Land law

Tiampati & another (Suing as the Chairman and Secretary of the Bellevue Estate Welfare Development Association) v Local Authorities Provident Board (LAPFUND) & 7 others [2026] KEELC 6871 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Case E328 of 2022
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
C.K Nzili

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Background

The 1st Defendant herein filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 21.7.2025 on grounds that:

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Question before the court

The Plaintiff submits that the 1st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection is founded on two principal grounds, namely, the issue of jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. In support of its position, the Plaintiff relies on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” v Caltex Kenya Ltd (1989) KLR 1, and Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya…

Paragraph 37 →

Reasoning passage

The upshot is I find the preliminary objection lacking merit.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

MILIMANI LAW COURTS

ELC LC NUMBER E328 OF 2022

JOSEPH MUSUNI TIAMPATI &

HASSAN M MOROWA(Suing as the Chairman and Secretary

Of the Bellevue Estate Welfare

Development Association)……………………………….…………………………PLAINTIFFS

VERSUS

LOCAL AUTHORITIES PROVIDENT BOARD(LAPFUND)………………....1ST DEFENDANT

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY…………...2ND DEFENDANT

COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI…………………………….…….3RD DEFENDANT

PS MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT…………………………………...……4TH DEFENDANT

PS MINISTRY OF LANDS……………………………………………..……..5TH DEFENDANT

KENYA URBAN ROADS AUTHORITY………………………………….….6TH DEFENDANT

KENYA AIRPORT AUTHORITY…………………………………………….7TH DEFENDANT

THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL………………………….…..8TH DEFENDANT

RULING

1. The 1st Defendant herein filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 21.7.2025 on grounds that:

a) The Honourable court lacks Jurisdiction to entertain Physical Planning and Land Use disputes as a court of first instance where there is a County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee in place.

b) The suit offends the doctrine of exhaustion by attempting to oust the jurisdiction of the County Physical and Land Use Planning Committee under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act.

2. The plaintiff, a welfare development of Bellevue Estate, approached this court through a plaint dated 6.7.2022, later amended on 5.5.2025.

3. In the amended plaint, they seek prayers that:

a. This Honourable Court do order for the immediate demolition of the multi-dwelling apartments and any other authorised structures constructed in violation of zoning laws and on public land, including the public road, at the cost of the 1st defendant.

b. That this honourable court do issue a permanent injunction restraining the 1st Defendant, their agent or successors from further construction, development or any activity on all that property known as Nairobi Block 90/108 comprising of public road or in contravention of the zoning laws applicable to the area.

c. That this honourable court declares null and void the issuance of the title deed of all that property known as NAIROBI BLOCK 90/108 which comprises the public road in question, as the land was improperly allocated, constituting a violation of public land laws under the Constitution, the Land Act, the Land Registration Act and the Physical Planning Act and directs the 5th Defendant to immediately cancel the said title and surrender the same to the 6th Defendant.

d. That the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Environment, be ordered to have the open area behind Bellevue Estate converted to a public park for the benefit of the current and future generation of Bellevue Estate and the surrounding estates.

e. That this Honourable Court orders the restoration of all that property known as Nairobi Block 90/108, being the public road, to its original status to ensure unimpeded access for all affected residents.

f. That this Honourable Court do declare that the 3rd to 7th defendants breached their statutory duty to protect public land, enforce zoning regulations and ensure compliance with urban planning laws.

g. That this honourable do direct the Deputy Registrar of this court to forward the file to the Director of Public prosecution to consider commencing investigation and prosecution of individuals or authorities who facilitated or approved the illegal construction and issuance of a title deed for public land being all that property known as Nairobi Block 90/108.

h. That this honourable court do issue a declaratory order that all relevant authorities are mandated to engage in meaningful consultation with affected residents before approving any developments in the area in question.

4. The contention by the plaintiff is that they are owners and occupiers of Bellevue Estate, Nairobi South C, who have raised complaints of an access road for Bellevue Estate Residents which falls on road reserve and children's playground adjacent to the estate by the 1st defendant.

