Land law

Rwamba v Njeri [2026] KEELC 6574 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Petition E319 of 2026
Judgment date
14 October 2026
Judge(s)
C.K. Nzili

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Case at a glance

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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

The plaintiff, by an application dated 8.7.2026, seeks:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

The respondent has also raised the issue of limitation on the basis that she has been in occupation since 2007. Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act provides that an action to recover land may not be brought after twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

Paragraph 75 →

Reasoning passage

In this matter the respondent herself denies that she was the applicant's tenant. The tribunal's determination that the alleged controlled tenancy had not been established therefore does not, without more, amount to a determination of the ultimate questions of title, boundaries or trespass now before this court. Accordingly, the court finds that it is properly seized of the present dispute.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

MILIMANI LAW COURTS

ELC LC PETITION NUMBER E319 OF 2026

PATRICK WAGUTU RWAMBA…………………...……………..PLAINTIFF

-VERSUS

ROSE NJERI……….. ………..…………………...…..............RESPONDENT

RULING

1. The plaintiff, by an application dated 8.7.2026, seeks:

a) Spent

b) That pending the hearing of this application inter partes, this honourable court be pleased to issue a temporary injunction restraining the Defendant/respondents, whether by herself, servants, employees, agents, assigns or any other person acting under her authority from entering, occupying, constructing upon, extending, trading upon, leasing, licensing, selling, alienating, wasting, interfering with or in any manner whatsoever trespassing upon the frontage of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills.

c) That pending the hearing of this suit inter partes, this honourable court be pleased to issue a temporary injunction restraining the defendant/respondents, whether by herself, servants, employees, agents, assigns or any other person acting under her authority from entering, occupying, constructing upon, extending, trading upon, leasing, licensing, selling, alienating, wasting, interfering with or in any manner whatsoever trespassing upon the frontage of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills.

d) That pending the hearing and determination of this application, this Honourable court be pleased to issue a mandatory injunction compelling the defendant/Respondent to forthwith cease trading upon the Plaintiff/Applicant’s frontage and remove all temporary and semi-permanent structures erected thereon.

e) That the (OCS) Officer Commanding Kahawa West Police Station, or such other officer commanding the nearest Police Station as the Court may direct, do supervise and provide security during the enforcement of the orders of this Honourable court.

f) That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the defendant be compelled by way of mandatory injunction to remove and/or demolish all structures, iron sheet structures, umbrellas, wooden tables, fruit displays and all other structures unlawfully erected upon the Plaintiff/Applicant’s frontage.

g) That in default of compliance with prayer number 6 above within seven(7) days, the Plaintiff/Applicant be at liberty to remove and/ or demolish the said illegal structures at the Defendant/Applicant’s sole cost and expense.

h) That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the defendant/ respondent be restrained from introducing any additional structures, improvements, developments or third parties onto the Plaintiff/Applicant’s property.

i) That pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the defendant/respondent be restrained from obstructing access to the plaintiff/applicant’s premises and interfering with the plaintiff/applicant’s use, occupation and enjoyment of the frontage of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills.

j) That costs be provided for.

2. The application is premised on the grounds set out on its face and the supporting affidavit sworn by Patrick Wagutu Rwamba on 8.7. 2026.

3. The applicant deposes that he is the lawful allottee, beneficial owner and person entitled to exclusive possession and occupation of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills, situated within Nairobi County.

4. The applicant states that he duly accepted the allotment and complied with all the conditions stipulated in the letter of allotment. He further states that from the date of allocation, he has remained the lawful owner and person entitled to exclusive possession of the property. A copy of the letter of allotment is annexed and marked PWR-1.

5. The applicant deposes that, without any lawful justification, the defendant/respondent entered upon the frontage of his property and progressively extended her occupation beyond the portion she initially occupied.

6. He further deposes that the defendant/respondent has erected temporary and/or semi-permanent structures on the frontage of his property and is presently conducting a commercial fruit business thereon.

7. The applicant states that the respondent continues to occupy a substantial portion of his frontage despite having no lawful title or other proprietary interest over the said portion.

8. The applicant further deposes that he has never transferred, leased, licensed or assigned any proprietary interest in the frontage to the defendant/respondent.

