REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELCL MISC APPLICATION NO. 198 OF 2026
OREX REALTY LIMITED…..................................................... APPLICANT
=VERSUS=
POSTAL CORPORATION OF KENYA… ................................. RESPONDENT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026, brought under Article 50, 159(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sections 3, 13, and 19 of the Environment and Land Court Act, Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, Rule 2 of the Arbitration Rules 1997, and Order 40 Rules 1,2,4 and 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Applicant seeks the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. Spent.
c. Pending the hearing and determination of the intended arbitration, an order be and is hereby issued preserving the status quo as at the date of filing of this Application with respect to the Applicant's occupation, possession and use of Land Parcel No. I.R. No. 1/1317 (formerly L.R. No. 1/374).
d. The costs of this Application be provided for.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Applicant’s Director, Abdul Latheef Mohammed Rashad, sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The deponent averred that the Applicant entered into a lease agreement with the Respondent on 2nd December 2022 for a portion of land known as L.R. No. 1/1317, formerly L.R. No. 1/374, on the Argwings Kodhek/Tigoni Road, Kilimani. He further averred that, relying on the assurance of a twenty-year term, the Applicant had made substantial investment in the suit property. He stated that the Applicant had diligently paid rent quarterly in accordance with the lease and was not in arrears.
4. The deponent averred that on 27th April 2026 the Respondent issued a Notice of Termination, threatening imminent and unlawful termination of the lease and consequent eviction. He further averred that its advocates responded by a letter dated 20th May 2026, asserting that the notice was baseless and issued in breach of the express terms of the lease. He explained that, by letter dated 2nd June 2026, the Respondent maintained its position and indicated its intention to proceed with the termination without further reference to the Applicant.
5. The deponent contends that the Respondent's reliance on Treasury Circular No. 3/2026, titled "Circular on Optimal Utilization of Government Assets," was misplaced, as the Circular merely required public entities to identify, document and optimise the use of government assets, and did not authorise unilateral termination of subsisting contractual obligations or the repudiation of a valid lease.
6. He further contends that the suit property cannot be classified as underutilised within the meaning of the Circular, as it was the subject of a registered twenty-year commercial lease under which it remained in active occupation. He stated that the lease has continuously generated rental income for the Respondent throughout its term. He argued that the Respondent's reliance on the Circular was an impermissible attempt to vary or defeat the parties' contractual obligations by administrative directive.
7. The deponent contends that a dispute had thereby arisen under the lease agreement. He relied on Clause 5.0, which provides for disputes to be referred to arbitration in the first instance. He explained that the lease expressly preserves the parties' right to seek interlocutory relief from a court of competent jurisdiction pending the commencement or determination of arbitration, and excludes the application of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act. He further contended that he was in the process of initiating arbitration under that clause in respect of the Notice of Termination.
8. He further averred that the lease contained no break clause, operational-use re-entry clause, redevelopment clause, or other provision allowing the Respondent, as lessor, to terminate the lease early for its own purposes. He contended that the Respondent could not unilaterally introduce a termination right that had neither been negotiated nor included in the agreement.
9. The deponent asserts that the subject matter of the intended arbitration was at risk of being wasted, alienated, or otherwise prejudiced without preservation by court order. He maintained that, unless restrained, the Respondent's actions would defeat the arbitral process and render any eventual award nugatory.
10. He contended that the Applicant would suffer substantial and irreparable loss, in the form of lost investment, business operations, goodwill and contractual rights, that could not be adequately compensated by damages. He argued that the Respondent would not be prejudiced by the grant of the orders sought, as the Applicant would remain in possession and continue to pay rent under the lease.
THE RESPONDENT’S CASE
11. The Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit, sworn on 25th June 2026 by Rose Musyimi, the Respondent’s Manager, Facilities Management, in opposition to the application. The deponent denied that the Applicant held a valid and subsisting twenty-year leasehold interest free from breach. She averred that the lease had effectively lost legal force and was lawfully terminated due to fundamental and material breaches by the Applicant, as Lessee.
12. She averred that the Applicant had incurred an uncured material default and owed rental arrears of KES 2,975,000.00/= as at 31st December 2025. She contended that, because the amount remained unpaid after the seven-day grace period, it triggered absolute forfeiture under Clause 3.1 of the lease and Clause 16 of the Letter of Offer.
