Background
Vide a Further Amended Plaint dated the 28th July 2023, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs:
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Selected passages from the judgment. Follow each paragraph link to read the full context.
Vide a Further Amended Plaint dated the 28th July 2023, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs:
Paragraph 1 →Consequently, I hold that the Plaintiffs’ suit is res judicata and lacking in merit. I dismiss it with costs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants.
Paragraph 120 →In the event that I have erred in finding above that the plaintiffs’ case is res judicata, now I consider whether their case was proved? On this limb, the backbone of the plaintiffs’ claim was that Shadrack Kamau was of feeble mind and which Peter Njoroge Kamau took advantage of in acquiring the 2 acres portion now comprised in L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227
Paragraph 110 →REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROВІ
CIVIL ELC CASE NO. 2952 OF 1997
TABITHA GATHONI KAMAU & 4 OTHERS ......................... PLAINTIFFS
= VERSUS =
HANNAH NJERI NJOROGE .............................................. 1st DEFENDANT
ESTHER NJERI NJOROGE
Both sued as the legal representatives of
the Estate of PETER NJOROGE KARIMА) ...................... 2nd DEFENDANT
DISTRICT LAND REGISTRAR ......................................... 3rd DEFENDANT
J U D G M E N T
A. BACKGROUND
1. Vide a Further Amended Plaint dated the 28th July 2023, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs:
i. An order restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants, their agents or servants from alienating and/or interfering with the suit premises until the suit herein shall be heard and determined.
ii. A declaration that the alleged sale by the 1st Plaintiff's son to the 1st and 2nd Defendants' late husband was illegal, null and void.
iii. There be an order declaring Title No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227 null and void and the same be revoked forthwith.
iv. The District Land Registrar Kiambu be ordered to rectify the register accordingly.
v. Costs of this suit.
2. The Plaintiffs’ case is that, on or about 11th January, 1990, following confirmation of the grant in Kiambu Succession Case No. 211 of 1990, the 1st Plaintiff’s son, Shadrack Nganga Kamau, was registered as the subsequent proprietor of Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037, to hold it in trust for himself and the other members of his family, who are the other Plaintiffs in this suit. They state that he has since disappeared and that his whereabouts remain unknown.
3. The Plaintiffs aver that, on or about 27th February, 1997, the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s late husband, Peter Njoroge Karima took advantage of the 1st Plaintiff’s son, Shadrack Kamau, whom he knew or had reasonable cause to believe was feeble-minded and incapable of entering into a contract for the sale of land. He unduly and fraudulently influenced him to sign false documents purporting to show that he had sold Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 to him for the purchase price of Kshs.520,000/=.
4. Following the purported sale, Mr. Karima obtained a consent from the Land Control Board. The consent, they maintain was unlawful, irregular and fraudulent, because it bore neither a Land Control Registration Number nor a date, and because it was obtained without their approval and consent as the rightful and equitable owners of the suit land.
5. The Plaintiffs further aver that, on the strength of the purported Land Control Board consent, Mr. Karima unduly and fraudulently caused Shadrack Kamau to execute a transfer of the suit land in his favour. He subsequently presented a false document to the Kiambu District Land Registrar, who, on 6th November, 1997, effected the transfer of two acres of the suit land into his name. According to the Plaintiffs, the Land Registrar was unaware of the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the Defendants’ late husband.
6. The Plaintiffs particularize the alleged fraud as including the registration of the transfer without surrender of the original title, which they contend was wholly irregular and unlawful; knowingly taking undue advantage of the 1st Plaintiff’s feeble-mindedness in collusion with the 1st Defendant’s relative despite knowing that the son was feeble-minded and lacked the legal capacity to enter into a contract for the sale of land.
7. Further particulars of fraud were set out as Mr. Karima falsely alleging that he paid the 1st Plaintiff’s son Kshs.520,000/= in cash, despite knowing or having reason to believe that he was feeble-minded or of unsound mind and could not sensibly handle such a substantial sum. The Plaintiffs also allege that the late husband presented false transfer documents to the Land Control Board and the District Land Registrar, thereby falsely and fraudulently procuring the unlawful transfer of two acres of the suit land to himself, without the knowledge of, and to the detriment of, its beneficial owners.
8. Further, they contend, following the purported sale, Mr. Karima, armed with an unlawful and/or irregular court order obtained in RMCC No. 282 of 1997, entered the suit property and damaged their crops. He eventually obtained title to Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227, which was issued irregularly and unlawfully, as they still held the original title that ought to have been surrendered upon subdivision and issuance of the new titles.
9. The Plaintiffs urge that the Defendants are not entitled to the suit property and would at most be entitled to a refund of the purchase price, if any, upon proof that the alleged sums were paid, which payment they deny. They aver that the foregoing acts have subjected them to harassment, inconvenience, substantial loss and damage, and that they will suffer irreparable harm should the Defendant obtain title to and possession of the suit plot.
10. The Defendants relied on the statement of defence dated the 6th September, 2005 by Peter Njoroge Karima(deceased). It was their statement that to his knowledge one Shadrack Nganga Kamau was registered as the sole proprietor of L.R Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 from the 11th January, 1994 and that the registration aforesaid was not undertaken in trust for anyone else.
11. Pursuant to a sale agreement dated 27th February 1997, duly executed by Shadrack Nganga before an advocate and other witnesses, Mr Karima purchased two acres from the suit property for an agreed consideration of Kshs.520,000/=, which he paid in full. They maintained that the registered proprietor had not been induced by anyone to sell the land and that the purchaser was an innocent purchaser for value. In any event, Shadrack was neither feeble-minded nor incapable of entering into a contract and that the sale transaction was validly undertaken.
