REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
ELC CASE NO 1513 OF 2013
AGNES WANJIKU NJOROGE ……………..................... PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
HUSSEINBHAI AHMEDALI HEBATULLAH….....1ST DEFENDANT
NAIROBI CITY COUNTY.....................................2ND DEFENDANT
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY…………………………………………..…….3RD DEFENDANT
NASSER ABDULHAMID AHMED BAKSH………..4TH DEFENDANT
MAKARIM AHMED OMAR................................. 5TH DEFENDANT
RULING
1. Before this court for determination is the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants’/Applicants’ Notice of Motion dated 27th October 2025, brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, seeking the following reliefs:
a) There be a stay of execution of the judgment and decree of this court issued on 2nd October 2025, pending the hearing and determination of the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendant’s appeal.
b) The costs of this application be provided for.
2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Zoeb Kapacce, of an even date. He deponed that he is the 1st Defendant/Applicant’s attorney, duly authorized to swear the affidavit on his behalf.
3. He explained that the Plaintiff/Respondent instituted the present suit against the Defendants on grounds of negligence and nuisance, seeking, among other reliefs, damages for the loss suffered. He further stated that, in a judgment delivered on 2nd October 2025, this court found, inter alia, that the 1st Defendant had erected gabions on L.R. No. 7741/254 in contravention of Sections 30(1), 30(2) and 33 of the Physical Planning Act (repealed).
4. According to the 1st Defendant’s attorney, the court further held that the construction of the gabions was undertaken negligently and that such negligence caused the collapse of the boundary wall and consequent damage to the Plaintiff's property.
5. Consequently, it was averred, the court ordered that the gabions be removed and the land restored to its original contours within ninety (90) days. In the alternative, the court directed the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants to reconstruct the gabions and reduce their height to ensure that a person standing on them could not overlook the Plaintiff's property, subject to obtaining all the requisite statutory approvals and permits before undertaking the alterations.
6. The court further awarded the Plaintiff loss of rental income at the rate of Kshs. 320,000 per month from January 2012 to June 2016, being a period of fifty-four (54) months. It also ordered the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiff Kshs. 2,905,523 being the cost of constructing a new boundary wall, including the sections incorporating the servants' quarters and leisure area, together with general damages of Kshs. 8,000,000 for private nuisance.
7. Being dissatisfied with the judgment, he explained, the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants intend to appeal to the Court of Appeal. He deponed that, unless an order of stay of execution is granted, the Plaintiff is at liberty to commence execution proceedings. Further, he urged, the intended appeal is arguable and has high prospects of success.
8. He further explained that, unless a stay of execution is granted, the Defendants stand to suffer substantial loss and the intended appeal will be rendered nugatory. He deponed that they are unaware of the Plaintiff's financial means or assets and therefore apprehend that, should they satisfy the decretal sum and subsequently succeed on appeal, they may be unable to recover the monies paid.
9. In addition, he deposed that they would be compelled to undertake permanent alterations to the gabions in compliance with the judgment before the intended appeal is heard and determined, thereby irreversibly altering the subject matter of the dispute.
10. The Plaintiff opposed the application by way of a replying affidavit sworn on 13th November 2025. In its judgment delivered on 2nd October 2025, she stated, this court found the Defendants liable and ordered the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants’ to remove the impugned gabions and to compensate her by way of damages. This judgment, she asserted form the subject of the present Motion.
11. According to Ms. Njoroge, the Defendants have failed to satisfy the legal threshold for the grant of an order of stay of execution. In particular, they have not demonstrated that they will suffer substantial loss if the stay is declined or that the intended appeal will be rendered nugatory in the absence of the orders sought.
12. She further maintained that this court correctly found that the gabions erected by the 1st Defendant were illegal and had caused damage to her property. Accordingly, granting a stay would have the effect of perpetuating an illegality and extending the harm occasioned to her. She asserted that she, rather than the Defendants, stands to suffer loss and prejudice if the stay orders are granted, having pursued the suit and endured damage, financial loss and continued interference with the enjoyment of her property for more than a decade.
