Land law

Imanyara v Bekya Floriculture Limited & another [2026] KEELC 6602 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E246 of 2025
Judgment date
9 October 2026
Judge(s)
TW Murigi

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

By a Chamber Summons dated 12th August 2025 brought under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the Applicant seeks the following orders:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The Applicant asserts that the Taxing Master erred in principle and in law by failing to properly analyse the evidence and case law submitted in opposition to the Party and Party Bill of Costs, and by failing to appreciate that the claim against the Respondents did not involve any complex issues of law, as none were pleaded by the Respondents.

Paragraph 5 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCL MISC APPLICATION NO. E246 OF 2025

MILTON MUGAMBI IMANYARA ………………………………. APPLICANT

=VERSUS=

BEKYA FLORICULTURE LIMITED ……………………….... 1ST RESPONDENT

YAACOV MAIMON ....................................................... 2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. By a Chamber Summons dated 12th August 2025 brought under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the Applicant seeks the following orders:

a. That this Honourable Court be pleased to set aside the decision of the Taxing Master delivered on 30th July 2025 with respect to the 1st & 2nd Defendants /Respondents’ Party & Party Bill of Costs dated 20th November 2024.

b. That the 1st & 2nd Defendants /Respondents’ Party & Party Bill of Costs dated 20th November 2024 be referred back for taxation before a different Taxing Officer with appropriate directions.

c. That this Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other relief that may be just to meet the ends of justice in this case.

d. That the cost of this Application be provided for.

2. The application is based on the grounds appearing on its face together with the supporting affidavit of the applicant sworn on even date. APPLICANT’S CASE

3. The Applicant averred that on 30th July 2025, the Taxing Officer, Hon. Vincent Kiplagat, erred in principle and in law by taxing the Respondents' Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 20th November 2024 at Kshs 942,721.67/=.

4. He contended that the Taxing Master erred in principle and in law by failing to assess and apply the correct value of the subject matter of the suit and by disregarding the following uncontroverted facts:

a) That the claim against the Respondents was unliquidated, the subject matter of the suit having sought restoration of the affected section of the public road adjoining L.R. No. 18997/23 and 18997/27 to its original condition, level, and width, without any quantification of the value of such restoration.

b) That the suit having been dismissed, it was impractical to determine the value of the subject matter from the pleadings or the judgment of the court.

c) That the Respondents had failed to state the pecuniary value of the subject matter upon which their claim under Item 1, instructions fees, was anchored.

5. The Applicant asserts that the Taxing Master erred in principle and in law by failing to properly analyse the evidence and case law submitted in opposition to the Party and Party Bill of Costs, and by failing to appreciate that the claim against the Respondents did not involve any complex issues of law, as none were pleaded by the Respondents.

6. The Applicant stated that the cumulative effect of the Taxing Master's errors amounted to unfair and unjust exploitation of the Applicant's right of access to justice, and that the taxed sum of KShs 942,721.67/= was excessive, exploitative, and unjust in the circumstances, thereby warranting this Honourable Court's intervention to restore the balance of justice between the parties.

7. In conclusion, he urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.

THE RESPONDENT’S CASE

8. The Respondent filed the grounds of opposition dated 1st December 2025 in opposing the reference. The Respondent contends that the Applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds to impugn the Taxing Officer's exercise of judicial discretion to warrant the reference. It was argued that the Applicant failed to identify the errors of principle or fact that the Taxing Officer allegedly disregarded.

9. The Respondent maintained that the assessment was made in accordance with the applicable principles of taxation, and that the Taxing Officer took into account the matter’s complexity and length, together with the voluminous evidence tendered. It was further contended that the Taxing Officer considered all necessary legal and factual parameters in arriving at the impugned Ruling. In conclusion, the Respondent urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs.

10. In a supplementary affidavit dated 30th July 2025, the Applicant annexed a copy of the ruling.

11. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions.

THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS

12. The Applicant filed his submissions dated 15th February 2026.

13. The Applicant submitted that, in exercising his discretion, the Taxing Master was obliged to have regard to the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings, any direction of the trial judge, and all other relevant circumstances, but failed to do so.

14. First, the claim against the Respondents was unliquidated, as the suit sought the restoration of the affected section of the public road adjoining L.R. Nos. 18997/23 and 18997/27 to its original condition, level and width, without quantifying the value of that restoration. Secondly, because the suit was dismissed, it became impracticable to determine the value of the subject matter from the pleadings or the judgment. Thirdly, the Taxing Master failed to state the value of the subject matter on which he based the taxation of instruction fees under Item 1.

15. The Applicant emphasised that the underlying suit against the Respondents was dismissed. The Applicant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates, SC Petition No. E011 of 2023, to submit that a Taxing Officer's discretion to assess instruction fees as he considers just arises only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement.

16. Applying this principle, the Applicant submitted that, given that the value of the subject matter could not be discerned from the pleadings or the judgment, and that the matter was not otherwise specifically provided for under Schedule VI of the Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order 2014, the applicable starting point was the general rate prescribed in the Schedule for matters not otherwise provided for, KShs 75,000 if defended.

17. On this basis, Counsel submitted that the instruction fee of KShs 500,000, as taxed by the Taxing Master, was unconscionable, exploitative, unmerited and unjust, and that acceding to such a fee would deter the Applicant and litigants generally from accessing justice. The Applicant made the same submission in respect of the getting-up fee of KShs 166,666.67, as taxed.

18. As at the time of writing this ruling, the Respondents had not filed their submissions as directed

19. In conclusion, the Applicant urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

20.Having considered the application, the Grounds of Opposition and the rival submissions, the only issue for determination is whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in assessing the instruction fees in the 1st and 2nd Defendant's Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 20th November 2024.

21.The Principles of taxation were aptly stated in Premchand Raichand Ltd and another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd and Others (1972) EA 162 where the Court held that:

“(a) successful litigant ought to be fairly reimbursed for costs he has had to incur (b) That costs be, not allowed to rise to such level as to confine access to justice to the wealthy. (c) that the general level of remuneration of advocates must be such as to attract recruits to the profession and (d) that as far as practicable there should be consistency in the awards made. (e) that there are no mathematical formulae to be used by the taxing master to arrive at the precise figure. Each case has to be decided on its merits and circumstances (f) the taxing officer has discretion in the matter of taxation but he must exercise the discretion judiciously and not whimsically (g) the court will only interfere when the award of the taxing officer is so high or so low as to amount to an injustice to one party.”

22. It is trite law that a judge on a reference will not interfere with the Taxing Officer's exercise of discretion unless an error of principle is shown. In Kipkorir, Tito & Kiara Advocates v. Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR the Court of Appeal held as follows:

“On a reference to a judge from the taxation by the Taxing Officer, the judge will not normally interfere with the exercise of discretion by the taxing officer unless the taxing officer erred in principle in assessing the costs.”

23.In Kamunyori & Company Advocates v. Development Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] eKLR, the Court described the forms that errors of principle may take as follows:

“.. failure to ascertain the correct subject matter in a suit for the purpose of taxation is an error of principle. So too, failure to ascribe the correct value to the subject matter is an error of principle. Authorities on taxation show that a Judge will normally not interfere with the Taxing Officer’s decision on taxation unless it is based on an error of principle. Where it is shown that the sum awarded was so manifestly excessive as to justify interference, an error of principle can be inferred. If instruction fee is arrived at on the wrong principles, it will be set aside”

24.This reference concerns item 1 of the Respondents’ Bill of Costs, namely instruction fees. The 1st and 2nd Defendants sought instruction fees of Kshs. 4,500,000/- on the basis of the value of the subject matter, the complexity, and the nature of the matter. The Taxing Officer assessed the instruction fees at Kshs. 500,000/-, noting that no valuation report had been produced to support the claimed value.

