Land law

Manchester Outfitters Limited & 2 others v Galot Holdings Limited & 3 others [2026] KEELC 6651 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Elc Case 358 of 2012
Judgment date
15 October 2026
Judge(s)
OA Angote

Case research

What the court decided

Overall outcome and orders

The Notice of Motion dated 20 May 2026, seeking Kshs. 40,000,000 security for the 4th Defendant’s costs, was dismissed as unmerited. Costs were awarded to the 1st Plaintiff.

Supporting judgment passages

77. Ultimately, the Notice of Motion dated 20th May 2026 is found to be unmerited and is dismissed with costs to the 1st Plaintiff.

Paragraph 77 →
Issue 1Whether the replying affidavit sworn by Pushpinder Singh Mann is fatally defective?

Held. No. The objection to Mr. Mann’s competence to swear the replying affidavit was rejected. It was raised for the first time in submissions and was therefore improperly raised; moreover, the disputed directorship and management question was pending before other courts, with no subsisting order barring him from acting for the 1st Plaintiff.

Ratio. Submissions are not pleadings or evidence and cannot introduce factual matters not raised through proper pleadings or affidavit evidence. Further, the court could not collaterally determine a pending directorship dispute, or strike out the affidavit in a manner that would prejudge that reserved dispute.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

i. Whether the replying affidavit sworn by Pushpinder Singh Mann is fatally defective?

Passage 75 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

60. To strike out his affidavit merely because his directorship is disputed would effectively prejudge an issue reserved for determination by the courts seized of that dispute. Accordingly, the objection to Mr. Mann’s competence to swear the replying affidavit is unmerited and is hereby rejected.

Paragraph 60 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

58. It is settled that submissions are not pleadings or evidence and cannot be used to introduce new factual matters that were not placed before the court through the appropriate pleadings or affidavit evidence. On that basis alone, the objection is improperly raised and cannot sustain an order striking out the replying affidavit.

Paragraph 58 →

59. In any event, the objection is without merit. The question of the lawful directorship and management of the 1st Plaintiff remains contested and is pending determination before various courts in the Commercial and Tax Division. This court cannot determine that dispute collaterally in an application for security for costs, nor has the 3rd or 4th Defendants placed before the court any subsisting order expressly declaring that Mr. Mann is not a director of, or is otherwise prohibited from acting on behalf of, the 1st Plaintiff.

Paragraph 59 →
Issue 2Whether the 1st Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish security for costs?

Held. No. The 4th Defendant did not establish a sufficient basis for the court to exercise its discretion to order security. The claimed impecuniosity substantially depended on long-standing liabilities whose validity, origin, and responsibility were disputed in other proceedings; the suit could not at this stage be called frivolous or vexatious; and the unsupported Kshs. 40,000,000 sought at the advanced trial stage would interrupt and could stifle the proceedings. The motion was dismissed with costs to the 1st Plaintiff.

Ratio. Under Order 26 rule 1, security for costs is discretionary, and the applicant must demonstrate that the plaintiff would be unable to satisfy an eventual costs order. The court must weigh all relevant circumstances, including the merits and genuineness of the proceedings, disputed causes of impecuniosity, timing, proportionality, and whether security would impede access to justice. Here, the prejudice to the Plaintiff and administration of justice outweighed the asserted recovery risk.

Supporting passages

Issue

Supporting judgment passages

ii. Whether the 1st Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish security for costs?

Passage 76 →

Held

Supporting judgment passages

76. Considering all the circumstances and the parameters set out in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD (supra), the court is not satisfied that the 4th Defendant has demonstrated a sufficient basis for the exercise of discretion in favour of security for costs.

Paragraph 76 →

77. Ultimately, the Notice of Motion dated 20th May 2026 is found to be unmerited and is dismissed with costs to the 1st Plaintiff.

Paragraph 77 →

Ratio

Supporting judgment passages

“In an application for further security for costs, the Applicant ought to establish that the Respondent, if unsuccessful in the proceedings, would be unable to pay costs due to poverty. It is not enough to allege that a Respondent will be unable to pay costs in the event that he is unsuccessful. And the onus is on the Applicant to prove such inability or lack of good faith that would make an order for security reasonable.”

Passage 86 →

74. The court must also consider whether the security sought is proportionate and whether it will impede access to justice. The 4th Defendant seeks Kshs. 40,000,000 but has not provided a sufficient assessment or other objective basis for that amount. Requiring the 1st Plaintiff to furnish such substantial security at this advanced stage of the suit will interrupt a long-running trial when only the defence case remains, and could effectively stifle the proceedings.

