Land law

Blue Bell Realty Investment Ltd & another v Alai & another [2026] KEELC 6722 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Land Case E381 of 2026
Judgment date
13 October 2026
Judge(s)
TW Murigi

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The Court dismissed the 1st Defendant’s preliminary objection, held that the suit may proceed, directed that the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 19 August 2026 be heard on its merits, and awarded the Plaintiffs the costs of the preliminary objection.

Supporting judgment passages

56. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026 is devoid of merit. Accordingly, this court makes the following orders:

Paragraph 56 →

i. The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026 is hereby dismissed.

Passage 92 →

ii. The Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 19th August 2026 shall proceed to hearing and determination on its merits.

Passage 93 →
Issue 1Whether the present suit is sub judice within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act;

Held. No. Although the earlier Petition was pending before a competent court, the present trespass and possession claims were not directly and substantially in issue in that Petition, which challenged the Registrar’s cancellation of title. Nor were the proceedings between the same parties or parties claiming under them: the Defendants were strangers to the Petition and there was no evidence that they claimed through its petitioners. Section 6 did not bar this suit.

Ratio. For sub judice under Section 6, the party invoking it must establish a prior pending competent proceeding, identity of matters directly and substantially in issue, and identity of parties or parties claiming under them under the same title. A possible bearing of one decision on another is insufficient. An interested party in earlier proceedings cannot thereby pursue a fresh trespass claim against persons who are strangers to those proceedings.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

i. Whether the present suit is sub judice within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act;

Passage 57 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

52. In the end, I find that the 1st Defendant has failed to establish that the matter in issue in the present suit is directly and substantially in issue in the Petition or that the two proceedings are between the same parties or parties claiming under them. Accordingly, the present suit is not sub judice. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act therefore does not bar this Court from proceeding with it.

Paragraph 52 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

40. From the foregoing, a party invoking the doctrine must establish that: there is a previously instituted suit or proceeding; the earlier suit or proceeding is pending before a court of competent jurisdiction; the matter in issue in the later suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the earlier one; and the two proceedings are between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title.

Paragraph 40 →

46. While it is evident that a decision of one Court may have some bearing on the other, that is not the test under Section 6, which requires that an issue have been directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit. In the matter at hand, the court seized of the Petition is not called upon to determine whether the Defendants entered upon the suit property, nor is it called upon to determine whether the Registrar lawfully expunged Entry No. 1 on I.R. No. 224628.

Paragraph 46 →

50. The 1st Defendant also relied on the 1st Plaintiff’s participation in the Petition as an Interested Party. However, the fact that one party appears in both proceedings does not satisfy the requirement that the proceedings involve the same parties. Moreover, an Interested Party has a limited role. In Muruatetu & another v Republic; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties); Death Penalty Project (Intended Amicus Curiae) [2016] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that an Interested Party may not frame fresh issues or introduce new issues for the Court’s determination.

Paragraph 50 →
Issue 2Whether the suit is an abuse of the court's process; and

Held. No. The alternative abuse-of-process request rested on the failed sub judice plea. The Plaintiffs had disclosed the Petition and expressly excluded its issues from the present suit; no independent basis for abuse was advanced. The Court therefore declined to dismiss the suit as an abuse of process.

Ratio. Sub judice, even if established, calls for a stay rather than dismissal. Where the sub judice plea fails and no other basis for abuse of process is advanced, the suit is not an abuse of the court’s process.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

ii. Whether the suit is an abuse of the court's process; and

Passage 58 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

54. Further, the Plaintiffs disclosed the Petition in the Plaint and expressly stated that they did not intend to invite this court to determine the issues it raised. No other basis for finding an abuse of process was advanced. Accordingly, this court finds that the suit does not constitute an abuse of process.