12. Upon execut1on of the sale agreement, it was stated, an application was made to the Lari Land Control Board for the transfer of 2 acres to Mr. Karima as an undivided share which application was approved by the Land Control Board with the knowledge and consent of the registered proprietor. The consent of the Plaintiffs was not necessary as they had no interest in the land known in law. Even if they consent was necessary, that was an issue between the Plaintiffs and the registered owner.
13. They denied the allegations of fraud and placed the Plaintiffs to strict proof. As per the statement, Mr. Karima moved into the 2 acres and obtained a separate title in respect thereof. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs have all along lived in Narok where the 1st Plaintiff is married and where her husband resides.
14. It was urged that the matter is in any event res judicata as the same issues were raised and adjudicated upon in Kiambu Principal Magistrates Court Case number 282 of 1997 and the same has been overtaken by events and cannot succeed in law. Further, HCCA 250 of 1997 is pending over the same matter.
B. HEARING AND EVIDENCE
15. PW1, was Tabitha Gathoni Kamau. It was her evidence that the co-Plaintiffs are her sons. She testified that she instituted the suit upon learning that the suit property, Gatamaiyo/Kagwe/1037, had been sold to the 1st and 2nd Defendants husband one Peter Njoroge Karima, by another of her sons, Shadrack Ng’ang’a, who was then the registered proprietor.
16. She testified that Shadrack Ng’ang’a had been issued with a title deed to the suit property on 11th January 1994, which she produced as P Exhibit 1. According to her, she had never surrendered the title deed to the Lands Office for purposes of sale or subdivision. She further testified that following the death of her husband, she suffered stress and was admitted at Kenyatta National Hospital, where she was attended to by Dr. Ann Obondo. In support thereof, she produced a letter dated 19th March 1993 as P Exhibit 2.
17. It was PW1’s further evidence that the suit property was family land which originally belonged to Mucheke Kariri, the father of her late husband. Following his death, David Mwaura Mucheke obtained letters of administration in respect of his estate, which she referred to as MFI 3. She stated that Shadrack Ng’ang’a subsequently became the registered proprietor of the suit property pursuant to those succession proceedings.
18. PW1 testified that she was neither consulted about nor aware of the subsequent sale of the property to the Defendant. She stated that her other children were similarly unaware of the transaction and that she did not attend any Land Control Board meeting in relation to the sale. Upon learning of the transaction, PW1 testified that she reported the matter to the District Commissioner, Kiambu, who referred her to the District Officer at Lari and thereafter to the Lands Office at Kiambu. At the Lands Office, she learnt that the transfer to the purchaser had already been registered.
19. According to her, the Land Registrar informed her that the transaction had proceeded with the approval of the District Officer. She further stated that, following intervention by the District Commissioner, she witnessed the Land Registrar cancel entries appearing on the green card, which she produced as P Exhibit 4.
20. She testified that the District Commissioner directed that the property be transferred to her, following which she took steps to have it registered in her name. She applied for Land Control Board consent to the proposed transfer and identified the application bearing her thumbprint as the document through which she sought that consent. The application and the consent were produced as P. Exhibits 5 and 6, respectively.
21. She explained that, upon appearing before the Land Control Board, they were informed that a caution had been lodged against the property, preventing registration of the transfer. She produced the caution as P. Exhibit 7, the plaint in PMCC No. 287 of 1997 as P. Exhibit 8, and the defence and counterclaim as P. Exhibit 9.
22. Ms. Kamau further testified that, after filing the counterclaim, her Counsel filed an application for an injunction, which she produced as P. Exhibit 10. However, Mr. Karima was not restrained from entering the suit land. She thereafter lodged HCCA No. 250 of 1997, seeking to recover the property, and produced the appeal as P. Exhibit 11. She stated that she was unaware of any orders issued in the appeal, explaining that she could neither read nor write. She later learnt that a consent had been filed in PMCC No. 287 of 1997, produced as P Exhibit 12.
23. PW1 further testified that they had withdrawn the counterclaim in the Kiambu proceedings and thereafter instituted the present suit. She produced the notice of withdrawal of the counterclaim as P. Exhibit 13. She also confirmed that HCCA No. 250 of 1997 had been withdrawn and produced the notice of withdrawal as P. Exhibit 14.
24. She stated that she had learnt of a sale agreement between Peter Njoroge Karima and her son, Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau, in which Njuguna Chauku Karemi, her husband’s brother and Shadrack’s uncle, was named as a witness. She also knew Mwirigi Kihuhia, another person named in the agreement, who came from her village and participated in the Lari Land Control Board at Rukuma. Mr. Karima similarly came from her village, approximately one and a half miles away, and knew her family.
25. PW1 maintained that the purported sale agreement was fraudulent. She explained that, after learning of the alleged transaction, she had noticed no change in her son’s behaviour or lifestyle. He had undertaken manual work before the alleged sale and continued doing so thereafter. At the material time, he was living at Njuguna Karemi’s home, approximately 100 metres from hers. Njuguna was also one of the persons named as witnesses to the agreement.
26. She further testified that, when she discussed the alleged sale with Shadrack, he told her that the land had already been sold by Njuguna Karemi and Joseph Ng’ang’a Karemi, the latter being her husband’s nephew and the son of her brother-in-law. According to her, Shadrack denied participating in the sale and stated that the two had given him Kshs.1,000/= to buy flour and soap for himself.
27. PW1 described Shadrack as lacking intelligence and appearing retarded, adding that she used to take him to a doctor concerning his mental capacity. She recalled that he had sworn an affidavit denying that he had sold the suit land. She produced the affidavit, sworn on 18th December 1997, as P. Exhibit 15.
28. Regarding the succession proceedings, she explained that she had left Narok during the clashes and was then living on the suit land in Kiambu. She had previously gone to Narok to lease land because it was more productive and did not require manure, unlike the land in Kiambu. She added that the Kiambu land had not been subdivided at that time.
