REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC EP NO. E005 OF 2026
CHARLES IRUNGU MUNGAH ...............................................1ST PLAINTIFF
MARTIN MAMICHA MUGI..... ............................................ 2ND PLAINTIFF
ELIZABETH W. GITHIORA ................................................... 3RD PLAINTIFF
MARY WANGAI. .................................................................. 4TH PLAINTIFF
ROSEMARY NYAGUTHII..... ................................................. 5TH PLAINTIFF
GILBERT GACHI NDIRITU ................................................... 6TH PLAINTIFF
PERMINUS KARUNGU JOSHUA............................................7TH PLAINTIFF
MATHENGE JOHN MUNENE ...............................................8TH PLAINTIFF
AMINA HAJI IBRAHIM ………..............................................9TH PLAINTIFF
BUSISA RUMINE AMANI... ................................................. 10TH PLAINTIFF
ROSEMARY MWITA ............................................................ 11TH PLAINTIFF
MARTHA NJUGUNA ..........................................................12TH PLAINTIFF
MUGADI CAROLINE MUHONJA........................................ 13TH PLAINTIFF
ALFRED MUGAISI AMBANI ................................................ 14TH PLAINTIFF
JOSEPH KIMANI CHEGE . .................................................. 15TH PLAINTIFF
ALICE MBAE.........................................................................16TH PLAINTIFF
MARYANNE MWAURA .......................................................17TH PLAINTIFF
=VERSUS=
GEM COURT LIMITED ........................................................... DEFENDANT
RULING
1. By a Notice of Motion dated 13th February 2026, brought under Order 40 Rules 1(a), (b) and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010 and Sections 1A, 18, 3A and 63 (c) & (e) of the Civil Procedure Act, the Plaintiffs/Applicants seek the following orders:
a. Spent.
b. Spent.
c. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue an order for temporary injunction, restraining the Defendant/Respondent, either by itself, its agents, servants and/or representatives from drilling a Borehole in the middle of the Public Access Road serving the residents of parcels of land Nos. Nairobi Block 4/483 (Formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/243), Nairobi Block 41484 (Formerly L.R No. 1870/V/244) and Nairobi Block 4/488 (Formerly L.R No. 1870/V/217) or in any other way interfering with the said public access road pending the hearing of the main suit herein
d. That the costs of this application be provided for
2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the 1st Applicant sworn on even date.
THE APPLICANTS’CASE
3. The deponent averred that he is the registered owner of Apartment No. D2, erected on Nairobi Block 4/488, formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/217. He further averred that his co-Applicants own apartments on the same parcel, while the other Applicants own apartments on Nairobi Block 4/483 and Nairobi Block 4/484, formerly L.R. Nos. 1870/V/243 and 1870/V/244, respectively. He averred that all 28 apartments on the three parcels, originated from the subdivision of a common title, were developed and sold by related developers and are served by a common public access road.
4. The deponent averred that the Respondent, the registered proprietor and developer of the adjacent parcel known as Nairobi Block 4/487, formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/216, had resolved to drill a borehole in the middle of the said access road without consulting or obtaining consent from the adjacent owners. Upon notice that drilling would commence on 11th February, 2026, the Applicants reported the matter to Kileleshwa Police Station. The Respondent's directors were then summoned, and they mutually agreed that drilling would await a report from the Director of Survey on the road's dimensions. He explained that before that report was furnished, the Respondent served a further notice dated 13th February, 2026. Consequently, the Applicants engaged NEMA, whose officers inspected the site and directed the parties to appear before it on 16th February, 2026, pending which no drilling was to proceed. The deponent contends that the Applicants are apprehensive that the Respondent will drill the borehole in the middle of the public access road if the orders sought are not granted.
THE RESPONDENT’S CASE
5. The Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit, sworn on 2nd March 2026 by Susan Nyambura Kamau, the Respondent's director, in opposition to the application. The deponent averred that the Respondent is the registered proprietor of Nairobi Block 4/487, formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/216. She further averred that on or about 17th April, 2025, the Respondent lodged an application with the Water Resources Authority and obtained an EIA licence from NEMA on 26th May, 2025, to address water scarcity on the parcel. She averred that the Applicants, who had no claim over the Respondent's land, had persistently obstructed the drilling exercise.
