REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ENVIRONMENT AND LAND PETITION NO. E005 OF 2026
SUPERCLEAN SHINE ENTERPRISE LTD ……….. 1ST PETITIONER
KING PRIME INTERNATIONAL LIMITED ……. 2ND PETITIONER PRIME THE PLACE LIMITED …………………….... 3RD PETITIONER
PRIME AUTO AND GENERAL
ENTERPRISES LIMITED ……….......................... 4TH PETITIONER
VERSUS
KENYA RAILWAYS CORPORATION …….…….. 1ST RESPONDENT NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE …………….…….... 2ND RESPONDENT
MR. PHILIP J. MAINGA EBS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
KENYA RAILWAYS CORPORATION …….…...... 3RD RESPONDENT
OFFICER MAUREEN
CHEPKEMBOI OCPD RAILWAYS ................... 4TH RESPONDENT
DOUGLAS KANJA KIROCHO, CBS, OGW
INSPECTOR GENERAL,
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE ……...............…. 5TH RESPONDENT
RULING
Background
1. Before this court for determination is the 2nd -4th Petitioners’/Applicants’ Notice of Motion application dated 10th July 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Articles 22, 23(3), 40, and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Rule 23 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013; Section 13(5) of the Environment and Land Court Act and Order 45 Rules 1, 2 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules seeking the following:
i. That this Honourable Court be pleased to review and/or vary its orders issued on 9th July, 2026 and consequently restore the Applicants' Applications dated 19th January, 2026 and 10th March, 2026 for determination on merit, and to consequently grant the conservatory orders sought therein and/or such other conservatory orders as this Honourable Court may deem just and expedient for the preservation of the suit property pending the hearing and determination of the Petition.
ii. That in the alternative to prayer (4) above, pending the hearing and determination of the petition herein, this Honourable Court be pleased to grant fresh conservatory orders preserving the suit property and restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves or through their agents, servants, employees, or any person acting under their authority, from undertaking, continuing, or permitting any acts of construction, excavation, development, alteration, interference, alienation, or any other dealings with the suit property, including any interference with the Applicants' machinery, rollers, or equipment thereon.
iii. That this Honourable Court be pleased to direct that, there being no pending proceedings before the Chief Magistrates' Court in Milimani MCELC/E1155/2025, the petition herein and any pending applications and/or consequential proceedings do now proceed to hearing and determination.
iv. That the costs of this Application be in the cause.
2. The Motion is supported by an affidavit of even date sworn by H.E. Gov. Dr. Paul Kimani Wamatangi, a director of the 2nd Petitioner/1st Applicant, who deponed that he is conversant with the facts of the matter and duly authorised to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Applicants. He stated that the Motion principally seeks the review and/or variation of the orders issued by this court on 9th July 2026, the reinstatement or grant of conservatory orders, and such further orders as may be necessary to preserve the subject matter of the Petition.
3. He deponed that on 9th July 2026, the court delivered a ruling dismissing their applications dated 19th January 2026 and 10th March 2026, and consequently vacated the interim conservatory orders which had been issued on 11th March 2026 and extended from time to time. He stated that those conservatory orders had preserved the status quo in respect of the suit property situated off Lang’ata Road at Km. 532/6, measuring approximately 0.5723 hectares and presently referenced as Plot No. 209/1618, pending determination of the applications and the Petition.
4. In determining the applications, he stated, the court had considered the existence of proceedings before the Chief Magistrates’ Court at Milimani in Milimani MCELC/E1155/2025 – Superclean Shine Enterprises Ltd v Kenya Railways & Others. According to him, the factual position placed before this court when the earlier applications were considered was that those proceedings remained pending.
5. He stated, however, that by a ruling delivered on 29th April 2026, Hon. Muthoni Njagi (PM) struck out Milimani MCELC/E1155/2025 upon finding that the Magistrates’ Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter. He deponed that the ruling had neither been reviewed nor set aside and that, as a consequence, the proceedings before the Magistrates’ Court had come to an end together with the interim injunctive orders issued therein on 13th January 2026.
6. Consequently, he stated, there is no longer any pending suit or subsisting preservatory order before the Magistrates’ Court concerning the suit property. He contended that the fact that those proceedings had already been struck out was material because it directly affected the factual basis upon which this court subsequently vacated its conservatory orders on 9th July 2026.