29. PW1 testified that she had seven children and considered the four acres remaining for her family, after two acres of the six-acre suit property had been hived off for Mr. Karima, insufficient for their needs. She stated that she did not know whether new titles had been issued following the alleged sales or subdivision. She maintained that she had retained the original title deed to the entire six-acre property throughout and had neither been asked to surrender it nor done so.
30. She further stated that Shadrack had disappeared from home in 2003 and that she neither knew his whereabouts nor what might have happened to him. She had reported his disappearance at Muthangari Police Station in Nairobi and at Kitale Police Station.
31. During cross-examination, it was PW1’s evidence that during the period when her son was the registered owner of the property, she did not register any caveat or caution on the land to indicate any interest. She stated that the title deed for Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 had been held by her husband’s brother, Njuguna Chauku. She explained that he had paid Kshs.5,000/= on their behalf in connection with the subdivision of the land and had refused to release the title until he was reimbursed.
32. She therefore involved the Chief of Gatamaiyu to witness the payment and facilitate the release of the title. She denied that the Chief’s involvement arose from her having forcibly taken the title from her son, Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau.
33. Regarding Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997, PW1 acknowledged that she was the 2nd Defendant but stated that she did not know what relief the Plaintiff in that case had sought. She explained that an advocate known as Wambui had informed her that she and Shadrack had been sued. Wambui initially represented her before her present advocate, Mr. Nduati, took over the matter. PW1 stated that she could neither read nor write.
34. PW1 stated that she was unaware that an order had been issued in the Kiambu proceedings directing that Peter Njoroge Karima be issued with a title to the disputed two acres. She also stated that she had challenged the Kiambu Court’s decision before the High Court and had never withdrawn her appeal. Upon being referred to High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 1094 of 1998, she recalled filing the application for judicial review of the Kiambu Court’s orders but could not recall whether it had been withdrawn.
35. She also acknowledged that High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 1688 of 1999 had been filed. She explained that she had not mentioned either application in her evidence-in-chief because she had not been asked about them.
36. PW1 further stated that she was unaware that Shadrack had sworn an affidavit in the Kiambu proceedings admitting that he had sold two acres of the suit land to Peter Njoroge Karima. She explained that she had not filed an affidavit rebutting his deposition because she was unaware of it, having only learnt that a case had been instituted in Kiambu, which prompted her to engage advocate Wambui.
37. She maintained that she had retained custody of the title to the suit land throughout and that nobody had asked her to produce it. She stated that she had produced the title in the present proceedings as Exhibit 1. When asked whether she had a claim against her son, Shadrack, she responded that the question should be addressed to her advocate.
38. Upon being re-examined, PW1 explained that Shadrack had been registered as proprietor of the suit land because she was unwell. She stated that her husband was called Kamau and that they had seven children together, the youngest having been born in 1982. Her husband died in 1988, and they remained husband and wife until his death. Although she lived in Narok while he lived elsewhere, he visited her frequently.
39. PW1 reiterated that she had always retained custody of the original title, a fact known to Shadrack, and that he had never requested it at the time of the alleged sale. Upon learning that the suit land was being sold, she sought assistance from the District Commissioner in Kiambu. According to her, the District Commissioner attempted to assist but subsequently established that proceedings had been instituted against them in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. She stated that she never testified in those proceedings.
40. She further recalled instructing her present advocate to seek an injunction from the Kiambu Court restraining the Defendant from entering the suit land. Her evidence was that her advocate obtained restraining orders, but the Defendant nevertheless forced his way onto the property.
41. PW1 stated that, to her knowledge, the Kiambu case had not proceeded to final determination, as she had not been called to testify. She was unaware of any consent order recorded between the Defendant and Shadrack. She also stated that she did not know how the suit land had been subdivided and had not been present when the subdivision took place.
42. PW1 stated that Shadrack Ng’ang’a, Njuguna Shauku and Joseph Ng’ang’a took her land and sold it to the Defendant. She described the three as cousins and stated that Njuguna Shauku had witnessed the sale agreement between the Defendant and Shadrack.
43. PW2, David Mwaura Mucheke, testified that his father had two wives and that Tabitha was married to Kingman, his paternal uncle. He stated that he had applied for letters of administration in respect of the deceased’s land and had given the land directly to the Plaintiff. According to PW2, the 1st Plaintiff was in hospital during the succession proceedings, and he represented her. He added that, because she was in hospital, he had given out her son’s name in the proceedings.
44. During cross-examination, PW2 reiterated that the 1st Plaintiff was in hospital during the succession proceedings. He also stated that he was unaware whether two acres of the suit land had been sold to Peter Njoroge Karima.
45. PW3, Peter Njagi Njuguna, a qualified medical doctor and psychiatrist, testified that Shadrack Kamau was his patient. He stated that, while working at Mathare Hospital, he received a referral from the Educational Assessment and Resource Services in Kiambu requesting a mental health assessment of Shadrack. Upon examining Shadrack and taking his history, he learnt that he was 33 years old and had dropped out of school in Standard Three, having repeated every class.
46. He stated that Shadrack could perform only simple tasks, such as feeding animals and tilling land, and remained single because he was unable to approach women for friendship. It was his further evidence that a mental state examination revealed that his speech was well developed and that he exhibited no symptoms of mental illness, but had generalised and global deficiencies. In PW3’s opinion, Shadrack has mild mental retardation, accompanied by automatic obedience, and required every possible assistance. He produced his report dated 26th January 1998.
47. During cross-examination, PW3 stated that the original report was unavailable but confirmed that the copy before the court was of the report he had signed. He explained that the original had been given to the persons who escorted Shadrack and that he had obtained most of the history from the accompanying person and Shadrack himself.