13. Further, having successfully prosecuted her claim, she ought not to be denied the fruits of her judgment. She asserted that compliance with the judgment by removing the gabions and restoring the land to its natural contours would occasion no prejudice to the Defendants but would merely give effect to the court's orders.
14. She further stated that the court had awarded her damages together with interest at court rates from December 2013 and that, as at the date of swearing the affidavit, the decretal amount, inclusive of accrued interest, stood at Kshs. 75,992,808, with interest continuing to accrue.
15. Finally, she deponed that there has never been any suggestion that she will be unable to refund the decretal sum should the intended appeal succeed. She maintained that the monetary award constitutes a money decree and, therefore, the intended appeal cannot not be rendered nugatory. In the alternative, she urged that if the court is inclined to grant a stay of execution, it should only do so on condition that the Defendants deposit the entire decretal sum in a joint interest-earning account in the names of the parties' advocates.
16. Vide a supplementary affidavit dated 15th April 2026, the Plaintiff deponed that she has since learnt that the property on which the impugned gabions had been erected was recently sold by Stanbic Bank in the exercise of its statutory power of sale to one Beatrice Wamuyu Gachanja and is therefore no longer owned by the 4th and 5th Defendants. She contended that this material fact was not disclosed to the court when the application for stay was made and that such non-disclosure disentitled the Defendants to the court's discretionary relief.
17. In a further affidavit dated 10th July 2026, Mr. Kapacce deponed that, subsequent to swearing his affidavit on 27th October 2025, the Defendants became aware that the suit property had been sold by Stanbic Bank in the exercise of its statutory power of sale. He averred that this material fact had not been brought to the attention of the court before the delivery of the judgment.
18. He further deponed that the 1st Defendant is a spiritual leader of the Dawoodi Bohra Community in Kenya and is not a person of substantial means, nor does he hold assets in his personal capacity. Consequently, the 1st Defendant is unable to deposit the entire decretal sum in a joint interest-earning account as proposed by the Plaintiff. He nevertheless expressed his willingness to furnish security by surrendering the title to L.R. No. Ngong/Ngong/99630 to the court, or in such other manner as the court may direct.
19. He added that the 1st Defendant had caused the said property to be valued, and that it had been assessed at Kshs. 25,000,000, which, in his view, constitutes sufficient security for the due performance of the decree.
Submissions
20. The 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants/Applicants filed written submissions dated 10th July 2026. Counsel submitted that the application satisfied the conditions for the grant of a stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely that the Defendants had demonstrated that they would suffer substantial loss if the orders sought were not granted, that the application had been made without unreasonable delay, and that they were willing to furnish security for the due performance of the decree.
21. On substantial loss, counsel submitted that the judgment of 2nd October 2025, directed the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiff Kshs. 2,905,523 for the construction of a new boundary wall and Kshs. 8,000,000 in general damages. It was contended that the 1st Defendant is a member of the Dawoodi Bohra Community in Kenya and does not engage in any commercial enterprise or income-generating activities, and therefore lacked the financial means to satisfy the decretal sum.
22. Counsel argued that unless execution was stayed, the Defendants would suffer substantial loss through execution before the intended appeal could be heard and determined, thereby rendering the appeal nugatory. Reliance was placed on Silverstein N. Chesoni [2002] 1 KLR 867, as cited in James Wangalwa & Another vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, and Tropical Commodities Suppliers Ltd & Others vs International Credit Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) [2004] 2 EA 331, as cited in Matata & Another vsRono & Another [2024] KEHC 2799 (KLR).
23. Regarding security for the due performance of the decree, counsel submitted that although the 1st Defendant is not a person of substantial means, he has demonstrated good faith by offering to deposit the title to L.R. Ngong/Ngong/99630 as security. It was further submitted that the property had been valued at Kshs. 25,000,000, which was sufficient to secure the decretal amount together with any accrued interest and costs.