7. According to Dr. Wamatangi, this fact did not form part of the factual matrix placed before the court when it considered and determined the earlier applications. He explained that they had proceeded on the bona fide understanding that the present Petition raised issues separate and distinct from those before the Magistrates’ Court, a question upon which the court subsequently pronounced itself in its ruling of 9th July 2026. Notwithstanding that determination, he maintained that the striking out of the Magistrates’ Court proceedings means that there are presently no subsisting orders preserving the suit property following the vacation of the conservatory orders issued by this court.
8. He urged that unless the court intervenes and restores appropriate conservatory protection, the Respondents will undertake acts capable of materially altering the suit property or changing its character before the Petition is heard and determined. Such actions, he contended, will prejudice them, compromise the substratum of the Petition and potentially render its eventual determination nugatory.
9. The 2nd Petitioner’s director further maintained that reinstating the previous conservatory orders or granting fresh conservatory relief will merely preserve the status quo that existed immediately before the ruling of 9th July 2026 and will occasion no prejudice to the Respondents.
10. Lastly, he deponed that, following the striking out of Milimani MCELC/E1155/2025, there is no longer any impediment arising from those proceedings to the hearing and determination of the present Petition and any related applications and that they are ready and willing to proceed expeditiously with the determination of the Petition and urged the court to grant the orders sought so as to preserve its subject matter pending determination of the dispute.
11. The 1st and 3rd Respondents opposed the application through a replying affidavit sworn on 17th July 2026 by Stanley Gitari, the Acting Corporation Secretary of the 1st Respondent. He contended that the application is misconceived, lacks merit and did not satisfy the legal threshold for review.
12. He stated that although the Applicants seek review on the basis of alleged new evidence, the material relied upon was already in existence and within their knowledge before the court delivered its ruling on 9th July 2026. In particular, following the ruling of the Magistrates’ Court on 28th April 2026, the parties appeared before this court on 14th May, 23rd June and 25th June 2026, yet the Applicants did not bring that development to the court's attention.
13. He asserted that review cannot be invoked to afford the Applicants a second opportunity to introduce evidence which was available but not presented before the impugned decision was rendered, as doing so would undermine the principle of finality in litigation.
14. Mr. Gitari further opposed the reinstatement of the interim conservatory orders, stating that the Applicants had already been evicted from the suit property and that the 1st Respondent had since engaged a contractor to construct a railway station thereon as part of the new railway line linking Talanta Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium.
15. He further deponed that construction of the railway station was a condition connected to Kenya's hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), intended to facilitate efficient movement between Talanta Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium. According to him, the station was required to be completed by January 2027, and any interruption of the works would prejudice implementation of the project and adversely affect the public interest.
16. Turning to the Applicants' asserted interest in the suit property, Mr. Gitari denied that they had ever been tenants of the 1st Respondent. He challenged the purported lease allegedly entered into between Peter Musyoka, on behalf of the Kenya Railways Corporation, and King Prime International Limited, contending that the Corporation is a body corporate which contracts in its own name and that an individual cannot contract in his own name on its behalf.
17. He further stated that the purported agreement did not bear the 1st Respondent’s corporate seal and was not in its standard contractual form; that it was witnessed only by a conveyancing clerk and was allegedly drawn by M.N. Njuya Advocates, yet the 1st Respondent ordinarily prepares its own leases and that it had no record of the alleged agreement.
18. The Corporation Secretary also asserted that the 1st Respondent does not grant 99-year leases, which he characterised as being equivalent to a disposition of its property. He relied on Section 14(4) of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, maintaining that disposal of the Corporation's land is subject to mandatory statutory requirements, including approval by the Board and the parent Ministry. In his view, none of those requirements had been demonstrated in relation to the purported lease relied upon by the Applicants.
19. Further, he stated that the land allegedly leased to the Applicants lies within ten metres of the railway line and, therefore, falls within the railway reserve or safety corridor, which extends approximately thirty metres on either side of the track. He explained that the reserve serves railway safety, operations and maintenance, future expansion, and the protection of railway users and neighbouring establishments.
20. He contended that the purported agreement unlawfully leased part of the railway buffer zone and, in any event, failed to identify the premises with sufficient precision, describing them merely as approximately 0.5723 hectares of land situated off Lang’ata Road at Km. 532/6. He also relied on Section 66 of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, which prohibits unauthorised interference with railway property where such interference endangers railway safety.
21. He stated that the Petition and the application offend Order 4 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which require immovable property forming the subject matter of proceedings to be described with sufficient particularity to enable its identification. According to him, the description contained in the purported lease is vague and incapable of identifying the alleged property on the ground.
