Background
By a Notice of Motion dated 15th November 2025, brought under Order 40 Rule 1 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following orders:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
By a Notice of Motion dated 15th November 2025, brought under Order 40 Rule 1 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following orders:
Paragraph 1 →Accordingly, this Court finds that the predominant issue in this matter is the Plaintiff's entitlement as a dependant to the Estate of the deceased, and the validity of the confirmation of the Grant of Probate and the transmissions made under it. These matters are reserved to the High Court under the Law of Succession Act, and are already pending before that Court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this application.
Paragraph 54 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCLC E582 OF 2025
KAMAL KESHVALAL SHAH ………………………………………… PLAINTIFF
=VERSUS=
JAYENDRA KESHVALAL SHAH (Sued as the
Personal representative of the Deceased) ………………….1ST DEFENDANT
AVNISH JAYENDRA SHAH …………………………………2ND DEFENDANT
MIRAJ JAYENDRA SHAH ……………………………………3RD DEFENDANT
LAND REGISTRAR ……………………………………………4TH DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 15th November 2025, brought under Order 40 Rule 1 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following orders:
i. Spent
ii. Spent
iii. That a temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the 1st to 3rd Respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents or assigns, from selling, transferring, charging, leasing, subdividing, entering into any new dealings, or any manner whatsoever interfering with or otherwise dealing with the Estate properties known as I.R. No. 87719 and I.R. No. 87862 pending the hearing and determination of the Applicant's Revocation of Grant of Probate application in HCFP&A/E1058/2024 In the Estate of Manugauri Keshavlal Shah alias Manugauri Keshavlal Devshi Shah alias Shah Manugauri Keshaulal Devshi.
iv. That an interim order does issue directing the Land Registrar to place an inhibition under section 68 of the Land Registration Act prohibiting any dealings on the Estate properties being I.R. No. 87719 and I.R. No. 87862 pending the hearing and determination of the Applicants suit or until further orders are issued by this court.
v. That this Honourable Court be pleased to make such further orders as it may seem just and expedient in the circumstances.
vi. That the costs of this application be provided for.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face, together with the supporting affidavit of Kamal Keshvalal Shah sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The Applicant averred that the deceased, Manugauri Keshavlal Shah, also known as Manugauri Devshi Shah, and Shah Manugauri Keshavlal Devshi, died on 21st July 2024, and was survived by three sons, namely Anil Keshavlal Shah, Kamal Keshavlal Shah and Jayendra Keshavlal Shah.
4. He further averred that on 8th April 2025 the Succession Court issued a Grant of Probate to the 1st Respondent, which was thereafter listed for confirmation on 29th September 2025. He contended that on 26th September 2025, prior to confirmation, he filed a Reasonable Provision Application dated 19th September 2025 under Section 29(a) of the Law of Succession Act, and that by dint of Section 72(a) of the Act, the pendency of that application absolutely barred confirmation of the grant. He averred that notwithstanding this bar, the Succession Court confirmed the Grant of Probate on 29th September 2025 in favour of the 1st Respondent.
5. He further averred that, following the confirmation, he filed a Revocation Application dated 1st October 2025, on the ground that the confirmation was procured fraudulently by concealing the pending Reasonable Provision Application and in breach of Section 71(3) of the Law of Succession Act and Rule 40(8) of the Probate and Administration Rules, as it was obtained without the consent of the deceased's dependents. He stated that on 16th October 2025 he also filed an application seeking Leave to appeal. He relied on the Court of Appeal's holding in Machuka & Another v Nyangute & Another (Civil Appeal E166 of 2019) [2025] KECA 538 (KLR) to contend that no automatic right of appeal exists in succession matters.
6. He averred that on 23rd October 2025 the Succession Court issued stay orders restraining the 1st Respondent from dealing with the Estate pending the determination of the applications. He further averred that when the three applications came up for hearing on 5th November 2025, the Court extended the stay orders and observed that the Revocation Application had prospects of success.
7. The Applicant contends that upon conducting a search at the Lands Registry on 10th November 2025, he established that title I.R. No. 87719 was transferred to the 1st Respondent on 21st October 2025 as personal representative of the Estate. He stated that on the same date, the property was transferred to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, a sequence he described as suspicious. He further averred that the 1st Respondent transferred title I.R. No. 87862 to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents on 13th November 2025, in defiance of the subsisting stay orders, with the transfer instrument backdated to 21st October 2025 to circumvent those orders.