Paragraph 54 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

53. Alternatively, the 1st Defendant sought to have the suit dismissed as an abuse of the court's process. This prayer was based on the plea of sub judice, which failed. In Kenya National Commission of Human Rights v Attorney General (supra), the Supreme Court held that the later matter ought to be stayed pending determination of the suit. The doctrine does not in itself found an order for dismissal.

Paragraph 53 →

54. Further, the Plaintiffs disclosed the Petition in the Plaint and expressly stated that they did not intend to invite this court to determine the issues it raised. No other basis for finding an abuse of process was advanced. Accordingly, this court finds that the suit does not constitute an abuse of process.

Paragraph 54 →
Issue 3WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS SUB JUDICE

Held. No. The Court held that the present suit concerns alleged trespass and interference with possession by Defendants who were not parties to, and did not claim under parties to, the earlier Petition. Those issues were distinct from the Petition’s challenge to cancellation of I.R. No. 224628, so the suit was not sub judice and could proceed.

Ratio. Section 6 requires the later suit’s matter to be directly and substantially in issue in the earlier pending proceeding, and requires the same parties or parties claiming under them. Mere connection to the same land or a possible effect of one decision on another does not meet that test.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS SUB JUDICE

Court’s reasoning →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

52. In the end, I find that the 1st Defendant has failed to establish that the matter in issue in the present suit is directly and substantially in issue in the Petition or that the two proceedings are between the same parties or parties claiming under them. Accordingly, the present suit is not sub judice. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act therefore does not bar this Court from proceeding with it.

Paragraph 52 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

45. The reliefs sought—declarations of trespass, permanent and mandatory injunctions, eviction, general damages, and mesne profits—arise from the Defendants’ conduct on the land. Accordingly, the issue is whether the Defendants trespassed upon or unlawfully interfered with the Plaintiffs’ possession of L.R. No. 209/7989 and, if so, what remedies should be granted.

Paragraph 45 →

47. Even if the Petition were to succeed, the outcome would vindicate the Petitioners' title; it would not confer any right on the Defendants, who do not claim under that title, to enter upon or occupy the suit property. Conversely, a finding on whether the Defendants committed trespass would neither validate nor invalidate the administrative action challenged in the Petition. There is therefore no real risk of conflicting decisions.

Paragraph 47 →

49. Although the 1st Defendant argued that Section 6 applies to parties litigating under the same title, it was necessary to show that he or the 2nd Defendant claimed under a party to the Petition, specifically the Petitioners. However, there is no evidence that either Defendant claims under the Petitioners.

Paragraph 49 →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

This ruling is in respect of a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026, in which the 1st Defendant raised the following grounds:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

On behalf of the 1st Defendant, Counsel submitted that the sole issue for determination is whether ELC Case No. E381 of 2026 is sub judice within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Paragraph 11 →

Decision / orders

In the end, I find that the 1st Defendant has failed to establish that the matter in issue in the present suit is directly and substantially in issue in the Petition or that the two proceedings are between the same parties or parties claiming under them. Accordingly, the present suit is not sub judice. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act therefore does not bar this Court from proceeding with it.

Paragraph 52 →

Reasoning passage

Further, the Plaintiffs disclosed the Petition in the Plaint and expressly stated that they did not intend to invite this court to determine the issues it raised. No other basis for finding an abuse of process was advanced. Accordingly, this court finds that the suit does not constitute an abuse of process.

Paragraph 54 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether the suit was sub judice under section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act because ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024 was pending; whether it was an abuse of process; and whether the preliminary objection should be upheld. The court also noted, but…

Material facts

Blue Bell Realty Investment Limited and Gerald Mwangi alleged that Robert Onyango Alai entered L.R. No. 209/7989, purported to take control of it, and posted Peter Mbithi as a guard without authority. They sought trespass-related remedies but expressly did…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELCLC CASE NO. E381 OF 2026