5. The plaintiffs plead that on 20.5.2020, they objected to the same through relevant state agencies, which were ignored, only for the 1st defendant to invite them for a public participation exercise on 30.9.2021 with plans for construction of 2300 residences (apartments) upon a parcel constituting approximately 3 acres.

6. The plaintiffs aver that the 1st defendant promised to furnish the attendees with approvals for the proposed development but never did; otherwise, at the meeting the residents expressed their objection to the proposed development, which would enlarge the population of the small area of 7000 to 10000 persons as indicated in the tender calling for registered contractors to tender for the development of apartments.

7. The plaintiff avers that, despite their objection, the 2nd defendant listed hearing has failed and/or refused to stop the 1st defendant from proceeding to carry out a development that has the potential to destroy the environment for the residents in occupation in adjacent areas for current and future generations.

8. The plaintiffs have particularised the negligence of the mandate of each of the 2nd to 7th defendants.

9. The plaintiff allege that as a result of failure and negligence of the 2nd defendant in their statutory obligations they face a danger of living in an area that is exceedingly highly populated and ill serviced in terms of necessary infrastructure for sewage and water services; there will be overshading by 18 storey buildings blocking natural overflow of lights and sunshine and estate will loose its privacy; high density living altering the neighbourhood’s character and undrmining its intended purpose; blocking access to houses causing inconvenience to residents affectinmg their daily lives and access to emergency services; undermining public trust with local authorities tasked with enforcing zoning and public land regulations; congestion of roads not built to handle increased traffic volumes; pressure on infrastructure designed for low density use; elimination of valuable open space leaving fewer areas of drainage, pedestrian walk ways or tree cover; blocked drainage systems increasing risk of flooding; overburdening the infrastructure requiring constant repair and upgrade; economic displacement as long term residents will be forced to move out due to congestion; undermining credibility and enforcement of urban planning and zoning standards and local authorities facing reputational harm for failure to regulate or enforce the law.

10. The plaintiff avers that despite objections being raised in a meeting with the 1st defendant on 30.9.2021, the said 1st Defendant is doggedly determined to proceed with its plan to erect 2,300 residences in a plot adjacent to the Plaintiffs' Estate.

11. The suit is opposed by the 1st Defendant through an amended defence dated 21.7.2025. It pleads that in pursuance of its investment objectives and duties, it acquired a leasehold interest in five title Nos. Nairobi Block/104, 105,106,107,108 adjacent to one another from Bellevue Park Limited, lease for 99 years with effect from 7.7.1997.

12. It avers that in January 2021, KENHA, through the National Land Commission, through Gazette Notice No. 78 of 11.1.2021, expressed intent to compulsorily acquire Nairobi block 98/104 & 105 for purposes of Nairobi expressway project which were eventually acquired and therefore no longer belong to it.

13. The 1st defendant avers that it then decided to use the remaining parcel of land for the ongoing residential developments referred to as Bellevue Park Residency.

14. The 1ST defendant avers that, to facilitate the intention actualisation, it applied for and obtained from the 3rd defendant both amalgamation approval and change of use approval.

15. The 1st defendant denies that any of its parcels of land is an access road on its development, encroaching in any way on other people's properties.

16. The 1st defendant avers that stakeholder consultation meetings were held, inter alia, to provide information about the project, including to the residents around the project site, to answer their concerns, questions and address them about the project.

17. The 1st defendant avers that it is not the role of the residents association or parliament stakeholders consultation meeting either to approve or deny approval for a project; otherwise, the process of approval was sanctioned by law.

18. The 1st defendant avers that it sought and obtained all required approvals for a project and will seek approval that may be required in future from government entities.

19. The 1st defendant avers that proper, safe and affordable housing is a major challenge in Nairobi and its environs as well as the entire nation and hence its project will go a long way in improving housing and including providing alternatives to the interested occupants of other homes in the vicinity.

