Background
By a Notice of Motion dated 29th January 2026, brought under Order 51 Rule 1, Order 42 Rule 6 Sub-rules (1) and (2), and Rule 4 Sub-rule (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 1st Plaintiff sought the following orders:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
By a Notice of Motion dated 29th January 2026, brought under Order 51 Rule 1, Order 42 Rule 6 Sub-rules (1) and (2), and Rule 4 Sub-rule (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 1st Plaintiff sought the following orders:
Paragraph 1 →Having considered the application, the response and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Applicant has met the threshold for an order staying execution pending appeal.
Paragraph 26 →In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the application lacks merit and should be dismissed with costs.
Paragraph 25 →Having considered the material before the Court, I find that the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that the execution of the decree would occasion substantial loss within the meaning of Order 42 Rule of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Paragraph 38 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC E124 OF 2022
IRENE WAKINI NJERU …………………………………..............1ST PLAINTIFF
ROBERT KARISA MDZOMBA
JOSHUA GICHUKI KARANJA &
OTHNIEL MWABILI MWANJALA
(Suing as Chairman, General Secretary & General Treasurer of
GOSPEL REVIVAL CENTRE ………………………………………2ND PLAINTIFF
=VERSUS=
PAUL ARAP CHANDOEK ………………………………………1ST DEFENDANT
FRED KANAU CHEGE …………………………………………2ND DEFENDANT
THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL ………………………….3RD DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 29th January 2026, brought under Order 51 Rule 1, Order 42 Rule 6 Sub-rules (1) and (2), and Rule 4 Sub-rule (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 1st Plaintiff sought the following orders:
i. Spent.
ii. Spent.
iii. That an Order for a Stay of execution of the judgment and/ or Decree and all subsequent orders herein given on the 27th November 2025 be issued pending the hearing and determination of the 1st Plaintiff/ Applicant's Intended Civil Appeal before the Court of Appeal.
iv. That the costs of this Application be provided for.
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the Applicant sworn on even date.
1ST PLAINTIFF’S CASE/APPLICANT’S CASE
3. The Applicant averred that she is the registered owner of L.R. No. 209/12371. She further averred that, on 27th November 2025, this Court delivered judgment dismissing her suit and entered judgment in favour of the 3rd Defendant, thereby cancelling her title. She also averred that the Commissioner of Lands issued her the title after she complied with all the conditions of the allocation.
4. She stated that a Notice of Appeal dated 27th November 2025 had been filed and served, and that her advocates had applied for certified copies of the proceedings and paid for them by letter dated 27th November 2025. She averred that her advocates had informed her that they were awaiting the certified copies of the proceedings and the judgment to lodge the record of appeal. They had also informed her that the 3rd Defendant might execute the decree at any time, thereby causing her substantial loss and damage.
5. She averred that she had already sold the suit property to the 2nd Plaintiff, who was in occupation. She further stated that the land had originally been allocated to her late husband and that, following his death, the allocation had been transferred to her. She contended that her appeal was highly likely to succeed and that, without a stay of execution, it would be rendered nugatory. In conclusion, she urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.
THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S CASE
6. The 3rd Defendant filed Grounds of Opposition dated 21st May 2026, opposing the application. The Respondent contends that the Applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for a stay of execution under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
7. It was further argued that dismissing the application was in the public interest, as the Applicant had unlawfully, illegally, unprocedurally, and/or fraudulently acquired the suit property, which was public land. It was also argued that the interests of justice required that the 3rd Defendant be permitted to enjoy the fruits of the judgment delivered in its favour.
8. This application was canvassed by way of written submissions.
THE 1ST PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
9. The Applicant filed her submissions dated 29th January 2026. On behalf of the 1st Plaintiff, Counsel submitted that Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules sets out the following conditions for granting a stay of execution pending appeal: the court must be satisfied that the applicant may suffer substantial loss if the order is not granted; the application must be made without unreasonable delay, and security must be furnished for the due performance of the decree.