8. He asserted that the Respondents had lined up prospective purchasers for the Estate properties and were poised to alienate them to third parties, thereby rendering his statutory rights illusory. He contended that his cause of action arose from the fraudulent and unlawful transfer of Estate property undertaken to defeat the applications pending before the Succession Court and to interfere with his equitable and beneficial interest as a dependent with a pending Reasonable Provision Application.
9. The deponent argued that the Succession Court's mandate is confined to administering the Estate under the Law of Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Rules, and that it lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief relating to title to land. He contended that, because the properties had already been alienated to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, who were strangers to the succession cause, only the Environment and Land Court possessed original jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act to grant interlocutory relief concerning title, transfer, registration or disposition of land. He further contended that the reliefs sought would not require this Court to determine matters properly pending before the Succession Court, but would instead support and preserve the integrity of those proceedings.
10. He argued that unless the orders sought are granted urgently, the Estate's properties would be sold and transferred to third parties, thereby defeating his right to reasonable provision and undermining the authority of both the Succession Court and this Honourable Court.
THE RESPONDENTS’ CASE
11. The Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit, sworn by the 1st Respondent on 5th December 2025 in opposition to the application. The deponent averred that he is the Executor of the deceased's Estate, duly appointed under the deceased's will dated 23rd July 2008.
12. He further averred that the application was based on falsehoods intended to mislead the Court and to cast the Respondents and their advocates in a defamatory light. He contended that the Applicant had no vested or beneficial interest in the suit properties and therefore disclosed no cause of action against the Respondents.
13. He further contended that the matters raised by the Applicant were properly within Nairobi High Court Succession Cause No. E1058 of 2024, in which the trial judge had already ordered that the Estate be preserved pending determination of the various applications filed by the Applicant. He further contended that the High Court Family Division retained inherent jurisdiction to grant the orders sought before this Court. He denied that he, his advocates, or the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had concealed or misrepresented any material fact when applying for or confirming the Grant of Probate.
14. He asserted that, the Grant having been confirmed, he had substantially completed his statutory mandate as Executor by assenting to the vesting of specific legacies in the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in accordance with the Will. He further asserted that his duties in respect of the two properties in issue were thereby extinguished, rendering him non-suited for want of any remaining interest.
15. He stated that the Vesting Assets were registered on 21st October 2025, before any order of stay was issued, and denied backdating any document. He maintained that he acted in good faith in discharging his statutory duty, irrespective of the beneficiaries' relationship to him. He relied on the Grant of Probate, the Will and the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant to assert that the Applicant, not being a named beneficiary under the Will, was not vested with any interest in the suit properties.
16. He contended that the Application was bad in law and an abuse of court process, and that no contempt had been demonstrated, or pursued by way of contempt proceedings. He averred that the issues in this suit were substantially in issue in applications already pending before the Succession Court, namely the Summons for Revocation/Annulment of Grant dated 1st October 2025, the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2025, the Application for Provision of a Dependant dated 19th September 2025, and an intended appeal to the Court of Appeal.
17. He argued that, instead of complying with the directions in the Succession Cause to file responses and submissions on these applications, the Applicant opted to bring the present suit. He contended that the determination of the Succession Cause applications would directly affect and have wide-ranging ramifications for the reliefs sought herein. He argued that, to avoid the risk of conflicting decisions between Courts of equal status, the present application ought to be held in abeyance pending their determination. He added that, should the Grant be revoked as sought, all consequential acts, including the impugned transfers, would fall, though he maintained that the revocation application had no prospect of success.
18. He deposed that the Respondents were fully aware of the pending Succession Cause proceedings and the intended appeal, and that they had shown no intention of dealing with the properties as alleged. He stated that L.R. No. 209/65/13 was held jointly by Kenya Shirt Manufacturing Company Limited (50%) and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents (50%), and that L.R. No. 209/64/32 was held jointly by Khilan Chandulal Shah and Chirag Chandulal Shah (50%) and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents (50%), so that any order of inhibition or injunction would prejudice the interests of co-owners who are non-parties.
19. The deponent contends that fraud is a serious allegation requiring particularity and proof, which the Applicant failed to provide. He denied any fraudulent conduct by the Respondents. He contended that the Applicant had not demonstrated any known interest in the properties, nor had it produced any agreement for sale or correspondence evidencing an intended disposal. He further contended that the Respondents had no intention of transferring or alienating the properties. He averred that the Applicant has not approached the court with clean hands and has failed to satisfy the conditions for granting injunctive relief.
20. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the deponent contends that the application is misconceived, lacks merit, and was brought with the ulterior motive of intimidating, embarrassing and harassing the Respondents, and that it is actuated by malice following the Respondents' refusal to permit circumvention of the deceased's Will.