20. The 1st defendant states that the project poses no risk to the environment as alleged. It denies the alleged neglect of duty or refusal by the 2nd to 7th defendants in their statutory mandates or basis to have declined to grant various approvals to it.

21. The 1st defendant states that the alleged actions of the 3rd defendant relate to physical and land use planning, for which the PLUPA has a mechanism to address any challenges; hence the suit violates the doctrine of exhaustion.

22. The 1st defendant avers that it illegaly acquired the various properties on which the project will be erected without any fraud or irregularly in the acquisition.

23. The 1st defendant avers that all the approvals and licenses granted to it by various Government of Kenya agencies were merited and granted after following the appropriate procedures in each case.

24. The 1st defendant avers that, through Evo Plan Management Limited it conducted a comprehensive ESIAS report from the proposed residential development which submitted EIA report dated October,2021,which deals with public participation issues, mitigation measures to prevent or minimize potential negative environmental, health and safety impact associated with the project.

25. The 1st defendant avers that, following various applications and interaction between it and the 2nd defendant between 2015 and December 2022, including a site verification exercise, the 2nd defendants issued it with a licence to implement the project on the 29.12.2022

26. Similarly, the 1st defendant avers that, following its application and after analysing the sites, the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, by a letter dated 25.11.2022, granted it the height approval of 63 metres for the project.

27. The 1st defendant avers that its appointed architects have also applied to the 3rd defendant for the approval of architectural and structural drawing/plans which approval was given on 1.2.2023.

28. The 1st defendant avers that the project has been and continues to be managed and supervised in a manner required by law by various Government of Kenya entities, and it continues to comply with the law in undertaking the project, especially in the building and construction process to ensure that the development is done appropriately, at appropriate locations and does not have undesirable effects.

29. The 1st defendant avers that it took all the necessary steps to address the potential negative consequences of any major construction project such as this one, and as such it has eliminated, prevented, or minimised the potential effect raised by the plaintiff.

30. On water infrastructure and facilities, the 1st defendant avers that the EIA report comprehensively deals with the question of water supply; it commissioned a hydrogeological survey on sinking of four boreholes, which application was approved by WRA and NCWSC by a letter dated 26.4.2021 and 27.4.2021 respectively.

31. The 3rd defendant filed a statement of defence dated 13.3.2024.

32. The 3rd defendant denies the contents of paragraph 10 of the Plaint and contests the assertion that the relevant authority was duly notified as claimed.

33. The 3rd defendant denies paragraphs 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the plaint and avers that it is a stranger to the allegations.

34. The 3rd defendant denies the contents of paragraph 15 of the Plaint and states that the duty does not fall within the scope of the functions of the City County.

35. The 3rd defendant further denies paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the Plaint.

36. When the matter came up for directions before Hon. Justice A. Omollo on 23.9.2025, the court directed that the Preliminary Objection be canvassed through written submissions. Consequently, the Plaintiff filed written submissions in opposition to the Preliminary Objection dated 27.10.2025, while the 1st Defendant filed its submissions in support of the Preliminary Objection dated 12.11.2025.

37. The Plaintiff submits that the 1st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection is founded on two principal grounds, namely, the issue of jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. In support of its position, the Plaintiff relies on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” v Caltex Kenya Ltd (1989) KLR 1, and Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & Others (2012) eKLR.

38. On the strength of the foregoing authorities, the Plaintiff submits that this Honourable Court is vested with the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the present suit. The Plaintiff places reliance on Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, which establishes the Environment and Land Court, as well as Section 13(2) of the Environment and Land Court Act, which sets out the Court’s jurisdiction.

39. The plaintiff further submits that a consideration of the amended plaint dated 5.5.2025 demonstrates that the substance of its claim concerns the alleged infringement of its constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment. According to the plaintiff, that right has been violated by the ongoing construction activities being undertaken by the 1st defendant.

40. It is submitted that the chronology of events pleaded in the amended plaint demonstrates a clear failure to comply with the applicable legal and procedural safeguards preceding the approval and commencement of the impugned construction works. The plaintiff further contends that its objection to the development was disregarded.