10. Relying on Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] eKLR, Counsel submitted that granting of a stay is within the Court's discretion, which should be exercised to ensure that a successful appeal is not rendered nugatory. Counsel also relied on Wilson v Church (No. 2) 12 Ch.D [1879] 454, to submit that the Court should ensure that an appeal, if successful, is not rendered nugatory.
11. Regarding substantial loss, Counsel relied on Kenya Shell Ltd v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru [1986] eKLR, which held that substantial loss is the cornerstone of an application for a stay. Counsel also relied on RWW v EKW [2019] eKLR to submit that a stay pending appeal preserves the subject matter and safeguards the rights of an appellant exercising the right of appeal.
12. Counsel submitted that the subject matter concerned the ownership of land, that the 1st Plaintiff was the registered owner of the suit property, and that the judgment delivered in this matter ordered the cancellation of her title. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Plaintiff had appealed that judgment and that, without a stay, execution would cancel her title and result in the loss of the suit property, which she had already sold to the 2nd Plaintiff, thereby occasioning substantial loss.
13. Counsel submitted that, at this stage, it is not the Court's function to determine the merits of the intended appeal, but rather to consider whether sufficient cause exists to preserve the subject matter pending appeal. Relying on Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, Counsel emphasised that preservation orders safeguard the substratum of litigation pending appellate proceedings. Counsel also relied on James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, where the court held that an applicant must establish that execution will irreparably affect the essential core of the applicant's position as a prospective successful party. Counsel submitted that the Applicant had established a likelihood of substantial loss, thereby warranting the grant of the orders sought.
14. Regarding the delay, counsel submitted that the judgment was delivered on 27th November 2025 and that the present application, filed on 29th January 2026, was not filed after an unreasonable delay, as time does not run during the court vacation from 21st December to 13th January.
THE 3RD DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS
15. The 3rd Defendant filed its submissions dated 29/01/2026 on behalf of the 3rd Defendant, Counsel submitted that the application is fundamentally defective for failing to satisfy the mandatory security requirement under Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Relying on Thuo v Waliula [2025] KEHC 2259 (KLR), Counsel argued that a successful party should not be denied the fruits of judgment for fear that the appeal might fail and the status quo be irrecoverable. Counsel also relied on Arun C. Sharma v Ashana Raikundalia t/a Raikundalia & Co. Advocates & 2 Others, which held that security under Order 42 is protective rather than punitive and guarantees the due performance of the eventual decree.
16. Counsel submitted that, unlike the applicant in Thuo v Waliula, who proposed a specific form of security, identified the issuing bank, and undertook to provide it within a set timeframe, the Applicant here offered no security, proposed no mechanism, and gave no undertaking. Counsel further submitted that this omission was compounded by the uncontested fact that the 1st Applicant was in rent arrears in respect of the property in dispute. Accordingly, Counsel argued that the application was fundamentally defective and should be dismissed on this ground alone, without consideration of the remaining limbs of the test.
17. Counsel submitted that the Applicants had wholly failed to establish substantial loss. Relying on Kenya Shell Ltd v Kibiru & Another [1986] KLR 410, Counsel submitted that substantial loss is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction to grant a stay. Counsel also relied on Afeela Umma v Sara Umma [2009] 1 Sri LR 116, where the Court held that the judgment debtor bears the burden of proving substantial loss, and that a mere assertion is insufficient to discharge that burden.
18. Counsel relied on James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, as adopted in Kimondo & Another v Progressive Credit Ltd [2025] KEHC 7297 (KLR), where it was established that the mere prospect of execution does not constitute substantial loss; that the loss must be irreparable and incapable of remedy in damages; and that it must be of such gravity as to undermine the fundamental core of the applicant's position on appeal.
19. Counsel submitted that the 1st Applicant had testified that she was not in occupation of the suit property but occupied another government house, in respect of which she owed arrears.
20. Counsel further submitted that her Certificate of Lease over the suit property, obtained in 2015, was found to have been procured unlawfully and void ab initio. Counsel argued that the loss she claimed was, in substance, the lawful consequence of a cancelled title, not a cognisable loss. Counsel further submitted that the 2nd Applicant's interest, being wholly derivative of the 1st Applicant's void title, could not support an independent claim for loss, as no person can give what they do not have.