48. He acknowledged that the tasks Shadrack could perform were ordinary tasks expected of a 33-year-old and conceded that a stranger might not recognise that he had a mental impairment. He further stated that, when he met Shadrack and his mother, he was unaware of the ongoing litigation. He clarified that the retardation was mild and did not prevent Shadrack from performing simple duties.
49. DW1, Joseph Nganga Mwaura, adopted his witness statement dated 18th February 2025 as his evidence-in-chief. He testified that he is a resident of Kisaju, Kitengela, in Kajiado County and a first cousin of Shadrack Nganga Kamau, formerly the 1st Defendant. He explained that their grandfather had three sons: Kareri Cauku, his father; Joel Njuguna Cauku; and Kamau Cauku, Shadrack’s father.
50. It was his evidence that, from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, his father and his two uncles worked on a farm in Kitale owned by a European known as Barnley. His father was employed as a personal driver, Joel Njuguna Cauku as a tractor driver and Kamau Cauku in the dairy section. All three brothers were married and lived on the farm with their families.
51. DW1 stated that, by 1970, Kamau Cauku had two children, Shadrack Nganga Kamau and Gathii Kamau. Around that time, their mother, Tabitha Gathoni, left Kamau Cauku, and the children were placed in the care of DW1’s mother. He testified that Shadrack and Gathii subsequently underwent circumcision in accordance with Kikuyu customs at Ngamba Village, Gatamaiyu, Kagwe, where the suit property was situated. Tabitha did not attend the ceremony, although, according to him, custom required her presence.
52. He further testified that his parents moved from Kitale with their children, together with Shadrack and Gathii, and settled on his father’s ancestral land. After establishing a home for them, his father secured employment as a driver in Nairegi Enkare/Roibot with an employer known as Karanai Ole Kisieri. While working there, his father encountered Tabitha, who had remarried. DW1 stated that, during a visit in 1984, his father showed him the homestead where Tabitha lived and informed him that she had married into the Githuna family and had borne about five children, including the 3rd, 4th and 5th Plaintiffs. According to DW1, Kamau Cauku died in or about 1990 while working in Kitale and was buried there. Tabitha did not attend the burial, and DW1 was unsure whether she had been aware of his death at the time.
53. Regarding the family land, DW1 testified that his grandfather and his grandfather’s elder brother, Mucheke Kariri, had lived on their father’s 50-acre property, which was registered in Mucheke Kariri’s name. Following their deaths, succession proceedings were instituted in Nairobi High Court Succession Cause No. 211 of 1990. Mucheke Kariri’s family received 30 acres, while Cauku Kariri’s family received 20 acres. The latter portion was divided among the three brothers, with Kareri Cauku and Joel Njuguna Cauku each receiving seven acres and Kamau Cauku’s estate receiving six acres. Kamau Cauku had died by the time the grant was confirmed.
54. It was his evidence that his father and Joel Njuguna Cauku convened a family meeting at which it was initially agreed that Kamau Cauku’s six-acre share would be registered absolutely in the names of Shadrack and Gathii. However, Gathii declined his share, stating that his mother had informed him that his entitlement lay elsewhere. DW1 stated that, as Tabitha had remarried, the family agreed that the entire six-acre share would be registered in Shadrack’s name absolutely, without any obligation to hold it in trust for another person.
55. DW1 further testified that, after obtaining title, Shadrack expressed a desire to sell part of the land to finance the construction of a decent home, marry and start a business. The family agreed, and Shadrack identified Peter Njoroge Karima as the purchaser of two acres. DW1 stated that he was present when the sale agreement was witnessed by an advocate and two other persons.
56. He maintained that Peter Njoroge Karima was placed in possession of the two-acre portion, that the requisite ownership documents were duly executed and that the relevant Land Control Board consent was obtained. It was his evidence that the purchaser had lawfully acquired the land.
57. On cross-examination, DW1 stated that he had seen the pleadings filed in court before recording his witness statement. He identified Shadrack’s parents as Tabitha Gathoni and Kamau Shauko. With reference to paragraph 5 of his statement, he explained that Ng’ang’a had a brother named Shauko and that Kamau Shauko had died around 1992 or 1993.
58. Regarding the succession proceedings, DW1 maintained that the land was to be allocated to Shadrack alone. He acknowledged that his witness statement did not indicate that Gathii had not claimed the land. He further explained that their father was alive at the time and that their share had therefore been registered in their father’s name.
59. DW1 explained that he had not participated in the present case earlier because he was involved in other cases instituted by Tabitha. He stated that he was not a party to the sale agreement and identified his father, Joel Njuguna and Kamau as the persons who had sold the land. He described David Mucheke as an uncle within the family and stated that Mucheke Karimi’s land measured 50 acres, out of which Shadrack had been allocated six acres.
60. He added that David had lived in Miharati, Gilgil, before moving to Kitengela in 2010. When questioned about the document dated 8th August 1996, DW1 stated that he had no knowledge of its contents. He maintained that the land had been sold in 1997 and that Ng’ang’a was not mentally unstable, notwithstanding PW3’s evidence to the contrary.
61. On re-examination, he referred to paragraph 11 of his witness statement, in which he had stated that Gathii had refused to part with his land. He further testified that, when Shadrack sold the land, the agreement was signed in the presence of Advocate Peter Gatere. Although he did not sign the agreement, he was among those present.
62. DW2 was David Koigu Njoroge, a farmer and a driver. He adopted his witness statement dated the 20th November, 2025 as his evidence in chief and adopted the documents dated 23rd August, 2013 as DEX 1-7.
63. It was his evidence vide the statement he is a son of the late Peter Njoroge Karima, one of the original Defendants, whose estate is represented by Hannah Njeri Njoroge and Esther Njeri Njoroge, the 1st and 2nd Defendants, respectively.
