REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIROBI
MILIMANI LAW COURTS
ELC (ELCLC) CASE NO. E195 OF 2026
AMRITA SONI CHODA…………………………PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT
VERSUS
SIUMA AUCTIONEERS………...……1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
UNITED CREDIT LIMITED ………….2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The Plaintiff filed the Notice of Motion dated 4th May 2026 brought under sections 3A, 75, 78 and 79G of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Articles 50(2) and 159 of the Constitution seeking the following orders:
I. Spent.
II. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to stay the auction by the 1" Respondent of NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 which has been advertised for auction on 13th May 2026 pending the first mention of the matter before the Court.
III. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to stay the auction by the 1" Respondent of NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 which has been advertised for auction on 13th May 2026 pending the hearing and determination of this application.
IV. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to declare the auction by the 1" Respondent of NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 be declared as illegal and void for violation of the Land Act, Laws of Kenya.
V. THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to issue any orders it deems fit.
VI. THAT each party bears their own costs
2. The application is premised on the grounds stated on its face and supported by the affidavit of the Plaintiff/Applicant sworn on 4th May 2026. The Applicant contends that she is a joint proprietor of the suit property L.R. NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 with her husband and that it is her matrimonial and family home where she resides with her children and elderly parents. She states that the property was purchased and registered in their names in 2013.
3. The Applicant states that she became aware of the intended auction of the suit property for a debt owed to the 2nd Respondent through a newspaper advertisement dated 4th May 2026, advertising the property for sale on 13th May 2026.
4. She contends that she had not been served with the statutory notices under sections 90 and 96 of the Land Act. She invokes the right to a fair hearing and contends that she was deprived of an opportunity to address the alleged indebtedness and protect her proprietary interest. She questions the amount claimed and the manner in which interest and other charges were accumulated.
5. She apprehends that the Respondents are acting in collusion to dispossess her of her home which she values at more than Kshs.100 million and maintains that the intended sale would cause substantial hardship. She consequently asks the Court to restrain the intended sale and to declare the auction illegal and void.
6. She deposes that immediately after she became aware of the intended auction, she attempted to engage the but that her efforts were unsuccessful. She further alleges that the 1st Defendant informed her that high-profile individuals wanted the family home and that there was no time to engage her.
7. She further deposes that she is unemployed and the sole caregiver of her family and that the loss of the property would cause her and her children substantial hardship.
8. The Applicant filed a separate application dated 12th May 2026 seeking rectification of the property reference and consequential amendment of the pleadings. The application was considered and an order was issued on 13th May 2026 and the property reference was rectified to NAIROBI/BLOCK/188/241 and the rectification also applied to the pleadings. Accordingly, the suit property is NAIROBI/BLOCK/188/241.
Replying Affidavit
9. The Application is opposed by the 2nd Defendant through the Replying Affidavit of Kunal Kamlesh Bid, a Director of United Credit Limited, sworn on 18th June 2026. The deponent states that by a Letter of Offer dated 17th October 2023, the 2nd Defendant advanced a facility of Kshs.44,302,559 to the Applicant and her husband, Ravi Soni. The facility was to be secured by a first legal charge over the property originally identified as L.R. No. 27/348 and subsequently appearing in the title documentation as the charged property, together with personal guarantees.
10. The Respondent states that the facility was to be repaid within six months. It states that Kshs.42,643,175 was paid directly to Diamond Trust Bank in respect of a facility associated with ATV Africa Limited and that Kshs.1,092,705 was applied to an earlier loan with United Credit Limited.
11. The 2nd Defendant states that the Applicant and her husband furnished the original conveyance/title, the executed charge and personal guarantees. The 2nd Defendant states that the facility was not repaid as agreed and that arrears had risen to Kshs.75,156,694.26 as at 26th October 2024.
12. It is the 2nd Defendant’s case that a statutory notice under section 90 of the Land Act was issued on 25th August 2025 and that a further notice under section 96(2) was issued on 9th December 2025. The deponent sated that following continued default, Siuma Auctioneers issued an auctioneer’s 45-day redemption notice and notification of sale dated 17th February 2026.