21. He maintained that the Respondents had not interfered with any of the Plaintiff’s interests, whether real or imagined, and that he had not acted fraudulently or in breach of fiduciary duty. In conclusion, he urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
22. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
23. The Applicant filed his submissions dated 15th February 2026.
24. On behalf of the Applicant, Counsel relied on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) and Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR), to submit that the party bearing the burden must demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right, a material and substantive invasion of that right, and an urgent necessity to prevent irreparable harm.
25. Applying this standard, Counsel submitted that the Applicant is the deceased’s son and therefore a dependant within the meaning of Section 29(a) of the Law of Succession Act. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had filed applications to revoke the Grant issued to the 1st Respondent and to seek reasonable provision out of the Estate. Counsel further submitted that, while both applications remained pending before the Succession Court, the Respondents transferred property out of the Estate to defeat them.
26. Counsel contended that the cause of action arose from the fraudulent and unlawful transfer of Estate property intended to defeat the pending applications and to interfere with his equitable interest as a dependant. Counsel asserted that the Applicant’s beneficial interest entitled him to seek protection and preservation of the property pending determination of his rights in the Succession Court. Counsel submitted that, without the orders sought, the Estate properties would be sold and transferred to third parties, thereby defeating the Applicant’s right to reasonable provision and undermining the authority of both Courts.
27. Regarding jurisdiction, Counsel submitted that the Succession Court cannot grant injunctive relief relating to title to land, as its mandate was confined to the administration of the Estate under the Law of Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Rules. Counsel further submitted that only the Environment and Land Court, under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, has original jurisdiction over interlocutory relief relating to the title, transfer, registration or disposition of land.
28. Counsel further submitted that the impugned dealings of the 1st to 3rd Respondents fell squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction, and that, contrary to the Respondents' position, the orders sought would support rather than usurp the Succession Court's mandate. It was submitted that the Applicant had adduced sufficient evidence to show that his rights were not illusory and that a real danger of violation existed. Counsel relied on Nguruman Ltd v Jan Bonde Nielsen, where it was held that a court need not conduct a mini-trial but need only be satisfied that there is a fair and bona fide question on a balance of probabilities. Counsel urged the Court to find that a prima facie case had been established.
29. On irreparable injury, Counsel relied on Nguruman Ltd v Jan Bonde Nielsen to submit that injury is irreparable where it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, whether for want of an ascertainable measure or by its very nature. Counsel submitted that it was not in dispute that the Respondents had transferred Estate property out of the Succession Court's jurisdiction, a fact supported by the annexed land registration forms. Counsel further submitted that the property, having belonged to the Applicant's mother, carried both legal and sentimental significance; that his absolute right to inherit was threatened by the transfers; and that any onward disposal to third parties would leave him without recourse and render the pending Succession Court applications nugatory, an injury incapable of adequate monetary compensation.
30. Counsel relied on the definition of the balance of convenience set out in Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR) to submit that the balance of convenience favoured him, as refusing the injunction would result in disinheritance without legal recourse, whereas the Respondents' averment that they had no intention to transfer or alienate the property meant that little prejudice would arise from granting the orders sought. Further reliance was placed on Mwangi & 3 Others v Ndunyu & 2 Others [2025] KEELC 1121 (KLR).
31. Counsel submitted that the inhibition sought does not affect the interests of Kenya Shirt Manufacturing Company Limited in L.R. No. 209/65/13 or of Khilan and Chirag Chandulal Shah in L.R. No. 209/64/32, as it is confined to the interests transferred out of the Estate, not to the co-owners or their respective half-shares.
32. In conclusion, Counsel urged the court to allow the application with costs to the Applicant.
THE 1ST – 3RD DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS
33. The Respondents filed their submissions dated 5th May 2026.
34. On behalf of the Respondents, Counsel submitted that the Applicant had raised matters of succession and inheritance falling within the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant should have pursued his remedies in the High Court rather than before this court. Counsel further submitted that the same subject matter was substantially in issue across five applications already pending in the Succession Cause, and that, having taken directions to file responses and submissions in those applications, the Applicant instead opted to institute the present suit rather than comply. Counsel contended that the determination of the Succession Cause applications would have a direct bearing on, and wide ramifications for, the reliefs sought in this suit.
35. Invoking the principle of comity between Courts of equal status, Counsel submitted that it was prudent to hold this application in abeyance pending the determination of the Succession Cause proceedings to avoid the risk of conflicting decisions. Counsel further submitted that, should the Grant be revoked as sought by the Applicant, all consequential acts, including the impugned transfers, would fall away automatically, rendering the present Application unnecessary. However, Counsel maintained that the revocation application had no prospect of success.