41. The plaintiff submits that the essence of the 1st defendant’s objection is that the plaintiff ought first to have pursued the available remedies before the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee or invoked the mechanisms provided under the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act before instituting the present proceedings.

42. The plaintiff contends that the question whether it exhausted the statutory remedies before approaching this Honourable Court cannot be determined purely as a matter of law. This is because the Preliminary Objection, as framed by the 1st Defendant, necessarily requires an examination of disputed factual matters, including:

a) whether the plaintiff lodged an objection before the relevant Planning Committee;

b) whether the committee acknowledged, considered, processed or responded to the objection; and

c) whether the statutory mechanisms available were adequate, effective and capable of providing an appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case.

43. The plaintiff therefore urges the court to interrogate the foregoing contested matters before making a conclusive determination on the Preliminary Objection. It is submitted that, were the court to embark upon determining those factual issues at this interlocutory stage, the Preliminary Objection would fail the threshold established in Mukisa Biscuit (supra), since its determination would require factual investigation beyond a pure question of law.

44. The plaintiff submits that the existence of disputed factual matters renders the 1st defendant’s Preliminary Objection incapable of satisfying the threshold in Mukisa Biscuit (supra). Before determining the objection, the court would necessarily have to examine disputed evidence and make factual findings as to whether the plaintiff exhausted the prescribed dispute-resolution mechanisms. Such an exercise, the plaintiff argues, would go beyond the proper scope of proceedings founded on a Preliminary Objection.

45. The plaintiff maintains that the question of whether the statutory mechanisms were exhausted cannot be resolved solely as a question of law because it necessarily entails an examination of whether the Plaintiff approached the relevant Planning Committee, whether the committee acted upon or responded to the objection, and whether the statutory remedies available were adequate and effective. According to the plaintiff, these are disputed factual matters which ought to be tested through evidence at trial. Reliance is placed on Avtar Singh Bharma & Another v Oriental Commercial Bank, Kisumu HCCC No. 53 of 2004, and Oraro v Mbaja (2005) 1 KLR 141.

46. It is further submitted that the 1st defendant’s Preliminary Objection does not raise straightforward questions of law but instead turns on disputed facts, particularly whether the plaintiff complied with the relevant internal and statutory procedures before approaching the Court. The plaintiff contends that these matters cannot properly be determined at this preliminary stage without an examination of the evidence. This is particularly so because the plaintiff has adduced evidence indicating that it did approach the County Physical Planning and Land Use Committee, but that the committee failed to respond to its objection.

47. The plaintiff’s position is that the present suit is not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. It is argued that the doctrine does not operate as an absolute bar where constitutional violations are alleged, particularly where the statutory mechanisms available are inadequate or ineffective. The plaintiff contends that its objection was left unanswered and that the Environment and Land Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, to determine disputes relating to land, environmental rights and public trust property.

48. The Plaintiff further relies on Section 9 of the Fair Administrative Action Act and the decision in William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others (2020) KEHC 10266 (KLR). It is submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion is intended, inter alia, to promote the use of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms in keeping with Article 159 of the Constitution. However, the Plaintiff argues that the doctrine is not an inflexible bar to the institution of proceedings before a court where other statutory mechanisms may exist, particularly where those mechanisms are incapable of providing an effective or adequate remedy in the circumstances.

49. In the circumstances, the plaintiff urges this Honourable Court to dismiss the Preliminary Objection.

50. In response, the 1st defendant submits that the matters raised in the Preliminary Objection are capable of disposing of the suit at a preliminary stage without requiring the court to ascertain facts from sources outside the pleadings. Reliance is placed on Quick Enterprises Ltd v Kenya Railways Corporation, Kisumu HCCC No. 22 of 1999, as cited in Benson Karomo & Another (suing as the Chairman and Secretary respectively of the New Nyali Residents Association) v Paul Onyango Kiagi & Another [2021] KEELC 447 (KLR), as well as Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696.