Paragraph 74 →

75. The resulting prejudice to the 1st Plaintiff and the administration of justice outweighs the asserted risk of unrecoverable costs, particularly where that risk is founded substantially upon liabilities whose validity and origin remain disputed.

Paragraph 75 →
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Case at a glance

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Background

Vide a Notice of Motion dated 20th May, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 26 Rule 1 and Order 51 Rules 1, 3 & 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 4th Defendant/Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

Paragraph 1 →

Question before the court

Having considered the Motion, the affidavits and the parties’ submissions, the issues for determination are:

Paragraph 56 →
SHERIAPLEX EDITORIAL BRIEF

Preview the case brief

Questions presented

Whether Pushpinder Singh Mann’s replying affidavit was incompetent because his authority to act for the 1st Plaintiff was disputed; and whether the 1st Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish Kshs. 40,000,000 as security for the 4th Defendant’s costs under…

Material facts

The 4th Defendant asserted that the 1st Plaintiff was insolvent, relying principally on unpaid Diamond Trust Bank facilities, personal guarantees and charged property, alleged unpaid advances, and debts to other creditors. He sought security in a joint…

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI

ELC CASE NO 358 OF 2012

MANCHESTER OUTFITTERS LIMITED ................ 1ST PLAINTIFF

MOHAN GALOТ ................................................... 2ND PLAINTIFF

GALOT LIMITED ................................................. 3RD PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

GALOT HOLDINGS LIMITED ............................ 1ST DEFENDANT

MANCHESTER OUTFITTERS

(E.A) LIMITED ................................................. 2ND DEFENDANT

PRAVIN GALOT ................................................ 3RD DEFENDANT

RAJESH GALOT ............................................... 4TH DEFENDANT

RULING

Background

1. Vide a Notice of Motion dated 20th May, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 26 Rule 1 and Order 51 Rules 1, 3 & 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the 4th Defendant/Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

a) The Court be pleased to order that the 1st Plaintiff do give security for the costs of the 4th Defendant in the sum of Kshs. 40,000,000 to be deposited in a joint interest earning account in the names of the advocates for the 1st plaintiff and 4th Defendant.

b) Costs of this application be met by the 1st plaintiff.

2. The Motion is supported by the affidavit of Rajesh Galot, the 4th Defendant, sworn on even date. He deponed that the 1st Plaintiff has carried on business in Kenya as a corporate entity since 1977 but is presently insolvent and unable to pay its debts, meet its daily operating expenses or discharge its other financial obligations as they fall due.

3. Mr. Galot deponed that he is a director of the 3rd Plaintiff, which holds an undisputed 50% shareholding in the 1stPlaintiff and that by virtue of that position, he is fully conversant with the 1st Plaintiff’s financial affairs and indebtedness.

4. He deposed that following the ruling delivered by a three-Judge Bench in HCC No. 55 of 2012 on 11th April 2024, the persons who assumed control of the 1st Plaintiff opened parallel accounts at Prime Bank Kenya Limited and ceased depositing funds into its principal account at Diamond Trust Bank, which had been operational since 2003. According to him, this diversion of funds resulted in Diamond Trust Bank issuing a statutory notice against the 1st Plaintiff.

5. He deponed that as at 12th April 2024, the 1st Plaintiff’s overdraft facility with Diamond Trust Bank stood at Kshs. 47,144,181.07; that between 12th April 2024, and 24th July 2025, the 1st Plaintiff failed to make any payment towards the debt; that consequently, Diamond Trust Bank issued a statutory notice dated 24th July 2025, demanding Kshs. 55,482,927.25, the debt having increased by approximately Kshs. 8,000,000 and that Diamond Trust Bank issued similar statutory notices to him and the 3rd Defendant in their capacities as guarantors of the facilities advanced to the 1st Plaintiff and as the owners of the property offered as security.

6. Instead of settling the debt, agreeing upon a repayment arrangement or presenting a reasonable repayment proposal, the 1st Plaintiff instituted proceedings before the High Court and obtained a temporary injunction in HCCOMM No. 149 of 2025 on 23rd October 2025 and that the injunction only temporarily suspended recovery and did not extinguish the debt, which the 1st Plaintiff lacks both the resources and willingness to repay.

7. According to Mr. Rajesh, the 1st Plaintiff is unable to meet even ordinary debts and routine operational expenses as they fall due and that when he and the 3rd Defendant were directors and substantial shareholders of the 1st Plaintiff, they provided personal guarantees and offered their property, L.R. No. 7785/151 situated along Runda, Drive, Nairobi, as security for working-capital facilities advanced to the 1st Plaintiff by Diamond Trust Bank.