36. Regarding the allegation of fraud, Counsel submitted that fraud is a serious allegation requiring specific particulars and proof which the Applicant failed to plead and prove. Counsel further submitted that, in the absence of such particulars or evidence, the allegations could not stand, and that any remedy for proven fraud or breach of fiduciary duty would, in any event, lie elsewhere than before this court.
37. Regarding the principles governing interlocutory injunctions, Counsel relied on the three-limb test in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, to submit that the Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, demonstrate that he would otherwise suffer irreparable injury not adequately compensable in damages, and show that the balance of convenience favours him. Counsel further submitted that an applicant seeking equitable relief must approach the court in utmost good faith; failing which, no injunction should issue. On the standard applicable to mandatory orders, Counsel relied on Mountain View Transporters Ltd & Another v Alcon Holdings Ltd, Milimani Commercial Court Civil Case No. 191 of 2005, in which Azangalala J adopted the English authority of Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agro Export and Others [1986] All ER 901, to submit that a mandatory interlocutory injunction should not be granted absent special circumstances.
38. Applying these principles, Counsel submitted that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate any known interest in the properties in issue and had not challenged the validity of the Will, and therefore had failed to establish a prima facie case. Counsel further submitted that no evidence, such as an agreement for sale or correspondence with prospective purchasers, had been produced to substantiate the alleged intention to dispose of the properties, and therefore the allegations in that regard remained speculative and unsupported. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had not come to Court with clean hands and had failed to satisfy the conditions for granting injunctive relief.
39. Counsel further submitted that the application is actuated by malice and brought with the ulterior motive of intimidating, embarrassing and harassing the Respondents, following their refusal to permit circumvention of the deceased's Will. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
40. Having considered the application, the replying affidavit and the rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:
a. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter;
b. Whether the Applicant has met the threshold for grant of an interlocutory injunction; and
c. Whether this Court should issue an order of inhibition under Section 68 of the Land Registration Act.
WHETHER THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THIS MATTER
41. The Respondents contend that the matters raised by the Applicant are succession matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court and are already before the Nairobi High Court, Succession Cause No. E1058 of 2024. The Applicant contends that the Succession Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief relating to title to land, and that only this Court may do so under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act.
42. It is trite law that jurisdiction is everything and without it the Court cannot take any further step, whether or not the question is raised by a party. In Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, Nyarangi JA stated as follows:
"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law down tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction."
43. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that;
“A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. We agree with counsel for the first and second respondents in his submission that the issue as to whether a Court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, is not one of mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the Court cannot entertain any proceedings.”
44. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, read with Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, confers on this court jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and to the use and occupation of, and title to, land. Conversely, Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act vests jurisdiction over the administration and distribution of the estates of deceased persons in the High Court, which may determine any dispute under the Act and make such orders as may be expedient. Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules preserves the inherent power of that court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice.
45. In Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] KESC 15 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that:
“We therefore entirely concur with the Court of Appeal’s decision that such parity of hierarchical stature does not imply that either ELC or ELRC is the High Court or vice versa. The three are different and autonomous courts and exercise different and distinct jurisdictions. As article 165(5) precludes the High Court from entertaining matters reserved to the ELC and ELRC, it should, by the same token, be inferred that the ELC and ELRC too cannot hear matters reserved to the jurisdiction of the High Court.”
46. Where a dispute raises issues that straddle the jurisdiction of more than one Court, this Court must determine which Court is properly seized of the real dispute between the parties. Two tests have emerged. The first is the predominant purpose test, which looks to the underlying transaction. The second is the predominant issue test, which looks to the subject matter of the dispute before the court. In Base Titanium Limited v Kiswili (On Behalf of 65 others) & 3 others (Civil Appeal E142 of 2022) [2025] KECA 1330 (KLR), the Court of Appeal summarized both tests as follows:
“The first approach is the “pre-dominant purpose test” which Prof.Ngugi, J. (as he then was), was a proponent in the decision of Suzanne Achieng Butler & 4 others vs. Redhill Heights Investments Limited & Another (2016) KEHC 1313 (KLR) in respect of which we must point out that, on this Court under the citation appeal to Redhill Heights Investments Limited vs. Suzanne Achieng Butler & 4 others (2018) KECA 776 (KLR), was not considered on merit since it was established that the parties therein filed a consent to settle the issue. The learned Judge (as he then was) held as follows:
“When faced with a controversy whether a particular case is a dispute about land (which should be litigated at the ELC) or not, the Courts utilize the Pre-dominant Purpose Test: In a transaction involving both a sale of land and other services or goods, jurisdiction lies at the ELC if the transaction is predominantly for land, but the High Court has jurisdiction if the transaction is predominantly for the provision of goods, construction, or works.
