsel with the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as early as April 2017, demonstrating awareness of and participation in a scheme to defeat the Appellant’s rights.
22. The Appellant further contended that, because it holds the original title deed, third-party dealings cannot override its registered ownership. He therefore urges the court to dismiss the review application with costs.
D. Issues for determination:
23. The Court has considered the Application, affidavit evidence on record, rival submissions and the cited judicial decisions. The issues identified by the court for determination are:-
1. Whether the Intended Interested Party/Applicant has demonstrated genuine "new and important evidence" obtained after exercising due diligence under Order 45 Rule 1.
2. Whether the application dated 17.6.2026 is resjudicata..
3. Who bears cost of the Application.
E. Analysis and Determination:
I ).Whether the Intended Interested Party/Applicant has demonstrated genuine "new and important evidence" obtained after exercising due diligence under Order 45 Rule 1.
24. This court’s jurisdiction to review its decision is derived from section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, as read with Order 45 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 provides as follows:-
“Any person who considers himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Act, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Act,
May apply for a review of judgement to the court, which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”
25. Order 45 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules sets out the requirements for an application for review as follows: -
“ (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved
a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby allowed and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, or the order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order, may apply for review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order without unreasonable delay”.
26. The applicable principle was stated by the Court of Appeal in Mbarak & 4 others v Mikaya [2024] KECA 637 (KLR) stated as follows:
“ . For materials to qualify to be new evidence so as to fall within the realm of order 45 rule 1, it must be evidence that was not within the knowledge of the applicant despite their having exercised the necessary due diligence –
27. In the present case, the application is anchored on discovery of new evidence by the interested party . the Intended Interested Party principally relies on a recently recovered transfer document, together with correspondence and investigative material, to demonstrate its acquisition of the suit property. It is contended that the transfer document had previously been unavailable because the relevant ownership documents had been stolen by a third party. The alleged loss of the transfer document was not disclosed in the Intended Interested Party’s earlier application dated 24th July 2019, nor in the subsequent application dated 21st April 2026.
28. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the Intended Interested Party had knowledge of the proceedings considerably earlier than it now suggests. The material placed before court indicates that the intended interested party was aware of the proceedings as early as 13th April 2017. The Intended Interested Party nevertheless did not seek joinder at that stage. The evidence further indicates that its counsel in the alleged transaction with Gilbi Construction & Co. Limited was also acting for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. This circumstance materially undermines the contention that the Intended Interested Party was unaware of the proceedings or the circumstances surrounding the suit property.
29. The Court takes judicial notice and cognizance of the Certificates of Official Search as presented by the appellant in opposition of the application. The certificate of official search dated 7.7.2015 confirmed the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as the registered proprietors. A further search dated 6.6.2016, similarly confirmed the 2nd and 3rd respondents as the registered proprietors. On the material date, the Magistrates’ Court issued orders prohibiting dealings with the suit property pending determination of the application then before it. The transfer of the suit property to a 3rd party on 7.6.2016 was within the period in which the prohibitory order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction was in force. Suh registration was in disregard of a valid order, the legal effect of which amounts to an illegality. A party cannot, therefore, benefit from an illegality. Rather Such registration offends the doctrine of Lis pendens.
30. The assertion that the Intended Interested Party acquired the property on 23.07.2015 is, moreover, difficult to reconcile with its assertion that the property was transferred to it on 7.6.2016. The Court cannot, on the material presently before it, consider these conflicting assertions as establishing the discovery of new and material evidence not within the knowledge of applicant, rather capable of displacing the findings previously made by the Court.
31. The Court further notes that the matters relied upon by a[applicant substantially concern the same ownership and bona fide purchaser issues that were determined by the Court in the earlier proceedings. The Intended Interested Party has not demonstrated that the evidence, as presented was not within the knowledge of the applicant, rather, was discovered upon exercise of due diligence. On the contrary, the material discloses that applicant had knowledge of the relevant proceedings, transactions and opportunities to place the matters before the Court.
32. The Court of Appeal in National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau [1997] KECA 71 (KLR) held that: -
“In the instant case the matters in dispute had been fully canvassed before the learned Judge. He made a conscious decision on the matters in controversy and exercised his discretion in favour of the respondent. If he had reached a wrong conclusion of law, it could be a good ground for appeal but not for review. Otherwise, we agree that the learned Judge would be sitting in appeal on his own judgment which is not permissible in law”
33. The Court is therefore satisfied that the Intended Interested Party has not demonstrated the discovery of new and important evidence within the meaning of Order 45 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010. Consequently, The material relied upon either relates to matters previously within its knowledge, was capable of being obtained through due diligence, or seeks to re-open issues that had already been canvassed and determined.
34. Accordingly, the Intended Interested Party has failed to satisfy the statutory threshold for review on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence.
ii. Whether the application is resjudicata :
35. Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 embodies the doctrine of res judicata.