21. Counsel distinguished Thuo v Waliula, submitting that the balance in the applicant's favour in that case was based on the respondent's uncertain financial standing, a factor absent in the present case. Counsel relied on Mohammed Salim t/a Choice Butchery v Nasserpuria Memon Jamat to contend that the right of appeal must be balanced against a successful litigant's right to enjoy the fruits of the judgment.
22. Counsel submitted that the dispute concerned government housing, a public asset held in trust, which the court had determined was unlawfully removed from public control. Counsel argued that a stay would not preserve any legitimate status quo but would instead reinstate the unlawful occupation the judgment had corrected, at continuing cost to the public purse. Counsel further submitted that the Applicants' conduct, including the continued accumulation of rent arrears on the government house occupied by the 1st Applicant, disentitled them to equitable relief, as equity does not aid those who come to Court with unclean hands.
23. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate an arguable appeal with reasonable prospects of success. Relying on Mukiri Mungai v Attorney General [2014] eKLR, which cited Stanley Kangethe Kinyanjui v Tony Ketter & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, Counsel submitted that an applicant must identify, not merely assert, a bona fide arguable ground.
24. Counsel noted that no draft memorandum of appeal or particularised grounds had been placed before the court. Counsel also relied on Mukiri Mungai, citing Reliance Bank Ltd v Norlake Investments Ltd [2002] 1 EA 227, to address whether the appeal would be rendered nugatory. Counsel submitted that the suit property, being fixed, immovable, and permanently identifiable government land incapable of dissipation or transfer to an innocent third party, presented no risk of the appeal being rendered nugatory.
25. In conclusion, Counsel submitted that the application lacks merit and should be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
26. Having considered the application, the response and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Applicant has met the threshold for an order staying execution pending appeal.
27. Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules sets out the principles governing the grant of a stay and provides that:
(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.
(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—
(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.
28. It is trite that the power to grant or refuse a stay of execution is discretionary. In Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that the discretion should be exercised so as not to render an appeal nugatory:
“If there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay ought to be granted so that an appeal, if successful, may not be nugatory. A stay which would otherwise be granted ought not to be refused because the judge considers that another, which in his opinion will be a better remedy, will become available to the applicant at the conclusion of the proceedings.”
29. Granting an order for a stay of execution is discretionary. In RWW Vs EKW (2019) eKLR, the Court held that:
“…the purpose of an application for stay of execution pending an appeal is to preserve the subject in dispute so that the rights of the appellant who is exercising the undoubted right of appeal are safeguarded and The appeal if successful is not rendered nugatory. However, in doing so the court should weigh the right against the success of a litigant who should not be deprived of the fruits of his/her judgment. The court is also called upon to ensure that no party suffers prejudice that cannot be compensated by an award of damages.”
30. The purpose of a stay of execution is to preserve the substratum of the case. In Consolidated Marine v. Nampijja & Another, Civil App. No. 93 of 1989 (Nairobi), the Court held that:
“The purpose of the application for stay of execution pending appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the right of the appellant who is exercising his undoubted right of appeal is safeguarded and the appeal, if successful, is not rendered nugatory.”
31. On the first condition for proving that substantial loss may result unless stay orders are granted, the Applicant should not only state that she is likely to suffer substantial loss; she must prove that she will suffer substantial loss if stay orders are not granted.
32. In so finding, I am persuaded by the decision in the case of Charles Wahome Gethi v Angela Wairimu Gethi (2008) eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that;
“….it is not enough for the Applicants to say that they live or reside on the suit land and they will suffer substantial loss. The Applicants must go further and show the substantial loss that the Applicants stand to suffer if the Respondent execute the decree in this suit against them.”
33. The Court of Appeal explained what constitutes substantial loss in Mukuma Vs Abuoga (1988) KLR, where it held that:
“Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the Appeal nugatory.
34. In James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, the Court held that:
“No doubt, in law, the fact that the process of execution has been put in motion, or is likely to be put in motion, by itself, does not amount to substantial loss. Even when execution has been levied and completed, that is to say, the attached properties have been sold, as is the case here, does not in itself amount to substantial loss under Order 42 Rule 6 of the CPR. This is so because execution is a lawful process. The applicant must establish other factors which show that the execution will create a state of affairs that will irreparably affect or negate the very essential core of the applicant as the successful party in the appeal ... the issue of substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the appeal nugatory.”