The Court must first determine whether the predominant purpose of the transaction is the sale of land or construction. Whether the High Court or the ELC has jurisdiction hinges on the predominant purpose of the transaction, that is, whether the contract primarily concerns the sale of land or, in this case, the construction of a townhouse.”
In Lydia Nyambura Mbugua vs. Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited & Another (2018) KEELC 1599 (KLR), Munyao, J., held that a court should consider the “predominant issue” in the parties’ dispute, stating as follows:
"On my part, I would modify the above test, andhold the position that what is important when determining whether the court has jurisdiction, is not so much the purpose of the transaction, but the subject matter or issue before court…That is why I hold the view, that in making a choice of which court to appear before, one needs to find out what the predominant issue in his case is, and not necessarily, the predominant purpose of the transaction. If the litigant’s predominant issue will touch on the use of land, or occupation of land, or a matter that affects in one or another, title to land, then such issue would fall for determination before the ELC.”
47. In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff's claim to the suit properties rests solely on his status as a son of the deceased, and accordingly, as a dependant under Section 29(a) of the Law of Succession Act. His interest in the suit properties does not exist independently of the Estate. It depends entirely on the outcome of three applications pending before the Succession Court: his Reasonable Provision Application dated 19th September 2025, his Revocation Application dated 1st October 2025, and his application for leave to appeal dated 16th October 2025.
48. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants acquired the suit properties by transfers from the 1st Defendant, acting as executor under the confirmed Grant of Probate. They therefore claim title through the Estate, not independently of it. Whether those transfers ought to stand depends on whether the confirmation of the Grant was lawful and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to provision from the Estate. These are questions of succession.
49. The Plaintiff's own pleadings confirm this. In his Plaint, he pleads that the Succession Court is seized of the question of whether the confirmed Grant was lawfully issued. He further pleads that if the Grant is revoked, all actions taken under it, including the transfers of the suit properties, shall be set aside. The substantive prayers in the Plaint are expressly conditional upon the Succession Court revoking the confirmed Grant. The Plaintiff further pleads that the suit is filed to give effect to the spirit and intention of the Stay Orders, and to preserve the suit properties pending the determination of the applications before the Succession Court.
50. It follows that the Plaintiff does not ask this Court to determine any question of title in its own right. The relief he seeks would arise only after a decision of the Succession Court. Prayer (c) of the application likewise seeks an injunction pending the determination of the Revocation Application. In substance, the suit is ancillary to the succession proceedings. This is not a case in which a third party asserts an independent proprietary right against the Estate, such as a claim based on a trust or a purchase, that would require this Court to determine title. Every question on which the Plaintiff's entitlement depends is reserved to the High Court under the Law of Succession Act.
51. It is not disputed that on 23rd October 2025 the Succession Court issued orders restraining the 1st Defendant from dealing with the Estate, and that on 5th November 2025 it extended those orders. The Succession Court is seized of the dispute and has exercised its powers to preserve the Estate.
52. The Plaintiff further alleged that the transfer of I.R. No. 87862 was registered on 13th November 2025 in breach of the Stay Orders, and backdated to 21st October 2025 to circumvent them. If that is so, the remedy lies before the Court whose orders are alleged to have been disobeyed. It does not found a fresh cause of action before this Court. The same applies to the complaints of transfer pendente lite and breach of the doctrine of lis pendens pleaded in the Plaint. The Succession Court is best placed to address any dealing calculated to defeat them.
53. This Court is alive to its power under Section 68 of the Land Registration Act to inhibit dealings in registered land. However, it exercises that power only in proceedings properly before it. To hold otherwise would allow a party to found this Court's jurisdiction on the relief sought rather than on the nature of the dispute.
54. Accordingly, this Court finds that the predominant issue in this matter is the Plaintiff's entitlement as a dependant to the Estate of the deceased, and the validity of the confirmation of the Grant of Probate and the transmissions made under it. These matters are reserved to the High Court under the Law of Succession Act, and are already pending before that Court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to determine this application.
55. Having so found, this Court must down tools. It shall not consider the merits of the application for an interlocutory injunction or the order of inhibition sought.
56. The upshot of the foregoing is that this Court makes the following orders:
a. The Notice of Motion dated 15th November 2025 is hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction.
b. The Respondents are awarded the costs of the application.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Ms Munene for the Applicant
Ongondi for the 1st – 3rd Respondents
Vena - Court assistant