The Supreme Court in the case of Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Muiri Coffee Estate Limited & another Motion No 42 of 2014 [2016] eKLR underscored the principle of resjudicata/finality reaffirmed the key principle of the doctrine of resjudicata as follows
i. The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must be identical to that which was in issue in the former suit,
ii. The parties in the subsequent suit must be the same parties, or parties litigating under the same title as those in the previous suit.
iii. The cause of action, claim or right claimed must be the same in both.
iv. The court which adjudicated the former suit must have been a court of competent jurisdiction capable of entertaining the prior matter.
v. There must have been a final adjudication and determination on the merits by that court conclusively settling the rights of the parties. ”
36. In determining res judicata, the Court must examine the decision in the former proceedings, the pleadings and record therein, and the subsequent proceedings, including whether the parties are the same or litigate under the same title, whether the issues are the same and whether the former decision was rendered by a competent court.
37. In the present matter, the Intended Interested Party previously filed an application dated 24th July 2019 seeking, inter alia, joinder, stay of execution, setting aside of the judgment and reopening of the proceedings. That application was determined by this Court on 7th October 2020. Subsequently, by its application dated 21st April 2026, the Intended Interested Party again sought substantially the same reliefs. This Court, in its ruling delivered on 21st May 2026, found the latter application to be res judicata.
38. The present application does not disclose a substantive departure from the issues previously canvassed. Rather, it seeks to introduce additional material in support of the same underlying claim to an interest in the suit property and, in effect, to reopen the matters which this Court had already determined.
39. The Intended Interested Party had been accorded previous opportunities to place before the Court the material evidence upon which its alleged proprietary interest rests. The alleged transfer, the circumstances surrounding its acquisition and the alleged loss and subsequent recovery of the transfer document all relate to matters concerning the same proprietary claim which was previously before the Court. The Court cannot permit litigation to proceed piecemeal merely because additional material is subsequently produced where the Applicant has not shown that, with reasonable diligence, it could not have been presented earlier.
40. It is trite that review is not an avenue to improve a case or obtain a second opportunity to litigate matters already determined. As held in National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau [1997] KECA 71 (KLR), a court cannot sit on appeal over its own decision under the guise of review merely because it considers its earlier decision erroneous.
41. Furthermore, the record shows that on June 6th ,2016, the Magistrates’ Court issued prohibitory orders restraining dealings with the suit property, while the Certificate of Official Search showed the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as the registered proprietors. The alleged transfer to the Intended Interested Party was registered on June 7th,2016. Even if genuine, the transfer therefore post-dates the prohibitory order and cannot displace its legal effect or the doctrine of lis pendens.
42. Similarly, the investigative correspondence does not conclusively establish the Intended Interested Party’s proprietary interest or provide sufficient basis to reopen the concluded proceedings. The Court therefore finds that the present application, in seeking to re-litigate matters previously determined, raises a legitimate concern of abuse of the court process. In Gandhi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others [2018] KEHC 6100 (KLR), the Court observed that: -
“ 23. The situation that may give rise to an abuse of court process is indeed in exhaustive; it involves situations where the process of court has not been or resorted to fairly, properly, honestly to the detriment of the other party. However, abuse of court process in addition to the above arises in the following situations: -
a. Instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues or multiplicity of actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin the action.
24. In the words of Oputa J.SC (as he then was)[15] abuse of judicial process is:- “A term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and is frivolous, vexations and oppressive. In his words abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of the legal process.”
43. The Court upheld the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent such abuse and preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings. The present application follows an earlier application by the Intended Interested Party seeking substantially similar reliefs, which was determined by this Court. The new evidence relied upon relates to matters that were either within the Applicant’s knowledge or could, with reasonable diligence, have been raised earlier. The application, therefore, amounts to an attempt to reopen concluded litigation by instalments, contrary to the principle of finality.
44. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution does not permit a party to circumvent the substantive doctrine of res judicata. As affirmed in Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Muiri Coffee Estate Limited supra, res judicata is founded on public policy and the need for finality in litigation. Accordingly, the Intended Interested Party has not demonstrated sufficient grounds to review the ruling of this court dated 21st May 2026. The alleged new evidence does not materially alter the matters previously determined. The application is therefore barred by section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act and constitutes an attempt to reopen concluded proceedings through litigation by instalments. The prayer for review consequently fails.
45. In conclusion, the award of costs is discretionary. In Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2014] KESC 31 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that although costs are at the discretion of the Court -which discretion must be exercised judiciously - in the circumstances, there is no compelling reason for departing from the general rule that costs follow the events. Having succeeded in defending the application, costs are awarded to the Appellant/Respondent.
46. The final disposition of the application dated June 17,2026 is as follows:
i)The Application lacks merit and is dismissed with costs to the Appellant/Respondent. It is ordered accordingly.
DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED THIS 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 AT VOI
JECINTA A. ORWA
JUDGE
In the presence of :
Mr. Muo for the Appellant/Respondent.
Ms. Atieno for the Intended Interested Party.
Mr Letisia - Court Assistant