6. The deponent contends that Development Survey Services had confirmed the parcel's boundaries. She explained that following the Applicants' trespass allegations, the Respondent, by letter dated 11th December, 2025, engaged the Director of Surveys, Kenya, to conduct a fresh beacon re-establishment exercise. She averred that the exercise was conducted on 16th January, 2026, in the presence of the Director of Surveys' officers and the neighbouring occupants' surveyors, and that it confirmed that all beacons had been correctly placed. She asserted that the occupants thereafter failed to attend the agreed joint follow-up survey. She further contended that the State Department for Lands and Physical Planning, in a report dated 6th January, 2026, confirmed that the ground data tallied with the cadastral survey.
7. She further averred that a survey by Development Survey Services dated 25th February, 2026 found that a structure associated with the Applicants on Nairobi Block 4/488 encroached by approximately 55.1% onto the access road, that 69% of that structure fell within the riparian reserve and the remainder within the road reserve, that the Applicants' driveway encroached by 0.19 hectares onto Nairobi Block 4/487, and that the proposed drilling points lay entirely within Nairobi Block 4/487. Based on the foregoing, the deponent asserts that the Applicants have no plausible ground to stall the drilling exercise, which would serve 27 tenant families. She further asserted that the Applicants acted in bad faith by lodging repeated false complaints at Kileleshwa Police Station.
8. The deponent averred that the Applicants failed to disclose the existence of Milimani MCELC Misc. No. E036 of 2026, in which the Court issued injunctive orders restraining them from interfering with the Respondent's parcel. She argued that the Applicants were in contempt of those orders, having parked vehicles on the land and engaged armed persons to interfere with its use, resulting in arrests at Kileleshwa Police Station and a subsequent reprimand of the Officer Commanding Station following an irregular release. The deponent contends that this non-disclosure and disobedience disentitled the Applicants to equitable relief. She further argued that granting injunctive orders in the present suit over subject matter already covered by the Milimani orders would create judicial disharmony contrary to the principle of judicial comity.
9. In a Supplementary affidavit dated 25th March 2026, the deponent maintained that the dispute was on the location of the drilling points and that the Applicants had adduced no substantial evidence beyond photographs. She averred that the access road was originally ceded from Nairobi Block 4/488 for the benefit of the three occupied parcels, as shown in deed plans and cadastral maps dated between 1986 and 1996. She further averred that the boundary re-establishment survey of 22nd July, 2025 was conducted at the Applicants' request and the Respondent's expense, following the Applicants' destruction of the original beacons, under the supervision of the Applicants' own surveyor. The deponent contends that survey reportedly found several beacons falling on existing concrete structures, including a parking lot, veranda and driveway, thereby undermining the evidential value of the Applicants' pictorials.
10. The deponent further relied on the survey report dated 25th February, 2026, and on the reports from the State Department for Lands and Physical Planning dated 6th January and 9th April, 2026. She contended that these reports confirmed that the drilling points lie within Nairobi Block 4/487 and outside both the road reserve and the riparian zone, and that they recommended relocating the Applicants' encroaching driveway and conducting a structural audit of the encroaching structure.
11. The deponent contends that the Applicants misrepresented their position, failed to disclose their encroachment, approached the court in bad faith and with unclean hands, and held no registrable or beneficial interest in the parcel.
12. She further contended that the NEMA variation licence dated 1st April, 2026 presumed the validity of the original licence dated 26th May, 2025, and that no evidence was adduced to show the withdrawal or cancellation of either regulatory approval. She contended that no prima facie case had been established, that the prayer for a permanent injunction was misconceived, and that the claim for damages for trespass was self-incriminating given the Applicants' own encroachment. She asserted that the drilling exercise, estimated at seven days, would not prejudice the Applicants, and that the Respondent was willing to accommodate supervision by the Court, NEMA or WRA. Accordingly, the deponent urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
THE APPLICANT’S RESPONSE
13. In a further affidavit dated 12th March 2026, the deponent averred that on 14th February 2026 the Respondent mobilised drilling equipment and steel pipes onto the access road, thereby entirely blocking it and denying the Applicants vehicular access to their premises. He further averred that the survey report confirmed the existence of a nine-metre road at the intended drilling site, and that fairness required the Respondent to comply with its own commissioned findings.
14. The deponent asserts that the Respondent did not deny its intention to drill on the access road, but instead sought to justify the drilling by asserting that the road formed part of its land, without explaining how the road came into being or proposing an alternative route. He averred that the related suits relied upon by the Respondent, namely ELCOS E062 of 2024, Criminal Case No. 95 of 2014, Judicial Review Application No. 620 of 2017, Civil Appeal No. 388 of 2018 and ELC No. 605 of 2012, had each been determined adversely to the Respondent and were no longer pending, contrary to the Respondent's assertions.