9. It is the applicant's case that the respondent's unlawful occupation has substantially impeded access to his premises.

10. The applicant states that his customers and visitors have experienced difficulties accessing the premises and that the structures erected by the defendant/respondent have also diminished the visibility of his commercial premises from the adjoining public road.

11. The applicant further deposes that the respondent's continued occupation has deprived him of the opportunity to utilise and develop the frontage and that he continues to suffer financial loss for each day the Respondent remains in occupation.

12. The applicant states that he has, over a considerable period of time, repeatedly requested the defendant/respondent to vacate the frontage, but despite those requests, she has persistently refused and/or failed to do so. Instead of vacating the premises, the Respondent allegedly continued expanding her business activities. The Applicant states that, as a consequence of the continued encroachment, he previously instituted proceedings against the Respondent before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal in BPRT Case No. E158 of 2026.

13. The applicant deposes that, in the said proceedings, and particularly in the pleadings filed therein, he sought orders restraining the defendant/respondent from maintaining illegal structures on his property.

14. He states that the Tribunal initially issued orders directing the demolition and removal of the illegal structures, pursuant to which the structures were removed.

15. The applicant further states that shortly thereafter, the defendant/respondent unlawfully reconstructed substantially similar structures on the same frontage, thereby prompting him to return to the Tribunal and seek enforcement of its earlier orders.

16. The applicant states that, during the tribunal proceedings, the defendant/respondent denied being his tenant. The tribunal subsequently found that it lacked jurisdiction after determining that no controlled tenancy had been established. According to the Applicant, the tribunal therefore did not determine the questions of ownership, trespass, unlawful occupation or eviction.

17. Consequently, the applicant states that he has approached this Honourable court, which he contends has jurisdiction to determine the dispute concerning ownership, occupation and trespass over the land in question. A copy of the tribunal's ruling is annexed and marked PWR-2.

18. The applicant further deposes that notwithstanding the previous tribunal proceedings, the defendant/respondent continues to occupy his frontage and/or conduct business therefrom, thereby deriving commercial benefit from his land and continuing to interfere with his proprietary rights.

19. The applicant contends that each day the Respondent remains in occupation of his property constitutes a continuing and/or fresh act of trespass. Photographs depicting the premises are annexed and marked PWR-3.

20. The applicant states that unless restrained by this Honourable court, the defendant/respondent will continue interfering with his constitutional and proprietary rights. He further apprehends that she may expand the illegal structures, further obstruct access to his premises and introduce additional developments on his land.

21. The applicant deposes that he is likely to continue suffering loss and prejudice which cannot adequately be compensated by an award of damages, as he is being deprived of the possession, use and enjoyment of his property.

22. The applicant maintains that he has established a strong prima facie case with a high likelihood of success and that he is in possession of documentary evidence supporting his claim.

23. He further deposes that the defendant/respondent has not produced any document conferring upon her ownership or possessory rights over the disputed frontage.

24. The applicant contends that the respondent's payment of business licence fees, county rates or other levies cannot, in law, confer ownership or proprietary rights over his property.

25. It is the applicant's position that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the preservation and protection of his proprietary rights pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

26. The applicant states that should the respondent be restrained and ultimately succeed in the suit, any prejudice suffered by her would be capable of compensation by an award of damages. Conversely, he contends that should the respondent be permitted to continue occupying his property, he will continue to suffer irreparable prejudice.

27. The applicant contends that this is a clear and exceptional case deserving the grant of a mandatory interlocutory injunction, particularly as the defendant/respondent has allegedly persisted in occupying his frontage despite the previous litigation between the parties.

28. He further states that the alleged unlawful occupation is open, apparent and continuing and that unless the offending structures are removed, the purpose and efficacy of the present proceedings may be defeated.

29. The applicant therefore prays that this Honourable court grant the orders sought in the Notice of Motion.

30. The application is opposed by the replying affidavit sworn by Rose Njeri on 24.8.2026.

31. The respondent deposes that the applicant's application is misconceived, an abuse of the process of the court and founded on allegations which have neither been proved nor properly substantiated. She further states that substantially similar allegations were previously raised before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal in BPRT Case No. E158 of 2026.