51. The 1st defendant submits that, in the present case, the issues raised in the amended plaint fall squarely within the original jurisdiction of the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee established under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act. It is contended that the suit principally concerns physical planning and land use planning matters. In particular:

a) Paragraph 9B of the amended plaint refers to an alleged recommendation by the Nairobi City Council Works and Town Planning Committee concerning the subdivision of L.R. No. 209/8790;

b) the plaintiff alleges that the 2nd defendant failed to ensure compliance with applicable zoning laws and approved a development allegedly inconsistent with the prescribed zoning standards, as set out at paragraph 16(a)(vi) and (vii) of the Amended Plaint;

c) the allegations made against the 3rd defendant, namely the County Government of Nairobi, at paragraph 16(b) of the amended plaint relate substantially to physical planning and land use planning matters;

d) at paragraph 16(b)(v), the plaintiff specifically alleges that the 3rd defendant approved building plans for a multi-dwelling apartment “in an area designated for single-dwelling use, contrary to the Physical Planning Act and county zoning laws”;

e) the allegations against the 4th defendant at paragraph 16(c) of the amended plaint similarly concern physical planning and zoning matters; and

f) the allegations against the 5th defendant at paragraph 16(d) of the amended plaint likewise relate to zoning, physical planning laws and related matters.

52. The 1st defendant submits that the foregoing allegations, read together with the remainder of the amended plaint, demonstrate that the plaintiff’s suit is predominantly concerned with matters of physical planning and land use planning.

53. The 1st defendant reiterates that the matters raised in the amended plaint fall within the original jurisdiction of the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act. In particular, the 1st defendant relies on the allegations relating to the proposed subdivision of L.R. No. 209/8790, alleged non-compliance with zoning requirements, approval of development contrary to established zoning standards, and the approval of multi-dwelling apartments in an area allegedly designated for single-dwelling use. The 1st defendant submits that the various allegations against the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants similarly arise from physical planning and land use planning considerations.

54. The 1st defendant submits that the authorities relied upon demonstrate that the doctrine of exhaustion is applied by the courts to prevent parties from approaching the courts in the first instance where Parliament has established an alternative statutory mechanism for resolving a particular dispute. In such circumstances, parties are required to first invoke the jurisdiction of the designated statutory body before seeking recourse from the Courts.

55. The 1st defendant further submits, as set out in the Preliminary Objection, that this Honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain physical planning and land use planning disputes as a court of first instance where a County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee has been established. According to the 1st defendant, the court’s role in such matters is limited to exercising appellate jurisdiction over decisions made by the Liaison Committee.

56. It is submitted that, at the time the suit was initially instituted in 2022, the Nairobi County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee was duly constituted pursuant to Gazette Notice Nos. 1609 and 2694 of 2020 and Gazette Notice No. 12344 of 2021. The 1st defendant therefore contends that the plaintiff ought to have commenced the proceedings before the Liaison Committee in the first instance. It is further submitted that, as at the time of filing the submissions, a Liaison Committee remained in existence, with members appointed pursuant to Gazette Notice No. 5844 of 2023. On that basis, the 1st defendant urges this Honourable Court to uphold the Preliminary Objection and strike out the suit.

57. The court has carefully looked at the pleadings filed by the parties, the Preliminary Objection, the rival submissions and the applicable constitutional and statutory framework. I have also considered the authorities cited by the parties.

58. A preliminary objection must be based on a pure point of law rather than disputed fact, as held in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Company Limited v West End Distributors Limited [1965] EA 696. In CCK VS Royal Media Services Limited and others [2014] EKLR, the Supreme Court affirmed that constitutional questions should be avoided where a dispute can be resolved on another basis.

59. Similarly, in Oraro v Mbaja [2005] 1 KLR 141, Ojwang J. stated that a Preliminary Objection must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and proved by evidence.

60. The plaintiff asserts that the Preliminary Objection is improper because deciding the exhaustion question forces the court to investigate disputed facts, specifically, whether the Plaintiff filed an objection with the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee, how or if the Committee replied, and whether that internal remedy was effective.