24. Counsel relied on Focin Motorcycle Co. Limited v Ann Wambui Wangui & Stephen Kinyua Mugo (Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2017) and Situma v Nyamari (Civil Appeal E084 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 16998 (KLR) for the proposition that it is the court's discretion to determine the nature and adequacy of security, and that an applicant who offers security demonstrates good faith and satisfies the requirement under Order 42 Rule 6(2). Counsel therefore urged the Court to allow the application as prayed.
25. The Plaintiff filed submissions dated 15th June 2026. Counsel submitted that although the court has discretion to grant a stay of execution pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, that discretion must be exercised judiciously and only where an applicant satisfies the requisite conditions, namely that the application was made without unreasonable delay, that substantial loss will result if the stay is not granted, and that adequate security has been furnished for the due performance of the decree. Reliance was placed on Antoine Ndiaye v African Virtual University [2015] eKLR in support of those principles.
26. Counsel conceded that the present application had been filed without undue delay, noting that judgment was delivered on 2nd October 2025, an interim stay of execution granted for thirty days, and the application for stay filed on 27th October 2025, before the expiry of the interim orders.
27. On the question of substantial loss, counsel submitted that the Defendants had failed to discharge the burden placed upon them under Order 42 Rule 6. It was argued that mere assertions of hardship or the commencement of execution proceedings do not, without more, amount to substantial loss.
28. Reliance was placed on Standard Assurance Co. Ltd vs Alfred Mumea Komu [2008] eKLR, James Wangalwa & Another vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR, and Kenya Women Microfinance Ltd vs Martha Wangari Kamau [2020] eKLR, for the proposition that substantial loss must be demonstrated by cogent evidence and not by bare assertions.
29. Counsel maintained that the Defendants had produced no empirical or documentary evidence to demonstrate that execution would occasion irreparable prejudice or render the intended appeal nugatory.
30. It was further submitted that the judgment sought to be stayed was delivered after a full hearing on the merits, during which the court found that the impugned gabions had been erected illegally and negligently, causing damage to the Plaintiff's property and violating her constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment. It was therefore contended that granting a stay would perpetuate the continuing nuisance and environmental harm already found by the court, contrary to the overriding objective under Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act.
31. Counsel argued that the restoration orders merely required the land to be returned to its original natural contours and that compliance with those orders would occasion no prejudice to the Defendants even if the appeal ultimately succeeded. Reliance was placed on Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates vs East African Standard [2002] KEHC 1167 (KLR) for the principle that a successful litigant is ordinarily entitled to enjoy the fruits of a judgment unless exceptional circumstances justify a stay.
32. In any event, it was urged, the Defendants contention that they would suffer substantial loss through compliance with the structural orders was untenable because the 4th and 5th Defendants’ had ceased to be the proprietors of L.R. No. 7741/254, the property upon which the gabions were erected, the same having been sold by Stanbic Bank in exercise of its statutory power of sale.
33. As such, the Defendants no longer had any proprietary interest capable of protection by an order of stay. In addition, counsel contended that the Defendants had failed to disclose this material fact to the court and had therefore approached the court without candour, disentitling them to the equitable relief sought. Cited in support was on Ahmed Musa Ismael vs Kumba Ole Ntamorua & 4 Others [2014] eKLR.
34. On the issue of security, counsel submitted, relying on Arun C. Sharma vs Ashana Raikundalia t/a Raikundalia & Co. Advocates & 2 Others [2014]eKLR, that the purpose of security is to guarantee the due performance of the decree rather than punish the judgment debtor. It was argued that, having lost proprietary rights, the only practical component of the decree capable of being secured was the monetary award.
35. Counsel therefore urged the court to dismiss the application with costs. Alternatively, should the court be inclined to grant a stay, it was submitted that the Defendants should first pay 50% of the decretal sum to the Plaintiff and deposit the balance, together with accrued interest, in a joint interest-earning account in the names of the parties' advocates pending the determination of the appeal.
36. The Plaintiff filed rejoinder submissions dated 15th July 2026. Counsel reiterated the Plaintiff's earlier submissions further noting that Zoeb Kapacce, who described himself as the attorney of the 1st Defendant had not disclosed his qualifications to depone to disputed matters of fact and that the affidavits offended Order 19 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. On that basis, counsel argued that the application was incompetent and liable to be struck out.