64. He asserted that he was fully conversant with the transaction between his late father and Shadrack Nganga Kamau concerning Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037, including the sale agreement, the resultant title and the documents listed in the Defendants’ list of documents dated 23rd August 2013, save for the details of items 5 and 6. He added that he was approximately 27 years old when the transaction took place.
65. He stated that, pursuant to the sale agreement, his father purchased two acres from Shadrack Nganga Kamau and paid the purchase price in full. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 was subsequently subdivided, and the resultant parcel, Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227, was transferred to his father. According to him, the register for Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 did not indicate that Shadrack held the property in trust for anyone at the time of purchase.
66. After the purchase, he stated, the purchased portion was physically handed over to his father, who proceeded to develop it. At the time, only Shadrack and his wife occupied the entire original parcel. He maintained that his father and family had remained in occupation of the purchased land from the time of the transaction to the date of his statement.
67. During cross-examination, he stated that he had attended court on the previous occasion but arrived when the proceedings were almost concluding, while DW1 was giving evidence.
68. According to him, Shadrack had no family of his own and had therefore attended the transaction with his uncles. He explained that they knew Shadrack and his brother as orphans and did not know their mother’s whereabouts.
69. He only later learnt that the Plaintiff was Shadrack’s mother. Referring to the Land Control Board document at page 9, being the consent dated 11th February 1997, he identified an entry under item 6 described as consent, He acknowledged that the Plaintiff’s name appeared in the document but could not tell whether she had attended the Board meeting as Shadrack’s mother or as a buyer.
70. He stated that the title was registered on 6th November 1997, but acknowledged that the consent to transfer in his possession was undated and that no transfer form had been produced. Regarding the mutation forms, he stated that they had been produced and that he knew they were available. He did not know why an entry in the green card had been cancelled. He was, however, aware that Ng’ang’a had intended to transfer the whole parcel to Tabitha, prompting his father to sue him.
71. DW3, Esther Njeri Njoroge, a peasant farmer, adopted her witness statement dated 1st December 2025. She testified that Peter Karima Njoroge was her husband and that, upon being granted letters of administration jointly with Jane Njoroge, she took over the conduct of this case. She also adopted the defence filed by Peter Karimi Njoroge and produced the letters of administration dated 28th January 2025 as D. Exhibit 8.
72. During cross-examination, she stated that she was not present when her husband paid for the land. She knew Shadrack Ng’ang’a, whom she identified as the person who had approached her husband to purchase it. She added that Shadrack was accompanied by his uncle, Njuguna.
C. SUBMISSIONS
73. The Plaintiffs filed submissions dated 11th February 2026. Counsel submitted that the suit property originated from ancestral land which was subdivided following Succession Cause No. 211 of 1990, with Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau receiving six acres subsequently registered as L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037. Relying on the evidence of PW1 and PW2, counsel argued that Shadrack held the property in trust for the family and could not dispose of it without their consent. Citing C.A. No.12/1982-Francis Munene Paul Muthuita v Milka Wanoe & 3 Others and Gatimu Kinguru v Muya Gathangi [1976] KLR 253, counsel submitted that such a customary or family trust was enforceable notwithstanding its absence from the register.
74. Counsel submitted that the Defendants’ deceased husband was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, citing his knowledge of Shadrack’s family without involving them in the transaction, Shadrack’s affidavit indicating that he received only Kshs.1,000/=, the absence of the 1st Plaintiff’s signature on the consent order underpinning the subdivision and registration, and the failure to surrender the original title. Counsel further relied on PW3’s evidence of Shadrack’s intellectual impairment and the use of a signature on the transaction documents despite his ordinarily executing documents by thumbprint. Citing Civil Appeal, No 59 OF 1982 Geoffrey Ndungu Theuri v Charles Ndumia Wahome, counsel argued that Shadrack lacked the legal capacity to enter into a valid sale agreement.
75. As regards the plea that the purchaser acquired the property innocently, counsel relying on Hannah Wacheke Kimathi & 6 Others t/a Umoja Investors SHG vs Julius Kimani Maina [2024] KEELC 1381 (KLR), Arthi Highway Developers Limited vs West End Butchery Limited & 6 Others [2015] KECA 816 (KLR), Dina Management Limited vs County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others [2023] KESC 30 (KLR) and Katende vs Haridar & Company Limited [2008] 2 EA 173 submitted that a purchaser invoking the bona fide purchaser doctrine must establish, among other matters, acquisition of a valid title, payment of valuable consideration, good faith, due diligence and absence of actual or constructive notice of any defect in the vendor’s title.
76. Counsel submitted that the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 established that the suit property was ancestral land held by Shadrack in trust for the family and that its transfer was unlawful. It was emphasized that the Defendants did not produce the material transaction documents in evidence, while DW3 admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged sale. The persons said to have witnessed the agreement were also not called to testify. Counsel therefore contended that the Plaintiffs’ evidence remained materially uncontroverted and satisfied the civil standard of proof.
77. On costs, counsel relied on Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act and submitted that costs ordinarily follow the event. Given the prolonged history of the dispute, the alleged deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ use of the property and the emotional burden occasioned by the litigation, counsel urged the court to allow the suit with costs to the Plaintiffs.
78. The Defendant filed submissions dated 19th August 2026. Counsel submitted that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the issues raised had previously been determined in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. Relying on Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR and Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, counsel argued that jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage and, once the court finds that it is absent, it must down its tools.
79. On Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau’s mental capacity, counsel submitted that neither the original plaint nor Shadrack’s affidavit of 19th May, 1997 and 18th December 1997 alleged that he lacked capacity to contract, the case then being that he had been misled or compelled to execute the sale documents. Counsel argued that the allegation that Shadrack was feeble-minded was introduced for the first time in the amended plaint filed about five years later, thereby materially departing from the Plaintiffs’ original case and constituting an abuse of the court process.
80. Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiffs had themselves relied upon documents executed by Shadrack, including a Land Control Board consent dated 11th May 1995 for the transfer of the property to the 1st Plaintiff and his affidavit sworn on 18th December 1997. It was therefore inconsistent for them to accept the validity of documents favourable to their case while rejecting those executed in favour of the Defendant on the ground of Shadrack’s alleged incapacity. According to counsel, Shadrack’s participation in the sale, Land Control Board proceedings, transfer and litigation demonstrated that he possessed the requisite mental capacity.
81. In the alternative, counsel argued that if Shadrack was incapable of managing his affairs, the suit was procedurally defective because the Plaintiffs had not complied with the Mental Health Act and the applicable provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning proceedings involving persons under disability. No guardian ad litem had been appointed for him, yet the cause of action arose directly from his alleged conduct. Counsel maintained that Shadrack was a necessary party and that the suit could not properly proceed in his absence.
82. On whether the Defendant knew or ought to have known of Shadrack’s alleged incapacity, counsel relied on PW1’s evidence that she did not know the Defendant before discovering the sale. It was therefore submitted that she could not establish when or in what circumstances the Defendant met Shadrack or whether he knew of any mental condition. Counsel also relied on PW3’s concession that a stranger might not have known that Shadrack had a mental problem. The allegation that the Defendant knowingly exploited Shadrack was consequently said to be unsupported by the evidence.
83. Counsel further argued that no fraudulent or fictitious documents had been identified or produced. The evidence showed that the Defendant purchased two acres out of L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 rather than the entire six-acre parcel. There was likewise no evidence that the Defendant exercised undue influence over Shadrack or participated in any fraud. The pleaded allegations of fraud had therefore not been proved to the required standard.
84. On res judicata, counsel submitted that the questions of ownership, family trust, the sale and the Defendant’s entitlement to two acres had already arisen in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997 and had been resolved through the consent order. The 1st Plaintiff subsequently challenged that outcome through HCCA No. 250 of 1997 and Judicial Review Application No. 1094. The memorandum of appeal expressly raised the contention that the property was family land held by Shadrack in trust for the family. However, the appeal was later withdrawn, leaving the consent order intact.
85. Counsel accordingly maintained that the present suit impermissibly sought to reopen matters already resolved by a competent court and would, if allowed, effectively nullify the subsisting orders issued in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. The Plaintiffs’ proper remedy lay in their appeal against those orders, which they had withdrawn, rather than instituting fresh proceedings. The court was therefore urged to dismiss the suit with costs to the Defendant.
86. The Plaintiffs filed rejoinder submissions dated 25th August 2026. Counsel addressed, first, whether the court could set aside the consent order issued in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997, pursuant to which two acres were excised from L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 and transferred to the late Peter Njoroge Karima.
87. Counsel submitted that a superior court may, in the exercise of its supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction, set aside an order of a subordinate court obtained through an irregular or unlawful process, even in the absence of a formal appeal. Reliance was placed on Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to supervise subordinate courts, call for their records and issue appropriate orders or directions to secure the fair administration of justice.
88. It was argued that the impugned consent order was irregular because it was entered into between Peter Njoroge Karima and Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau without the participation of the 1st Plaintiff, notwithstanding that she was a party to the proceedings. Counsel maintained that an order made in breach of a party’s right to be heard, without jurisdiction or through a process amounting to an abuse of the court, may be set aside as a matter of judicial duty.
89. In support of that position, counsel relied on Boro Kabuthia & 10 Others v Michael James Karanja [2025] KECA 624 (KLR), which cited Attorney General v Small Wonder Limited [2015] KECA 122 (KLR). It was submitted that proceedings conducted without proper notice to an affected party are irregular and that any resulting judgment or order must be set aside ex debito justitiae to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
90. On res judicata, counsel referred to Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act and submitted that the doctrine is inapplicable because the issues raised in the present suit were never heard and finally determined in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. According to counsel, the impugned consent was filed hastily to steal a march on the 1st Plaintiff, after which no further substantive proceedings were undertaken in that suit.
91. Counsel further submitted that no judgment had been delivered in the subordinate court proceedings, a fact said to have been confirmed by DW2, who did not produce any such judgment. In the circumstances, it was contended that the requirement that the former dispute must have been heard and finally determined had not been satisfied. The Plaintiffs therefore urged the court to reject the Defendant’s plea of res judicata.
D. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
92. Having considered the pleadings, evidence and submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:
i. Whether the suit is res judicata? And if not?
ii. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought?
I. Whether the suit is res judicata?
93. The substantive law on res judicata is found in Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 which provides that:
“No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court”.
94. In the case of John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others (Petition 17 of 2015) [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) (Civ) (6 August 2021) (Judgment), the Supreme Court delved into an in-depth discussion of the concept of res judicata thus;
“…. The essence of the res judicata doctrine is further explicated by Wigram, V-C in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313, as follows:… where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward, as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a Judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time” [emphasis supplied].
Hence, whenever the question of res judicata is raised, a court will look at the decision claimed to have settled the issues in question; the entire pleadings and record of that previous case; and the instant case¾to ascertain the issues determined in the previous case, and whether these are the same in the subsequent case. The court should ascertain whether the parties are the same, or are litigating under the same title; and whether the previous case was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. This test is summarized in Bernard Mugo Ndegwa v James Nderitu Githae & 2 others, (2010) eKLR, under five distinct heads: (i) the matter in issue is identical in both suits; (ii) the parties in the suit are the same; (iii) sameness of the title/claim; (iv) concurrence of jurisdiction; and (v) finality of the previous decision.