32. Contrary to the applicant's allegations, the respondent states that she has occupied the disputed premises, which she describes as a road reserve, openly and continuously since 2007, during which period she has conducted business thereon.

33. The respondent states that she acquired occupation of the premises from her predecessor, one Amos Njuguna, and has remained in occupation since that time.

34. She further deposes that she has never been a tenant of the applicant and has never entered into any tenancy agreement with him in respect of the disputed premises.

35. The respondent states that she has never paid rent to the applicant and that the applicant has never been her landlord. Instead, she states that she has been directly remitting rates, business permit fees and other applicable levies to the Nairobi City County Government in respect of her occupation and business activities. A copy of an M-Pesa message evidencing a previous payment to Nairobi City County is annexed and marked RN-1.

36. The respondent contends that the applicant is therefore misleading the court by portraying her as a tenant who has unlawfully remained in occupation of his premises after allegedly failing to pay rent.

37. The respondent acknowledges that the applicant previously instituted proceedings against her before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal in BPRT Case No. E158 of 2026. She states that, in those proceedings, the applicant alleged the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, which she disputed. According to the Respondent, the Tribunal, in its ruling dated 18.6.2026, found that the alleged tenancy relationship had not been established and consequently struck out the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. A copy of the ruling is annexed and marked RN-2.

38. The respondent further contends that the applicant has presented the tribunal proceedings to this court in a manner suggesting that the tribunal merely declined jurisdiction without making any finding regarding the alleged tenancy. She maintains, however, that the applicant's own documents demonstrate that the tribunal found that the alleged landlord-tenant relationship had not been established.

39. The respondent denies having occupied the applicant's property as a tenant and disputes the allegation that she has refused to vacate premises belonging to him. She further denies that the applicant has ever granted her a lease, licence, tenancy or any other proprietary interest over the road reserve in question.

40. The respondent challenges the applicant's reliance on the allotment letter dated 21.9.2001 as proof of ownership of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills. She contends that the allotment letter, by itself, does not establish registered ownership or exclusive entitlement to the particular road reserve upon which she conducts her business. She further states that the applicant has neither established the boundaries of the alleged plot nor demonstrated that the portion occupied by her falls within those boundaries. She also contends that no survey evidence has been produced to establish that the occupied portion forms part of the applicant's property.

41. The respondent further contends that the photographs annexed to the application merely depict the trading area and cannot, without more, establish ownership of the land or the precise location and extent of the alleged property. She states that the applicant has not produced a survey plan, deed plan, Registry Index Map or other documentary evidence demonstrating that the structures complained of are situated on his registered property.

42. The respondent maintains that the issue of limitation raised in her defence is material, given that her occupation is alleged to have constituted trespass since 2007. She contends that the applicant cannot simply characterise the alleged trespass as continuing without first establishing his legal ownership and entitlement to the disputed portion of land. She further argues that, even assuming the applicant had a cause of action as alleged, the same would have long since been extinguished by the passage of time.

43. The respondent denies that her continued occupation has substantially obstructed access to the applicant's property or caused him the alleged financial loss, obstruction or interference. She states that none of these allegations has been supported by sufficient evidence. She further contends that the applicant's apprehension that she may expand the structures, introduce third parties onto the occupied area or otherwise interfere with his alleged proprietary rights is speculative and unsupported by evidence of any such intention.

44. The respondent deposes that she stands to suffer substantial prejudice if the orders sought are granted, as the business conducted on the premises constitutes her source of livelihood.

45. When the matter came up for hearing on 23.7.2026, the Court directed the parties to file their respective written submissions by 30.9. 2026. As at the time of writing the present ruling, the court takes judicial notice that neither party had filed written submissions.

46. Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court downs its tools. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes courts with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.

47. Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 gives this court original and appellate jurisdiction over disputes relating to the environment and land, including disputes concerning title, tenure, boundaries, land use planning, land administration and management and public, private and community land. The court is also expressly empowered to grant interim and permanent preservation orders, including injunctions.

48. The present dispute concerns the alleged occupation and use of a particular portion of land, the applicant's alleged proprietary entitlement thereto, the respondent's alleged trespass and the competing assertion that the land is a road reserve. Those are quintessential land questions. This court therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.

