Land law

Njuwe v Attic Bar & Restaurant Ltd [2026] KEELC 6557 (KLR)

Included with active membership. View daily and monthly plans · Sign in

Court
Environment and Land Court
Case number
Environment and Land Appeal E156 of 2026
Judgment date
15 October 2026
Judge(s)
O. A. Angote

Case research

Open case research →
READ THE DECISION FASTER

Case at a glance

Read the full text ↓

Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.

Background

Before this court for determination is the Appellant’s Notice of Motion dated 16th July, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 15 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act and Order 42 Rule 6, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, seeking the following reliefs:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Although the Applicant describes the arrears as undisputed, the Tribunal directed the parties, if necessary, to reconcile their accounts by considering all admitted payments, deposits, change-of-user charges, public charges and agreed offsets. Whether rent remains outstanding, the amount due and the availability of any offsets are therefore matters requiring reconciliation and form part of the controversy in the appeal. Compelling…

Paragraph 27 →

Decision / orders

In the end, the Notice of Motion dated 16th July, 2026 is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Paragraph 29 →

Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA

MILIMANI ELC LCA/E156 OF 2026

MARGARET MUTHONI NJUWE .............................. APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE ATTIC BAR & RESTAURANT LIMITED .........RESPONDENT

(Being an Appeal from the Judgment and Decree by Hon. Gakuhi Chege and Joyce Akinyi Osodo issued and delivered on 18th June, 2026 at the Business Premises Rent Tribunal at Nairobi in BPRT E482 of 2025).

BETWEEN

MARGARET MUTHONI NJUWE ........ APPELLANT/ APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE ATTIC BAR & RESTAURANT LIMITED .......... RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination is the Appellant’s Notice of Motion dated 16th July, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 15 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act and Order 42 Rule 6, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, seeking the following reliefs:

i. Pending hearing and determination of this Application and the Appeal, an order of stay of execution of the Judgment and all consequential Orders issued of the Judgment delivered on 3rd July, 2026 in BPRT Case No. E482 of 2025.

ii. Pending hearing and determination of this Application and the Appeal, the Respondent be ordered to continue paying rent as it falls due without prejudice to the rights and respective positions of the parties in the Appeal.

iii. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 above, the Respondent be ordered to pay the outstanding rent for the first two (2) quarters of this year that fell due in June 2026, being rent that accrued at the pendency of the suit in BPRT E482 of 2025 and same is not disputed.

iv. Further, if this Honourable Court deems it appropriate, the Respondent be ordered to deposit the outstanding rent for the said two (2) quarters into the Appellant's account as it is rightfully owed to the Landlord under the Tenancy Agreement within fourteen (14) days, pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal.

v. Consequence to prayers 4 and 5 being granted and if defaulted by the Respondent, the Appellant be at liberty to apply for such further or consequential orders as this Honourable Court may deem just, including orders relating to enforcement of the Lease Agreement and/or vacant possession.

vi. Pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal, the Respondent, whether by itself, its servants, employees or agents, be restrained from assigning, subletting, licensing, transferring, charging, parting with possession of, or otherwise creating any third-party interest in the suit premises without the prior leave of this Honourable Court.

vii. Pending the hearing and determination of this Application and Appeal, the Respondent shall preserve the suit premises in good tenantable condition and shall not undertake any structural alterations, additions, demolition, waste or material changes to the premises without the written consent of the Appellant or the leave of this Honourable Court.

viii. Without prejudice to the aforementioned paragraphs, the status quo be maintained, save for the Respondent's obligation to pay rent as it falls due and in accordance with the Lease Agreement pending hearing and determination of this Application and the Appeal.

ix. Costs of this Application abide the outcome of the Appeal.

2. The motion is supported by the affidavit of Margaret Muthoni Njuwe, the Appellant/Applicant herein sworn on an even date. She explained that the Business Premises Rent Tribunal, in BPRT No. E482 of 2025, delivered judgment on 18th June 2026, in favour of the Respondent and dismissed her Reference with costs.

3. She deposed that being dissatisfied with that decision, she prepared and lodged a Memorandum of Appeal, contending that the Tribunal misapprehended the evidence and erred both in law and fact in dismissing her claim and allowing the Respondent to continue occupying the suit premises. According to her, the intended appeal raises substantial issues with high chances of success and will be rendered nugatory unless a stay of execution is granted.

4. She further deponed that as advised by counsel, under Section 15 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301, she is entitled to receive rent in accordance with the lease agreement. She explained that despite the Respondent remaining in occupation of the suit premises, it had failed to pay the undisputed rent for the first and second quarters of 2026, resulting in accrued rent arrears for two consecutive quarters.

5. According to the Applicant, the continued occupation of the premises without payment of rent has occasioned her substantial financial loss, particularly in respect of Land Parcel No. 6034 situated in Ruiru, formerly known as Plots 213 and 211. She expressed apprehension that unless the court directs the Respondent to continue paying rent as it falls due pending the appeal, the Respondent will persist in withholding rent under the guise of offsetting it against other alleged payments, thereby causing her continuing prejudice.