13. The 2nd Defendant further states that attempts were made to facilitate a private treaty sale, but no willing purchaser was obtained, and that the auctioneer thereafter advertised the property for public auction, initially for 13th May 2026 and subsequently through a corrected and rescheduled advertisement.
14. The 2nd Defendant disputes the Applicant’s assertion that she was unaware of the charge or the debt and maintains that she personally executed the relevant security documentation. The 2nd Defendant contends that the statutory notices were properly issued and posted to both chargors and that the Application is intended to frustrate recovery of a debt secured by the suit property.
The Applicant’s Written Submissions
15. In written submissions dated 21st September 2026, counsel submits that the Applicant, as a joint proprietor and occupier of the family home, was entitled to the statutory notices required before the exercise of the power of sale. The Applicant challenges the service of the statutory and auctioneer’s notices. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the redemption notice and notice of auction were served upon the Applicant personally, by email, by hand or acknowledged by her. Counsel maintains that the notices were served upon the Applicant’s husband and not upon her.
16. The Applicant relies on sections 90 and 96 of the Land Act and contends that compliance with the statutory notice regime is mandatory before a chargee can proceed to sell charged land.
17. The Applicant relies on Nyangilo Ochieng & Another v Fanuel Ochieng & 2 Others [1996] KECA 205 (KLR) for the proposition that, once a chargor disputes receipt of a statutory notice, the chargee bears the burden of demonstrating that the notice was actually sent.
18. The Applicant also questions the amount demanded. Counsel points to the original facility of approximately Kshs.44.3 million and the subsequent figures appearing in the Respondent’s documents, including Kshs.75,156,694.26 and Kshs.126,920,248.01. It is submitted that the increase raises a serious issue concerning interest, default charges and the in-duplum rule.
19. The Applicant further contends that the property is a family home and that its sale would occasion irreparable loss. The Applicant invokes Order 40 Rule 1 and the principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358.
The 2nd Defendant's Written Submissions
20. In submissions dated 21st September 2026, Counsel confirmed the factual basis of the application as summarized above and submits that the Applicant has not established a prima facie case under the principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) and Nguruman Ltd v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR.
21. The 2nd Defendant submits that the statutory notices were served and that the applicant was aware of the transactions herein as charge documents bear her signature, including the Letter of Offer, the charge documentation, spousal consent and the guarantee.
22. On the issue of quantum, the 2nd Defendant submits that the Applicant has not demonstrated that the amount claimed is unlawful in a manner sufficient to establish a prima facie case. It further submits that a dispute on the amount owing does not, without more, extinguish the chargee’s right to realize the security.
23. The 2nd Defendant relies on the principles concerning interlocutory injunctions and asks that the Application be dismissed with costs and the interim orders discharged.
Analysis And Determination
24. Before dealing with the substantive application, the Court has noted that the provisions of the law the application herein are anchored do not seem to be in tandem with the prayers sought or the tenor of the dispute before the Court. The application is brought under 3A, 34, 75, 78 and 79G of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 42 Rule 6 and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Articles 50(2) and 159 of the Constitution. In the Court’s view the above provisions do not support an application for an inter locutory injunction as appears on the body of the application.
25. To make matters worse, the applicant prayer ii and iii seeks orders of stay of the auction by the 1" Respondent of NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 which has been advertised for auction on 13th May 2026 pending the first mention of the matter before the Court. And stay the auction by the 1" Respondent of NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241 which has been advertised for auction on 13th May 2026 pending the hearing and determination of this application.
26. Notwithstanding the above procedural defects, the court has considered the provisions of Order 51 Rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules as it addresses applications that fail to state, or incorrectly state, the legal provisions under which they are brought and provides that an application should not be defeated on a technicality or for want of form where the defect does not affect its substance. The Court will thus consider and determine the substantive dispute as canvassed by the parties being an application for injunction.
27. Having considered the Application, the grounds, the Supporting Affidavit, the Replying Affidavit and the written submissions, the Court considers that the determination is whether the prayers sought in the Notice of Motion date 4th May 2026 ought to be allowed:
28. The jurisdiction of this Court to grant temporary injunctions is donated by Section 63(c) of the Civil Procedure Act, read with Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. which empower the Court to preserve property that is in danger of being wasted, damaged, alienated or wrongfully dealt with pending determination of a suit and in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated.