49. Issues have been raised as to whether the previous proceedings before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal deprive this court of jurisdiction. The tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301. Section 12(1)(a) expressly empowers the tribunal to determine whether or not a tenancy is a controlled tenancy. The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is therefore central to its statutory jurisdiction.

50. In this matter the respondent herself denies that she was the applicant's tenant. The tribunal's determination that the alleged controlled tenancy had not been established therefore does not, without more, amount to a determination of the ultimate questions of title, boundaries or trespass now before this court. Accordingly, the court finds that it is properly seized of the present dispute.

51. As to whether the applicant is entitled to a temporary injunction, the statutory foundation for the present application is principally Order 40 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and section 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act.

52. Order 40 Rule 1 empowers the court to issue a temporary injunction where it is shown that the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated or where circumstances exist creating a reasonable probability that execution of a decree may be obstructed or delayed. Order 40 Rule 2 also permits an injunction restraining the commission of a breach of contract or other injury relating to property or a right.

53. The classic principles remain those enunciated in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, namely that an applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success; demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot adequately be compensated by damages; and, if the court is in doubt, the application is determined on a balance of convenience.

54. The Court of Appeal subsequently gave the test greater analytical precision in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, holding that the three conditions are separate and sequential hurdles. A prima facie case is not, by itself, sufficient to justify an injunction.

55. Similarly, in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125, the Court of Appeal described a prima facie case as a case in which, on the material presented, a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed to call for an explanation or rebuttal.

56. The court must, however, be cautious not to conduct a mini-trial. At the interlocutory stage the court should not make final findings upon contested questions of ownership, boundary, validity of title or the ultimate rights of the parties.

57. This principle accords with the wider jurisprudential proposition that interlocutory relief is intended to preserve the subject matter rather than determine the suit before trial. The philosophical justification is captured in Lon L. Fuller's observation in his book, The Morality of Law(1964) that:

“Law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.”

58. John Locke famously observed in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), Chapter V that:

“Every Man has a Property in his own Person.”

59. Ronald Dworkin's influential conception of rights as “political trumps” in his book, Taking Rights Seriously,is also instructive. A right, once legally established, is not simply to be displaced because another person's interest appears more convenient. But before a court treats an asserted right as a trump, the existence and scope of that right must first be demonstrated.

60. The applicant's principal evidence of proprietary entitlement is the letter of allotment dated 21.9.2001. There is an important distinction in law between an allotment letter and a registered title.

61. In Mary Mukami Kariithi v Dentopak Agencies Limited & 2 Others [2021] KEELC 389 (KLR), the court observed that a letter of allotment does not, by itself, constitute title to property. The court cited with approval Stephen Mburu & 4 Others v Comat Merchants Ltd [2012] eKLR, where it was stated that a letter of allotment is not title but a right or offer to take property. The court further referred to Wreck Motors Enterprises v Commissioner of Lands & 3 Others, Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1997, where the court of Appeal explained that title ordinarily comes into existence after the allotment, compliance with its conditions and subsequent issuance of a title document.

62. This position is important because the applicant describes himself as the "lawful owner" but the evidence presently before the court demonstrates, at least at this stage, an allotment letter rather than a registered title.

63. The Land Registration Act draws a statutory distinction between allotment and registration. Section 24 provides that registration of a person as proprietor vests in that person the ownership and rights appurtenant thereto, while section 25 protects the rights of a registered proprietor subject to the statutory qualifications.

64. This, however, is not to say that the absence of a registered title necessarily defeats the applicant's application. An allottee may have enforceable rights depending upon the circumstances in which the allotment was made and the steps subsequently taken. The question at this stage is whether the applicant has established a sufficiently clear proprietary or possessory right capable of protection by injunction.

65. That question is complicated by the respondent's specific challenge to the identity of the boundaries of the land.

66. The applicant refers to the "frontage" of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills. However, no survey plan, Registry Index Map, deed plan, beacon certificate or other technical evidence has been placed before the Court to demonstrate with precision that the area upon which the Respondent's structures stand forms part of Plot No. S41.

67. Photographs are useful evidence of physical occupation. They do not, however, ordinarily establish the legal boundaries of land.

68. This distinction is critical. The question is not merely whether the respondent is trading somewhere adjacent to the applicant's premises. The question is whether the particular portion occupied by her is legally comprised in Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills.