22. Lastly, Mr. Gitari reiterated that a railway station is already under construction on the property to serve the Madaraka area and facilitate access to Nyayo Stadium. He maintained that efficient transportation to and from the stadia is an important requirement for hosting AFCON and that the proposed station will assist in reducing road congestion and demand for parking. On those grounds, he contended that the application for review and reinstatement of the conservatory orders is without merit and urged the court to dismiss it with costs.
23. Vide a Further Affidavit dated 27th July 2026, the 2nd Petitioner’s director deponed that the 1st and 3rd Respondents had not accurately presented the procedural history preceding the court’s ruling of 9th July 2026. He stated that the Petition was instituted on 20th January 2026, together with an application dated 19th January 2026 seeking conservatory orders to preserve the suit property and that directions were subsequently issued on 26th February 2026 for the filing of responses and submissions.
24. Before the next scheduled court date, however, further developments threatening the suit property prompted the Applicants to file another application dated 10th March 2026, pursuant to which the court issued conservatory orders on 11th March 2026, preserving the property pending determination of the applications and the petition.
25. He further deponed that by 23rd March 2026, the Applicants had filed their submissions and a further affidavit, following which the court directed that the said applications be heard together and reserved its ruling for 30th April 2026. Thereafter, the proceedings before the court principally concerned the Applicants’ contempt application and the consequential directions arising therefrom. The ruling on the two applications was subsequently rescheduled to 25th June 2026, and, following further changes in the court’s schedule, was ultimately delivered on 9th July 2026.
26. According to him, by the time the Magistrates’ Court delivered its ruling on 29th April 2026 striking out Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 for want of jurisdiction, the two applications before this court had already been fully canvassed and were merely awaiting delivery of the reserved ruling. He therefore disputed the suggestion that the Applicants had deliberately withheld the Magistrates’ Court decision from this court. He reiterated that the Applicants had throughout proceeded on the bona fide understanding that the Magistrates’ Court proceedings and the present Petition were separate proceedings raising distinct issues and seeking different reliefs.
27. He maintained that the material consideration which led the court to depart from its earlier position and vacate the conservatory orders was its understanding that Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 remained pending and presented an impediment to the continued prosecution of the present proceedings. He therefore contended that it was material that, by the time the ruling of 9th July 2026 was delivered, the Magistrates’ Court proceedings had already been struck out and no preservatory orders could subsist therefrom.
28. Turning to the 1st and 3rd Respondents’ challenge to the Applicants’ interest in the suit property, he maintained that those allegations are collateral to the issue presently before the court, namely whether the substratum of the Petition ought to be preserved pending its determination.
29. He nevertheless reiterated that the 2nd Applicant had entered into a lease with the 1st Respondent on or about 2nd May 2001, pursuant to which the Applicants took possession of the suit property and remained in occupation for more than twenty-five years, during which period the 1st Respondent continuously demanded and accepted rent. He contended that allegations that the lease is invalid, fraudulent, irregular or otherwise unenforceable raises substantive questions requiring determination at the hearing of the Petition and ought not to be conclusively determined at the interlocutory stage.
30. He further disputed the assertion that the Applicants had simply been evicted from the property. According to him, the Petition also concerns the alleged unlawful demolition of the Applicants’ developments and interference with their proprietary interests. He stated that heavy machinery, rollers and other equipment belonging to the Applicants and their affiliates remained on the property and were exposed to the risk of interference, vandalism and further damage.
31. As regards the railway station project relied upon by the Respondents, he pointed out that the contract annexed as “SG-1” was executed on 14th April 2026, at a time when the conservatory orders issued on 11th March 2026 remained in force and while the Applicants’ contempt application arising from the alleged disobedience of those orders was pending.
32. In his view, the execution of the contract in those circumstances demonstrated an intention by the Respondents to proceed with works affecting the suit property notwithstanding the pending proceedings and reinforced the Applicants’ apprehension that the property could be materially altered before their rights were finally determined.
33. He consequently maintained that the Respondents’ own averments and annexures demonstrated a continuing need to preserve the suit property. He urged the court to reinstate the conservatory orders previously issued or, alternatively, grant fresh conservatory orders to maintain the status quo, protect the Applicants’ remaining machinery and equipment and preserve the substratum of the Petition pending its hearing and determination.
Submissions
34. The Petitioners/Applicants counsel filed submissions dated 31st August 2026. Counsel submitted that the court’s jurisdiction to review its orders is founded on Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and that the present application principally falls under the ground of “any other sufficient reason.”
35. It was submitted that as expressed by the Court of Appeal in Swai vs Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] KECA 883 (KLR), the ground of “any other sufficient reason” under Order 45 Rule 1 is not confined to circumstances strictly analogous to the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or to an error apparent on the face of the record.