13. She further averred that non-payment of rent for more than seven days conferred on the Respondent an absolute right of re-entry, whether or not formally demanded. She asserted that rent fell due on the first day of each quarter under Clause 1.1, and that the right of re-entry was automatically triggered once payment remained outstanding by the seventh day of the quarter.
14. She further averred that the Applicant breached the restrictive covenant in Clause 1.15 of the lease by unauthorisedly subletting and assigning portions of the suit property to third parties without the Respondent's prior written consent. In support of this allegation, she relied on bank remittance records showing deposits from two distinct entities: the lessee and the sub-lessee.
15. She contended that the clean ledger and receipts relied upon by the Applicant did not accurately reflect the account's lawful financial standing, but instead resulted from bad-faith circumvention of the Respondent's corporate structures and collusion by staff in its billing department to understate the Applicant's true liabilities. She deposed that the consequences of the demand notice dated 20th November 2025 had been waived through unauthorised staff collusion.
16. Regarding statutory compliance, she averred that the Applicant is bound by the directives and laws issued by the Government of Kenya, in accordance with Clauses 1.4 and 1.17 of the lease. She further averred that the National Treasury Circular, which directed state corporations to dispose of idle or underutilised assets and enhance asset efficiency, imposed a statutory obligation on the Respondent, as the suit property had been earmarked for value addition through the Respondent's e-commerce operations.
17. She clarified that the Respondent's right to terminate the lease rested primarily on express contractual and statutory rights of forfeiture arising from the Applicant's material breaches, namely financial default and unauthorised third-party allocation. She maintained that invoking the Treasury Circular merely reinforced an internal audit revealing underutilisation of the asset's commercial value attributable to the Applicant's conduct. She averred that, as a state corporation, the Respondent was obliged to protect public property from waste, unpaid rent, illegal subleases and fraudulent loss of revenue.
18. The deponent explained that the Applicant selectively invoked Clause 5.0 of the lease to seek interim court intervention while seeking to obscure its own operational breaches. She contended that although Clause 5.0 preserved a right to seek interim relief, such relief remained equitable and discretionary, and that a party seeking equity was required to approach the court with clean hands, which the Applicant, in light of its financial default, unauthorised subletting and alleged collusive conduct, had failed to do.
19. Regarding the criteria for granting an injunction, she asserted that the Applicant had failed to satisfy the tripartite test in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358. She contended, first, that no prima facie case with a probability of success had been established, as the lease was tainted by material breach, unauthorised assignment and collusion, and was incapable of equitable protection; second, that any loss claimed by the Applicant was purely commercial, quantifiable, and therefore adequately compensable in damages should an arbitral tribunal find in its favour; and third, that the balance of convenience favoured the Respondent, a public entity charged with safeguarding public land assets and statutory revenue against private circumvention. She further asserted that the grant of the interim orders sought would cause immense prejudice to the public interest, sanitise a material default, and permit an unauthorised occupant to continue wasting a strategic public asset.
THE APPLICANT’S RESPONSE
20. In a Further Affidavit dated 6th August 2026, the deponent averred that the Respondent's affidavit revealed a substantive dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation, performance, enforcement and termination of the lease agreement, which shall be referred to arbitration under Clause 5.0 of the lease. He maintained that the Notice of Termination dated 27th April 2026 remained unlawful and contrary to the lease. The deponent noted that the Respondent had sought to justify termination by reference to an undated notice, alleged rent arrears, unauthorised subletting, alleged breaches of the lease, and Treasury Circular No. 3 of 2026. The Applicant disputed these allegations in their entirety.
21. He averred that the present Application is intended to preserve the subject matter pending arbitration in accordance with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act and Clause 5.0 of the lease. He contended that the Respondent's allegations of rent arrears, forfeiture, unauthorised subletting, and lease breaches raised contested issues properly for determination by an arbitral tribunal, making it inappropriate for this court to resolve them conclusively in an application whose sole purpose was to preserve the subject matter.