37. Addressing the Defendants’ contention on substantial loss, counsel submitted that the Defendant’s had admitted that L.R. No. 7741/254 had been sold by Stanbic Bank in exercise of its statutory power of sale. It was argued that the admission confirmed that the 4th and 5th Defendants no longer owned the property, with the result that the foundation of their claim of substantial loss had completely fallen away.
38. Counsel submitted that the title to L.R. Ngong/Ngong/99630 was neither appropriate nor adequate security for the monetary decree, which exceeded Kshs. 75,992,808, exclusive of continuing interest. It was further argued that the 1st Defendant’s acquisition of the property for approximately Kshs. 25 million after judgment demonstrated his financial means and raised the question why those funds had not been used to secure or satisfy the decree.
Analysis and determination
39. Having considered the pleadings, and submissions, the sole issue that arises for determination is whether the Motion is competent, if so, if the Defendants are entitled to an order of stay of execution of the Judgment pending appeal.
40. The Plaintiff challenges the competence of the Motion on the ground that Zoeb Kapacce, who swore the supporting and further affidavits as the 1st Defendant’s attorney, did not disclose his qualifications or demonstrate his capacity to depone to the disputed matters of fact contained therein. It is contended that the affidavits offend Order 19 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules and should be struck out together with the Motion.
41. This objection was not raised in the replying or supplementary affidavits and appeared for the first time in the Plaintiff’s rejoinder submissions. Submissions provide parties with an opportunity to analyze the evidence and applicable law. They are not pleadings or evidence and cannot be used to introduce a new factual case. In Robert Ngande Kathathi vs Francis Kivuva Kitonde [2020] eKLR, the court emphasized that submissions do not constitute evidence and that a party’s case must be founded on its pleadings and evidence.
42. The same principle was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Sila vs Attorney General (Civil Appeal 224 of 2019) [2025] KECA 498 (KLR), which affirmed that parties are bound by their pleadings and cannot raise an un pleaded issue or adduce evidence upon it during the proceedings.
43. In any event, Order 19 Rule 3 requires an affidavit to be confined to facts within the deponent’s knowledge, save that, in interlocutory proceedings, statements based on information and belief may be admitted where their sources and grounds are disclosed. The provision does not require a deponent to possess or disclose any particular professional qualification. What matters is whether the deponent is competent to swear the affidavit and whether the matters deponed to are within his knowledge or are properly stated on information and belief.
44. Mr. Kapacce expressly stated that he was the 1st Defendant’s attorney and had been duly authorized to swear the affidavit. Much of his deposition concerns the judgment, the intended appeal and the consequences of execution, matters borne out by the record or arising from his role as attorney. The objection is accordingly rejected, and the Motion is found to be competent.
45. The law with respect to stay of execution pending appeal is found in Order 42 Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provides as follows:
“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except appeal case of in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the Court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.
(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub rule (1) unless—
(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and
(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”
46. In Vishram Ravji Halai vs Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No. Nai. 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365, the Court of Appeal, discussing the High Court’s [read ELC’s] jurisdiction under this order stated:
“The Superior Court’s discretion to order a stay of execution of its order or decree is fettered by three conditions. Firstly, the applicant must establish a sufficient cause, secondly the court must be satisfied that substantial loss would ensue from a refusal to grant a stay and thirdly the applicant must furnish security. The application must of course be made without unreasonable delay.”
47. What arises from the foregoing is that the grant of orders of stay of execution is subject to the court’s discretion, the court in this respect being guided by the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The question of how the court should exercise this discretion was extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in Butt vs Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 417 as follows:
“1. The power of the court to grant or refuse an application for a stay of execution is a discretionary power. The discretion should be exercised in such a way as not to prevent an appeal.
2. The general principle in granting or refusing a stay is; if there is no other overwhelming hindrance, a stay must be granted so that an appeal may not be rendered nugatory should that appeal court reverse the judge’s discretion.