36. Counsel emphasized that the Applicants are not inviting the court to sit on appeal over its earlier decision or to reconsider its interpretation or application of the doctrine of sub judice. Rather, the factual premise upon which the doctrine had been applied had ceased to exist before the impugned ruling was delivered.
37. In that regard, counsel relied on County Government of Kwale vs Nyakongo t/a HR Ganijee & Sons & another [2023] KECA 1066 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal recognised that a material omission affecting the factual or evidential foundation upon which an order was made may constitute sufficient reason to warrant review. Counsel further submitted that the application had been brought without unreasonable delay, having been filed on 10th July 2026, a day after delivery of the impugned ruling.
38. In the alternative, counsel urged the court to grant fresh conservatory orders preserving the suit property and the Applicants’ machinery and equipment pending determination of the Petition. Relying on Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KESC 30 (KLR) and Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7 Others vs Attorney General [2011] KEHC 4297 (KLR), it was submitted that the Applicants had demonstrated an arguable constitutional and proprietary dispute and a real risk that the subject matter would be materially altered unless preserved.
39. Counsel pointed to the previous demolition, construction activity recorded in the site visit report, the court’s contempt findings, the subsequent contract for construction of a railway station and the continued presence of the Applicants’ heavy machinery and equipment on the property as evidence that the apprehended prejudice was not speculative.
40. It was further argued that the Petition is not confined to compensation for past loss, but also seeks prospective relief, including a permanent injunction against further interference with Plot No. 209/1618. Counsel maintained that preservation is therefore necessary to ensure that the court retains the practical ability to grant effective final relief and the Petition is not rendered nugatory by further construction, excavation or alteration of the property.
41. Lastly, counsel submitted that, since Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 had been struck out and had not been reinstated, reviewed or otherwise revived, there was no longer any procedural basis for the Petition to remain stayed. He urged the court to grant the reliefs sought.
42. The 1st and 3rd Respondents filed submissions dated 6th August 2026. Counsel submitted that the Applicants had failed to satisfy the threshold for review. It was argued that although the Applicants characterised the decision of the Magistrates’ Court as new evidence, that decision was delivered on 28th April 2026, and was therefore in existence and within their knowledge well before this court delivered its ruling on 9th July 2026.
43. Reliance was placed on Kithoi vs Kioko (1982) KLR 177 for the proposition that an applicant for review on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence must demonstrate that the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not, despite due diligence, have been produced when the impugned order was made, which was not the case herein.
44. On whether the Applicants had established a prima facie case, counsel submitted that the Petition principally seeks declaratory and compensatory reliefs and did not contain any prayer for restoration of possession of the suit property. It was contended that the Applicants had been evicted from the property on 17th December 2025 and that the conservatory relief now sought has no nexus with the substantive reliefs in the Petition.
45. Counsel further challenged the Applicants’ asserted proprietary interest in the suit property. It was submitted that the purported lease between Peter Musyoka, allegedly acting on behalf of Kenya Railways Corporation, and King Prime International Limited cannot constitute a valid disposition by the 1st Respondent, which, as a body corporate, contracts in its own name.
46. Counsel pointed out that the agreement bore no corporate seal and was witnessed only by a conveyancing clerk. It was further submitted that the 1st Respondent does not grant 99-year leases and that any disposition of its land was subject to Section 14(4) of the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, including the requisite approval of its Board and the parent Ministry.
47. It was further submitted that the purported lease was a forgery, did not conform to the standard form used by the 1st Respondent and was allegedly entered into by a person unknown to it. Counsel maintained that although the lease was purportedly drawn by M.N. Njuya Advocates, the 1st Respondent ordinarily prepared its own leases and had no record of the impugned lease.
48. On the prayer for reinstatement of the interim orders, counsel submitted that the Applicants have already been evicted from the suit property and that the 1st Respondent had since engaged a contractor to construct a railway station thereon. The station was said to form part of the railway infrastructure intended to serve Talanta Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium in connection with Kenya’s hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations, with completion scheduled for January 2027.
49. It was submitted that any interruption or delay to the project will occasion losses estimated at Kshs. 5 million per day and substantially prejudice the public interest. On that basis, counsel urged the court to decline the reinstatement of the interim orders and to dismiss the application with costs.
Analysis and determination
50. Having considered the pleadings and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the Applicants have met the threshold for the grant of review sought? And if so,
ii. Whether the Applicants are entitled to the conservatory orders sought?