8. He deposed that the property, valued at Kshs. 110,000,000 in 2020, remains charged to Diamond Trust Bank to secure facilities advanced to the 1st Plaintiff. He added that the loan and overdraft facilities extended to the 1st Plaintiff totaled Kshs. 74,000,000, as evidenced by the facility agreement dated 6th July 2023.

9. The 4th Defendant argued that the guarantees and security had been provided because he and the 3rd Defendant were then considered directors and substantial shareholders of the 1st Plaintiff; that following the ruling of 11th April 2024 that they were neither directors nor shareholders, they considered their corresponding obligations to have ceased and that on 25th July 2025, they instructed their advocates to request Diamond Trust Bank to discharge the charge over their property.

10. After several reminders, Diamond Trust Bank by a letter dated 26th September, 2025, responded through its advocates, that the 1st Plaintiff had not made any payments since 11th April 2024, when its new directors assumed control and that the 1st Plaintiff owned L.R. No. 209/8314, situated at Dunga Close off Dunga Road in Nairobi’s Industrial Area, which was similarly charged to Diamond Trust Bank.

11. He further deponed that, during their tenure as directors and shareholders of the 1st Plaintiff, he and the 3rd Defendant advanced funds from their personal savings to meet its immediate and short-term working-capital requirements and that those advances were not fully repaid, leaving an outstanding balance of Kshs. 97,147,645, as reflected in the 1st Plaintiff’s audited financial statements for the year ended 31st December 2022.

12. He maintained that the continued non-payment of that sum demonstrates a real risk that any award of costs made in his favour will be rendered nugatory unless the 1st Plaintiff furnishes security.

13. Mr. Rajesh further stated that in HCC No. 55 of 2012, the 1st Plaintiff’s chairman confirmed on oath that he and the 3rd Defendant held 50% of the 1st Plaintiff’s share capital, having paid for the shares in cash. He averred that, notwithstanding the ruling delivered on 11th April 2024, the 1st Plaintiff had neither recognized their shareholding nor refunded the amounts paid for the shares in 1993 and 1995.

14. He further averred that the 1st Plaintiff is indebted to several service providers and is unable to settle even relatively modest debts. In support of that assertion, he referred to a letter dated 25th March 2026, demanding payment of Kshs. 396,900.04 owed to Pemex Enterprises Limited, as well as dishonored cheques for Kshs. 300,000 issued to Oriental Mills Limited and USD 1,103.16 issued to Sights and Sounds Limited and that the latter cheque was dishonored on 11th April 2024, resulting in proceedings before the Small Claims Court and a judgment delivered on 5th February 2025.

15. He added that the 1st Plaintiff’s only known immovable property is the Dunga Road property, which is already heavily charged to Diamond Trust Bank. Consequently, there would be no unencumbered property against which he could recover his costs if he successfully defended the suit.

16. Mr. Galot further deponed that he had repeatedly requested the 1st Plaintiff to settle its indebtedness to Diamond Trust Bank to secure the discharge of the personal guarantees and securities provided by him and the 3rd Defendant, or, alternatively, to have the current directors replace them as guarantors and providers of security. Those requests have not elicited any meaningful response and that instead, the 1st Plaintiff changed its bankers to Prime Bank Kenya Limited in 2024 and directed that funds due to it be deposited into the new account.

17. He stated that the overdraft facilities secured by their personal guarantees and properties had been used to finance the 1st Plaintiff’s tenders, from which more than Kshs. 40,000,000 was outstanding as at 11th April 2024. It was deposed that although the 1st Plaintiff continued to receive the tender proceeds, it deposited them at Prime Bank and applied them to undisclosed purposes rather than settling the facilities at Diamond Trust Bank or its other known debts.

18. He contended that it is inequitable for the 1st Plaintiff, whose operations had historically depended on securities provided by him and the 3rd Defendant, to use funds generated through those facilities to prosecute the present proceedings against them. Given the 1st Plaintiff’s alleged insolvency, the substantial legal and incidental expenses incurred in defending the suit, and the fact that its subject matter is valued at more than Kshs. 1,000,000,000 and continues to appreciate, there is a real risk that the Defendants will be unable to recover their costs if the suit failed.

19. The 4th Defendant also questioned the authority of the persons presently managing the 1st Plaintiff, contending that they are neither shareholders nor authorised by the existing shareholders to manage its affairs. According to him, the search showed that the natural persons registered as shareholders were deceased and that those presently controlling the company had no personal financial stake in it.