3. A judge should not refuse a stay if there are good grounds for granting it merely because in his opinion, a better remedy may become available to the applicant at the end of the proceedings.
4. The court in exercising its discretion whether to grant [or] refuse an application for stay will consider the special circumstances of the case and unique requirements. The special circumstances in this case were that there was a large amount of rent in dispute and the appellant had an undoubted right of appeal.
5. The court in exercising its powers under Order XLI rule 4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, can order security upon application by either party or on its own motion. Failure to put security for costs as ordered will cause the order for stay of execution to lapse.”
48. Further to the above, this court is now enjoined to give effect to the overriding objectives in the exercise of its powers as expressed in Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act, to wit, the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes.
49. The court is so guided.
50. By way of brief background, the Plaintiff instituted the present suit by an amended Plaint seeking, inter alia, orders compelling the 1st Defendant to rebuild the boundary wall, guard house, servants' quarters and leisure center destroyed following the collapse of the boundary wall, or in the alternative, to permit the Plaintiff to undertake the reconstruction at the Defendants' cost.
51. The Plaintiff also sought an order directing the 1st Defendant to remove the gabions erected on the adjoining property and restore the land to its original contours, a permanent injunction restraining further construction and acts of waste, punitive and exemplary damages against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, general and special damages against the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants, together with costs and interest.
52. The matter proceeded to a full hearing. Upon considering the pleadings, the evidence and the parties' submissions, this court delivered its judgment on 2nd October 2025. The court found in favour of the Plaintiff noting, inter alia, that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully erected the impugned gabions in contravention of Sections 30(1), 30(2) and 33 of the Physical Planning Act (repealed), and that the gabions had been negligently constructed, resulting in the collapse of the Plaintiff's boundary wall and damage to her property.
53. The court further found that the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants had created a continuing private nuisance by maintaining gabions that overlooked the Plaintiff's property, thereby interfering with her privacy and quiet enjoyment of the land. Consequently, the court ordered the removal of the gabions and restoration of the land to its original contours within ninety (90) days, or alternatively their reconstruction to an acceptable height upon obtaining the requisite approvals.
54. The court also awarded the Plaintiff loss of rental income at the rate of Kshs. 320,000 per month from January 2012 to June 2016, Kshs. 2,905,523 being the cost of reconstructing the boundary wall and associated structures, general damages of Kshs. 8,000,000 for private nuisance, together with costs and interest.
55. Being dissatisfied with the said judgment, the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants intend to appeal to the Court of Appeal. They ask this court to stay the execution of the aforesaid judgment and the decree arising therefrom pending determination of the pending appeal.
56. Turning to the question of whether the parameters for stay have been satisfied, the court observes that the Defendants have strongly submitted on the merits of the intended appeal, asserting that it raises arguable grounds. It is however necessary to clarify that this court’s jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution pending appeal is anchored on Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
57. This provision does not make the arguability of the appeal one of the conditions precedent for the grant of a stay. This position is well-founded. It would be both procedurally improper and logically untenable for this court to assess the arguability of an appeal arising from its own decision. The court will disregard any arguments under this head.
58. Moving to the pre-requisites under Order 42 Rule 6(2), the court will begin with the aspect of sufficient cause. What constitutes the same was explicitly discussed by the court in Antoine Ndiaye vs. African Virtual University [2015] eKLR, which persuasively stated:
“The relief of stay of execution pending appeal is governed by Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The relief is discretionary although, as it has been said often, the discretion must be exercised judicially, that is to say, judiciously and upon defined principles of law; not capriciously or whimsically. Therefore, stay of execution should only be granted where sufficient cause has been shown by the Applicant. And in determining whether sufficient cause has been shown, the court should be guided by the three prerequisites provided under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, that:
a) The application is brought without undue delay;
b) The court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the Applicant unless stay of execution is ordered; and
c) Such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the Applicant.”
59. The court concurs. In determining whether the sufficient cause has been established, the court will examine whether the Applicant has satisfied the three mandatory prerequisites to the grant of stay pending appeal.