BLUE BELL REALTY INVESTMENT LIMITED........................ 1ST PLAINTIFF

GERALD MWANGI................................................................ 2ND PLAINTIFF

=VERSUS=

ROBERT ONYANGO ALAI..................................................1ST DEFENDANT

PETER MBITHI................................................................. 2ND DEFENDANT

RULING

1. This ruling is in respect of a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026, in which the 1st Defendant raised the following grounds:

a) The suit is sub judice because a previous suit, ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024, concerning the same subject matter—namely, the validity of the cancellation of I.R. No. 224628 over L.R. No. 209/7989 and the proprietary rights arising therefrom—remains pending. The 1st Defendant further contends that the Plaintiff is an Interested Party in ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024.

b) He asserted that the present suit seeks, inter alia, injunctive, mandatory and eviction orders in respect of the same property, L.R. No. 209/7989, thereby inviting this court to determine concurrently issues directly connected with the determination of the said Petition.

c) He argued that allowing the suit and interlocutory application to proceed alongside the Petition could result in parallel adjudication and conflicting orders concerning the same property.

2. Accordingly, the 1st Defendant prays that:

i. The suit be stayed pursuant to Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act pending the hearing and determination of ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024.

ii. In the alternative and without prejudice to prayer (a), the suit be dismissed as an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court.

iii. The costs of the Preliminary Objection and the suit be awarded to the 1st Defendant.

THE PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE

3. The Plaintiffs filed a Supplementary Affidavit, sworn on 11th September 2026 by the 2nd Plaintiff, the 1st Plaintiff’s Director, in opposition to the Preliminary Objection. The deponent asserts that ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024 arose from the Land Registrar’s cancellation of Certificate of Title I.R. No. 224628, previously issued in the names of Joseph Kiplagat Keitany and Barnabas Kipkurgat Tembulio, trading as Ketem Agencies.

4. He further averred that neither the Plaintiffs nor the present suit invited this court to determine the validity of I.R. No. 224628, or whether its cancellation should be upheld or reversed. He further averred that the suit arose from the Defendants’ alleged entry upon, trespass, obstruction, and unlawful interference with the Plaintiffs’ possession of and access to L.R. No. 209/7989. The deponent contends that the interim relief sought in the Plaintiffs’ application dated 19th August 2026 is intended to preserve possession, access, and the physical status of the property pending the determination of the Plaintiffs’ complaint.

5. He argued that the Petition primarily challenges the administrative action of the Chief Land Registrar and the Registrar of Titles in cancelling I.R. No. 224628. He further contended that the Petition invoked Article 47 of the Constitution, the Fair Administrative Action Act and the court’s supervisory jurisdiction, and alleged a lack of notice, hearing, reasons and procedural fairness. The deponent contended that the Petition is directed against public officers, whereas the present suit concerns alleged trespass by private persons and raises no similar administrative law issue.

6. He averred that none of the substantive prayers in the Petition sought relief against Robert Alai Onyango or Peter Mbithi, sought a declaration that either was an owner, occupier, agent, licensee, caretaker, guard, or person entitled to possession, or sought authority for either to enter or occupy the property, station guards there, or obstruct access to it. He argued that restraining the Defendants from trespassing would therefore neither grant nor defeat any relief sought in the Petition.

7. The deponent asserted that the plea of sub judice conflated three distinct matters: the Petitioners’ rival proprietary dispute, pending in Milimani ELC Case No. E015 of 2023; their constitutional and judicial review challenge in E030 of 2024 to the administrative cancellation of their title; and this suit, which concerns subsequent acts of trespass by persons who neither claimed the cancelled title nor acknowledged any relationship with its holders.

8. He averred that, although the proceedings concerned the same parcel of land, the parties whose conduct was challenged, the alleged wrongs, and the reliefs sought were materially different. He further stated that no issue requiring determination in the suit called on this Court to decide whether the Registrar had lawfully expunged I.R. No. 224628; nor would resolving that administrative question determine whether the Defendants had committed the alleged acts of trespass.