29. The Court also exercises jurisdiction under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act to grant appropriate reliefs necessary for the preservation of property pending determination of disputes falling within its jurisdiction.
30. The principles governing a temporary injunction are settled. In Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, the Court stated:
“First an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. Thirdly, if the court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience.”
31. The first limb is therefore not satisfied merely by raising an arguable complaint. In Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated that:
“A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case. It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.”
32. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Ltd v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR emphasized that the three requirements are separate, distinct and sequential. The first hurdle is therefore decisive. Where a prima facie case is not established, the Court should not proceed to determine the second and third limbs.
33. It is also a principle of law that in determining an interlocutory application for injunction, the Court must avoid turning the application into a trial of the suit. The inquiry is directed at the material placed before the Court and whether it discloses an apparently infringed right calling for protection. The Court should not make final findings on disputed matters that properly belong to the trial.
34. In the present case, the Court must answer the question of whether a prima facie case with a probability of success has been established to warrant an interlocutory injunction restraining the exercise of the statutory power of sale over NAIROBI/BLOCK/118/241.
35. The Applicant’s principal complaint is that she was not served with the notices required before the chargee could exercise the power of sale. The complaint is material because compliance with the statutory notice regime is a condition precedent to a lawful exercise of the statutory power of sale.
36. Section 90(1) of the Land Act provides: “If a chargor is in default of any obligation, fails to pay interest or any other periodic payment or any part thereof due under any charge or in the performance or observation of any covenant, express or implied, in any charge, and continues to be in default for one month, the chargee may serve on the chargor a notice, in writing, to pay the money owing or to perform and observe the agreement as the case may be.”
37. Section 96(2) further provides: “Before exercising the power to sell the charged land, the chargee shall serve on the chargor a notice to sell in the prescribed form and shall not proceed to complete any contract for the sale of the charged land until at least forty days have elapsed from the date of the service of that notice to sell.”
38. The burden of demonstrating compliance with statutory notice requirements initially rests upon the chargee. In Nyangilo Ochieng & Another v Fanuel Ochieng & 2 Others [1996] KECA 205 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that once the chargor alleges non-receipt, it is for the chargee to prove that the statutory notice was in fact sent. The principle is equally reflected in later decisions concerning proof of service of statutory notices.
39. The question is therefore whether the 2nd Defendant has placed sufficient evidence before this Court to demonstrate, at the interlocutory stage, that the statutory notices were sent to the Applicant.
40. On Section 90, the 2nd Defendant annexed the statutory notice dated 25th August 2025 accompanied by a postal receipt dated 27th August 2025. The receipt identifies both Ravi Kishor Soni and Amrita Soni Choda and gives P.O. Box 382-00606. The same postal address appears in other documents exhibited by the 2nd Defendant, including the Letter of Offer and the security documents. There is therefore a documentary basis for the 2nd Defendant’s assertion that the notice was addressed to the Applicant at the address used by the parties in the transaction.
41. The Applicant does not state that P.O. Box 382-00606 was not her address, nor does it identify a different address to which the statutory notice ought to have been sent. Her evidence is that she was not served with notices. That assertion has to be considered against the Respondent’s documentary proof of posting.
42. The Court is conscious that proof of posting is not synonymous with proof of actual physical receipt. The statutory scheme and the parties’ contractual arrangements concerning service, however, make the evidence of proper addressing and posting material to the interlocutory inquiry. The charge itself contains a provision governing service by registered post to the chargors’ address and deeming service after the stipulated period.
43. In the Court’s view, the Applicant has not placed before the Court evidence showing that the postal address was invalid, that the notice was returned undelivered, or that she had notified the 2nd Defendant of a change of address before the notices were posted.
44. On section 96 notice the 2nd Defendant annexed the notice dated 9th December 2025 issued under section 96(2). The postal receipt dated 10th December 2025 again identifies Ravi Kishor Soni and Amrita Soni Choda at P.O. Box 382-00606.The evidence therefore differs materially from a situation in which the chargee merely asserts that notice was sent without producing any documentary proof. Here, the 2nd Defendant has produced the notices and the postal receipts identifying the Applicant as an addressee.