69. The respondent has raised a further serious question by asserting that the disputed portion is a road reserve. A road reserve, if proved, cannot simply be treated as private land merely because a party possesses an allotment letter referring to an adjacent or related parcel. The courts have repeatedly emphasised the special legal status of public road reserves.

70. In Elizabeth Wambui Githinji & 29 Others v Kenya Urban Roads Authority & 4 Others [2019] eKLR, the Court of Appeal considered the question of whether a person could acquire proprietary rights in land constituting a public road or road reserve and emphasised the importance of establishing entitlement to the land before proprietary rights can validly pass.

71. In Mughal v Chief Land Registrar & 2 Others [2022] KEELC 2263 (KLR), the court found that a planned public road reserve was not available for private alienation and emphasised the legal consequences of attempting to alienate land reserved as a public road.

72. The court is therefore confronted with two competing propositions: the applicant says the disputed frontage belongs to his allotted parcel, while the respondent says it is a road reserve upon which she has traded since 2007. These are not peripheral questions. They go to the very foundation of the applicant's alleged right.

73. In my view, the evidence before the court raises a genuine and arguable case but does not, at this interlocutory stage, establish with sufficient clarity that the exact portion occupied by the Respondent forms part of the Applicant's property.

74. The court therefore finds that the Applicant has not established a prima facie case with the degree of clarity required for the sweeping orders sought, particularly the orders which would effectively remove the respondent from the disputed premises.

75. The respondent has also raised the issue of limitation on the basis that she has been in occupation since 2007. Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act provides that an action to recover land may not be brought after twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

76. The court is conscious that the legal consequences of continuous possession, adverse possession and continuing trespass are matters requiring careful examination of the precise nature of the claim, the title relied upon and the circumstances under which possession commenced.

77. The court should therefore not finally determine limitation on the interlocutory stay. Nevertheless, the assertion that the respondent has occupied the disputed portion since 2007 raises a substantial legal question which cannot simply be disregarded.

78. Nineteen years of alleged occupation is not a trivial evidential circumstance. It calls for the applicant to explain when his cause of action accrued, whether he was dispossessed, whether the occupation was adverse, whether the disputed land is in fact his land and whether any statutory circumstances interrupted or postponed the running of time.

79. These are matters more appropriately determined upon full evidence. The applicant contends that his proprietary rights, access to his premises and use and enjoyment of the frontage are being interfered with and that damages would not be an adequate remedy.

80. There is considerable force in the proposition that unauthorised interference with proprietary rights may constitute an injury not readily measurable in monetary terms.

81. Nevertheless, the requirement of irreparable injury cannot be considered in isolation. As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (2014) eKLR, the applicant must first establish the requisite prima facie right and thereafter demonstrate irreparable injury. The court cannot leapfrog the first hurdle merely because the alleged injury concerns land.

82. The applicant has also alleged loss of business visibility, obstruction of access and financial loss. Such loss, insofar as it can be established, may potentially be quantified and compensated by damages.

83. More importantly, the alleged proprietary right itself remains contested. The court therefore finds that the applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated, at this stage, irreparable injury of the kind contemplated by the second limb of Giella v Cassman Brown (Supra).

84. The balance of convenience is considered only where the court is in doubt after considering the first two principles.

85. The respondent asserts that she has traded from the disputed area since 2007 and that the business constitutes her source of livelihood.

86. On the other hand, the applicant claims that the occupation interferes with his use and enjoyment of the frontage. Both parties therefore allege prejudice.

87. In circumstances where the legal status and precise boundaries of the disputed area have not been conclusively established, the court must be particularly cautious about granting an order that would effectively determine possession in favour of one party before trial.

88. The balance of convenience would therefore favour preservation of the subject matter and avoidance of irreversible acts rather than the removal or demolition of structures before the evidence has been fully tested.

89. The applicant seeks an interlocutory mandatory injunction compelling the respondent to cease trading by removal or demolished all structures erected upon the frontage. A mandatory injunction stands on a different footing from an ordinary prohibitory injunction.