9. This objection was canvassed through written submissions.

THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS

10. The 1st Defendant filed his submissions dated 12th September 2026.

11. On behalf of the 1st Defendant, Counsel submitted that the sole issue for determination is whether ELC Case No. E381 of 2026 is sub judice within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act.

12. Relying on Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 16 others (Interested Parties) (2020) eKLR, Counsel submitted that the sub judice doctrine is intended to prevent parallel litigation over the same controversy, avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, and forestall conflicting decisions. Counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 to support the proposition that a preliminary objection raises a pure point of law arising from the pleadings and, if successful, may dispose of the matter.

13. Counsel contended that sub judice is a jurisdictional issue that may be determined by way of a preliminary objection. To support this argument, Counsel relied on Nkamasiai & another v Juhudi Kilimo Co. Limited & another (Civil Appeal E006 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 1834 (KLR), where the High Court upheld a stay of subsequent proceedings under Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act. Counsel argued that the material facts were apparent from the Plaintiffs’ pleadings, which expressly disclosed ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024 and I.R. No. 224628, and that the objection therefore did not require the court to resolve disputed evidence.

14. Counsel relied on Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 16 others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR, where the Supreme Court set out the elements of sub judice, namely: more than one suit over the same subject matter; one suit instituted before the other; both suits pending before courts of competent jurisdiction; and the suits being between the same parties or their representatives.

15. Applying that test, Counsel submitted that the present suit was instituted while the Petition remained pending. Counsel argued that the Petition concerned L.R. No. 209/7989, including the competing title I.R. No. 224628 and the legality of its cancellation, whereas the present suit concerned the same parcel and sought injunctive, mandatory and possessory relief based on the Plaintiffs’ asserted proprietary and possessory rights.

16. Regarding the parties' identities, Counsel conceded that the parties in the two proceedings were not identical, but argued that Section 6 applied where parties litigated under the same title or claimed through one another. Counsel further asserted that the 1st Plaintiff, Blue Bell Realty Investment Limited, is an Interested Party in the Petition and could not participate in the earlier proprietary controversy while inviting this Court to determine questions of possession and control over the same property.

17. Counsel further submitted that a distinction in the form of proceedings or in the reliefs sought does not defeat the doctrine.

18. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to uphold the Notice of Preliminary Objection with costs to the 1st Defendant.

THE PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS

19. The Plaintiffs filed their submissions dated 11th September 2026.

20. On behalf of the Plaintiffs, Counsel identified the following issues for the court’s determination:

a) whether the objection met the threshold of a proper preliminary

objection;

b) whether the requirements of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act had been met;

c) whether the parties and causes of action in ELC Case No. E381 of 2026 and ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024 were directly and substantially the same;

d) whether the present proceedings constituted an abuse of the court process; and

e) what orders should issue.

21. Regarding the threshold for a preliminary objection, Counsel relied on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 and Oraro v Mbaja [2005] KEHC 3182 (KLR), to submit that an objection requiring investigation of contested facts or evidence is not a proper preliminary objection. Counsel further submitted that determining the objection would require the Court to ascertain the parties to the Petition, the reliefs sought and the issues raised therein, whether the Defendants claimed under any party to it, and whether the alleged acts of trespass fell within its scope. Counsel submitted that these were not pure questions of law but required a comparison of pleadings, parties, causes of action and reliefs. In this regard, Counsel relied on Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission v Mwachumba & 2 others [2026] KEELC 751 (KLR).

22. Regarding the parties' identities, Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant had deposed that he was not a party to the Petition nor an agent, nominee, associate or representative of Joseph Kiplagat Keitany, Barnabas Kipkurgat Tembulio or Ketem Agencies; that he had no business relationship with Ketem Agencies and that his involvement in these proceedings was unrelated to the competing title or the Petition. Counsel contended that, in light of those statements, the 1st Defendant could not credibly assert that the two proceedings involved the same parties or persons claiming under them, as required by the Supreme Court's test.