20. Regarding the timing of the application, Mr. Galot acknowledged that the court had, on 26th February 2026, granted the parties 30 days within which to file and serve their documents and witness statements and that the period had lapsed. Although the court had not expressly prohibited the filing of formal applications, he considered it appropriate to seek leave to prosecute the present motion in light of the earlier directions and the scheduled hearing.

21. He explained that the circumstances demonstrating the 1st Plaintiff’s illiquidity had crystallized after the court issued the directions of 26th February 2026 and that the application had therefore been made without undue delay. Finally, Mr. Galot contended that no party would suffer prejudice incapable of compensation by an award of costs if the application were heard and determined on its merits.

22. In response, the 1st Plaintiff, through its director, Pushpinder Singh Mann, filed a replying affidavit dated 10th June 2026. Mr. Mann averred that, owing to the age of the case, the court had previously directed that it would not entertain any further applications and that any outstanding matters should be raised through evidence at the trial and that those directions had neither been reviewed nor set aside. He therefore contended that the present application had been filed in violation of the court’s directions and constituted an abuse of its process.

23. The Plaintiff’s Director denied the allegations contained in the supporting affidavit, describing them as misrepresentations made in bad faith and intended to mislead the court and interfere with the hearing of the suit. According to him, until 11th April 2024, the 4th Defendant and his brother, the 3rd Defendant, whom he collectively referred to as “the duo”, had fraudulently held themselves out as directors of the 1st Plaintiff.

24. During that period, it was deposed, they misappropriated the 1st Plaintiff’s resources, incorporated parallel companies operating from its premises and diverted its funds. These actions, he explained are the subject of investigations and proceedings in HCCC No. 55 of 2012, Manchester Outfitters Limited vs Pravin Galot & Rajesh Galot, and HCCC No. 149 of 2010.

25. He further averred that the 3rd and 4th Defendants were the sole directors and shareholders of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, which they had allegedly incorporated and operated from the 1st Plaintiff’s premises without its knowledge.

26. Mr. Mann contended that the suit concerns allegations of fraud and misappropriation of the 1st Plaintiff’s property by the 3rd and 4th Defendants. It is therefore improper, in his view, for persons facing those allegations to require the company to furnish security as a condition for pursuing its claims against them. He denied that the 1st Plaintiff is insolvent, stating that it had operated in Kenya as a going concern since its incorporation in 1977 and had consistently met its obligations despite the alleged frauds committed against it.

27. He urged that the Motion, brought approximately 15 years after the suit was filed and after the 1st Plaintiff had closed its case, is an afterthought and made in bad faith; that it constitutes the Defendants’ fifteenth attempt to stay or otherwise delay the proceedings and that although the Motion had been presented under a certificate of urgency on the ground that it required determination before the hearing proceeded, the hearing had already commenced and the 1st Plaintiff had closed its case. Accordingly, he maintained that the application had been overtaken by events.

28. Mr. Mann further contended that requiring the 1st Plaintiff to furnish security as a condition for the continued prosecution of the suit would violate its rights of access to justice and a fair hearing under Articles 48, 50 and 159 of the Constitution. He maintained that despite the fact that security for costs is intended to protect defendants from frivolous or vexatious litigation, the 4th Defendant had neither alleged nor demonstrated that the present suit falls within that category. Instead, the suit concerns substantial allegations of fraud against the Defendants.

29. Mr. Mann maintained that the 1st Plaintiff’s failure to pay the Diamond Trust Bank debt is not evidence of financial incapacity, as the debt is disputed on grounds of fraud and remains the subject of pending proceedings in HCCC No. 149 of 2010. He argued that the 3rd and 4th Defendants, who were involved in the disputed facilities, cannot not rely on that debt to impede the prosecution of the present suit.

30. He further contended that any finding that the debt demonstrates the 1st Plaintiff’s inability to meet its obligations will necessarily touch on the validity and enforceability of the facilities and the alleged fraud, matters reserved for determination by the Commercial Court and, potentially, the criminal justice process.

31. Similarly, with respect to the debts allegedly owed to Pemex Enterprises Limited, Oriental Mills Limited and Sights and Sounds Limited, Mr. Mann stated that they arose from transactions undertaken by the 3rd and 4th Defendants before 11th April 2024, when they acted unlawfully as directors of the 1st Plaintiff. These too are the subject of a forensic investigation to ascertain their authenticity.

32. In response to the contention that the 1st Plaintiff’s current directors do not own shares in the company and cannot not satisfy an award of costs, Mr. Mann stated that a company is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders and directors and that the personal financial capacity of its directors and shareholders is therefore irrelevant.