22. He further averred that, in its Replying Affidavit, the Respondent admitted that the suit property had been identified and earmarked pursuant to Treasury Circular No. 3 of 2026, and that it intended to repossess the premises and implement the impugned notice. The deponent contends that the Circular and the Respondent's internal operational requirements could not, of themselves, override or extinguish the parties' contractual obligations under a valid and subsisting lease. He argued that whether the Respondent was entitled to terminate the lease under the notice dated 27th April 2026 or the undated notice annexed to the Replying Affidavit was a matter for arbitration.
23. He averred that the Respondent did not dispute the existence of Clause 5.0 of the lease, nor did it dispute that the clause permitted a party to seek interim orders to preserve the status quo pending arbitration. He contended that, without preserving the suit property and its possession pending arbitration, the Respondent might implement the impugned notice and repossess the premises before the arbitral tribunal could determine the parties' competing claims.
24. He further contended that repossession, reallocation, use of the property for the Respondent's intended e-commerce operations, or any other interference with the Applicant's possession would risk rendering the arbitral proceedings nugatory and any eventual award in the Applicant's favour ineffective. He maintained that the orders sought were necessary to preserve the subject matter and to safeguard the efficacy of the arbitral process contemplated by the parties. He concluded that the Respondent's Replying Affidavit confirmed, beyond doubt, both the existence of a dispute between the parties and that arbitration, as agreed under Clause 5.0, was the proper forum for its determination.
25. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
26. The Applicant filed its submissions dated 6th August 2026.
27. Counsel submitted that, contrary to the Respondent's position, a valid and subsisting lease agreement existed, and that the Termination Notice dated 27th April 2026 had been issued under Clause 3.3 of that agreement, providing six months' notice of termination. Counsel further submitted that it was inconsistent for the Respondent to contend that the lease had already been terminated for breach, since, had that been so, there would have been no basis for issuing a notice of termination under Clause 3.3.
28. Counsel further submitted that the lease contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes arising out of or in connection with it to be referred to arbitration. Counsel maintained that the Termination Notice was unlawful, invalid, and contrary to the lease. The Respondent sought to justify termination on grounds of alleged rent arrears, forfeiture, unauthorised subletting, other breaches, and the Treasury Circular. Counsel submitted that this divergence of position demonstrated a genuine dispute over the validity of the termination and the parties' respective rights and obligations, which fell within the scope of the arbitration clause and was properly referable to arbitration.
29. Counsel further submitted that Section 7(1) of the Arbitration Act permits a party to seek an interim measure of protection from the High Court before or during arbitral proceedings without derogating from the arbitration agreement. Counsel relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR) to argue that the purpose of interim protection is to preserve the subject matter of arbitration so that the arbitral process is not rendered nugatory. The Court identified four essentials: the existence of an arbitration agreement, whether the subject matter of arbitration is under threat, the appropriate measure of protection having regard to the merits, and the period for which such measure ought to be granted.
30. Applying this framework, Counsel submitted that it was not in dispute that Clause 5.0 of the lease required disputes to be referred to arbitration, while expressly preserving the right to seek interlocutory relief from a court of competent jurisdiction, and that both parties had acknowledged the clause in their pleadings.
31. Regarding whether the subject matter of arbitration was under threat, Counsel submitted that the Respondent, in its Replying Affidavit, demonstrated a real, immediate and continuing intention to enforce the Termination Notice and repossess the premises before any arbitral determination, thereby placing at risk the lease, the Applicant's leasehold interest, possession of the premises and the validity of the notice itself. Without the orders sought, the Applicant risked losing possession, together with its investments, business operations, goodwill and contractual rights, before the dispute could be heard in arbitration.
32. Regarding the appropriate measure of protection, Counsel submitted that the Applicant sought only preservation of the status quo pending arbitration, not a final determination of the parties' rights. It maintained that the Respondent's allegations of arrears, forfeiture, unauthorised subletting and other breaches were matters for the arbitral tribunal, and that the relief sought accordingly aligned with the preservative purpose of Section 7 as articulated in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR).
33. Counsel submitted that the Court had jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act to grant the interim measures sought pending the commencement and determination of arbitration. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had demonstrated the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, a dispute capable of reference to arbitration, and an imminent threat to the subject matter of the intended arbitration, thereby warranting its preservation.
34. Counsel submitted that the Respondent would not suffer any prejudice from the grant of the orders, whereas the Applicant would suffer substantial prejudice through eviction and loss of possession pending arbitration. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the Applicant had satisfied the requirements for interim measures of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act and urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.
THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
35. The Respondent filed its submissions dated 19th August 2026.
36. Regarding the applicable principles, Respondent’s Counsel relied on Section 7 of the Arbitration Act and the Court of Appeal's decision in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR) to submit that the material considerations were the existence of an arbitration agreement, whether the subject matter of arbitration was under threat, the appropriate measure in the circumstances, and the period for which protection should subsist without encroaching on the tribunal's decision-making power.
37. Counsel submitted that, at this interlocutory stage, the Respondent did not invite the court to determine conclusively whether the Applicant had breached the lease, whether the lease had been forfeited, whether any subsequent payment constituted a waiver, or whether the Notice of Termination dated 27th April 2026 was contractually effective, as those matters were reserved for arbitration.
38. Counsel further submitted that the same restraint applied equally to the Applicant and that the Court could not, under the guise of preservation, assume that the Applicant had an unconditional and indefeasible right to remain in possession until 2042. Counsel relied on Infocard Holdings Limited v Attorney General & 2 Others [2014] eKLR to argue that Section 7 was not a means for the Court to determine the merits of a contractual dispute, as doing so would encroach on the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction.
39. Counsel submitted that the orders sought by the Applicant, to restrain the implementation of the termination notice, repossession, and any alienation, leasing, licensing, transfer or charging of the property pending the final determination of arbitration, were too broad. Counsel argued that the orders would compel the Respondent to keep the Applicant in occupation indefinitely and prevent the Respondent from exercising disputed contractual and proprietary rights.
40. Counsel relied on Seven Twenty Investments Limited v Sandhoe Investment Kenya Limited [2013] KEHC 7038 (KLR), in which the High Court declined to grant a Section 7 application to restrain termination of a contract, holding that the court should not, by an interim measure, prevent a party from exercising a disputed contractual right and thereby effectively rewrite the parties' agreement pending arbitration.
41. Counsel also relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in Eden Developers Limited v China Zhongxing Construction Company Limited [2024] KECA 1476 (KLR), to submit that the court must first correctly identify the subject matter of arbitration and ensure that any measure granted preserves that subject matter rather than securing a collateral advantage for one party. It submitted that a distinction fell to be drawn between preserving property from irreversible dissipation and granting the Applicant substantive enjoyment of the very contractual right whose continued existence was disputed.
42. Turning to the documentary record, Counsel submitted that Clause 1.1 of the lease required rent to be paid quarterly in advance, and that Clause 3.1 entitled the Lessor to re-enter where rent remained unpaid seven days after falling due, whether formally demanded or not, or where other covenants were not performed, without prejudice to antecedent breaches. Counsel further submitted that its payment analysis disclosed repeated instances of rent remaining outstanding beyond the contractual seven-day period, including rent due 1st April 2025 paid substantially in May 2025, rent due 1st July 2025 paid substantially in September 2025, rent due 1st October 2025 paid substantially in November 2025, and rent due 1st January 2026 paid on 12th and 14th January 2026.
43. Counsel submitted that these matters were not placed before the court for a final finding of breach or forfeiture. Counsel demonstrated that the Applicant's assertion of an unquestionable subsisting right of occupation was itself contested on substantial documentary grounds, and noted that the Further Affidavit had not offered an alternative payment chronology. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant instead maintained that questions of arrears, forfeiture and breach fell to the arbitrator, a position the Respondent accepted but submitted was inconsistent with treating the Applicant's right to continued possession as finally established for the purposes of an indefinite injunction.
44. Regarding the Applicant's reliance on subsequent payments, Counsel submitted that Clause 3.10 of the lease provided that receipt of rent, with knowledge of a breach, did not, in itself, constitute a waiver, and that payments could be accepted without prejudice to the Lessor's other contractual rights.
45. Counsel relied on National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & Another [2001] KECA 362 (KLR) and Langat v Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd [2017] KECA 152 (KLR) to submit that courts must give effect to freely agreed contractual terms and should not rewrite the parties' bargain. Counsel submitted that whether Clause 3.10 ultimately defeated the Applicant's waiver argument was a matter for the arbitrator, but that the clause was sufficient to show that payment of arrears, absent determination of the contractual dispute, could not be treated as conclusive proof that antecedent defaults and their consequences had disappeared.