35. The Applicant contends that execution would cancel her title, cause substantial loss, and render the intended appeal nugatory. However, as held in James Wangalwa & Another v Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, execution is a lawful process, and the mere enforcement of a decree does not, by itself, amount to substantial loss.
36. The Applicant further contends that she has already sold the suit property to the 2nd Plaintiff, who now occupies it. It is therefore clear that the Applicant is not in possession, and execution will not dispossess her of a home or property from which she earns her livelihood. Any liability she may owe the 2nd Plaintiff arising from the sale is, in substance, a claim that can be quantified and compensated in money. The 2nd Plaintiff has not sought relief from this Court, and the Court cannot grant a stay based on a loss that a non-applicant may suffer.
37. The Applicant has not demonstrated that the 3rd Defendant intends to undertake any further dealings with the suit property that would render restoration impossible or materially prejudice the intended appeal.
38. Having considered the material before the Court, I find that the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that the execution of the decree would occasion substantial loss within the meaning of Order 42 Rule of the Civil Procedure Rules.
39. The 3rd Defendant argued that the 1st Plaintiff failed to demonstrate an arguable appeal and did not provide a draft memorandum of appeal. Although the existence of an arguable appeal is a consideration under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, it is not a requirement under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. As observed in Antoine Ndiaye v African Virtue University [2015] eKLR, the inquiry under Order 42 Rule 6 does not concern the merits of the appeal. This Court cannot sit on appeal over its own judgment and therefore makes no finding on the prospects of the intended appeal.
40. This Court is alive to the public interest. In its judgment of 27th November 2025, the Court found that the suit property is public land unlawfully acquired. That finding remains in force unless set aside on appeal, and the 3rd Defendant is entitled to the fruits of its judgment. Although the 3rd Defendant referred to the 1st Plaintiff's alleged rent arrears in respect of another government house, that assertion was made in submissions without an affidavit and relates to property that is not the subject of this suit. This Court makes no finding on that matter.
41. Regarding the delay, judgment was delivered on 27th November 2025. The Applicant filed the present application on 29th January 2026. This court finds that the application was filed without unreasonable delay.
42. On the last condition regarding provision of security for costs, Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b) is couched in mandatory terms requiring the Applicant to provide security for the due performance of the order or decree. In Arun C Sharma v Ashana Raikundalia t/a A Raikundalia & Co Advocates & 2 Others [2014] KEHC 2430 (KLR), the court held that:
“The purpose of the security under Order 42 is to guarantee due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the Applicant. It is not to punish the judgment debtor….civil process is quite different because in civil process the judgment is like a debt hence the applicant become and are judgment debtors in relation to the respondent. That is why any security given under order 42 rule 6 of the civil procedure rules acts as a security for the performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the Applicants. I presume the security must be one which can serve that purpose.”
43. The Applicant has not proposed any undertaking or other measure to safeguard the 3rd Defendant’s interests during the pendency of the appeal.
44. The Court is also called upon to determine whether the interests of justice and the need to preserve the substratum of the appeal warrant a stay of execution. Although preserving the substratum of the appeal is a relevant consideration, it is not, on its own, an independent ground for the statutory requirements governing a stay of execution.
45. The Court must balance the Applicant’s right to pursue an appeal against the 3rd Defendant's right to enjoy the fruits of the judgment. Having considered the material presented, this Court finds that the interests of justice, considered alongside the statutory requirements, do not warrant a stay of execution pending appeal.
46. The 3rd Defendant challenged the absence of a draft memorandum of appeal and the failure to identify the grounds of appeal. Order 42 does not prescribe demonstrating an arguable appeal as a statutory condition for a stay of execution. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Applicant has not satisfied the conditions for a stay pending appeal.
47. The upshot of the foregoing is that the application dated 29th January 2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs. Costs to abide the outcome of the appeal.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
Njeru for the 1st Plaintiff
Vena – Court Assistant