33. He added that the directors had been appointed in accordance with the company’s memorandum and articles of association and that the 4th Defendant, being a stranger to the company, lacked standing to challenge its internal management. In any event, any costs awarded would be payable by the company rather than its directors or shareholders.

34. As to the sum of Kshs. 40,000,000 sought as security for costs, he contended that the amount had been arbitrarily selected and was unsupported by any assessment, valuation or taxation of the costs likely to be incurred.

35. Mr. Mann invoked the equitable principle that a party seeking discretionary relief must approach the court with clean hands. He contended that the 3rd and 4th Defendants are responsible for the financial issues upon which the application was founded and should not be permitted to benefit from their alleged wrongdoing.

36. He further alleged that the motion is intended to stifle the 1st Plaintiff’s genuine claims arising from the alleged fraud and unlawful dealings with its property. According to him, the 4th Defendant failed to disclose his role in creating the debts upon which the application is founded and is therefore guilty of material non-disclosure. He consequently maintained that the Motion has been brought in bad faith, is frivolous and vexatious, and constitutes an abuse of the court process. He urged the court to decline to exercise its discretion in the Applicant’s favour and to dismiss the application with costs to the 1st Plaintiff.

37. The 4th Defendant filed a further affidavit dated 17th July 2026. He deponed that the present Motion was prompted by recent developments concerning the 1st Plaintiff’s management and financial position, which had created a genuine apprehension that the Plaintiff would be unable to pay his costs if its allegedly malicious claim against the Defendants was ultimately dismissed.

38. The 4th Defendant further deponed that, until the ruling delivered by the three-Judge Bench in HCCC No. 55 of 2012, he and the 3rd Defendant had served as the Plaintiff’s managing directors for a combined period of 61 years. During their tenure, the Plaintiff had experienced consistent growth, met its financial and contractual obligations and maintained good relations with its creditors and directors.

39. He therefore denied that they had defrauded the 1st Plaintiff of its funds or assets, adding that the ruling delivered on 11th April 2024, did not make any finding of fraud or misappropriation against them. He consequently described the Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary as malicious and misleading.

40. On the aspect of delay, he deponed that the present proceedings had previously been stayed pending the resolution of the dispute over the Plaintiff’s directorship and shareholding in HCCC No. 55 of 2012 and the dispute was determined by the ruling of the three-Judge Bench delivered on 11th April 2024, following which the court directed that the present suit should proceed.

Submissions

41. The 4th Defendant/Applicant filed submissions dated 17th July 2026. Relying on Westmont Holdings SDN BHD vs Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others [2023] KESC 11 (KLR), counsel submitted that security for costs is meant to protect a successful litigant from the risk of being unable to recover costs from an unsuccessful and impecunious opponent.

42. It was submitted that such an order balances the rights of access to justice and a fair hearing under Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution against the need to ensure that a successful Defendant is not deprived of recompense because of the plaintiff’s inability to pay. Also referenced was Munya vs Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] KECA (KLR).

43. Counsel further argued that as held in Njue & another vs Gulflink Enterprises Limited [2023] KEELC 18623 (KLR), the appropriate response to an application for security for costs is an affidavit of means demonstrating the respondent’s ability to satisfy a future costs order and that the 1st Plaintiff had failed to file an affidavit of means or otherwise to demonstrate its financial strength. Instead, its replying affidavit addressed matters that are irrelevant to the central question of its ability to pay costs.

44. Relying on the principles Westmont Holdings SDN BHD (supra), counsel submitted that, in determining an application for security for costs, the court may consider, among other factors, the merits and genuineness of the proceedings; the plaintiff’s impecuniosity and whether it is attributable to the defendant’s conduct; whether an order for security would stifle the proceedings or impede access to justice; the public importance of the dispute; the likely costs of the proceedings and whether the security sought is proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the matter.

45. Further considerations include the timing of the application and the enforceability of any eventual costs order. Where security has previously been ordered, any subsequent application for increased security must be founded on a significant and unforeseen change in circumstances, and the jurisdiction to vary the amount should be exercised cautiously.

46. It was urged that the aforesaid considerations are disjunctive and non-exhaustive and have been satisfied in the present case, particularly in view of the 1st Plaintiff’s impecuniosity and the asserted absence of evidence of fraud in the testimony of Pushpinder Singh Mann.

47. The 3rd Defendant filed submissions dated 17th July 2026. Counsel submitted that as explained in Keary Developments Limited vs Tarmac Construction Limited & another [1995] All ER 543, an order for security for costs is discretionary and must be determined in light of all the circumstances of the case and that relevant considerations include the plaintiff’s prospects of success, whether an order for security would stifle a genuine claim, the prejudice likely to be suffered by either party, the appropriate amount of security and the timing of the application.