45.The Applicant’s complaint that the auctioneer’s notice was served upon her husband rather than upon her does not answer the separate evidence concerning the earlier statutory notices issued by the chargee. The statutory notices are the notices upon which the power of sale depends.
46. The auctioneer’s Notification of Sale does raise a separate evidential point. The annexed notice records personal service at Ridgeways upon Ravi Soni and contains a notation that he declined to sign. It does not contain an equivalent endorsement of personal service upon the Applicant. The Notification of Sale also identifies Ravi Soni as debtor, although the redemption notice names both chargors.
47. That issue may be relevant to the regularity of the auctioneer’s process. It does not, however, on the evidence before the Court, displace the documentary proof that the chargee’s statutory notices under sections 90 and 96 were addressed and posted to both chargors.
48. The Court therefore finds, for purposes of the interlocutory application, that the 2nd Defendant has produced sufficient documentary evidence of posting of the statutory notices to the Applicant and that the Applicant has not displaced that evidence. The Applicant has consequently not established, on the material before the Court, a prima facie case founded on failure by the 2nd Defendant to serve the statutory notices under sections 90 and 96 of the Land Act.
49. The Applicant’s case is not confined to service. The material before the Court also requires consideration of whether she has demonstrated a prima facie case that the charge itself was created without her knowledge or participation.
50. The 2nd Defendant produced documentary evidence in the form of the Letter of Offer addressed to both Ravi Soni and Amrita Soni. The acceptance portion bears the name and signature of Amrita Soni. The charge documentation identifies Amrita Soni Choda as one of the chargors. The title and register identify her as a joint proprietor and record the charge in favour of United Credit Limited.
51. The spousal consent documentation is also in the Applicant’s name. It records that she and Ravi Soni were husband and wife, that they intended to create the charge, that they understood the nature and effect of the security and that consent was given without compulsion, threat or undue influence. The deed of guarantee and indemnity also bears the Applicant’s name and signature.
52. The Court is not at this stage making a final finding on the validity of each security document or the ultimate enforceability of every contractual term. The question is whether the Applicant’s assertion that the property was being charged without her knowledge is supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.
53. On that question, the documentary record substantially contradicts the assertion of ignorance. The Applicant has not, in the affidavit material before the Court, denied signing the Letter of Offer, the spousal consent, the charge documentation or the guarantee. She has not alleged that the signatures are forged. Nor has she placed before the Court an affidavit or other evidence from the advocate or other person involved in the execution process disputing the execution.
54. The Court therefore finds that the Applicant has not established a prima facie case that the charge was created without her participation or that the Respondents acquired the right to enforce the security through a transaction of which she was wholly unaware.
55. The Applicant alleges that the Respondents are colluding to dispossess her of her matrimonial home. If fraud or collusion are proved, they could affect the legality of the transaction and the exercise of the statutory power of sale. However, at the interlocutory stage, the Court must examine the evidence placed before it. The Applicant’s evidence concerning alleged collusion consists principally of her statement that the 1st Defendant allegedly told her that high-profile individuals wanted the property and that there was no time to engage her. No particulars are supplied identifying the alleged individuals, the nature of the alleged arrangement, when the arrangement was made, or how the 2nd Defendant participated in it.
56. The 2nd Defendant’s evidence, on the other hand, is that the property was charged to secure a facility, the facility fell into default, statutory notices were issued, and the auctioneer was thereafter instructed. That account is supported by the documentary record comprising the Letter of Offer, charge, title, guarantees, statutory notices, postal receipts and auction documents.
57. The Court is not persuaded that the evidence of alleged collusion rises above suspicion or assertion. The Applicant has not placed before the Court material from which a properly directed tribunal would, at this stage, conclude that there was a fraudulent scheme to dispossess her outside the charge and the statutory realization process.
58. The Court therefore finds that no prima facie case of fraud or collusion has been established on the material presently before it.
59. The Applicant also challenges the amount claimed by the 2nd Defendant. This issue requires careful treatment because the figures appearing in the record are substantial and materially different from the original facility.
60.The Applicant invokes the in-duplum rule and contends that the amount demanded is unlawful. The Court has considered the Court of Appeal decision in Travel House Limited & Another v Chase Bank (Civil Appeal 143 of 2018) [2024] KECA 602 (KLR), where the Court considered a challenge concerning interest and the in-duplum rule in the context of an interlocutory injunction. The Court of Appeal cautioned against making final determinations on matters that belong to the trial and upheld the principle that, where the first Giella limb is not established, the application is not rescued by proceeding further.