90. In Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agroexport & Others [1986] 1 All ER 901, the court stated that a mandatory injunction should not ordinarily issue at the interlocutory stage in the absence of special circumstances and that it should be granted only in clear cases where the court has a high degree of assurance that the injunction will ultimately prove to have been rightly granted.

91. That principle has repeatedly been adopted by the Kenyan courts. In Nation Media Group & 2 Others v John Harun Mwau [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal emphasised that a higher standard applies before an interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted. The principle has similarly been applied by the Environment and Land Court in subsequent decisions.

92. The reason for this elevated threshold is obvious. A mandatory injunction may substantially alter the factual position before trial and may, in practical terms, determine the dispute.

93. In the present matter, the court is being asked to order the respondent to demolish structures and cease business operations on land whose precise legal status remains disputed. The court has not yet determined whether the frontage is legally part of Plot No. S41; the precise boundaries of Plot No. S41; whether the disputed area is a road reserve; whether the applicant's allotment matured into an enforceable proprietary interest over the disputed portion; the legal effect of the respondent's alleged occupation since 2007 or whether the Applicant's claim is affected by limitation or other equitable considerations.

94. It would therefore be inappropriate for the court to order demolition of the respondent's structures at this stage.

95. The court does not have the high degree of assurance required by Locabail case to grant a mandatory interlocutory injunction. The application for mandatory injunction is accordingly declined.

96. The Applicant also seeks an order directing the OCS Kahawa West Police Station to supervise and provide security during enforcement. Police assistance is ordinarily ancillary to the enforcement of a valid court order. It should not be used to determine disputed private rights or to facilitate self-help.

97. The court has considered the parties' competing accounts of BPRT Case No. E158 of 2026. It is common ground that proceedings were instituted before the tribunal and that the respondent denied the existence of a tenancy.

98. Section 12 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act gives the tribunal power to determine whether a tenancy is a controlled tenancy.

99. Once the tribunal concluded that the requisite tenancy relationship had not been established, the jurisdictional foundation for the tenancy proceedings fell away. The Tribunal proceedings do not, on the material presently before this Court, constitute a final adjudication of the Applicant's alleged ownership or the respondent's alleged trespass.

100. The court therefore declines the respondent's suggestion that the present proceedings are necessarily an abuse of process merely because earlier proceedings were filed before the Tribunal.

101. The court is mindful that judicial discretion must be exercised to balance competing rights while ensuring that the eventual judgment is not rendered nugatory, especially on whether or not to grant interim orders of injunction.

102. The present application illustrates that principle. The Applicant asserts a right to exclusive possession. The Respondent on the other hand asserts a competing right to remain in occupation of what she describes as public road reserve. The court cannot conclusively determine that contest upon photographs and a disputed allotment letter.

103. The court has power under Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules and section 13(7) of the Environment and Land Court Act to fashion an appropriate interim order for preservation of the subject matter. Section 13(7) expressly empowers this court to grant interim or permanent preservation orders, including injunctions.

104. The court is therefore not confined to an all-or-nothing approach. In the present circumstances, the justice of the matter requires that neither party should alter the physical character of the disputed frontage pending determination of the suit.

105. The respondent should not be permitted to expand the structures, erect additional structures, introduce new third parties or otherwise increase the extent of her occupation.

106. Equally, the applicant should not resort to self-help by demolishing the Respondent's structures without a lawful order of the Court. The proper course is therefore to preserve the subject matter while allowing the parties an opportunity to prove their respective cases at trial.

107. Since the substantive mandatory injunction sought by the Applicant has not been granted, there is no basis at this stage for issuing a police enforcement order in the terms sought.

108. Having considered the Notice of Motion dated 8th July 2026, the Supporting Affidavit, the Replying Affidavit, the documents exhibited thereto and the applicable law, I find that the Applicant has not satisfied the threshold for the grant of the substantive prohibitory and mandatory interlocutory injunctions sought.

109. For the ends of justice to be met pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the parties shall maintain the status quo obtaining as at the date of this ruling in respect of the disputed frontage of Plot No. S41 Kahawa West Infills.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2026.

…………………………

HON. JUSTICE C.K. NZILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Dr. Kinyanjui for the defendant

Mr. Anyanga for the plaintiff

Court assistant ; Julius

Legal researcher: Bevalyn Nyakwana

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