48. It was urged that the 4th Defendant had placed before the court uncontroverted evidence showing that the 1st Plaintiff was heavily indebted, had defaulted on its financial obligations, was unable to meet its daily operating expenses and had provided no realistic proposal for settling its debts. That evidence demonstrated that, if the suit were dismissed, the 1st Plaintiff would be unable to satisfy the substantial costs incurred by the 4th Defendant and the other Defendants.

49. Cited in support were Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited vs Salim Sultan Moloo & 5 others [2012] KEHC 3014 (KLR), and Munya vs Kithinji & 2 others [2014] KECA 876 (KLR).

50. Counsel maintained that the 4th Defendant had approached the court with candour and had disclosed all the information and documents in his possession relating to the 1st Plaintiff’s inability to pay. Reliance was placed on Gulf Engineering (East Africa) Ltd vs Amrik Singh Kalsi & another [1976] KEHC 5 (KLR), where the court held that once credible evidence establishes reason to believe that a plaintiff company will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs, the court has a discretion to order security, having regard to all the circumstances.

51. Regarding the prospects of the suit, Counsel submitted that the 1st Plaintiff’s claim had little prospect of success, contending that its sole witness, Pushpinder Singh Mann, had admitted during cross-examination that he had no evidence of fraud in the transfer of the suit property. He argued that, although the court should avoid a detailed assessment of the merits at this stage, the alleged admission, coupled with the closure of the 1st Plaintiff’s case, justified an order for security for costs.

52. The 1st Plaintiff’s counsel filed submissions dated 19th July 2026. Counsel submitted that the Defendants had repeatedly filed applications for stay and other interlocutory reliefs, thereby delaying the hearing of a suit that had remained pending for nearly fifteen years. The court was therefore urged to safeguard the Plaintiff’s rights to a fair hearing and access to justice under Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution.

53. Counsel submitted that an order for security for costs is discretionary and, as stated in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD vs Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others, Petition No. 16 of 2021, should be made only in genuine, special and exceptional circumstances, none of which had been demonstrated in the present case. It was contended that the Plaintiff’s claim was bona fide and had reasonable prospects of success, as it was undisputed that the suit property had previously belonged to the Plaintiff, that it had subsequently lost the property through transactions involving the Defendants, and that the 4th Defendant had paid no consideration for it.

54. Counsel submitted that the liabilities relied upon by the 4th Defendant arose from facilities procured fraudulently in the Plaintiff’s name by Pravin Galot and Rajesh Galot and were already the subject of Nairobi HCCC No. 149 of 2010, Manchester Outfitters Limited v Pravin Galot, Rajesh Galot and Diamond Trust Bank.

55. It was argued that given the advanced stage of the trial, the delay, the Defendants’ conduct and the absence of exceptional circumstances, an order for security will unjustifiably impede the Plaintiff’s rights of access to justice and a fair hearing under Articles 48, 50 and 159 of the Constitution. The court was therefore urged to dismiss the application with costs.

Analysis and Determination

56. Having considered the Motion, the affidavits and the parties’ submissions, the issues for determination are:

i. Whether the replying affidavit sworn by Pushpinder Singh Mann is fatally defective?

ii. Whether the 1st Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish security for costs?

57. The 3rd and 4th Defendants contend that Mr. Mann lacks authority to act for the 1st Plaintiff because his directorship remains disputed in HCCC No. 55 of 2012. At the outset, it is noted that the objection to Mr. Mann’s competence to swear the replying affidavit was raised for the first time in the Defendants’ submissions.

58. It is settled that submissions are not pleadings or evidence and cannot be used to introduce new factual matters that were not placed before the court through the appropriate pleadings or affidavit evidence. On that basis alone, the objection is improperly raised and cannot sustain an order striking out the replying affidavit.

59. In any event, the objection is without merit. The question of the lawful directorship and management of the 1st Plaintiff remains contested and is pending determination before various courts in the Commercial and Tax Division. This court cannot determine that dispute collaterally in an application for security for costs, nor has the 3rd or 4th Defendants placed before the court any subsisting order expressly declaring that Mr. Mann is not a director of, or is otherwise prohibited from acting on behalf of, the 1st Plaintiff.

60. To strike out his affidavit merely because his directorship is disputed would effectively prejudge an issue reserved for determination by the courts seized of that dispute. Accordingly, the objection to Mr. Mann’s competence to swear the replying affidavit is unmerited and is hereby rejected.