15. He contended that the Respondent acknowledged the road had been used for over 20 years without interruption. He argued that the survey records from 1986 to 1996, relied upon by the Respondent, and the associated WRA and NEMA approvals were obtained in secrecy and without public participation, leading to the suspension of the licences following the Applicants' protest. He exhibited the WRA suspension letter of 10th March, 2026, and the NEMA variation licence of 1st April, 2026, which relocated the drilling point and imposed Condition 7, protecting the access road from obstruction. This condition was said to be contravened by the Respondent's own documents, which placed the drilling point in the middle of the road.
16. He contended that the Applicants had no objection to drilling on Nairobi Block 4/487, provided it did not affect the access road or the parking area serving their premises. He proposed a site visit to resolve the dispute pending the full hearing. The deponent contends that, without injunctive or status quo orders, the Respondent would drill in the middle of the road and fence off the area, thereby blocking the 28 families from their homes. He further contends that the Applicants undertook to give the usual undertaking as to damages.
17. In a Further Supplementary Affidavit dated 8th June 2026, the deponent reiterated the contents of his affidavit in support of the application. He asserted that the Respondent had expressly admitted that the 28 apartments had always been served by the nine-metre access road. He further contended that the Respondent's claim of encroachment was disputed and would be determined at trial.
18. He stated that the varied NEMA licence dated 1st April 2026, relied upon by the Respondent, contained two key conditions. The first required the drilling point to be moved approximately two metres from the original point. The second, Condition 7, obliged the proponent to ensure that no obstruction, encroachment or interference with the access road and public right of way occurred at any stage, including mobilisation, drilling, operation and maintenance, and that any temporary works maintained full and safe access for residents, emergency services and utility providers. He contended that the Respondent intended to drill the borehole in the middle of the road, despite the pending dispute, and in contravention of Condition.
19. He asserted that although the Respondent had not clearly identified the drilling point, its pleadings and its letter dated 7th February 2026 indicated that the borehole would be sunk in the middle of the road.
20. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
21. The Applicants filed two sets of submissions dated 25th March 2026 and 3rd June 2026.
22. On behalf of the Applicants, Counsel anchored their submissions on the three-limb test set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely the existence of a prima facie case with a probability of success, the likelihood of irreparable harm not adequately compensable by damages, and, in case of doubt, the balance of convenience.
23. Counsel relied on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR to submit that a prima facie case is one which, on the material before the court, discloses an apparently infringed right that calls for explanation or rebuttal by the opposing party, and that the evidential burden accordingly shifts to the Respondent once such a case is made out. Further reliance was placed on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielson & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, where it was held that, at the interlocutory stage, the court need not conduct a mini-trial but need only be satisfied of a fair and bona fide question as to the existence of the right asserted. Applying these principles, Counsel submitted that the Respondent's notice dated 7th February, 2026, which explicitly informed residents that drilling would be conducted "in the middle of the road", with consequent disruption of access and parking, together with photographic evidence showing drilling machinery and pipes positioned on the road itself, discharged this threshold.
24. Counsel further submitted that the Respondent's abandonment of the drilling exercise immediately upon the grant of interim injunctive orders was itself telling. Counsel argued that had the intended drilling point been within L.R. No. 1870/V/216, or away from the access road, there would have been no reason to cease works restrained only from the road. Counsel contended that the status quo should be preserved, as the location of the boundary and the effect of the re-establishment exercise remained live and disputed issues reserved for the full hearing.
25. Regarding irreparable harm, Counsel submitted that the injury must be real, actual and substantial and not speculative. Counsel relied on Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielson [2014] KEHC 1718 (KLR) to argue that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to prevent grave and irreparable injury that cannot be compensated by damages. Counsel contended that the threatened obstruction of the access road was not prospective or speculative but an active, ongoing encroachment upon a road that had served the Applicants for over twenty years. Counsel submitted that once the borehole was drilled and the area fenced, physical access to the 28 apartments would be permanently compromised in a manner no award of damages could restore, as it would affect the mobility, safety and enjoyment of property of numerous residents.