60. In the present case, the judgment was delivered on 2nd October, 2025 after which a 30- day stay of execution was issued. The present application was filed on 27th October, 2025, a mere 3 weeks thereafter. In the circumstances, the court is satisfied that the application was filed timeously and without undue delay. Indeed, the Plaintiff has conceded to the same.
61. Moving to the aspect of substantial loss, the same was discussed in Rhoda Mukuma vs John Abuoga [1988] eKLR, as follows:
“Granting a stay in the High Court is governed by Order XLI rule 4(2), the questions to be decided being – (a) whether substantial loss may result unless the stay is granted and the application is made without delay; and (b) the applicant has given security. The discretion under rule 5(2)(b) is at large, but as was pointed out in the Kenya Shell case substantial loss is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions. That is what has to be prevented, because such loss would render the appeal nugatory…”
62. Similarly, the court in Century Oil Trading Company Ltd vs Kenya Shell Limited as cited in Muri Mwaniki & Wamiti Advocates Vs Wings Engineering Services Limited [2020] eKLR, held:
“The word 'substantial' cannot mean the ordinary loss to which every judgment debtor is necessarily subjected when he loses his case and is deprived of his property in consequence. That is an element which must occur in every case and since the Code expressly prohibits stay of execution as an ordinary rule it is clear the words 'substantial loss' must mean something in addition to all different from that.”
63. The courts have also held that substantive loss must be demonstrated. This position was articulated by the Court of Appeal in Kenya Shell Limited v Benjamin Karuga Kibiru & another [1986] eKLR thus:
“It is usually a good rule to see if Order 41 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules can be substantiated. If there is no evidence of substantial loss to the Applicant, it would be a rare case when an Appeal would be rendered nugatory by some other event. Substantial loss in its various forms is the cornerstone of both jurisdictions for granting stay.”
64. The court in James Wangalwa & Another vs Agnes Naliaka Cheseto [2012] eKLR held that the mere commencement or completion of execution does not, of itself, amount to substantial loss, as execution is a lawful process. An applicant must therefore demonstrate additional factors showing that execution would create a state of affairs that irreparably affects the core of the appeal and renders it nugatory.
65. Other the order to restore the Defendants’ land to its natural shape, the decree predominantly monetary, comprising loss of rental income, reconstruction costs, general damages, costs and accrued interest.
66. A monetary decree is ordinarily capable of restitution should the appeal succeed. An applicant seeking its stay must therefore demonstrate, through cogent evidence, that payment would occasion substantial loss because the respondent may be unable to refund the decretal sum or because exceptional circumstances exist. This principle was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kenya Hotel Properties Limited v Willesden Investments Limited [2007] KECA 401 (KLR), where it held that:
“Courts have felt that the success of the appeal would not be rendered nugatory if the decree is a money decree so long as the Court ascertains that the respondent is not a ‘man of straw’ but is a person who, on the success of the appeal, would be able to repay the decretal amount plus any interest to the applicant.”
67. Whereas the burden remains on an applicant to demonstrate the likelihood of substantial loss, courts have held that a respondent, being possessed of peculiar knowledge of their own financial means, bears a corresponding obligation to allay any reasonable apprehension as to their ability to refund the decretal amount in the event that the intended appeal succeeds. Speaking to this, the Court of Appeal in National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd vs Aquinas Francis Wasike & Another [2006] eKLR stated as follows:
“While the legal duty is on the Applicant to prove the allegation that an appeal would be rendered nugatory because a Respondent would be unable to pay back the decretal sum, it is unreasonable to expect such an applicant to know in detail the resources owned by a Respondent or lack of them. Once an Applicant expresses a reasonable fear that a Respondent would be unable to pay back the decretal sum, the evidential burden must then shift to the Respondent to show what resources he has since that is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge.”
68. In the present case, the Defendants have expressed apprehension that, should they satisfy the decree and subsequently succeed on appeal, they may be unable to recover the decretal sum from the Plaintiff. The material before the court shows that, currently, the decretal amount, inclusive of accrued interest, stands at approximately 70,000,000, with interest continuing to accrue. Indeed, the Plaintiff concedes to this.