51. The law governing the framework of review is set out in Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45, Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Section 80 of the Act provides as follows:
“80. Any person who considers himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Act, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Act,
May apply for a review of judgment to the court, which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”
52. Whereas Order 45 Rule 1(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, provides as follows:
“Rule 1 (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved
(a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby allowed, and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order, may apply for review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order without unreasonable delay.”
53. Discussing this, the Court of Appeal in Benjoh Amalgamated Limited & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2014] eKLR observed that:
“In the High court, both the Civil Procedure Act in section 80 and the Civil Procedure Rules in Order 45 rule 1 confer on the court power to review. Rule 1 of Order 45 shows the circumstances in which such review would be considered range from discovery of new and important matter or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason but section 80 gives the High Court greater amplitude for review.”
54. Vide the Motions dated 19th January 2026, and 10th March 2026, the Applicants sought, inter alia, for conservatory orders preserving Plot No. 209/1618 and restraining the Respondents from interfering with their possession and use of the property, undertaking construction or other development thereon, dealing with the property, or interfering with the Applicants’ machinery and equipment pending determination of the Petition.
55. It was their case that they occupied the suit property pursuant to a subsisting lease granted by the 1st Respondent and that, notwithstanding that interest, the Respondents had unlawfully demolished their developments, interfered with their possession and subsequently commenced construction activities on the property, thereby threatening to alter the substratum of the Petition.
56. The Respondents maintained that the purported lease was invalid and that, in any event, the Petition and the Motions were incompetent and liable to be struck out for offending the doctrine of sub judice.
57. Upon considering the applications, the court found that the dispute substantially overlapped with Milimani CM ELC No. E1155 of 2025, pending before the Magistrates’ Court. It therefore held that the concurrent determination of the two matters created a risk of conflicting decisions concerning the same property and the underlying dispute.
58. The court consequently struck out the Motions, vacated the interim conservatory orders and stayed the Petition, save for the pending contempt proceedings, pending determination or withdrawal of the Magistrates’ Court suit.
59. It is that decision which the Applicants now seek to review, principally on the basis that, unbeknownst to this court when it rendered its ruling on 9th July 2026, Milimani CM ELC No. E1155 of 2025 had already been struck out for want of jurisdiction on 29th April 2026, with the result that the factual premise upon which the finding of sub judice and the consequential orders rested no longer obtained.
60. In opposition, the 1st and 3rd Respondents contend that the plea for review is unmerited asserting that the decision of the Magistrates’ Court does not constitute new evidence within the meaning of Order 45 Rule 1, since it was delivered before this court's ruling and was therefore available to the Applicants, who had several subsequent opportunities to bring it to the court's attention but failed to do so.
61. They further oppose restoration of the conservatory orders on the basis that the Applicants have already been evicted, a railway station is presently under construction on the property, and reinstatement of the orders would disrupt an ongoing public infrastructure project and occasion substantial financial and public prejudice.
62. Having keenly considered the Motion and submissions, it is clear that the 22nd Applicant’s plea for review is based on the ground of “any other sufficient reason”. The scope of the ground “for any other sufficient reason” has been subject to different interpretations by the courts. There are two schools of thought, first being that the “sufficient reason” alluded to must be analogous to the grounds pertaining to discovery of new evidence or error on the face of the record and second, that the “sufficient reason” need not be analogous to the previous grounds.
63. The position that the sufficient reason ought to be analogous to the grounds of discovery of new and important evidence or error apparent on the face of the record was embraced by the Court of Appeal in the case of Assets Recovery Agency vs Charity Wangui Gethi & 3 others [2020] eKLR which stated that:
“The ground “other sufficient reason” has been held to be consonant with the first two grounds: See Kuria v Shah [1990] KLR 316.”
64. Taking a contrary position, the Court of Appeal in Pancras T. Swai vs Kenya Breweries Limited [2014] eKLR stated that:
“As repeatedly pointed out in various decisions of this Court, the words, “for any sufficient reason” must be viewed in the context firstly of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21, which confers an unfettered right to apply for review and secondly on the current jurisprudential thinking that the words need not be analogous with the other grounds specified in the order. In Sarder Mohamed v Charan Singh Nand Singh and Another [1959] EA 793, the High Court correctly held that Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act conferred an unfettered discretion in the Court to make such order as it thinks fit on review and that the omission of any qualifying words in the Section was deliberate. In Shanzu Investments Limited v. Commissioner for Lands (Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1993) this Court with respect, correctly invoked and applied its earlier decision in Wangechi Kimata & Another v Charan Singh (C.A. No. 80 of 1985) (unreported) wherein this Court held that“any other sufficient reason need not be analogous with the other grounds set out in the rule because such restriction would be a clog on the unfettered right given to the Court by Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act; and that the other grounds set out in the rule did not in themselves form a genus or class of things which the third general head could be said to be analogous.”