61. The issue for determination by this court is not whether the plaintiff has established the merits of its complaint regarding the development. Rather, the question is whether, having regard to the nature of the dispute as pleaded in the amended plaint, Parliament has established a specialised statutory dispute-resolution mechanism that the plaintiff was required to exhaust before invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.

62. That question is capable of determination from the pleadings and the applicable law. Indeed, the Plaintiff's own amended plaint identifies the matters complained of as including subdivision, zoning, development approvals, compliance with zoning requirements, approval of building plans and development allegedly undertaken in an area designated for single-dwelling use.

63. To make a determination on the preliminary objection, the court need not delve into the substantive merits or conduct an evidentiary hearing; it must only identify the statutory forum legally designated to hear the pleaded dispute.

64. The objection consequently raises a question of jurisdiction and statutory exhaustion, both of which are quintessential questions of law.

65. Jurisdiction in a pure question of law and should be resolved in limine as held in Mary Wambui Munene Vs Peter Gichuki Kingara & Others [2014] EKLR.

66. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes this court as a court with jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land. Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act similarly sets out the jurisdiction of this Court.

67. The existence of such jurisdiction does not, however, imply that every dispute falling within the court’s broad subject-matter jurisdiction may be instituted before it at first instance. Parliament is constitutionally empowered to establish specialised administrative and quasi-judicial bodies to determine specific categories of disputes.

68. The doctrine of exhaustion is founded upon the above principle. In Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] KLR 21, the Court of Appeal held that where there is a clear procedure for redress prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure ought to be strictly followed.

69. The Court of Appeal subsequently reiterated the rationale in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, holding that where a dispute-resolution mechanism exists outside the courts, it should ordinarily be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked.

70. The Supreme Court has also emphasised that the doctrine of exhaustion must be applied in a manner that respects the specialised role assigned by Parliament to alternative statutory forums. The doctrine is intended to ensure that courts are ordinarily approached as fora of last resort after the mechanisms provided by statute have been utilised. See Magare Gikenyi Benjamin v Attorney General & 55 others (Petition E042 of 2024) [2026] KESC 5 (KLR) (23 January 2026) (Judgment)

71. In the present case, the relevant statutory framework is the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019.

72. Section 56 of the Act vests county governments with powers relating to development control, including the control of the use and development of land and buildings, consideration and approval of development applications and the implementation of approved physical and land use development plans.

73. Section 76 establishes a County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee for each county. Section 78 expressly sets out the functions of that Committee. Among those functions are:

a. hearing and determining complaints and claims made in respect of applications submitted to the planning authority in the county;

b. hearing appeals against decisions made by the planning authority with respect to physical and land use development plans in the county;

c. advising on broad physical and land use planning policies, strategies and standards; and

d. hearing appeals with respect to enforcement notices.

74. Section 61(3) further provides an appeal mechanism to the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee for an applicant or interested party aggrieved by a decision of the County Executive Committee Member concerning an application for development permission. The aggrieved party may thereafter appeal to this Court on a matter of law under the statutory framework.

75. The statutory scheme is therefore deliberate. Parliament has assigned the first-instance consideration of specified physical planning and land use disputes to the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee, with the Environment and Land Court exercising the jurisdiction provided to it at the subsequent appellate stage.

76. The importance of this statutory arrangement was recently underscored by the Court of Appeal in Malusha v Swaleh & another [2025] KECA 761 (KLR). In that case, the Court of Appeal considered a challenge to an enforcement notice issued under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act and affirmed that the doctrine of exhaustion applies to disputes concerning the use and development of land and buildings. The court held that an aggrieved party was required to pursue the statutory appeal to the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee before invoking the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. Of relevance, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that allegations of procedural impropriety, bias and illegality in the administrative process automatically entitled the litigant to bypass the statutory mechanism. The court held that such complaints could themselves be raised before the Liaison Committee through the prescribed statutory process.