6. The Appellant finally averred that unless the orders sought are granted, she stands to suffer substantial prejudice as she will be deprived of the opportunity to effectively prosecute her appeal, whereas the Respondent will suffer no prejudice incapable of being compensated by costs. She further stated that the application was brought promptly, in good faith and in the interests of justice.

7. No response was filed to the Motion.

Analysis and Determination

8. Having considered the Motion, the issues that arises for determination are:

i. Whether the Applicant has discharged the conditions warranting the stay of execution pending appeal and/or temporary injunction pending Appeal?

ii. Whether the Applicant is entitled to orders compelling the Respondent to pay the outstanding and accruing rent?

9. The law with respect to stay of execution pending appeal is found in Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provides as follows:

“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except appeal case of in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the Court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.

(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub rule (1) unless—

(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”

10. In Vishram Ravji Halai vs. Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No. Nai. 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365, the Court of Appeal, discussing the High Court’s [read ELC’s] jurisdiction under this order stated:

“The Superior Court’s discretion to order a stay of execution of its order or decree is fettered by three conditions. Firstly, the applicant must establish a sufficient cause, secondly the court must be satisfied that substantial loss would ensue from a refusal to grant a stay and thirdly the applicant must furnish security. The application must of course be made without unreasonable delay.”

11. What arises from the foregoing is that the grant of orders of stay of execution is subject to the court’s discretion, the court in this respect being guided by the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The question of how the court should exercise this discretion was extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in Butt vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 as follows:

“1. The power of the court to grant or refuse an application for a stay of execution is a discretionary power. The discretion should be exercised in such a way as not to prevent an appeal.

2. The general principle in granting or refusing a stay is; if there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay must be granted so that an appeal may not be rendered nugatory should that appeal court reverse the judge’s discretion.

3. A judge should not refuse a stay if there are good grounds for granting it merely because in his opinion, a better remedy may become available to the applicant at the end of the proceedings.

4. The court in exercising its discretion whether to grant [or] refuse an application for stay will consider the special circumstances of the case and unique requirements. The special circumstances in this case were that there was a large amount of rent in dispute and the appellant had an undoubted right of appeal.

5. The court in exercising its powers under Order XLI rule 4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, can order security upon application by either party or on its own motion. Failure to put security for costs as ordered will cause the order for stay of execution to lapse.”

12. Further to the above, this court is now enjoined to give effect to the overriding objectives in the exercise of its powers as expressed in Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act to wit the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes.

13. Briefly, vide the reference and Notice of Motion application both dated 18th March, 2025, before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal, the Applicant here as landlord sought vacant possession, eviction orders, payment of rent arrears and costs against the tenant. The Applicant’s case was that the Respondent, having entered into a lease with it commencing 1st June, 2024 had defaulted in paying rent and utilities warranting her termination of the tenancy agreement. On its part, the Respondent asserted that it had no rent arrears nor was it served with any termination notice as alleged.

14. The tribunal considered the matter and vide its judgment rendered on 18th June 2026, dismissed both the reference and the Motion denying the Applicant’ s claim for vacant possession and eviction.

15. The Applicant now seeks an order staying the execution of the judgment and all consequential orders pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal. She contends that the Tribunal erred in dismissing her Reference and permitting the Respondent to continue occupying the suit premises notwithstanding the alleged rent defaults.

16. She further argues that unless a stay is granted, the Respondent will continue to enjoy possession of the suit premises without meeting its rental obligations, thereby occasioning her substantial financial loss and rendering the intended appeal nugatory.

17. To begin with, the court notes that the judgment delivered by the Business Premises Rent Tribunal on 18th June 2026 dismissed the Applicant's Reference and the accompanying application. It reads thus:

i. The Landlords reference is hereby dismissed.

ii. The Landlords notice of motion dated the 18th March, 2025 is hereby dismissed.

iii. The purported notice to terminate the tenancy dated the 16th November, 2024 is found not to have been proved nor to have been served upon the Tenant and cannot found any eviction of vacant possession orders.

iv. The Landlords claim for eviction and vacant possession is declined.

v. The parties shall if necessary, reconcile their rent accounts taking into account all admitted payments, deposits, change of use charges, public charges and any agreed offsets, but such reconciliation shall not operate as authority for eviction without compliance with Cap 301.

vi. Costs of the Reference and the application are awarded to the Tenant.

18. It is evident from the foregoing that the Tribunal principally declined to grant the reliefs sought by the Applicant. Although it directed the parties, if necessary, to reconcile their rent accounts, that direction was conditional and merely facilitated the ascertainment of the rent position. The judgment was therefore negative in nature, raising the question whether it is capable of being stayed pending appeal.