61. The next issue is whether the 1st Plaintiff should be ordered to furnish security for costs? Order 26 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules gives the court discretion to order security for the whole or any part of a defendant’s costs. It provides thus:

“1. In any suit the court may order that security for the whole or any part of the costs of any defendant or third or subsequent party be given by any other party.”

62. Speaking to this, the court in Marco Tools & Explosives Ltd vs Mamujee Brothers Ltd, [1988] KLR 730 held as follows:

“...the Court has unfettered judicial discretion to order or refuse security.  Much will depend upon the circumstances of each case, though the guidance is that the final result must be reasonable and modest.” 

63. In such an application, the applicant must demonstrate that the Plaintiff will not be able to satisfy an order for costs made at the end of the trial should he lose the case. In Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Githinji & 2 Others, CA No. 38 of 2013 [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court emphasized that:

“In an application for further security for costs, the Applicant ought to establish that the Respondent, if unsuccessful in the proceedings, would be unable to pay costs due to poverty.  It is not enough to allege that a Respondent will be unable to pay costs in the event that he is unsuccessful.  And the onus is on the Applicant to prove such inability or lack of good faith that would make an order for security reasonable.”

64. More recently, the Supreme Court in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD vs Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others (Petition 16 (E023) of 2021) [2023] KESC 11 (KLR) (17 February 2023) (Judgment) noted:

“Security for costs is defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary Ninth Edition at page 1478 as money, property, or a bond given to a court by a plaintiff or an appellant to secure the payment of court costs if that party loses. The purpose of security for costs order is to alleviate the concerns of potential difficulties in seeking to recover costs. An applicant of such an order, is required to establish that the respondent, if unsuccessful in the proceedings will be unable to pay costs. The objective is to protect a party from circumstances where one is dragged to court and made to incur costs due to litigation. It is meant to prevent frivolous and vexatious litigation.

46.In Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others: Civil Appeal(Application) 38 of 2013; [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal gave the rationale for security for costs which is to ensure firstly, that a party is not left without recompense for costs that might be awarded to him in the event that the unsuccessful party is unable to pay the same due to poverty; secondly, it ensures that a litigant who by reason of his financial ability is unable to pay costs of the litigation if he loses, is disabled from carrying on litigation indefinitely except on conditions that offer protection to the other party. Further, the court stated that in an application for security for costs, the applicant ought to establish that the respondent, if unsuccessful in the proceedings, would be unable to pay costs due to poverty. It is not enough to allege that a respondent will be unable to pay costs in the event that he is unsuccessful. In Kibiwott & 4 others v Registered Trustees of Monastery of Victory Nakuru, HCCC No 146 of 2004 the court there observed that for a party to succeed in an application for security for costs has to prove that the opposing party will not be able to pay the costs to be awarded in the event of the suit filed by such a party being dismissed.

47.The rationale for security for costs therefore is aimed at balancing the overarching objectives in the administration of justice as expressed under articles 48, 50 and 159 of the Constitution, that courts should aim to dispense justice. As such, the costs protect the defendant or a respondent against the risk that a costs order made in its favour may be rendered ineffective by the plaintiff’s impecuniosity. An order for security for costs will normally affect the interest of plaintiff’s access to the court system, regardless of their financial status; shield a successful defendant from litigation costs; and conserve the courts processes: costs and security for costs may discourage frivolous claims, and encourage the parties to conduct litigation in a manner that is proportional to the matters at issue.”

65. Setting out the parameters, the same court expressed itself thus:

“In determining whether it was appropriate to make an order that a party give security for costs, the court could have regard to the following matters and such other matters as it considered relevant in the peculiar circumstances of each case: the prospects of success or merits of the proceedings; the genuineness of the proceedings; the impecuniosity of the plaintiff; whether the plaintiff's impecuniosity was attributable to the defendant's conduct; whether the plaintiff was effectively in the position of a defendant; whether an order for security for costs would stifle the proceedings and/or impede access to justice; whether the proceedings involved a matter of public importance; whether there had been an admission or payment in court; whether the delay by the plaintiff in commencing the proceedings had prejudiced the defendant; the costs of the proceedings; Whether the security sought was proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute; the timing of the application for security for costs; whether an order for costs made against the plaintiff would be enforceable within the Republic of Kenya; the ease and convenience, or otherwise, of enforcing a Kenyan court judgment or order in the country of a non-resident plaintiff or appellant; if the plaintiff was a natural person, an order for security for costs could not be made merely on account of his or her impecuniosity. security for costs was to be given in such manner, at such time and on such terms (if any) as the court may by order direct; if the plaintiff failed to comply with an order under the instant rule, the court could order that the proceeding on the plaintiff's claim for relief in the proceedings be dismissed; the provisions of any Act under which the court could require security for costs to be given, such as the Elections Act; a second motion for security for costs would not succeed unless there was an unforeseen and material change in circumstances since the first order for security. An example of an unforeseen and material change in circumstances might be where a plaintiff had come into a sum of money sufficiently large that they could no longer make an impecuniosity argument. The defendant seeking increased security bears the onus of demonstrating a significant gap between the security ordered and the actual expenses which were not foreseeable, and that, in hindsight, the original request for security for costs was based on an assessment of the complexity of the case which hindsight has established was not realistic.The jurisdiction to increase or decrease the amount of security already ordered should not be exercised lightly or be used to second-guess the court that made the original order, whether on consent or otherwise, unless the gap between what was ordered and what later appears to be necessary is significant.”