69. In response to that apprehension, the Plaintiff deponed that there had never been any suggestion that she will be unable to refund the decretal sum should the intended appeal succeed. She maintained that the decree is essentially a money decree and, for that reason alone, the appeal cannot not be rendered nugatory.
70. Significantly, however, beyond that assertion, the Plaintiff did not place before the court any evidence of her present financial means or resources. She did not exhibit bank statements, title documents, investment portfolios, business interests or any other documentary material from which the court could objectively assess her ability to refund a decretal sum of approximately over Kshs. 70,000,000, exclusive of further accruing interest. This omission is particularly material given that the Plaintiff is an individual litigant and not a corporate entity or public institution whose financial standing may readily be inferred.
71. In those circumstances, the court finds that the 1st Defendant’s apprehension cannot be dismissed as speculative. While the legal burden initially rests upon an applicant to demonstrate substantial loss, once a reasonable concern is raised regarding a respondent's ability to make restitution, the evidential burden shifts to the respondent to disclose material demonstrating the financial capacity to refund the decretal amount.
72. In the absence of such evidence, and bearing in mind the magnitude of the monetary decree, this court is satisfied that the Defendants have established that they stand to suffer substantial loss if compelled to satisfy the decree before the intended appeal is heard and determined.
73. Moving to the last issue regarding provision of security, its purpose was discussed by the court in Arun C Sharma vs. Ashana Raikundalia t/a Rairundalia & Co. Advocates & 2 others [2014] eKLR, thus:
“The purpose of the security needed under Order 42 is to guarantee the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the applicant. It is not to punish the judgment debtor...Civil process is quite different because in civil process the judgment is like a debt hence the applicants become and are judgment debtors in relation to the respondent. That is why any security given under Order 42 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules acts as security for due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on the applicants. I presume the security must be one which can serve that purpose.”
74. The Defendants have expressed their willingness to furnish such security as the court may direct. Specifically, the 1st Defendant has offered to deposit the title to L.R. No. Ngong/Ngong/99630, which, according to a valuation report dated March 2026, has an open market value of Kshs. 25,000,000.
75. It is settled that the nature and form of security lies within the discretion of the court, and courts have, in appropriate cases, accepted immovable property as security for the due performance of a decree. The overriding consideration, however, is not merely whether security has been offered, but whether the proposed security is adequate to secure the due performance of the decree should the appeal fail.
76. In the present case, the court is not persuaded that the proposed security is sufficient. As already observed, the decretal sum presently stands at approximately Kshs. 70,000,000, inclusive of interest which continues to accrue. Against that figure, the property offered as security has an open market value of Kshs. 25,000,000. The value of the proposed security falls significantly below the decretal amount and would not adequately safeguard the Plaintiff's interests in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful.
77. Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, including the fact that the decree is substantially a money decree, the magnitude of the decretal amount, the Applicants' demonstrated willingness to furnish security, and the need to balance the competing rights of the parties, this court is satisfied that an order for stay of execution is merited, albeit on terms that adequately secure the due performance of the decree.
78. Consequently, the Notice of Motion dated 27th October 2025 is allowed as follows:
i. There shall be a conditional stay of execution of the judgment and decree of this court dated 2nd October 2025 pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal.
ii. The Applicants shall, within forty-five (45) days from the date hereof, either deposit the sum of Kshs. 50,000,000 in a joint interest-earning account in the names of the parties' advocates; or furnish an unconditional bank guarantee issued by a reputable commercial bank in Kenya in the sum of Kshs. 50,000,000, to remain in force pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
iii. In default of compliance with paragraph (ii) above within the stipulated period, the order of stay shall automatically lapse without the necessity of any further order of this court.
iv. Costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the appeal.
Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 15th day of October, 2026.
O. A. Angote
Judge
In the presence of;
Mr. Kimani for Muthui for Plaintiff
Mr. Ondieki for 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants
Court Assistant: Tracy