26. Regarding the balance of convenience, Counsel relied on Amir Suleiman v Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] eKLR, where the Court held that it should opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice. Counsel contended that the applicant must show that the mischief of withholding the injunction would outweigh that of granting it. Further reliance was placed on Paul Gitonga Wanjau v Gathuthi Tea Factory Company Ltd & 2 Others [2016] eKLR to submit that, where there is doubt as to the right or its violation, the Court should weigh the relative harm each party stands to suffer should it ultimately be shown to be in the right.
27. Counsel submitted that the inconvenience to the Respondent was limited to a delay in implementing its plans, whereas denial of the injunction would cause the Applicants irreversible loss of their sole means of access.
28. In their further submissions dated 8th June 2026, Counsel relied on the NEMA variation licence dated 1st April 2026 to argue that Condition 7, which requires that no obstruction, encroachment or interference with the access road and public right of way occur at any stage of the works, was itself contravened by the Respondent's documents, which placed the drilling point in the middle of the road.
29. Counsel further relied on the WRA suspension letter dated 10th March, 2026, which directed the suspension of drilling pending the determination of that dispute. Counsel submitted that, as at the date of submissions, the suspension had not been lifted and no fresh licence had been issued. On this cumulative basis, it was submitted that the equitable remedy of an injunction should be granted to preserve the status quo, restrain the Respondent from interfering with the access road pending the determination of the suit, and safeguard the Applicants' unhindered access to their apartments.
THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
30. The Respondent filed its submissions dated 17th April 2026.
31. On behalf of the Respondent, Counsel outlined the following issues for the Court’s determination:
a) Whether the Applicants had discharged the burden to warrant the grant of the interlocutory orders sought, and
b) Whether the application was otherwise meritorious.
32. Counsel submitted that the Respondent's ownership of L.R. No. 1870/V/216 (Nairobi Block 4/487) was undisputed, that the drilling points had been identified within its boundary, and that the borehole was intended to serve its tenants. Counsel relied on the Water Resources Authority approval and the NEMA licence dated 26th May, 2025, neither of which had been withdrawn, disowned or recalled by the issuing authorities.
33. Counsel submitted that the Applicants challenged the validity of these instruments on bare assertions, without evidence from WRA or NEMA. Counsel further submitted that the NEMA variation licence of 1st April, 2026, which adjusted the drilling point by two metres, proved that the original licence was validly issued. Accordingly, Counsel argued that the Applicants' challenge was a lost cause intended to frustrate a genuine effort to remedy water scarcity.
34. Regarding the location of the drilling points, Counsel submitted that the Applicants relied solely on photographs, whereas the Respondent had produced survey reports from the State Department for Lands and Physical Planning and from Development Survey Services Ltd. Counsel further submitted that the reports show several beacons of L.R. No. 1870/V/216 falling on existing concrete structures, a parking lot, a veranda, a retaining wall, and a driveway, thereby undermining the evidential weight of the Applicants' photographs. Counsel also sought to confirm, by GPS coordinates, that the drilling points lay entirely within L.R. No. 1870/V/216 and outside both the nine-metre road reserve and the thirty-metre riparian zone. Counsel urged the Court to find that a structure and driveway associated with the Applicants had encroached onto the Respondent's parcel.
35. Counsel further relied on a survey history tracing the subdivisions of the original title from 1992 to 1996 to submit that L.R. No. 1870/V/217 had ceased to exist by 1996, having been reconstituted as L.R. Nos. 1870/V/224 and 1870/V/245. Accordingly, Counsel submitted that a 2006 lease extension, purportedly referencing L.R. No. 1870/V/217, was invalid, thereby rendering the Applicants' occupation of the resultant parcel unlawful.
36. Counsel further submitted that this occupation was secured through fraudulent extensions and transfers of leases, including forged signatures and identification particulars of a director of Kenon Place Ltd, which are the subject of pending proceedings in ELC No. 214 of 2011 and Nairobi COMCA No. E225 of 2026, which the Applicants failed to disclose.
37. Regarding non-disclosure, Counsel cited The King v The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington, ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac [1917] 1 KB 486, to support the principle that a party approaching the court in circumstances calling for full candour must make the fullest disclosure of material facts or forfeit any advantage obtained. Further reliance was placed on Gabriel Kariuki Gitonga & 2 Others v Redken Wells Ltd & 11 Others [2021] KEHC 12892 (KLR), to emphasize that material non-disclosure justifies setting aside an order and that good faith is central to such an application. Counsel submitted that the Applicants failed to meet this standard by omitting the true location of the drilling points, their own encroachment, and the pending fraud-related proceedings.
38. Regarding the doctrine of clean hands, Counsel relied on Siteyia v Gitome & 3 Others [1993] KEHC 88 (KLR), to submit that equitable relief is available only to an applicant whose conduct demonstrates fairness, honesty and an absence of delay. Counsel invoked Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap. 80) to submit that a party asserting a fact bears the burden of proving it. Counsel further submitted that the Applicants failed to discharge this burden in relation to either the validity of the regulatory approvals or the location of the drilling points.
39. Counsel relied on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358, to submit that the three conditions are sequential, so failure on the first condition defeats the application without recourse to the second or third. Counsel further submitted that the Applicants failed to establish a prima facie case, as their claim as to the location of the drilling points rested on photographic evidence alone, which had been rebutted by uncontested survey reports confirming that the drilling points lay within the Respondent's boundary, and that the Applicants held no registered interest, easement, or other claim over L.R. No. 1870/V/216. It was submitted that the application was brought in bad faith, to frustrate the Respondent's lawful and licensed use of its land and to obscure the Applicants' own conduct. Counsel submitted that the court should not extend its discretion in favour of a frivolous litigant or one approaching equity with unclean hands.
40. Counsel submitted that no prejudice would arise from permitting the drilling to proceed, as the points had been relocated by two metres and confirmed within its own boundary. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
41. Having considered the application, the responses and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Applicants have met the threshold for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
42. Before addressing the substantive issue, it is necessary to address the Respondent's contention that the Applicants failed to make full disclosure and approached the court with unclean hands. Indeed, a party seeking equitable relief must make full and frank disclosure of material facts. In Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR), the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal of an injunction to an applicant who had failed to show utmost good faith.
43. The Respondent relied on the orders issued in Milimani MCELC Misc. No. E036 of 2026, which restrain the Applicants from interfering with Nairobi Block 4/487 (formerly LR No. 1870/V/216). However, the application and suit herein do not seek any right over that parcel. The relief sought is confined to the access road, which, according to the Respondent's survey evidence, lies outside Nairobi Block 4/487. An order protecting the road and an order protecting the Respondent's parcel operate in distinct areas and do not conflict. In any case, the allegations that the Applicants have disobeyed the Magistrate’s Court’s orders are for the court that issued them to consider.
44. The Respondent further alleged the Applicants' encroachment and highlighted allegations of forged leases and an invalid lease extension, said to be pending in ELC No. 214 of 2011 and Nairobi COMCA No. E225 of 2026. The Applicants themselves disclosed ELC No. 214 of 2011 in their further affidavit. The remaining allegations concern the validity of the Applicants' titles and the extent of their developments. These are questions for trial. They do not bear on the narrow right the Applicants seek to protect, namely the use of the access road.
45. This Court is therefore not satisfied that the Applicants withheld material facts or acted in a manner that disentitles them from being heard on the merits of the Motion.
46. Turning to the substantive issue, the law governing applications for injunctions is outlined in Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides:-
"Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or
(b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit,
the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.
The principles for granting an injunction were set out in the celebrated case of Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd. 1973 EA 358 as follows:
a) Firstly, the Applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success.
b) Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the Applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable harm which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.
c) Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on a balance of convenience.
The first issue for determination is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success. In Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya and 2 others, (2003) KLR 125, the Court of Appeal defined a prima facie case as follows:
"A Prima facie case in a civil application includes, but is not confined to, a genuine and arguable case. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter”
47. In the matter at hand, the existence of a nine-metre access road between Nairobi Block 4/488 and Nairobi Block 4/487 is common ground. The Applicants produced a map showing it. In its supplementary affidavit, the Respondent averred that the road was ceded from Nairobi Block 4/488 for the benefit of the three occupied parcels, as shown in deed plans and cadastral maps dated between 1986 and 1996. The Respondent's survey report of February 2026 also refers to the nine-metre road reserve. The Applicants have therefore shown, prima facie, a right to use the road as access to their apartments.
48. That right does not depend on any interest in Nairobi Block 4/487. The Respondent's contention that the Applicants hold no registrable or beneficial interest in the parcel does not address the Applicants' case.
49. Regarding the threat, the Applicants relied on the Respondent's notices dated 7th and 12th February 2026, which announced drilling in the middle of the road. They also relied on photographs showing drilling equipment and pipes on the road. According to the Respondent, the drilling points, as subsequently surveyed, lie within its parcel.
50. The Environmental Inspectors Integrated Tool, adduced by the Applicant, noted that the site description in the Respondent's licence did not reflect the site on the ground. It directed that drilling stop and that public participation be undertaken with all affected parties. By its letter of 10th March 2026, the Water Resources Authority noted the residents' contention that the boundary had been moved. In view of this suit, it suspended drilling until the case is heard and determined. No evidence was placed before this court that the suspension had been lifted. The NEMA variation licence of 1st April 2026 relocated the drilling point by two metres and, by Condition 7, prohibited any obstruction of or interference with the access road. The regulator's decision to impose that condition shows that the risk to the road is not fanciful.
51. Whether the drilling points lie on the road or within Nairobi Block 4/487 depends on the true position of the boundary beacons. The Applicants contend that the beacons were moved. The Respondent maintains that they were correctly placed and verified. That is a contested question of fact which cannot be resolved on affidavit, and this Court shall not conduct a mini-trial on it. Equally, the validity of the regulatory approvals is not a question this Court is called upon to decide in this Motion.
52. At this stage, the burden on the Applicants is to establish a prima facie case, not to prove their claim. Based on the material before me, this Court finds that the Applicants have demonstrated a threatened right of access arising from the Respondent's declared intention and conduct, and that this requires an explanation or rebuttal at trial. Accordingly, the Applicants have established a prima facie case.
53. On the second limb, The Applicants must demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by an award of damages. In Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:
i. “On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima facie, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is, injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.”
54. The alleged injury is not speculative. The Respondent gave notice of drilling in the middle of the road, and the Applicants aver that on 14th February 2026 equipment and pipes were placed on the road, blocking vehicular access to their premises. A borehole is a permanent installation. If it is sunk within the road and enclosed area, the residents of 28 apartments would suffer a material reduction in access. That injury affects the daily use and enjoyment of their homes. It cannot be measured with reasonable accuracy, and damages would not restore access once lost.
55. The Respondent's offer to drill under the supervision of the court, NEMA, or the Water Resources Authority does not cure the injury, as the dispute concerns the drilling location. This Court finds that the Applicants have demonstrated that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is refused.
56. On the third limb, the Court must weigh the hardship to be borne by the Applicants by refusing the injunction against the hardship to be borne by the Respondent if it is granted. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] KEELC 2424 (KLR), the Court set out the definition of balance of convenience as follows:
“The meaning of balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff is that if an injunction is not granted and the suit is ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed. Although it is called balance of convenience it is really the balance of inconvenience and it is for the plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience caused to them would be greater than that which may be caused to the defendants. Should the inconvenience be equal, it is the plaintiffs who suffer. In other words, the plaintiffs have to show that the comparative mischief from the inconvenience which is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than which is likely to arise from granting it. This court finds that the Plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of irreparable harm.”
57. The inconvenience to the Respondent from a restraint limited to the road would delay its drilling programme. In any event, that delay arises from the subsisting suspension by the Water Resources Authority. The restraint leaves the Respondent free to use its parcel outside the road.
58. By contrast, if the injunction is refused and the Applicants succeed at trial, their access may by then have been permanently compromised. Based on the foregoing, I find that the balance of convenience favours the maintenance of the status quo.
59. The Respondent, in its affidavits and submissions, sought leave to proceed with drilling in accordance with the NEMA variation licence. No formal application for that relief is before the court. The relief would also contravene the subsisting suspension imposed by the Water Resources Authority. The prayer is declined.
60. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Motion dated 13th February 2026 is merited and is hereby allowed on the following terms:
a. A temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the Defendant, whether by itself, its agents, servants or representatives, from drilling a borehole on, or otherwise obstructing or interfering with, the nine metre access road serving Nairobi Block 4/483 (formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/243), Nairobi Block 4/484 (formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/244) and Nairobi Block 4/488 (formerly L.R. No. 1870/V/217), pending the hearing and determination of the suit.
b. The parties shall comply with Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules within thirty (30) days of the date of this ruling, with a view to the expeditious hearing of the suit.
c. Costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the suit.
RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
…………………………………….
HON. T. MURIGI
JUDGE
IN THE PRESENCE OF;
Mwangi for the Plaintiffs/Applicants
Njathi for the Respondent
Vena - Court assistant