61.The present record does disclose an arguable question concerning the computation of the debt. The Court is of the view that an arguable dispute as to quantum is not, by itself, sufficient to establish the prima facie case required for an injunction where the existence of the charge, the Applicant’s execution of the security documents, the default and the documentary evidence of the statutory notices have not been displaced.
62. Moreover, the Applicant’s challenge to the amount does not identify an admitted or undisputed figure that she says is properly due, nor does the affidavit evidence provide an alternative account supported by payment records or an expert reconciliation. The Court therefore cannot, at this stage, conclude that the amount demanded is so demonstrably unlawful that the 2nd Defendant has lost the right to enforce the security altogether.
63.The Court consequently treats the issue of quantum and interest as a matter properly capable of investigation at the hearing of the suit, but not as sufficient, on the present evidence, to establish the first Giella limb.
64. The Applicant emphasizes that the suit property is her matrimonial and family home and that children and elderly parents reside there. The Court acknowledges the importance of the property to the Applicant and her family. However, the fact that property is a matrimonial home does not, without more, extinguish a charge validly created over the property. The evidence before the Court includes the Applicant’s own consent documentation and her participation in the security transaction. The legal question at this stage is not whether the Court considers the sale desirable or undesirable, but whether the statutory and contractual right of realization has been shown, prima facie, to have been unlawfully invoked.
65.Taking the evidence as a whole, the Applicant has demonstrated that she is a joint proprietor of the suit property and that she faces an intended sale of that property. She has also raised questions concerning the amount claimed and the form and service of some auctioneer’s documents.
66.Those matters, however, must be distinguished from proof of a prima facie infringement of a right sufficient to restrain the statutory power of sale. In the Court’s view, the Applicant has not displaced the documentary evidence produced by the 1st Defendant by denying execution, demonstrating that the postal address was invalid, showing that the statutory notices were returned undelivered, or otherwise demonstrating that the statutory preconditions to the exercise of the power of sale had not been met.
67.The Court therefore finds that, although the Applicant has raised questions concerning the computation of the indebtedness and the regularity of some auctioneer’s steps, she has not established a prima facie case with a probability of success sufficient to warrant an interlocutory injunction restraining the 2nd Defendant’s statutory power of sale.
68. The first Giella limb having failed, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider the second limb concerning irreparable injury or the third limb concerning the balance of convenience. The Court deliberately refrains from making final findings on the disputed accounting issues, the ultimate enforceability of every contractual term, or any substantive issue reserved for trial.
69.The Applicant separately seeks an order declaring the auction illegal and void for violation of the Land Act. A declaration that the auction is illegal and void is substantive in character. It calls upon the Court to pronounce finally upon the legality of the realization process. The Court must therefore be cautious where the same substantive relief is also sought in the Plaint, because granting it at the interlocutory stage may effectively determine an issue reserved for trial.
70.In Andrew Karanja Ndaba & Another v Pasadena Systems Limited [2021] KEELC 1703 (KLR), the Environment and Land Court cautioned against granting final or substantive relief through an interlocutory application where the effect would be to determine or conclude the main suit before trial.
71. At this stage, the legality of the intended realization and the Applicant’s substantive rights under the charge remain matters in dispute in the main proceedings. Such a declaration would go beyond preserving the subject matter; it would substantially determine the legal status of the sale process.
72.Prayer (d) is accordingly declined at this stage.
73. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Applicant has not established a prima facie case with a probability of success and therefore issues the following orders:
1) The Notice of Motion dated 4th May 2026 is dismissed.
2) The interim/status quo orders made on 12th May 2026 and subsequently extended on 6th July 2026 are hereby discharged upon delivery of this ruling.
3) Costs of the Application shall be borne by the Plaintiff/Applicant.
Delivered, dated and signed via Microsoft Teams this 15th day of October 2026.
HON. L. G. KIMANI
JUDGE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT
The Ruling read in the presence of-
Manani for the plaintiff/Applicant.
Ochwo for the Defendant/Respondent.