95. It is the Defendants’ case that the present suit is res judicata on account of the proceedings and consent order in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. They contend that the questions concerning ownership of the suit property, the alleged family trust, the validity of the sale and the late Peter Njoroge Karima’s entitlement to two acres were raised in those proceedings and resolved by the consent order pursuant to which the two acres were excised from L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 and registered as L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227.
96. They further state that the 1st Plaintiff challenged that outcome through HCCA No. 250 of 1997 and Judicial Review Application No. 1094, and that the memorandum of appeal expressly raised the claim that Shadrack held the property in trust for the family. The appeal was, however, withdrawn, leaving the consent order intact. In their view, the present suit seeks to reopen the same dispute and obtain relief that would effectively nullify a subsisting order of a competent court, whereas the Plaintiffs’ remedy lay in pursuing their challenge to that order in the appropriate proceedings.
97. In response, the Plaintiffs contend that the requirements of res judicata have not been satisfied because the issues raised in the present suit were never heard and finally determined in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997. They maintain that the consent order was entered into between the late Peter Njoroge Karima and Shadrack Ng’ang’a Kamau without the participation of the 1st Plaintiff, notwithstanding that she was a party to those proceedings.
98. According to them, the consent was procured hastily to steal a march on her, no substantive hearing thereafter took place, and no judgment determining the contested issues was delivered or produced in evidence. They further contended that the impugned order resulted from an irregular process that denied the 1st Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard and invited this court to set it aside in the exercise of its supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction. They urged the court to reject the plea of res judicata and consider their claim on its merits.
99. The court has examined the pleadings and order in Kiambu PMCC No. 282 of 1997 alongside the pleadings in the present suit. The former proceedings were instituted by Peter Njoroge Karima against Shadrack Nganga Kamau and Tabitha Gathoni Gathii. In the present case, the Plaintiffs are Tabitha Gathoni together with her other sons whereas the 1st and 2nd Defendants herein represent the estate of the late Peter Njoroge Karima. Although the parties’ names are not entirely identical, the capacities in which they litigate and the interests they represent remain the same. Accordingly, the requirement that the proceedings involve the same parties, or persons claiming under them, litigating under the same title is satisfied for purposes of Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act.
100. Turning next to whether the matters directly and substantially in issue are the same, Mr. Karima sought in the former suit, inter alia, orders protecting his registration, possession and use of two acres out of Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037, restraining dealings intended to defeat his interest and securing release of the purchased portion.
101. He maintained that he had lawfully purchased the two acres, paid the agreed consideration and obtained Land Control Board consent to the transfer. He further alleged that the 2nd Defendant in those proceedings had caused Shadrack’s arrest and compelled him to execute a fresh application for the transfer of the entire property to her. The defence and counterclaim challenged his entitlement on the ground that the property was family land sold without the family’s knowledge or consent.
102. In the present suit, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration invalidating the same sale, cancellation of Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227 and rectification of the register. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227 comprises the very two acres excised from Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 that were contested in the former proceedings. The competing claims to the two acres, including the alleged family interest and the purchaser’s entitlement under the sale, were therefore directly and substantially in issue in the former case.
103. As to whether the matter was finally determined, it is conceded and the court has indeed noted that vide a consent order dated 6th October 1997, it was directed that Mr. Karima be registered as proprietor of two acres out of Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 and be issued with a title deed forthwith, while the remaining four acres would remain registered in Shadrack’s name. The consent order has been signed and sealed by the court.
104. The Plaintiffs contend that the earlier proceedings did not result in a final determination because no substantive hearing took place, the 1st Plaintiff did not testify, and no separately reasoned judgment was delivered or produced. That contention, however, overlooks the legal effect of a consent adopted as an order of the court. In Tongelech v Chamir & 2 others (Civil Appeal 133 of 2019) [2023] KECA 733 (KLR), the Court of Appeal considered an appeal against a decision striking out a subsequent land ownership suit on the ground of res judicata. In the earlier proceedings, the parties had agreed to engage a surveyor to ascertain ownership, acreage and occupation, and the resulting report was adopted as the judgment of the court. At paragraphs 29–31, the court held that ownership had been conclusively determined by a competent court, albeit through the parties’ consent, and could not be reopened through a fresh suit challenging the cancellation of the appellant’s title.
105. Applying that reasoning, the order of 6th October 1997 finally determined Mr. Karima’s entitlement to registration of the disputed two acres. The Plaintiffs cannot avoid that determination merely by asserting that no conventional judgment was delivered. Nor does the subsequent withdrawal of the counterclaim remove the order’s effect. The counterclaim was withdrawn after the consent had been entered which consent had effectively concluded the matter. The requirement of a competent former court is also satisfied. No determination divesting it of jurisdiction, or setting aside its order for want of jurisdiction, has been shown.
106. The Plaintiffs contend that the consent was, in any event, fatally defective and cannot stand. The 1st Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Mr. Karima and Shadrack entered into it hastily, without her participation and with the intention of stealing a march on her. The Plaintiffs also question Shadrack’s capacity to enter into the consent. These objections ought to have been pursued through a properly constituted application in the proceedings in which the consent was recorded or through an appropriate appellate process.
107. Even assuming that this court could entertain such a challenge, no pleaded claim seeking to set aside the consent is before it. The further amended plaint seeks to invalidate the sale, revoke the resulting title and rectify the register, but does not seek to vacate the consent. The express invitation to set it aside arose in submissions, particularly the rejoinder. It is trite that submissions are not pleadings and cannot introduce a claim or prayer omitted from the pleaded case.
108. Reliance on Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution does not cure that omission. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to determine the extent of this court’s supervisory powers over subordinate courts in land disputes. Even assuming that such powers are available in an appropriate case, their invocation in closing submissions does not constitute properly instituted proceedings challenging the consent. Similarly, the principles relied upon in Boro Kabuthia & 10 Others v Michael James Karanja [2025] KECA 624 (KLR) and Attorney General v Small Wonder Limited [2015] KECA 122 (KLR), concerning irregular judgments and the right to be heard, do not dispense with the requirement to place the challenge and the relief sought properly before the court.
109. In the absence of a properly constituted challenge or an order setting aside the consent, that determination remains binding. The requirements of Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act having been satisfied, the Plaintiffs cannot reopen the same dispute through the present suit, and the court is precluded from considering its merits afresh.
2. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought:
110. In the event that I have erred in finding above that the plaintiffs’ case is res judicata, now I consider whether their case was proved? On this limb, the backbone of the plaintiffs’ claim was that Shadrack Kamau was of feeble mind and which Peter Njoroge Kamau took advantage of in acquiring the 2 acres portion now comprised in L.R. No. Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1227
111. The Plaintiffs in demonstrating the mental status of Shadrack produced a doctor’s letter/report dated 26.1.1998 by Dr. P.N. Njagi, chief consultant/Medical Superintendent, Mathari Hospital Nairobi, the letter reads thus;
“RE: MENTAL STATE ASSESSMENT OF SHADRACK NG’ANG’A KAMAU ID NO. 8323816
I have today the 26.1.1998 assessed the above names following a referral from the educational assessment and resource serviced in Kiambu.
He is 33 years old who dropped from school in standard 3 after repeating every class. He has no training and performs simple tasks like feeding cows and tiling land.
He is single because he cannot approach a woman for friendship. Mental state examinations reveal the speech is well developed. There are no symptoms of mental illness. Cognitively however, there is global deficiency on intellectual function.
In conclusion, Shadrack Kamau suffers from mild mental retardation/handicap with automatic obedient his testament ally capacity is impaired.”
112. The Plaintiffs contends that this report affirms that Shadrack Kamau had no mental capacity to enter into the sale agreement dated February, 1997. The 1st Plaintiff was sued alongside Shadrack in the Kiambu case and from the copies of pleadings from that case produced in that case, there is no mention of the incapacity of Shadrack to transact. Before signing the consent, Shadrack had sworn a replying affidavit admitting selling land to the deceased Peter Njoroge.
113. It is noteworthy that the original land Gatamaiyu/Kagwe/1037 was registered in Shadrack Kamau’s name during the distribution of the land originally owned by Mucheke Kariri. The Plaintiffs do not explain why they chose to register their family share in the name of Shadrack Kamau if he was incapable of making decisions. Further, the plaintiffs produced as pexhibit 15, an affidavit sworn by Shadrack Kamau where he denies that he had sold the land. For a person to swear an affidavit, it means he was capable of giving evidence on oath.
114. In his deposition, (Pex. 15) Shadrack confirms he signed the document whether freely or forced. He deposes at paragraph 8 thus:
“That it is now that what has been transpiring in respect of the said parcel of land has been explained to me by my mother’s advocates, Ms Muchangi Nduati & Co when I visited their offices and I wish to state I am shocked that the documents I was induced to sign were intended to sell away the family land which I am registered as proprietor in trust for myself and other family members.”
115. This affidavit (Pexhibit 15) was sworn on 18.12.1997 before the mental assessment on 26.1.1998. Mr Shadrack states that he was explained to and understood what was transpiring, including the court documents in the previous suit vide Kiambu CMCC 282 of 1997. At paragraph 6, he states that Joel Njuguna received Kshs.200,000/= while Ng’ang’a Karemi received Kshs.300,000/=. This person of feeble mind is deposing knowing how much was paid and how the purchase price was shared? Yet, after understanding what was happening, he did nothing to set aside the consent which gave land to the deceased 1st defendant in this case. He also took no steps against Ng’ang’a Karimi and Joel Njuguna.
116. It is my considered opinion from the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs that Shadrack was capable of signing the impugned sale agreement. Shadrack Kamau, not having taken any steps to impeach the sale agreement on the alleged coercion or undue influence, there is no foundation for the Plaintiffs' suit to stand on. In any event if the said Shadrack’s mental faculties were not okay as alleged, then the plaintiffs ought to have brought this suit as next friend of Shadrack Kamau and not in their capacities as beneficiaries of the suit land. I find they do not have a direct claim against Peter Njoroge – deceased before establishing the trust.
117. Additionally, the plaintiffs pleaded particulars of fraud against the 1st and 2nd Defendants, inter alia, that he approached Shadrack Kamau to sell him land and gave Shadrack a whopping Kshs.520,000/-, which Shadrack could not handle. Again, exhibit 15 explains who approached the deceased Defendant for the offer to sell. Shadrack Kamau confirm the 1st Defendant paid out Kshs.500,000/- which he alleges was received by Njuguna and Ng’ang’a. No evidence was led to prove the forgeries alleged under paragraph 8(b) and 9 of the re-amended plaint.
118. According to the plaintiffs, the sale was fraudulent because after the transaction, the 1st Plaintiff saw that Shadrack continued doing manual work. Therefore, she discussed the alleged sale with Shadrack, who responded that Njuguna Karemi and Joseph Ng’ang’a Karemi had already sold the land. As already stated, Shadrack and the Plaintiffs do not deny the signature on the sale agreement. They alleged Shadrack was coerced to sign but went no further to state who coerced Shadrack. If the coercion came from Shadrack’s known relatives, Njuguna Karemi and Joseph Ng’ang’a Karemi, the Plaintiffs chose not to join them in these proceedings.
119. It is trite law that allegations of fraud must be strictly proved, but here, the Plaintiffs proved no fraud against Peter Njoroge Karima-deceased.
120. Consequently, I hold that the Plaintiffs’ suit is res judicata and lacking in merit. I dismiss it with costs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants.
Dated, signed and delivered at KISII this 15th day of October, 2026.
A. OMOLLO
JUDGE