77. The same approach was adopted by the court in Kinuthia v County Government of Kiambu [2025] KEELC 3261 (KLR). The court upheld a Preliminary Objection where the Plaintiff had approached the Environment and Land Court without first exhausting the statutory mechanism under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019. The court held that the plaintiff ought first to exhaust the primary dispute-adjudication mechanism provided under the Act and remitted the dispute to the relevant County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee.

78. The principle is also consistent with the earlier decision in Waithaka & 7 Others v Kimani & 3 Others; Kahawa Sukari Limited (Interested Party) [2023] KEELC 17004 (KLR), where the court recognised the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee as the primary adjudicatory forum for disputes falling within the statutory planning framework.

79. In Republic v County Director Physical Planning Department, Kiambu County & another; Cheche (Ex parte Applicant) [2025] KEELC 8668 (KLR), the court upheld a Preliminary Objection and struck out judicial review proceedings where the applicant had failed to first exhaust the remedies available before the County Physical and Land Use Planning Liaison Committee.

80. In the present case, the substance of the plaintiff's complaint, as disclosed by the amended plaint, concerns the legality and propriety of a proposed development, subdivision, zoning, development permission, approval of building plans and compliance with physical and land use planning requirements.

81. At paragraph 9B of the amended plaint, the plaintiff refers to the recommendation concerning subdivision of L.R. No. 209/8790. At paragraph 16(a)(vi) and (vii), the Plaintiff challenges alleged non-compliance with zoning laws and the applicable zoning standards. The allegations against the 3rd defendant at paragraph 16(b) similarly concern planning and zoning matters, including the alleged approval of a multi-dwelling apartment in an area designated for single-dwelling use.

82. The complaints against the other defendants likewise arise substantially from the same development, planning and zoning decisions.

83. In Malusha v Swaleh & another [2025] KECA 761 (KLR), the Court of Appeal emphasised that disputes arising from the use and development of land and buildings remain subject to the statutory exhaustion mechanism under the Physical and Land Use Planning Act.

84. The plaintiff has relied on Section 9 of the Fair Administrative Action Act and William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others [2020] KEHC 10266 (KLR) to submit that the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute.

85. Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act permits the Court, in exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice, to exempt a person from the requirement to exhaust an alternative remedy.

86. The Supreme Court has similarly recognised that the exhaustion doctrine is context-sensitive and that exceptional circumstances may justify judicial intervention without prior exhaustion. See Magare Benjamin case (supra)

87. In Oak Valley Management Limited v County Executive Committee Member (CECM) Built Environment and Urban Planning, Nairobi City County & 5 Others [2026] KEELC 2266 (KLR), the court recently considered a Preliminary Objection founded on the alleged failure to exhaust remedies under both the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act and the Physical and Land Use Planning Act. The court acknowledged that constitutional claims may, in appropriate circumstances, justify an exemption, particularly where the statutory mechanisms cannot provide an adequate remedy.

88. In Sikalieh (Suing as the Chairman of Karen & Langata District Association (KLDA) v Valley Oak Properties Limited & 5 Others [2026] KEELC 888 (KLR), the court considered allegations relating to development approvals and zoning. The court recognised that exceptional circumstances may justify departure from exhaustion where the statutory forum is genuinely unavailable, or the nature of the dispute is such that the statutory mechanism is inadequate.

89. In this matter the 1st defendant says that the amended plaint concern matters development and planning facilitating under the jurisdiction of time liason committee and not this court. It urges the court to find the suit premature for bypassing the established procedure under PLUPA. Courts have indeed held that a petitioner cannot bypass the established protocol and walk to the court. See Geoffrey Muthinja & Others v Stanley Munge Henrys & Others [2015] EKLR.

90. In Joshika Construction Company Limited & Others Vs Sokhi & Others, Civil Appeal E031 of 2024 [2026] KECA 1017 KLR (29th May 2026) (judgment) the respondent had been faulted for failing to perform statutory obligations and for allowing the 1st respondent to start developing the suit property in breach of Article 42 & 70 of the construction provision of PLUPA , National Act and EMCA.