23. On the matters in issue, Counsel submitted that Section 6 does not bar every subsequent suit relating to a parcel of land merely because it was the subject of earlier litigation. Counsel argued that the Petition concerned the validity of the cancellation of I.R. No. 224628, whereas the present suit concerned whether the Defendants had unlawfully entered or obstructed access to L.R. No. 209/7989, stationed persons there, or otherwise interfered with the Plaintiffs’ possession. Counsel noted that the Plaintiffs’ application expressly stated that the Court was not invited to determine the validity of I.R. No. 224628 or the merits of the Petition, and that trespass could be determined independently of whether the cancellation was lawful.

24. Counsel further contended that the 1st Defendant’s case reinforced this distinction. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant had denied any ownership, proprietary or possessory interest in the property, denied instructing Peter Mbithi, and denied any intention to enter the property. Accordingly, counsel argued, the 1st Defendant’s defence was not that he was entitled to enter under I.R. No. 224628, but that he had not entered at all, thereby undermining the objection’s conceptual basis. Whether he entered the property was a factual dispute for this court, while the validity of the cancellation was a matter for the court seized of the Petition.

25. Counsel argued that accepting the 1st Defendant’s position would allow a stranger to enter the land while a title dispute was pending, and would deny the registered owner or person in possession immediate protection. Counsel submitted that Section 6 was intended to prevent duplicative adjudication between the same litigants, not to suspend the court’s jurisdiction to protect against independent wrongs. Counsel maintained that the application sought to prevent a unilateral change to the status quo and therefore supported, rather than undermined, the orderly determination of the Petition.

26. Regarding the risk of conflicting decisions, Counsel submitted that no such risk had been demonstrated, as this Court need not pronounce on the validity of I.R. No. 224628, and the court determining the Petition need not decide whether Robert Alai Onyango or Peter Mbithi committed the alleged acts. Relying on Republic v Kariuki & 3 others; Law Society of Kenya (Ex parte Applicant) [2020] KEHC 10142 (KLR), Counsel applied the test of whether the later suit necessarily required the court to examine issues pending in the earlier proceedings, and argued that it did not.

27. Regarding the alternative prayer for dismissal, Counsel submitted that it fell outside the scope of Section 6, which provides for a stay, not the extinguishment of a cause of action. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiffs had not abused the process by seeking to restrain alleged new acts of trespass by persons who, in their own sworn evidence, claimed no interest in the earlier proceedings.

28. Regarding the challenge to the 2nd Plaintiff’s standing, Counsel relied on a company resolution dated 17 August 2026, which retained DRCO Kenyariri Advocates LLP to institute proceedings against trespassers on the Kileleshwa property and authorised Gerald Mwangi, together with the company, to commence proceedings to protect its registered interest. Counsel submitted that this issue did not bring the suit within the scope of Section 6.

29. Counsel submitted that the objection was internally contradictory: the 1st Defendant had disclaimed under oath any connection with the Petition, its Petitioners, or the competing title, yet sought to stay the suit against him on the basis of sub judice proceedings brought by those same persons, with whom he had allegedly disclaimed any connection.

30. In conclusion, Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Preliminary Objection and to allow the Notice of Motion dated 19th August 2026 to be determined on its merits.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

31. Having considered the pleadings and rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:

i. Whether the present suit is sub judice within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act;

ii. Whether the suit is an abuse of the court's process; and

WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS SUB JUDICE

32. The law on preliminary objection is well settled. A preliminary objection must be based on a pure point of law. In Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Company Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Law JA stated as follows:

“So far as I’m aware, a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which, if argued as a preliminary point, may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation or submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”

33. In the same decision Sir Charles Newbold JA stated:

“The first matter relates to the increasing practice of raising points which should be argued in the normal manner, quite improperly by way of preliminary objection. A preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct.it cannot be raised if any fact had to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. The improper raising of points by way of preliminary objection does nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and, on occasion, confuse the issue. The improper practice should stop.”