25.In his submissions, the Applicant appeared to challenge the assessment of the getting up fees. The Applicant did not raise that challenge in the Chamber Summons. Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order requires the objector to set out the grounds of objection in the Chamber Summons, and the reference is determined on those grounds. It is well settled that submissions are neither pleadings nor evidence, and that a party cannot introduce a new issue for determination through submissions. In Moi v Muriithi & another [2014] KECA 642 (KLR), the Court of Appeal described submissions as parties' "marketing language", intended to persuade the Court that each side's case is the better one. This court shall therefore not consider the getting up fees and shall confine itself to whether the instruction fees were properly assessed.

26.The Applicant’s reference is based on the claim being unliquidated; the value of the subject matter could not be determined from the pleadings or the judgment, the suit having been dismissed; and the Taxing Officer did not state the value on which he anchored the instruction fees. Having considered the judgment annexed to the reference, this court is satisfied that the value of the subject matter could not be ascertained from the pleadings or the judgment. The suit sought the restoration of a section of a public road adjoining L.R. Nos. 18997/23 and 18997/27 to its original condition, level and width, without quantifying the cost of such restoration.

27.The Taxing Officer declined to adopt the value advanced by the Respondents because no valuation report was produced. This court adds that any valuation of property adjoining the road would, in any event, have been beside the point, since the subject matter of the suit was the public road, not the adjoining parcels. Accordingly, the Taxing Officer did not ascribe any value to the subject matter.

28.The Applicant relied on Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] KECA 597 (KLR), as cited in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), contending that the Taxing Officer's discretion arises only after the value of the subject matter has been ascertained from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement:

“It is only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement, as the case may be, that the Taxing Officer is permitted to use his discretion to assess instructions fees in accordance with what he considers just bearing in mind the various elements contained in the provision we are addressing. He does have discretion as to what he considers just but that discretion kicks in only after he has engaged with the proper basis as expressly and mandatorily provided: either the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement. He has no leeway to disregard the statutorily commanded starting point. And we think, with respect, that the starting point can only be one of the three. It is not open to choose one or the other or to use them in combination, the provision being expressly disjunctive as opposed to conjunctive. It is also mandatory and not permissive”

29.This Court agrees with that statement of the law. The decision affirms rather than restricts the discretion exercised in the matter at hand.

30.The Court of Appeal set out the Taxing Officer's discretion in these circumstances in Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (Civil Appeal 66 of 1999) [2002] KECA 153 (KLR) as follows:

“…a bill of costs ought to be determined from the pleadings, judgment or settlement (if such be the case) but if the same is not so ascertainable the taxing officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account, amongst other matters, the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the interest of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings, any direction by the trial judge and all other relevant circumstances.”

31.The Applicant submitted that the correct starting point was the basic fee of Kshs. 75,000/= prescribed in Schedule VI for defended matters not otherwise provided for, and that the sum of Kshs. 500,000/= was unconscionable. The basic fee is indeed the starting point. However, the Advocates (Remuneration) Order does not confine the Taxing Officer to it. Where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained, the Taxing Officer may increase the fee, having regard to the considerations set out in Joreth Limited (supra). An increase above the basic fee is not, by itself, an error of principle.

32.The Respondents argued, and the Applicant did not rebut, that the matter was lengthy and that bulky evidence was tendered. The suit was litigated for about ten years and was heard to its conclusion. The Applicant has not shown that the Taxing Officer took into account an irrelevant consideration or disregarded a relevant one. In view of the duration and conduct of the proceedings, this Court is not persuaded that the costs are so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference of an error of principle.

33.The upshot of the foregoing is that the application dated 12th August 2025 is without merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Mutwiri for the 1st and 2nd Respondents

Vena-court assistant

Vena – Court Assistant

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder