Land law

Omustani v Olenja [2026] KEELC 6901 (KLR)

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Court
Environment and Land Court at Nairobi
Case number
Environment and Land Appeal E009 of 2024
Judgment date
16 October 2026
Judge(s)
TW Murigi

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Background

By a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26th January 2024, the Appellant appealed against the ruling of Hon. Cyprian Mugambi, Chairperson of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal in BPRT Case No. E142 of 2023 delivered on 19th December 2023 and set out eight grounds of appeal.

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Full judgment

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

ELCLA E009 OF 2024

DR. MARY OMUSTANI .......................................... APPELANT/LANDLADY

=VERSUS=

SHARON OLENJA ............................................... RESPONDENT/ TENANT

JUDGEMENT

1. By a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26th January 2024, the Appellant appealed against the ruling of Hon. Cyprian Mugambi, Chairperson of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal in BPRT Case No. E142 of 2023 delivered on 19th December 2023 and set out eight grounds of appeal.

BACKGROUND

2. The Appellant/ Landlord filed a Notice of Motion dated 22nd February 2023 seeking the following orders:

a) Spent.

b) THAT the orders granted on 9th February 2023 be set aside pending hearing of this application inter-parties.

c) THAT this Honourable Tribunal be pleased to strike out the Tenant/Respondent’s suit for want of jurisdiction.

d) THAT in consequence to prayer 2 above, the Honourable Tribunal be pleased to discharge, vary or rescind and or set aside the Order of Injunction issued before Honourable Andrew Muma,(Vice Chairman) on the 9th February 2023.

e) THAT the Respondent be ordered to compensate the Applicant for misrepresentation of facts.

f) THAT the costs be provided for by the Tenant.

3. The Appellant averred that she owned Flat No. A 929, Madaraka Infill Section "E" Housing Scheme, a residential property whose use had never been changed to commercial purposes. She stated that, around March 2020, she leased the premises to Zipporah Okello, who subsequently vacated without notice but continued paying rent through the Respondent, whom she identified as her cousin. She contended that the Respondent was a stranger to her, that no landlord–tenant relationship existed between them, and that the Respondent was unlawfully occupying the premises. She further asserted that the Respondent held no licence or permit to conduct business on the premises and was not tax compliant. On that basis, she argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

4. The Respondent filed a replying affidavit, sworn on 13th March 2023, in opposition to the application. The Respondent averred that the Appellant provided no evidence that the premises were residential and that, at all material times, the Appellant knew they were used for business purposes. The Respondent further stated that the Appellant failed to show that any rent had been received from Zipporah Okello and that she had consistently paid rent.

5. The Respondent asserted that the premises had been let to her and Zipporah Okello, who operated a hostel for Strathmore University students as business partners. She contended that, following a falling-out between them, Zipporah Okello had used the caretaker and the Appellant to carry out an unlawful eviction. She further contended that the application had been brought in bad faith.

6. In its ruling delivered on 13/07/2023, the Tribunal held that an unwritten controlled tenancy existed between the parties. It found that the Respondent's M-Pesa statement showed payments to the Appellant, which she did not deny receiving as rent. The Appellant produced no evidence that Zipporah Okello paid rent, or that the Respondent's payments were made on her behalf. Exhibit "OS3" identified Zipshan Girls Hostel, Ustawi Court Block A79 House 929, as the same premises.

7. Applying the principle that he who alleges must prove, the Tribunal held that the Appellant failed to prove that the premises were residential. Relying on exhibit "OS3", a list of Strathmore University hostels, it found that a whole hostel could not have been rented for residential purposes and was a business unit engaged in accommodation for profit. It held that the premises were business premises. The Tribunal further held that it had jurisdiction because the tenancy was controlled and the premises were business premises. The Tribunal dismissed the application dated 22nd February 2023 with costs to the Respondent.

8. Aggrieved by the ruling, the Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 19th December 2023 on the following grounds:

a. The learned chairperson erred in law and fact when he failed either to appreciate the elements of the claim before him and or/to apply the evidence before him against the said claim before arriving at the conclusion that the Tenant had proved the claim as against the Appellant/ Landlady, Respondent.

b. The learned trial chairperson misdirected himself when he appraised the case and evidence before him by not appreciating sufficiency or at all the contradictions raised by the Respondent's/Tenant's case.

c. The learned chairperson erred when he failed to make findings of fact that there was no tenant landlord relationship in the case before him and thereafter arrived at a wrong decision.

d. The learned chairperson erred in Law and in fact when he failed to appreciate the evidence that the impugned house was a domestic house and not a business house.

e. The learned chairperson misdirected the fact and Law to bestow jurisdiction on himself where there was none by making a finding that the house was a business premises whereas it was a dispute under the civil court.

f. The learned chairperson erred in fact and Law in failing to appreciate that conversion of residential premises for business purpose was by law for change of use and not by presumptions.

g. The learned chair erred in Law and in fact by failing to appreciate that the Notice to vacate by the Landlady was sufficient requisite knowledge to the tenant, there being no tenancy agreement between the Appellant and the Respondent.

h. The learned chair erred in law and fact when he bestowed a tenancy contract on the Respondent/Tenant, an act that was against the law.

9. The Appellant seeks to have the BPRT’s ruling quashed.

ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

10. Having considered the Appeal and the entire record, the following issues arise for determination:

a. Whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties.

b. Whether the tenancy is a controlled tenancy

c. Whether the Business Premises Rent Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.

11. This being a first Appeal, this Court must evaluate, assess and analyse the evidence on record and reach its own conclusions. The principles that guide a first Appellate Court were set out by the Court of Appeal in Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Company and Others [1968] 1 EA 123 as follows:

“An appeal to this court from a trial court by the High Court is by way of a retrial, and the principles upon which this court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put, they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it, and draw its own conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge finding of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.”

12. Similarly, in Ephantus Mwangi & Another v Duncan Mwangi [1982-1988] 1 KAR 278, the Court of Appeal held that:

“A member of an appellate court is not bound to accept the learned Judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that (a) he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities material to an estimate of the evidence or (b) if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.”

WHETHER A LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES

13. The Appellant asserts that the Tribunal erred in finding that a tenancy agreement existed between her and the Respondent. It is not in dispute that a tenancy existed between the Appellant and Zipporah Okello. The Appellant produced a tenancy agreement dated 1st February 2021 for the suit premises, described as Madaraka Estate Infills House No. 929, before the Tribunal. The agreement provided for a monthly rent of Kshs. 55,000/=.

14. The Appellant averred that the Respondent lived with Zipporah Okello, the bona fide tenant, and that rent was occasionally paid through the Respondent.

15. She stated that Zipporah Okello vacated the premises without notice and denied any tenancy relationship with the Respondent, as there was no lease agreement. The Respondent averred that she had always been a tenant alongside Zipporah Okello and that they operated a hostel on the premises.

16. The following facts are not in dispute: the Respondent paid rent to the Appellant; the Appellant received and retained those payments; after Zipporah Okello left the premises, the Respondent remained in occupation, and the Appellant continued to accept rent from her.

17. The Appellant's explanation is that those payments were made on behalf of Zipporah Okello. However, she did not demonstrate that the Respondent made the payments as Zipporah Okello's agent. This explanation is difficult to reconcile with her averment that Zipporah Okello had vacated the premises without notice.

18. It is trite that a tenancy does not depend on a written instrument. Where an owner permits a person to occupy land exclusively and accepts rent from that person, the law deems a periodic tenancy to exist. In the matter at hand, the Appellant permitted the Respondent to occupy the premises exclusively and accepted rent from her.

19. Section 57(2) of the Land Act provides that:

If the owner of land permits the exclusive occupation of the land or any part of it by any person at a rent but without any agreement in writing, that occupation shall be deemed to constitute a periodic tenancy.

20. A periodic tenancy therefore arose between them by operation of Section 57(2) of the Land Act. The absence of a written lease, relied on in grounds (g) and (h), does not negate that relationship.

21. This Court is therefore satisfied that a landlord and tenant relationship existed between the Appellant and the Respondent.

WHETHER THE TENANCY IS A CONTROLLED TENANCY

22. Section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act defines a controlled tenancy as:

“a tenancy of a shop, hotel or catering establishment—

(a) which has not been reduced into writing; or

(b) which has been reduced into writing and which—

i) is for a period not exceeding five years; or

ii) contains provision for termination, otherwise than for breach of covenant, within five years from the commencement thereof; or

iii) relates to premises of a class specified under subsection (2) of this section”

23. The definition comprises two elements. The first relates to the nature of the premises, which must be a shop, a hotel or a catering establishment. The second concerns the form or duration of the tenancy. The parties did not reduce the tenancy to writing, so the second element is satisfied under paragraph (a). The Court is called upon to determine whether the premises fall within the first element.

24. A hotel is defined under Section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act as any premises where accommodation, or accommodation and meals, are supplied or available for supply to five or more adult persons in exchange for money or other valuable consideration.

25. The Appellant contends that the premises were residential. She relied on Clauses 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 of the tenancy agreement with Zipporah Okello, which permitted only residential use and prohibited subletting to a third party. This court has found that the tenancy between the Appellant and the Respondent was a periodic tenancy arising from their conduct. The Respondent was not a party to the agreement with Zipporah Okello, so its terms do not bind the Appellant. The Appellant further contended that any business conducted on the premises was unlawful, as the Respondent held no business licence and was not tax compliant.

26. The Respondent averred that the Appellant was at all material times aware that the premises were used for business and that they were listed as Zipshan Girls Hostel. Exhibit "OS3", a list of Strathmore University hostels, identifies Zipshan Girls Hostel at Ustawi Court Block A79 House 929, which is the suit premises. The Appellant did not challenge that exhibit. Her complaint that the Respondent held no licence or permit to conduct business there acknowledges that business was conducted on the premises.

27. In determining whether premises fall within the Act, the Court must look beyond the label of the tenancy to the nature of the activities carried out on the premises. This approach was adopted in Colts Construction Limited & Another v Njuguna [2023] eKLR where the Court held that:

“I do not agree with the Respondent that when interpreting the question of jurisdiction, one relies on the term-controlled tenancy only. The Court must look into the controlled tenancy and the nature of the activities being carried out in the premises”

28. Similarly, in Total Kenya Limited v Drumcon Kenya Limited [2022] eKLR, the Court held that:

“Premises used for manufacturing goods do not fall within the ambit of premises falling under Cap 301. As I had earlier mentioned, the premises herein were let out for purposes of drum manufacturing. This is an industrial purpose property. It is neither a shop, hotel, nor a catering establishment.”

29. A hostel offering accommodation to university students in exchange for payment is a premises where accommodation is supplied, or is available for supply, for money, and may be regarded as a form of hotel.

30. The Appellant argued that residential premises can become business premises only through a change of user. However, the definition of a hotel in Section 2 turns on the use to which the premises are put, not on their approved planning user. Whether the premises had planning approval for that use, and whether the Respondent held a business licence or was tax compliant, are regulatory questions for the relevant authorities. The Appellant cited no provision of Cap 301 that makes approved user, licensing or tax compliance a precondition to a controlled tenancy, and this Court has found none.

31. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the premises are a hotel within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. Since the tenancy was not reduced to writing, it falls within the definition of a controlled tenancy.

WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE DISPUTE

32. It is trite that jurisdiction is everything, and without it, the court cannot proceed. In Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lillian S’ vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) eKLR, the Court held that:

“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings...”

33. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others [2012] eKLR held that:

“A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.”

34. Section 12(4) of the Act empowers the Tribunal to investigate any complaint relating to a controlled tenancy. Having found that the tenancy between the parties is a controlled tenancy, this Court finds that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the Respondent's complaint.

35. The upshot of the foregoing is that the appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT SIGNED, DATED, AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.

…………………………………….

HON. T. MURIGI

JUDGE

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

In the absence of the parties

Vena – Court assistant

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