34. Similarly, in Oraro v Mbaja (2005) eKLR Ojwang J (as he then was) held as follows:

“I think the principle is abundantly clear. “A Preliminary Objection” correctly understood is now well identified as, and declared to be a point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the process of evidence. An assertion which claims to be a Preliminary Objection and yet it hears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true Preliminary Objection which the Court should allow to proceed.”

35. It follows that a valid preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law, grounded in facts either pleaded by the opposite party or not in dispute, and, if upheld, would dispose of the suit without the court having to ascertain any facts or exercise its discretion.

36. A plea of sub judice may properly be taken by way of a preliminary objection where the earlier proceedings, the parties thereto and the matters in issue are apparent from the pleadings and are not contested. In such a case, the court is required to do no more than compare the pleadings in the two proceedings.

37. In this matter, the existence and pendency of ELC Constitutional Petition No. E030 of 2024 are undisputed. The Plaintiffs disclosed the Petition’s pendency in the Plaint and attached a copy to their Supplementary Affidavit dated 11th September 2026. Accordingly, the Court may determine the objection by comparing the pleadings in the two proceedings, on the assumption that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs are correct. The Court will proceed on that basis. The Court is called upon to determine whether this suit is sub judice.

38. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that:

“No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or proceeding in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit or proceeding between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, where such suit or proceeding is pending in the same or any other court having jurisdiction in Kenya to grant the relief claimed”

39. The Supreme Court in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 16 Others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR explained the doctrine as follows:

“The term sub judice is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 9th Edition as:

“Before the Court or Judge for determination.” The purpose of the sub judice rule is to stop the filing of multiplicity of suits between the same parties or those claiming under them over the same subject matter so as to avoid abuse of the court process and diminish the chances of courts, with competent jurisdiction, issuing conflicting decisions over the same subject matter. This means that when two or more cases are filed between the same parties on the same subject matter before courts with jurisdiction, the matter that is filed later ought to be stayed in order to await the determination to be made in the earlier suit. A party that seeks to invoke the doctrine of sub judice must therefore establish that; there is more than one suit over the same subject matter, that one suit was instituted before the other; that both suits are pending before courts of competent jurisdiction; and lastly, that the suits are between the same parties or their representatives.”

40. From the foregoing, a party invoking the doctrine must establish that: there is a previously instituted suit or proceeding; the earlier suit or proceeding is pending before a court of competent jurisdiction; the matter in issue in the later suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the earlier one; and the two proceedings are between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title.

41. It is not in dispute that the Petition was filed in 2024, before the present suit was commenced by the Plaint dated 19th August 2026. It remains pending before the Environment and Land Court, which has jurisdiction to determine it. Accordingly, the first two requirements are satisfied.

42. The question that follows is whether both proceedings relate to the same matter. In the Petition, the Petitioners, Joseph Kiplagat Keitany and Barnabas Kipkurgat Tembulio, trading as Ketem Agencies, plead that on or about 21st September 2022, the Chief Land Registrar and the Registrar of Titles, without notice to them, relied on Section 79 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, to expunge Entry No. 1 from their title, I.R. No. 224628, over L.R. No. 209/7989.

43. They contend that the cancellation was effected without a hearing or reasons, in breach of Articles 25(c), 40, 47 and 50 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. The Petition therefore challenges the administrative action of public officers. The issue is whether the cancellation of Entry No. 1 on I.R. No. 224628 was lawful.

44. In the present suit, the Plaintiffs plead that the 1st Defendant entered the suit property and purported to take control by posting the 2nd Defendant there as a security guard, without their consent or lawful authority. They expressly state that they are not asking the Court to determine the merits of the pending challenge to the cancelled title. They also plead that neither Defendant is the registered proprietor under either the 1st Plaintiff’s title or the cancelled title.