65. A similar position was taken by the Court of Appeal in Khauka (Administrator of the Estate of Luka Masakha) vs Wepukhulu (Civil Appeal 134 of 2019) [2025] KECA 707 (KLR) (25 April 2025) (Judgment) which held that:
“On the other hand, the phrase “any other sufficient reason” has been subject to judicial interpretation to determine its scope and application. The key case is Wangechi Kimita & Another v. Mutahi Wakabiru [1980-88] 1 KAR 977 where this Court held that the phrase should be interpreted broadly and is not confined to grounds analogous to discovery of new evidence or error apparent on the record. This means that courts have the discretion to grant a review for reasons other than those explicitly listed, provided they are sufficient to warrant such a review. As per Nyarangi, JA:“I see no reason why any other sufficient reason need be analogous with the other grounds in the order because clearly section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act confers an unfettered right to apply for a review and so the words “for any other sufficient reason” need not be analogous with the other grounds specified in the order: see Sadar Mohamed v Charan Singh (1959) EA 793 .”
Even while our jurisprudence is that the phrase “any other sufficient reason” is given a flexible interpretation, the review jurisdiction of the court cannot be used to reverse a reasoned decision of the court or to re-appraise evidence or to attack the process of reasoning by a court. These types of grievances must be processed through an appeal. A decision that a party feels is erroneous cannot be corrected in the guise of the power of review.”
66. Considering the foregoing, the court takes the view that the ground of “any other sufficient reason” need not be confined to circumstances analogous to the discovery of new and important matter or an error apparent on the face of the record. The question, therefore, is whether the circumstances relied upon by the Applicants disclose sufficient reason to warrant review of the orders made on 9th July 2026.
67. The material facts are not in serious dispute. The applications dated 19th January 2026, and 10th March 2026, were heard and fully canvassed before this court, after which a ruling was reserved. At the time, Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 was pending before the Chief Magistrates’ Court. Before this court delivered its ruling, however, the Magistrates’ Court, on 29th April 2026, struck out that suit for want of jurisdiction. By the time this court eventually delivered its ruling on 9th July 2026, therefore, the proceedings before the Magistrates’ Court had ceased to exist.
68. In its ruling of 9th July 2026, this court considered the existence of Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 and found that the continued pendency of those proceedings implicated the doctrine of sub judice. It was on that basis, among others, that the court declined to entertain the applications and vacated the interlocutory orders that had been issued.
69. As aforesaid, the Applicants principally invoke the ground of “any other sufficient reason.” Their case is that the factual basis upon which this court applied the doctrine of sub judice had ceased to exist before the ruling of 9th July 2026, since Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 had already been struck out for want of jurisdiction on 29th April 2026. The order to this effect has been adduced.
70. The court accepts that the striking out of the Magistrates’ Court suit was a material development. The critical question is whether a party who was aware of that development before delivery of the impugned ruling, but failed to place it before the court may subsequently rely upon the same fact to reopen the decision.
71. On the material before the court, the answer must be in the negative. The ruling of the Magistrates’ Court was delivered on 29th April 2026, more than two months before this court delivered its ruling on 9th July 2026. The Applicants were aware of that ruling. Further, the record shows that there were subsequent appearances before this court before delivery of the ruling. The Applicants therefore had both the knowledge of the changed circumstances and opportunities to bring them to the attention of the court.
72. The Applicants explain that, by the time the Magistrates’ Court struck out the suit, the applications before this court had already been fully canvassed and were awaiting delivery of the reserved ruling. Further, they state that they proceeded on the understanding that the Magistrates’ Court proceedings and the present Petition were separate proceedings raising distinct issues.
73. In the court’s opinion, the fact that the applications had already been canvassed and a ruling reserved did not preclude the Applicants from notifying the court of a material intervening development. This could have been done during any of the subsequent appearances before the court or through an appropriate application seeking leave to place the changed circumstances on record.
74. More significantly, the Applicants’ own deponent stated that the omission arose from their understanding that the two proceedings were distinct. That admission materially weakens their position, as it demonstrates that the non-disclosure was a deliberate litigation choice rather than the result of circumstances beyond their control. Indeed, this position is reinforced by the fact that the current Petition and the impugned Notice of Motion were filed by the Petitioners during the pendency of the matter in the lower court, a fact they were aware of.