46. Counsel further submitted that it had raised an alleged breach of Clause 1.15, which prohibits transferring, assigning, subletting, charging or parting with possession without the Lessor's prior written consent. Counsel explained that the Applicant disputed this allegation and maintained that it fell within the arbitration clause. Counsel further submitted that the Respondent was not asking the Court to make a final finding on this allegation, but its existence made it inappropriate to grant relief based on an undisputed contractual entitlement to occupy the premises until the expiry of the twenty-year term.
47. Regarding Treasury Circular No. 3 of 2026, Counsel submitted that the Applicant's attack on the Circular did not dispose of the application, as the Respondent did not contend that the Circular alone rewrote or extinguished the lease. Counsel explained that the Circular set out the public asset-management considerations informing the Respondent's intended use of the property, while the contractual questions of default, breach, termination, forfeiture and waiver remained separate matters for the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, Counsel maintained that it would be premature for the court to resolve the validity of the termination by determining those competing positions within a Section 7 application.
48. Regarding the application, Counsel submitted that it was filed on 19th June 2026, and that the Applicant had already benefited from a status quo order issued on 29th June 2026. Counsel contended that the Applicant continued to describe the arbitral proceedings as merely "intended," without demonstrating that a tribunal had been constituted or an arbitrator appointed. Counsel argued that Section 7 was intended to facilitate arbitration, not to substitute litigation for it or provide an indefinite court-supervised moratorium.
49. Counsel further submitted that in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR), the Court of Appeal, while considering interim protection appropriate, limited its order to 28 days to enable the parties to commence arbitral proceedings, failing which the order would automatically lapse. Counsel argued that the Applicant could not rely on that authority to establish section 7 jurisdiction while disregarding the Court of Appeal's caution regarding duration.
50. Counsel submitted that the orders sought, which would remain in force during the arbitration hearing and determination, would be disproportionate, would materially determine the commercial consequences of the dispute before the arbitrator's decision, and would encroach on the tribunal's ability, once constituted, to consider the parties' positions and to determine whether further interim protection should continue. Section 7 requires the court to support arbitration rather than supersede it. Accordingly, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
51. Having considered the application, the affidavits filed in response and the rival submissions, the following issues that arise for determination:
i. Whether the Applicant has satisfied the conditions for the grant of an interim measure of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
ii. If so, what measure of protection is appropriate, and for what period.
52. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, defines an interim measure of protection as follows:
“An international tribunal order to prevent a litigant from prejudicing the final outcome of a lawsuit by arbitrating action before judgment has been reached. This measure is comparable to a temporary injunction in national law.”
53. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides as follows:
(1) It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request from the High Court, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection and for the High Court to grant that measure.
(2) Where a party applies to the High Court for an injunction or other interim order and the arbitral tribunal has already ruled on any matter relevant to the application, the High Court shall treat the ruling or any finding of fact made in the course of the ruling as conclusive for the purposes of the application.
54. In Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 others, Civil Application No. NAI 327 of 2009 [2010] eKLR, the Court of Appeal outlined the conditions that must be met before an interim measure of protection is granted as follows:
i) The existence of an arbitration agreement.
ii) Whether the subject matter of arbitration is under threat.
iii) In the special circumstances which is the appropriate measure of protection after an assessment of the merits of the application.
iv) For what period must the measure be given, especially if requested for before the commencement of the arbitration, so as to avoid encroaching on the tribunal’s decision-making power as intended by the parties.”
55. Further, in Moi University Pension Scheme (Registered Trustees) v Stanlib Kenya Limited [2020] eKLR, it was held that the purpose of an interim measure of protection is to preserve the subject matter of the arbitration and to ensure that the arbitral process is not rendered nugatory.
56. The grant of an interim protective measure is discretionary. An order of protection is intended to preserve assets or maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the arbitral proceedings.
57. It is not in dispute that the parties executed a lease agreement containing an arbitration clause. Both parties relied on Clause 5.0, though they differed on the legal consequences of the alleged breaches and on the validity of the termination Notice. It is not in dispute that Clause 5.0 of the lease requires that disputes arising under it be referred to arbitration. The clause provides that:
“The Parties agree to refer any disputes relating to any matter in respect of this lease to arbitration in the first instance. A party may, however, seek interlocutory relief in civil courts in Kenya with competent jurisdiction. The provisions of the Landlord and Tenants (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap 301 Laws of Kenya shall not apply to this lease.”
58. This clause expressly preserves the parties’ right to seek interlocutory relief from a court of competent jurisdiction before arbitration is commenced or determined. The Respondent did not dispute the clause's existence or validity. Instead, both parties submitted that the questions of arrears, forfeiture, subletting, waiver, and the validity of the termination are reserved for the arbitral tribunal.
59. From the foregoing, it is clear that a dispute exists. The Applicant contends that the Notice of Termination dated 27th April 2026 is unlawful and contrary to the lease. The Respondent maintains that the lease was terminated because of the Applicant's breaches and that the Treasury Circular reinforced its decision. Accordingly, this Court finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and that the dispute falls within its scope.
60. The subject matter of the intended arbitration is the lease, the Applicant's leasehold interest, and the Applicant’s possession of the suit property. The Respondent deposed that the lease has terminated, that the suit property has been earmarked for its electronic commerce operations and that it has a right of re-entry. The Respondent's affidavit therefore discloses a present intention to recover possession and to use the property for a different purpose.
61. If the Respondent were to repossess the suit property and reallocate it before the tribunal determines whether the termination was valid, an award in the Applicant's favour on the continuation of the lease would be academic. The Respondent argued that the Applicant's loss is commercial and compensable in damages. However, the inquiry under Section 7 is not whether damages would be an adequate remedy at the end of the day. It is whether the subject matter of the arbitration requires preservation to prevent the arbitral process from being rendered nugatory. This Court finds that the subject matter of the arbitration is under threat.
62. Both parties invited this Court to refrain from determining whether rent was paid late, whether the lease was forfeited, whether any payment constituted a waiver under Clause 3.10, whether there was unauthorised subletting in breach of Clause 1.15, and whether the Treasury Circular bears on the lease. These are questions for the arbitral tribunal, and this Court shall not rule on them.
63. It suffices to observe that the parties' positions raise serious questions for arbitration. The Respondent asserts that the lease was terminated by forfeiture for breach, whereas the Notice of Termination dated 27th April 2026 is said to have been issued under Clause 3.3, which requires six months' notice. Whether these positions are consistent is for the tribunal to decide, not for this Court.
64. The Respondent argued that the Applicant approached the court with unclean hands. The allegations of arrears, collusion and unauthorised subletting, on which that contention rests, are disputed. They are precisely the matters reserved for arbitration. This Court cannot make findings on them at this stage, and they cannot disentitle the Applicant from a preservatory order.
65. The Respondent's concern is that an interim measure should not confer on the Applicant the substantive enjoyment of a disputed right for an extended period. A measure under Section 7 is a holding order. It must preserve the subject matter without determining the parties’ rights in advance, and without placing either party in a better position than it held when the dispute arose. In this court’s view, the appropriate measure is an order preserving the status quo as at the date of filing the application.
66. Regarding the duration of the measure, in the Safaricom case the Court of Appeal limited the order it granted to 28 days to enable the parties to institute arbitral proceedings. The application before this court was filed on 19th June 2026, and a status quo order has subsisted since 29th June 2026. The Applicant still describes the arbitration as intended, and no tribunal has been shown to have been constituted. Section 7 is intended to facilitate arbitration. Once constituted, the arbitral tribunal may itself order interim measures of protection under Section 18(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act, unless the parties otherwise agree. The remedy will be limited to what is reasonably necessary to initiate arbitration and obtain directions from the Tribunal.
67. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Motion dated 19th June 2026 is merited and is allowed as follows:
a) The status quo obtaining as at 19th June 2026 in respect of the Applicant's occupation, possession and use of Land Parcel No. I.R. No. 1/1317 (formerly L.R. No. 1/374) is hereby preserved pending the hearing and determination of the intended arbitration.
b) The Applicant shall commence arbitral proceedings in accordance with Clause 5.0 of the lease within thirty (60) days of the date of this ruling.
c) Each party shall bear its own costs.
JUDGMENT SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Omondi holding brief for Khalif for the Applicant
Vena – Court assistant