45. The reliefs sought—declarations of trespass, permanent and mandatory injunctions, eviction, general damages, and mesne profits—arise from the Defendants’ conduct on the land. Accordingly, the issue is whether the Defendants trespassed upon or unlawfully interfered with the Plaintiffs’ possession of L.R. No. 209/7989 and, if so, what remedies should be granted.

46. While it is evident that a decision of one Court may have some bearing on the other, that is not the test under Section 6, which requires that an issue have been directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit. In the matter at hand, the court seized of the Petition is not called upon to determine whether the Defendants entered upon the suit property, nor is it called upon to determine whether the Registrar lawfully expunged Entry No. 1 on I.R. No. 224628.

47. Even if the Petition were to succeed, the outcome would vindicate the Petitioners' title; it would not confer any right on the Defendants, who do not claim under that title, to enter upon or occupy the suit property. Conversely, a finding on whether the Defendants committed trespass would neither validate nor invalidate the administrative action challenged in the Petition. There is therefore no real risk of conflicting decisions.

48. Regarding the parties’ identities, the Petition is brought by the Petitioners against the Chief Land Registrar and the Registrar of Titles. The 1st Plaintiff is an Interested Party, and neither Defendant is a party to the Petition. Counsel for the 1st Defendant conceded this point but argued that Section 6 also applies to parties litigating under the same title or claiming through one another.

49. Although the 1st Defendant argued that Section 6 applies to parties litigating under the same title, it was necessary to show that he or the 2nd Defendant claimed under a party to the Petition, specifically the Petitioners. However, there is no evidence that either Defendant claims under the Petitioners.

50. The 1st Defendant also relied on the 1st Plaintiff’s participation in the Petition as an Interested Party. However, the fact that one party appears in both proceedings does not satisfy the requirement that the proceedings involve the same parties. Moreover, an Interested Party has a limited role. In Muruatetu & another v Republic; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties); Death Penalty Project (Intended Amicus Curiae) [2016] KESC 12 (KLR), the Supreme Court held that an Interested Party may not frame fresh issues or introduce new issues for the Court’s determination.

51. It follows that the 1st Plaintiff, as an Interested Party in the Petition, could not have sought a determination of its trespass complaint against the Defendants, who are strangers to the Petition. This reinforces the finding that the matter in issue in the present suit is not directly and substantially in issue in the Petition.

52. In the end, I find that the 1st Defendant has failed to establish that the matter in issue in the present suit is directly and substantially in issue in the Petition or that the two proceedings are between the same parties or parties claiming under them. Accordingly, the present suit is not sub judice. Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act therefore does not bar this Court from proceeding with it.

THE WHETHER THE SUIT IS AN ABUSE OF THE COURT PROCESS

53. Alternatively, the 1st Defendant sought to have the suit dismissed as an abuse of the court's process. This prayer was based on the plea of sub judice, which failed. In Kenya National Commission of Human Rights v Attorney General (supra), the Supreme Court held that the later matter ought to be stayed pending determination of the suit. The doctrine does not in itself found an order for dismissal.

54. Further, the Plaintiffs disclosed the Petition in the Plaint and expressly stated that they did not intend to invite this court to determine the issues it raised. No other basis for finding an abuse of process was advanced. Accordingly, this court finds that the suit does not constitute an abuse of process.

55. The Defendants also challenged the 2nd Plaintiff’s standing. However, that challenge is not among the grounds set out in the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026, and the Court will not address it at this stage.

56. The upshot of the foregoing is that the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026 is devoid of merit. Accordingly, this court makes the following orders:

i. The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1st September 2026 is hereby dismissed.

ii. The Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated 19th August 2026 shall proceed to hearing and determination on its merits.

iii. The costs of the Preliminary Objection are awarded to the Plaintiffs.

RULING SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Dr Kenyariri for the Plaintiff

Enock LoisamoIi holding brief for Miller for the 1st Defendant

Vena – Court assistant

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