75. A party cannot make a tactical decision to file two parallel proceedings, fail to inform the court of any material change in respect of the earlier suit, await the court’s determination, and, upon finding the outcome unfavourable, return on review relying upon the very information it had elected not to place before the court. To permit that course would convert the review jurisdiction into an opportunity for a second bite at the cherry and undermine the principle of finality in litigation. The breadth accorded to the expression “any other sufficient reason” does not alter that conclusion.
76. The Applicants’ reliance on County Government of Kwale vs Nyakongo t/a HR Ganijee & Sons & another [2023] KECA 1066 (KLR) does not assist them. In this case, the trial court had failed to take into account an issue properly before it and on that basis found the review merited. This position was upheld by the Appellate Court.
77. Accordingly, the court finds that “any other sufficient reason” has not been demonstrated to warrant review of the orders made on 9th July 2026. The application for review therefore fails.
78. The Applicants have made an alternative and distinct plea for fresh conservatory relief. The first question is whether the court can entertain that plea, considering that conservatory orders had previously been sought in the applications dated 19th January 2026 and 10th March 2026, and that the court has now declined to review its ruling of 9th July 2026.
79. In the court's view, there is no bar to consideration of the prayer. The earlier applications for conservatory relief were not determined on their substantive merits. The court declined to entertain them upon finding that the pendency of Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025 implicated the doctrine of sub judice, and it was on that basis that the interlocutory orders were vacated.
80. Equally, the dismissal of the present prayer for review does not alter that position. That determination concerns the availability of the remedy of review. It is not a determination of the merits of the Applicants' claim to conservatory protection.
81. The Applicants have further sought an order directing that, there being no pending proceedings in Milimani MCELC No. E1155 of 2025, the Petition and any pending applications or consequential proceedings should proceed to hearing and determination. That prayer follows from the present procedural position.
82. The Magistrates’ Court suit, whose pendency formed the basis upon which this court invoked sub judice, has since been struck out and is no longer pending. There is presently no parallel proceeding upon which the sub judice bar previously identified can continue to operate. The court will accordingly consider the prayer for fresh conservatory relief pending that determination.
83. Moving now to the merits, in Judicial Service Commission vs Speaker of the National Assembly & Another [2013] eKLR, the court described conservatory orders thus:
“Conservatory orders in my view are not ordinary civil law remedies but are remedies provided for under the Constitution, the Supreme law of the land. They are not remedies between one individual as against another but are meant to keep the subject matter of the dispute in situ. Therefore, such remedies are remedies in rem as opposed to remedies in personam. In other words, they are remedies in respect of a particular state of affairs as opposed to injunctive orders which may only attach to a particular person.”
84. The conditions for consideration by the court in granting conservatory orders were persuasively set out in Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School vs City County Director of Education and 2 Others (2015) eKLR as follows:
“a) First, an Applicant must demonstrate an arguable prima facie case with a likelihood of success, and to show that in the absence of the conservatory orders, he/she is likely to suffer prejudice.
b) The second principle is whether the grant or denial of the conservatory relief will enhance the constitutional values and objects of a specific right or freedom in the Bill of Rights.
c) Thirdly, the Court should consider whether, if an interim conservatory order is not granted, the Petition or its substratum will be rendered nugatory.
d) The final principle for consideration is whether the public interest will be served or prejudiced by the decision to exercise discretion to grant or deny a conservatory order.”
85. The court is also alive to the fact that in determining whether or not to grant conservatory orders, it must be careful not to make a final determination so as not to prejudice the main Petition. [See Muslim for Human Rights (Milimani) & 2 Others vs Attorney General & 2 Others (2011) eKLR.
86. The starting point is to determine whether the Applicants have established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success. The parameters of what constitutes a prima facie case were aptly expressed in the case of Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School vs City County Director of Education & 2 others (supra) thus:
“It is in my view not enough to merely establish a prima facie case and show that it is potentially arguable. Potential arguability is not enough to justify a conservatory order but rather there must also be evident a likelihood of success. The prima facie case ought to be beyond a speculative basis…”
87. Further still, the court in Amir Lodges Ltd & another vs Mohammed Omar Shariff & another [2022] KEHC 26896 (KLR quoted the case of In Re Bivac International SA (Bureau Veritas) (2005) 2 EA 43 where the court, while expounding on what a prima facie case or arguable case was, stated that such a decision is not arrived at by tossing a coin or waving a magic hand or raising a green flag, but instead a court must undertake an intellectual exercise and consider without making any findings, the scope of the remedy sought, the grounds and the possible principles of law involved.