19. The law on this issue is well settled. In Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited vs Banking Insurance & Finance Union (Kenya) [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that:

“An order for stay of execution (pending appeal) is ordinarily an interim order which seeks to delay the performance of positive obligations that are set out in a decree as a result of a judgment. The delay of performance presupposes the existence of a situation to stay – called a positive order – either an order that has not been complied with or has partly been complied with.”

20. The Court of Appeal reiterated the same principle in Kenya Commercial Bank Limited vs Tamarind Meadows Limited & 7 Others [2016] eKLR, where, while citing Kanwal Sarjit Singh Dhiman vs Keshavji Juvraj Shah [2008] eKLR, it observed that an order dismissing a suit or application is a negative order incapable of execution save as to costs. The court stated:

“The 2nd prayer in the application is for stay (of execution) of the order of the superior court made on 18th December 2006. The order of 18th December 2006 merely dismissed the application for setting aside the judgment with costs. By the order, the superior court did not order any of the parties to do anything or refrain from doing anything or to pay any sum. It was thus, a negative order which is incapable of execution save in respect of costs only.The same reasoning was applied in the case of Raymond M. Omboga vs Austine Pyan Maranga (supra) that a negative order is one that is incapable of execution, and thus, incapable of being stayed. This is what the Court had to say on the matter:-The order dismissing the application is in the nature of a negative order and is incapable of stay of execution, save perhaps, for costs and such order is incapable of stay. Where there is no positive order made in favour of the respondent which is incapable of execution, there can be no stay of execution of such an order….The applicant seeks to appeal against the order dismissing his application. This is not an order capable of being stayed because there is nothing the applicant has lost. The refusal simply means that the applicant stays in the situation he was in before coming to court and therefore the issues of substantial loss that he is likely to suffer and or the appeal being rendered nugatory does not arise….”

21. The court need not say more. The effect of the judgment was merely to leave the parties in the position they occupied prior to the institution of the proceedings, save for the order as to costs. In those circumstances, there is no positive decree capable of execution against which an order of stay can issue. Consequently, the prayer for stay of execution of the judgment cannot be granted.

22. Moving next to the plea for temporary injunction, the law governing the same is found in Order 42 rule 6(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule (1) of this rule the High Court shall have power in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction on such terms as it thinks just provided the procedure for instituting an appeal from a subordinate court or tribunal has been complied with.”

23. As regards the principles governing the same, the court in Patricia Njeri & 3 others vs National Museum of Kenya [2004] eKLR, stated as follows:

a. An order of injunction pending appeal is a discretionary order which will be exercised against an applicant whose appeal is not frivolous.

b. The discretion should be refused where it would inflict great hardship than it would avoid.

c. The applicant must show that to refuse the injunction would render the appeal nugatory.

d. The court should also be guided by the principles in Giella v Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358.”

24. In the case of Giella vs Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358, the court stated the conditions for grant of interlocutory injunctions as follows:

“The conditions for the grant of interlocutory injunction are now I think well settled in East Africa. First an applicant must show a prima facie case with probability of success. Secondly an interlocutory injunction will not be normally granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly if the court is in doubt it will decide an application on the balance of convenience.”

25. In the present case, it is common ground that the relationship between the parties is one of landlord and tenant and is governed by a written lease agreement. This defines their respective rights and obligations pending determination of the appeal or lawful termination of the tenancy. The mere pendency of an appeal does not justify the grant of injunctive orders particularly where there is no evidence of any actual or threatened assignment, subletting, alienation, waste or other breach by the Respondent. No prima facie case justifying the grant of this relief has been established and the same must fail.

26. The Applicant seeks orders compelling the Respondent to continue paying rent as it falls due and to settle the alleged arrears for the first two quarters of 2026. In the alternative, she asks that the alleged arrears be deposited into her account within fourteen days and, upon default, that she be permitted to seek further orders, including enforcement of the lease or vacant possession.

27. Although the Applicant describes the arrears as undisputed, the Tribunal directed the parties, if necessary, to reconcile their accounts by considering all admitted payments, deposits, change-of-user charges, public charges and agreed offsets. Whether rent remains outstanding, the amount due and the availability of any offsets are therefore matters requiring reconciliation and form part of the controversy in the appeal. Compelling payment or deposit of the alleged arrears at this interlocutory stage would effectively determine those substantive questions before the appeal is heard. Prayers (iv) and (v) are consequently declined.

28. The appeal does not, however, suspend the parties’ obligations under the lease. Pending its determination, the Respondent remains bound to pay rent as it falls due in accordance with the lease, without prejudice to the parties’ respective positions regarding the disputed arrears and any lawful offsets. However, to the extent that this court is not seized at this stage with evidence of actual payable rent, it cannot make a definitive order to that effect.

29. In the end, the Notice of Motion dated 16th July, 2026 is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 15th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

No appearance for the Petitioner

No appearance for Respondents

Court Assistant: Tracy

KEEP THE USEFUL PART

Save to My Research

Create a new folder