66. Vide the present Motion, the 4th Defendant seeks an order compelling the 1st Plaintiff to furnish security for costs in the sum of Kshs. 40,000,000. He asserts that the 1st Plaintiff is insolvent, unable to meet its financial obligations and unlikely to satisfy an eventual order for costs should the suit fail. His position is supported by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, who further contend that the suit has little prospect of success.

67. In response, the 1st Plaintiff maintains that the application is belated, founded on disputed liabilities pending determination in other proceedings and intended to delay or stifle the trial.

68. The court has considered the parties contentions. Regarding the 1st Plaintiff’s alleged impecuniosity, the 4th Defendant principally relies on its indebtedness to Diamond Trust Bank and other creditors. Those liabilities are, however, contested. The 1st Plaintiff alleges that some arose from facilities procured without its authority by the 3rd and 4th Defendants, allegations which are already the subject of HCCC No. 149 of 2010 and continuing forensic investigations.

69. It also contends that any deterioration in its financial position is attributable, at least partly, to the Defendants’ alleged conduct. Determining the validity and origin of those debts, or the responsibility for the 1st Plaintiff’s financial position, would therefore require the court to decide disputed matters pending in other proceedings.

70. As to the prospects and genuineness of the suit, the 4th Defendant relies on Mr. Mann’s alleged admission that he had no evidence of fraud in the transfer of the suit property. The 1st Plaintiff disputes that characterization of Mr. Mann’s testimony and maintains that the suit property previously belonged to it, was transferred through the impugned transactions and was acquired by the 4th Defendant without payment of consideration.

71. The issue of whether the suit property was fraudulently transferred from the 1st Plaintiff or not lie at the heart of this suit. The claim cannot, at this stage, be described as frivolous or vexatious without prematurely evaluating the evidence before the Defendants have presented their case.

72. The timing and bona fides of the application are equally material. The Motion was brought more than fourteen years after the suit was instituted and after the 1st Plaintiff’s witness has testified and closed its case. Although the timing is attributed to the alleged recent deterioration in the 1st Plaintiff’s financial position, the 3rd and 4th Defendants admittedly ceased being directors in April 2024 and were aware from that time of the change in its management and banking arrangements.

73. Moreover, the principal bank facilities, guarantees and liabilities relied upon predated the Motion. While delay alone does not necessarily establish bad faith, the timing of the motion, its reliance on long-standing and disputed liabilities, and its likely effect on the trial cast doubt on its bona fides.

74. The court must also consider whether the security sought is proportionate and whether it will impede access to justice. The 4th Defendant seeks Kshs. 40,000,000 but has not provided a sufficient assessment or other objective basis for that amount. Requiring the 1st Plaintiff to furnish such substantial security at this advanced stage of the suit will interrupt a long-running trial when only the defence case remains, and could effectively stifle the proceedings.

75. The resulting prejudice to the 1st Plaintiff and the administration of justice outweighs the asserted risk of unrecoverable costs, particularly where that risk is founded substantially upon liabilities whose validity and origin remain disputed.

76. Considering all the circumstances and the parameters set out in Westmont Holdings SDN BHD (supra), the court is not satisfied that the 4th Defendant has demonstrated a sufficient basis for the exercise of discretion in favour of security for costs.

77. Ultimately, the Notice of Motion dated 20th May 2026 is found to be unmerited and is dismissed with costs to the 1st Plaintiff.

Dated, signed and delivered virtually in Nairobi this 15th day of October, 2026.

O. A. Angote

Judge

In the presence of;

Ms Awiti holding brief for Genje Gilbert of Plaintiff

Mr. Kaka for 2nd and 3rd Defendant

Mr. Kaka for Ouma for 1st Defendant

Mr. Kaka holding brief for Kenyatta for 4th Defendant

Mr. Ashioya for Havi (SC) for 5th Defendant

Court Assistant: Tracy

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