88. It is the 2nd Applicant’s case that it entered into a lease agreement with the 1st Respondent in respect of the suit property and maintain that, pursuant thereto, it took possession of the property and remained in occupation for over twenty-five years. it further contends that during that entire period, rent was throughout demanded and accepted by the 1st Respondent.
89. The 1st and 3rd Respondents, on the other hand, deny that the Applicants were lawful tenants and challenge the validity and authenticity of the lease on several grounds, including the manner of its execution, the absence of the Corporation’s seal and records, the term of the lease and the contention that the property falls within a railway reserve.
90. At this stage, the court is not called upon to determine whether that lease is valid, fraudulent, irregular or otherwise unenforceable. Those are substantive questions which go to the heart of the Petition and can only properly be determined upon consideration of the parties’ evidence at the hearing.
91. What is material for present purposes is that there is evidence of an agreement upon which the 2nd Applicant predicates its interest in the property and evidence that they were in occupation of the property before the events giving rise to these proceedings.
92. Indeed, although the Respondents deny the legitimacy of the 2nd Applicant’s tenancy, their own evidence is that the Petitioners were evicted from the suit property. That assertion necessarily acknowledges, at the very least, the Petitioners’ prior physical occupation of the suit property. The court finds that a prima facie case has been established.
93. The next consideration is whether the Applicants are likely to suffer prejudice if conservatory relief is withheld. The Applicants contend that the prejudice is no longer merely apprehended. They point to the demolition already undertaken on the property and maintain that machinery, rollers and other equipment belonging to them and their affiliates remain thereon and are susceptible to interference, vandalism or further damage.
94. The court notes that crucially, the Respondents do not deny an intention to undertake further works on the suit property. Their evidence is that the 1st Respondent has engaged a contractor to construct a railway station thereon. The Applicants' apprehension of further interference cannot, in those circumstances, be described as speculative. The court is therefore satisfied that the Applicants have demonstrated a real risk of prejudice in the absence of appropriate preservatory relief.
95. Closely related to prejudice is whether failure to preserve the subject matter would render the Petition or the reliefs sought nugatory. The Petition is not confined to compensation for completed acts, but also challenges the alleged interference with the Applicants’ proprietary interests and seeks prospective relief against further interference with the suit property.
96. Given the Respondents admitted intention to undertake construction, there is a real likelihood that the property may be materially transformed before the dispute is determined, thereby compromising the efficacy of some of the reliefs sought.
97. Preservation at this stage neither validates the Applicants’ lease nor determines the lawfulness of the Respondents’ actions. It merely ensures that the subject matter is not irreversibly altered before those questions are determined, thereby preserving the court’s ability to grant effective relief and advancing the rule of law and orderly administration of justice.
98. The final consideration is public interest. This assumes particular importance in the present matter. The 1st and 3rd Respondents contend that construction of the railway station forms part of a public infrastructure project intended to facilitate transportation between Talanta Stadium and Nyayo National Stadium, including preparations associated with Kenya's hosting of AFCON. They state that the station is required to be completed by January 2027 and contend that interruption of the works would prejudice implementation of the project and the wider public interest.
99. Those considerations are substantial and cannot be disregarded. Public infrastructure, efficient transportation and the timely implementation of projects undertaken for public purposes are legitimate public-interest considerations. Public interest, however, is not confined to the completion of the proposed project. It equally encompasses adherence to the law, respect for pending judicial proceedings and ensuring that public bodies do not, through the completion of works during the pendency of litigation, place disputed matters beyond the practical reach of the court. The fact that a project serves a public purpose does not, by itself, determine the competing proprietary and constitutional questions raised in the petition.
100. In the end, the court finds the Notice of Motion dated 10th July 2026 to be partly merited and directs as follows:
a) Pending the hearing and determination of the Petition, a conservatory order does hereby issue restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves or through their agents, servants, employees, or any person acting under their authority, from undertaking, continuing, or permitting any further acts of construction, excavation, development, alteration, interference, alienation, or any other dealings with the suit property, lot No. 209/1618, including any interference with the Petitioners’ machinery, rollers, or equipment thereon.
b) Save for the removal of their machinery, rollers or equipment, if they so wish, the conservatory order in (i) above should not be interpreted to mean that the Petitioners have been allowed to re-enter the suit property until the Petition is heard and determined.
c) The Costs of the application to be paid by the 1st Respondent.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 15th day of October, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Mr. Amimo and Mr. Ligunya for the 2nd – 4th Petitioners
Mr. Obuya for 1st and 3rd Respondents
Mr. Odongo for 2nd, 4th and 5th Respondents
Court Assistant: Tracy