91. An objection was raised for non-exhaustion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided for by statute, including an appeal to the liaison committee, NEMA Tribunal and/or the complaint committee under EMCA.

92. The preliminary objection was dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the court cited Uganda General Trading Company Limited Vs NT Patel [1965] EA 149, the words of Sir Udo Udoma CI that the objection to the jurisdiction may be due to the tendency to conflate the issue of the form of action and procedure and that it does not necessarily mean that because the action is not maintainable in law, therefore the court before which the case has been brought would have no jurisdiction to try it.

93. The court said that the appellant's suit was based on violation of or threats to a clean and safe environment because the respondent failed to undertake their statutory mandate to ensure that the development being carried out on the suit property adhered to the set standards.

94. The court followed the ratio decidendi in the Abitha Nicholus case, that where there is an alternative remedy, only in exceptional circumstances should the court resort or any other processes known to law, and that for the doctrine of exhaustion to pass master, the test of availability , effectiveness and sufficiency must be met.

95. In this matter, at the time the Preliminary Objection was filed, the court notes that the Plaintiff had not amended their plaint, leading to an amendment of the 1st defendant's defence in which it has admitted various developments that have taken place since 2021 regarding approvals, permits and licences to undertake the project.

96. In Joshika Construction Company Limited & Others Vs Sokhi & Others (Supra), the court observed that the mere fact that it may well hold that the reliefs sought are not maintainable when the suit is determined does not necessarily mean that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

97. An objection to the form and procedure by which the proceedings have been originated, or mere omission to follow a prescribed procedure in instituting proceedings would not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the court.

98. In this suit, the central issue by the Plaintiff is that their right to a clean and healthy environment is threatened by the 1st defendant’s proposed development, which, over and above this, they allege has been allowed, facilitated and approved by the 2nd to 7th defendants contrary to their statutory mandate and obligation to the persons most likely to be adversely affected by the project, including through public participation.

99. The 1st defendant in its amended defence has pleaded to the matters raised in the amended plaint. The mandate of the Liaison Committee is set out under Section 63(3) and (4) of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act.

100. In Benjamin vs the Honourable Attorney General and Others, Petition No. E042 of 2024 (2026) KESC (KLR), the Supreme Court said that the doctrine of exhaustion was not to be applied as a blanket principle in a manner that stiffens or impedes the right of access to justice, as it frustrates the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms.

101. The Liaison Committee has the jurisdiction to hear and determine claims raising breaches of fundamental rights to a clean and healthy environment or breach of natural values and principles of governance.

102. Article 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution grant the plaintiff the right to a clean and healthy environment, which is being, likely or has been threatened with breach; in addition to any other legal remedies that are available in respect of the same matter on such an application, the court may make an order for appropriate directions to prevent, stop or discontinue any action or omission that is harmful to the environment or compel any public officer to take measures to prevent or discontinue such act or omission harmful to the environment.

103. The National Environment Tribunal and the liaison committee have no jurisdiction to hear and determine alleged claims of violation of the right to a clean and healthy environment. They do not have the capacity, efficacy, specifically and mandate to handle such claims or to grant remedies for redress. Section 58 of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act provides that a project proponent, such as the 1st defendant, cannot be relieved of its delay to take steps for the safety of neighbours likely to be affected by the project.

104. The duty to safeguard & eliminate processes or activities likely to endanger the environment under Article 69(1) of the Constitution, sections 3, 5, 9, 71 & 142 of Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act repose with the county government and National Environment Management Authority.

105. The upshot is I find the preliminary objection lacking merit.

It is dismissed with costs.

Orders accordingly.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 14th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

…………………………..

HON. JUSTICE C.K NZILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Kisala for the plaintiff

Mr Tugee for the 1st defendant

Mr Wabwire for the 5th -8th defendants

Court Assistant: Julius

Legal Researcher: Bevalyn Nyakwana

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